Vagaries of Desire. A Collection of Philosophical Essays by Airaksinen, Timo
<UN>
Vagaries of Desire
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
<UN>
Value Inquiry Book Series
Founding Editor
Robert Ginsberg
Executive Editor
Leonidas Donskis†
Managing Editor
J.D. Mininger
volume 340
Philosophy, Literature,  
and Politics
Executive Editor
J.D. Mininger (lcc International University)
The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/vibs and brill.com/plp
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
<UN>
Vagaries of Desire
A Collection of Philosophical Essays
By
Timo Airaksinen
leiden | boston
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
<UN>
Cover illustration: photograph by Susan Airaksinen
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Airaksinen, Timo, 1947- author.  
Title: Vagaries of desire : a collection of philosophical essays / Timo  
Airaksinen.  
Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill-Rodopi, 2019. | Series: Value inquiry  
book series, 0929-8436 ; volume 340. Philosophy, literature, and  
politics | Includes index. | Summary: “Vagaries of Desire is a major  
collection of new essays by Timo Airaksinen on the philosophy of desire.  
The first part develops a novel account of the philosophical theory of  
desire, including Girard. The second part discusses Kafka’s main works,  
namely The Castle, The Trial, and Amerika, and Thomas Hobbes and the  
problems of intentionality. The text develops such linguistic tropes as  
metaphor and metonymy in connection with topics like death and then  
applies them to Kafka’s texts. The third part makes an effort to  
understand the mysteries of sadism and masochism in philosophical and  
rhetorical terms. The last article criticizes Thomas Nagel’s influential  
account of sexual perversion and develops a viable alternative”--  
Provided by publisher. 
Identifiers: LCCN 2019025587 (print) | LCCN 2019025588 (ebook) | ISBN  
9789004410299 (hardback) | ISBN 9789004410305 (ebook) 
Subjects: LCSH: Desire (Philosophy) 
Classification: LCC B105.D44 A37 2019 (print) | LCC B105.D44  (ebook) |  
DDC 128/.4--dc23 
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019025587
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019025588
Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.
ISSN 0929-8436
ISBN 978-90-04-41029-9 (hardback)
ISBN 978-90-04-41030-5 (e-book)
This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.
Copyright 2019 by the Authors. Published by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.  
Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill 
Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink 
Verlag.  
Koninklijke Brill NV reserves the right to protect the publication against unauthorized use and to 
authorize dissemination by means of offprints, legitimate photocopies, microform editions, reprints, 
translations, and secondary information sources, such as abstracting and indexing services including 
databases. Requests for commercial re-use, use of parts of the publication, and/or translations must 
be addressed to Koninklijke Brill NV. 
This title is published in Open Access with the support of the University of Helsinki Library.
 
This is an open access title distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
are credited. Further information and the complete license text can be found at 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
 
The terms of the CC license apply only to the original material. The use of material from other
license, which permits any non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided no alterations are made and the original author(s) and source 
sources (indicated by a reference) such as diagrams, illustrations, photos and text samples may
require further permission from the respective copyright holder
.
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
<UN>
Contents
Preface  IX
Part 1
Analytical Issues
1 Introduction: Depicting Desire  3
 Definitions  3
 Two Types of Desire  13
 Wishful Thinking and Wish-Fulfilment  21
 De Re and De Dicto: a Paradox  24
2 Beliefs and Desires  29
 From Wollheim’s Challenge to Human Needs  29
 Modality: Beliefs as Constraints  31
 Hermeneutical Considerations  37
 Moral Beliefs  42
 The Demise of Directionality  45
3 Push and Pull Theories of Desire  47
 Background Checks  47
 Russell on Desire  53
 Desirability Demystified  61
 Push Theory Returns  64
4 Our Anxious Desires  70
 Preliminaries  70
 Sources of Frustration and Anxiety  72
 Immodest Desires  76
 Zero Desires  81
 Desire as a Metonym  84
5 René Girard and Mimetic Desire  89
 Girard on Desire  89
 Model, Not Desirability  93
 Scripted Desires  98
 Desires, Not My Own  103
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
vi Contents
<UN>
Part 2
Desire in Context: Philosophy and Literature
6 Death, Desire, and the Generation of Metaphor  111
 Prelude: Death and Dress  111
 Meaning of Death  114
 Meaning of Desire  118
 Generating Metaphors  125
7 Kafka: Tropes of Desire  128
 Introduction: Two Persons, Two Tasks, Two Desires  128
 Tropological Considerations: The Castle  130
 Tropological Considerations: The Trial  135
8 Lost in Kafka’s America  144
 Preliminaries, or False Starts  144
 Empty Metaphors  150
 Irony: from Here to Eternity  158
9 Thomas Hobbes on Intentionality, Desire, and Happiness  163
 Theories of Happiness  163
 Happiness and Desire  168
 Pleonexia  173
 Desire and Its Intentionality  176
 Egoism  180
Part 3
Sexuality
10 Sadomasochistic Desire  183
 Kinky Sex  183
 Tropological Delineations  184
 The Riddles of Motivation  190
 Sade and Sadism  194
 Problems with Consent  196
 Safe and Sane?  199
11 Tricky Sexual Differences: What Is Perversion?  202
 The Tropes of Perversity  202
 Freud: Perverted and Pathological Desires  205
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
viiContents
<UN>
 Nagel: the Substantiality Thesis  207
 Nagel: Ideally Good Sex, or in the Singles Bar  209
 Nagel: the Genesis of Sexual Perversion  211
 Some Probable Reasons for the Success of SP  214
 Cases of Criticism  216
 Conclusion: Anxious Desires  219
 Index  223
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
<UN>
Preface
This volume contains eleven essays on philosophical theories of desire, their 
applications and rhetorical aspects. They move via analysis towards rhetori-
cal literary and metaphysical case studies on Kafka and Hobbes. The final two 
chapters deal with kinky sexual desire and its moral and motivational myster-
ies, first by focusing on BDSM and consensual S/M, and then reading Thomas 
Nagel’s influential article on perversions and their psychological genesis. In 
this way, the chapters display the use of several philosophical strategies, such 
as analysis, criticism, literary interpretation, and rhetorical speculation side by 
side and one after the other, proceeding from modern logical clarity towards 
postmodern suggestiveness. This makes the volume multifaceted and, as I 
hope, polyphonous in a way that is not immediately obvious or trivial. All the 
papers can be read individually, they are self-contained and hence somewhat 
repetitious, which I apologise, but they also display a methodological prog-
ress from relative triviality towards what looks like an interpretative deep end 
where the philosophical ladders do not quite reach the bottom or where phi-
losophy ends. Plato thought that philosophy should lead us up and away from 
the cave, but another way of seeing it is that it leads us to the bottom of the 
cave where all the fundamental secrets lie in eternal gloom and darkness. Plato 
dreams of truths in bright sunlight, which is nice but far too optimistic. In the 
end confusion and mystery prevail and the world, as I see it, covers itself in 
semantic noise, ambiguity, and metaphors as if to avoid the intolerable truth. 
In the end, linguistic tropes rule. When I looked at the essays in this volume in 
toto, I noticed, to my initial surprise, that the key metaphor here is travel. I was 
not planning it that way but when I think of it now I am inclined to say that it 
is a perfectly good one.
The papers here are new and previously unpublished. Exceptions are as fol-
lows: Chapter 10 “Sadomasochistic Desire” originally appeared under the title 
“The Language of Pain: A Philosophical Study of BDSM,” SAGE Open 8 (2018), 
1–9, but I have made some significant modifications. I also moved some mate-
rial from that essay to the last one, “Sexual Differences,” which is previously 
unpublished. My third relevant paper on sexuality is “A Philosophical and Rhe-
torical Theory of BDSM,” The Journal of Mind and Behaviour 38 (2017), 53–74. 
The two Kafka essays in this volume belong to a series of four papers, of which 
two are published as “Nowhere to Go, Kafka,” Munich Social Science Review NS 
1 (2018), 91–110, and “Conspiracy Theories as Fiction: Kafka and Sade,” Munich 
Social Science Review NS 2 (2019) (in press). The essay on Hobbes is the origi-
nal version of the paper first published as a  Spanish  translation: “Dentro del 
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torbellino: Intencionalidad, deseo y felicidad en Thomas Hobbes.” In Natu-
raleza y teoria politica, F. Bertelloni and M.L. Lukac (Eds.). Buenos Aires: Edi-
toria de la Facultad de Filosofia e Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 2018, 
pp. 114–143. For this volume I have modified the original version slightly but 
significantly.
What I have written in this volume is loosely based on some of my published 
essays, namely, “Desire and Happiness,” Homo Oeconomicus 29 (2012), 393–412; 
“An Introduction to Desire,” Homo Oeconomicus 31 (2014), 447–461; and “Narra-
tives of Desire.” In Desire: The Concept and Its Practical Context. T. Airaksinen 
and W.W. Gasparski (Eds.). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2016, pp. 3–58. 
See also “Narratives of (Mad) Desire,” Ethics in Progress 4 (2014), 7–17; “Sade, or 
the Scandal of Desire,” Homo Oeconomicus 30 (2013), 369–384; and “Psychology 
of Desire and the Pragmatics of Betterment.” In Pragmatism and Objectivity,  
S. Pihlström (Ed.). London: Routledge, 2017, pp. 223–238.
My long standing interest in desire is an offshoot of my struggles with the 
notions of happiness. I originally toyed with the argument to the effect that 
satisfied desires make, or should make, a person happy. This contrasts with 
the idea that one cannot satisfy a desire de se, like some Buddhists may ar-
gue, which is to say that happiness is an ever delusive notion. Also, a crucial 
moment was when Dr Gerald Doherty (Turku) defined, in personal commu-
nication, de dicto desires as narrative idealizations referring at the same time 
to Jacques Lacan. I do not think he himself ever developed this idea but he 
seemed to take it as an obvious truth. I connected narrativity to the semantics 
of possible worlds, and this is how it began. Another key idea is that desire de 
dicto has a metaphorically and metonymically characterized intentional ob-
ject. One can say that desire has a metonymic structure, as Lacan says; this is 
another way of admitting one never gets what one wants. We get an object that 
is only metonymically connected to what we want.
Acknowledgements: As usual, I am deeply grateful to Professor Heta Gylling 
(Helsinki) for all the help she gave me in the various stages of the project. Pro-
fessor Manfred Holler (Hamburg and Munich) has provided valuable support 
over time. I am grateful to Karri Liikkanen (Helsinki) for his help, now and 
earlier.
Helsinki 4. July 2018
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Depicting Desire
 Definitions
Desire has many names: desire, want, will, wish, longing, craving, need, lust, 
greed, aspiration, appetite, and hope among others. Dictionaries make many 
of these, in different patterns, synonyms and they can be used as metonyms. 
They may indeed be synonyms but as well they can be given a specific mean-
ing. For instance what is will and how is it related to desire? The problem is 
that the specific relations between such ordinary language terms are impos-
sibly messy. It is a bad idea to start analysing them. Of course, we feel they 
all somehow belong together. Each of them represents a subject’s vision of a 
better world or a transformation of the actual world into something better, 
or at least into a more desirable place. Even greed does so, although in a per-
verted manner. Perhaps this indeed is the common core of them all and thus 
they would represent variations of one and same theme. This is possible and I 
presume it is the case. Perhaps we may even assume that only one basic type 
of desire exists. At the same time we must agree that to find its proper defini-
tion is impossible. You cannot define ordinary language terms because they are 
used in such variable ways.
In what follows I review some attempts and later on we will find more. All 
of them are inadequate, which is to say that desire is a fuzzy concept. My own 
favoured characterization of the concept of desire is below. In the course of 
my deliberations on desire in this book, I am afraid I will deviate in many ways 
from the following ideas, but as a first approximation it may be useful:
Desire or rational desire means, by definition, a subject’s propositional 
attitude, that is, the subject recognizes and prima facie presents a claim 
to a salient feature of an imaginary possible world that one also hopes to 
get, or the intentional object of desire, which object is such that (a) its 
meaning can be disambiguated, (b) it is intrinsically attractive or desir-
able and can be socially understood as such, (c) it is plausible to consider 
the success of the claim in an accessible, new possible world; moreover, 
(d) the object is more desirable than any of the relevant features of the 
actual world, (e) the object is more desirable than any other object in 
those alternate possible worlds that are at least equally accessible, and 
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(f) the possible world where the desired object is located is acceptable 
in toto.
Let me explain. “Rational” means that we are not interested in, say, plain urges 
or addictions; desires are motivated by some reasons that are based on the 
desirability of the desired objects. The basic idea is that I recognize an object, 
consider it attractive, and make a claim to it as if I demanded it. I want to move 
over to a possible world in which my demand is satisfied. It can happen that 
some objects of desire are initially too vague or figuratively expressed and this 
must be corrected. The subject must not already possess the desired object, 
and it must be possible to get it. Also, the designated possible world must be 
better than the actual world. If this is not the case, one has no reason to con-
sider that possible world and thus no desire emerges, but it is not enough to 
consider one possible world, and I cannot only consider the object in question 
but I must check what comes along with it, that is, the world. Too much extra 
bad baggage there means that I cannot afford to choose the given object, be-
cause it is located in a bad environment. I want to kill Bill but that spells twenty 
years in prison, which is to say that the object of my desire is located in a bad 
possible world. I may then reject the desire or the world. I drop the idea of kill-
ing him; I now want Bill dead or, alternatively, I accept the actual world where 
Bill and I both live. We may say the desire must not be too costly in the possible 
world where its object is located.
Richard Wollheim argues that “[o]ur desires do not generate a possible 
world.” His argument for this is as follows: “Each desire offers us, as it were, a 
view through a keyhole, but there is no reason that there should emerge from 
these views of a coherent picture of what lies on the other side of the gate.” 
He compares desire to belief and says the latter, all things considered, forms 
such a coherent picture. But all the (true) beliefs together form the picture of 
this actual world, which is of course also a possible world, too. Desires, on the 
other hand, sketch an aspect of a novel but accessible possible world, which is 
better than this actual world; that is the whole point of desiring. The possible 
world revealed by beliefs may be a coherent totality and in this sense a recon-
struction of what we already have. However, when I desire something and tell 
the full story of its desirability conditions that I expect to be there, I sketch an 
aspect of the world that does not exist. It is a non-actual possible world such 
that the world where the sketch holds true is similar to the actual world in all 
other respects. It is not the actual world because of its novel features but it is 
a whole possible world because it is its novel features plus the remaining fea-
tures of the actual world. In this way, desire constructs its own possible world.1 
1 R. Wollheim, The Thread of Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984, p. 53.
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
5Introduction: Depicting Desire
<UN>
When I want to drink beer the new world contains me drinking beer and the 
rest remains the same.
Any idea and concept can be employed either as a definiens or a definien-
dum, or as that which explains or that which is to be explained. I may try to say 
something about desire or about something else by means of desire. In the first 
case I am interested in desire per se and in the second case of something else. 
If I am interested in desire, as I happen to be, the definition or characteriza-
tion of desire is bound to be long, complicated, and yet incomplete.2 Actually, 
it may look like a theory rather than a definition. But in the case of desire as 
a definiens one may be brief – the briefer the better. It all depends on what 
one tries to explain and what kind of explanatory machinery one needs; of 
course, one makes an attempt to use tools that are as simple as possible. For 
instance, Mark Schroeder uses “desire” as a “stipulative abbreviation” that is 
fit to explain his key cases and examples. But he consoles the reader by saying 
that “desires in this technical sense really are desires.”3 Minimal features cre-
ate minimal problems but technical stipulations may lose contact with real-
ity. Perhaps for this reason we have so many simplicistic definitions of desire, 
some of them too brief and some rather strange. Let me list a random sample 
plus some comments.
Richard Brandt in his “Rational Desires” says, “a person who desires S is in 
a state such that, were he to think of S, S would seem attractive to him” (italics 
in the original). I wonder why he uses a counterfactual construction here. He 
sums up his view as follows: “These two aspects of desire appear to be logically 
distinct: Seeming attractive seems to be somewhat different from being ready 
to do something if one sees it will produce something else. But psychologically 
I suppose they are connected in a law like manner.”4 This is to say, according 
to Brandt, that desires are motives, which I think is not true, and most phi-
losophers today would approve.5 Sometimes desire as an explanans is part of 
action explanation, if action is called for, but never as a motive. Of course we 
also have contexts like “Q: Why are you here? A: I wanted to see you,” which 
justifies what I have done, but this is a different matter. Anyway, the idea that 
2 A relevant example is knowledge. My favourite definition of knowledge as a definiendum is 
by M. Swain, Reason and Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981, pp. 223, 231. It all 
started from E. Gettier’s challenge and ended in an impasse.
3 M. Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 9.
4 R. Brandt, “Rational Desires.” In his Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1992, pp. 38–56, p. 42.
5 A.H. Goldman, Reasons from Within. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 7, 87; 
J.M. Russell, “Desires Don’t Cause Actions,” Journal of Mind and Behavior 5 (1984), 
1–10; and T. Schroeder, Three Faces of Desire. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, 
pp. 16ff.
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the  person who desires O is, for that reason alone, also motivated to act on 
one’s desire for O has been quite popular earlier (we will return to this). What 
comes to Brandt’s characterization of desire, I find it too simple to be plausible. 
It indeed spells out a necessary condition of desiring, namely, that one finds 
the object desirable but of course it is not sufficient. I read classic car maga-
zines and find most cars attractive so that I could consider myself as owning 
them, but yet I for all kinds of reasons do not desire any of them. Say, the pos-
sible world where I own such a car is alien to me. Moreover, I cannot see why 
Brandt talks about “seeming attractive.” An object is or is not attractive to me 
and thus one cannot make sense of a qualification like seeming in this context. 
If an object seems attractive to me it is attractive to me and also the other way 
round. Also, some features of an object may be attractive to me without mak-
ing the object desirable. I see an attractive painting that I do not find desirable 
because I see the painting in a disinterested aesthetic perspective. I may find 
little kids very attractive but I abhor any ascription of desire to our mutual exis-
tence. Desirability means attractiveness in a special way that is open to desire.6
Allan Gibbard says, “What’s desirable, we can say, is what one ought to de-
sire,” when “ought” here is what he calls the “basic normative ought.” Such 
ought is at work when we consider what we ought to believe given some posi-
tive and negative evidence.7 The question about the nature of desirability is 
as important as it is difficult. Think of it in the past tense: “I ought to have 
believed he is a crook,” when the relevant evidence was there but I refused to 
believe what it entails. However, it does not make sense to say, “I ought to have 
desired it,” when I failed to desire something I had found desirable. Belief and 
desire behave differently here. Evidence forces belief and we should accept 
that, if we are rational. When I see you I must believe you are there. If counter-
evidence is present I ought to handle it properly. Nothing similar can be said 
of desirability and desire. Desirability does not force desire because it only al-
lows for desire. We can say, “I ought to have chosen it,” if my utility calculations 
indicate it is so. But it does not make sense to say “I ought to have desired it.” 
Considering desirability, the normal strategy is to pass them by. You recognize 
a desirable object and you pass it by without normative consequences. Given 
that an ought is at work, this is impossible. Think of belief: if I accept some 
evidence I ought to formulate a corresponding belief. If I do not, I am irrational 
6 For a Renaissance notion of desirability, see M. Mertens, Magic and Memory in Giordano 
Bruno. Leiden: Brill, 2018, p. 175. Mertens discusses Ficino and the idea of binding: certain 
perceptions bind us to the objects, that is, we find them desirable. Desirability is a bond 
between an object and the perceiver.
7 A. Gibbard, Meaning and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 14.
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and that is a negative characterization and an unfavorable evaluation. Desir-
ability is a prima facie invitation to explore the situation further in order to 
see whether you desire the intentional object in question. You start from its 
desirability and you narrate the case; finally you watch your desire to emerge 
or fail to emerge. In this sense desire generation is not an act but rather like 
a spontaneous mental event. Desirability is prima facie invitation to explore, 
and that entails permission. Therefore, evidence forces belief, which is a two 
place relation; desirability considerations do not force desire because a third 
variable is needed here, which indicates a three place relation: subject, desir-
ability, and desire. I desire ice cream not only because it tastes good, which is 
its desirability condition, but because all people around me eat ice cream.
Desirability is a problematic notion, though. Think of the following de-
sire and its motivation, when motivation is based on desirability conditions: 
“I want to hurt people because I do not want they hurt me.” First we need to 
eliminate the second reference to wanting, for instance, by saying hurting is 
bad. Now we have an inconsistent looking sentence: “I want to hurt because 
hurting is bad.” Perhaps the person wants to say: “I hurt people so they cannot 
hurt me,” which sounds like an implausible strategy. If we accept it, the origi-
nal picture of the desire changes accordingly: what I really want is not to get 
hurt and, thus, hurting others is just my instrumental desire or need. Another 
strategy is to find a set of mediating propositions between “I want to hurt” and 
“Hurting is bad.” One can imagine that the mediation will prove to be complex 
and controversial and also that the person herself may not have much to say 
about it. Perhaps it has something to do with childhood traumas. I suspect 
such cases have given some psychologists and psychiatrists a motive to speak 
about unconscious motivation. Anyway, my basic idea is that the gap between 
a desire and its desirability conditions must be spelled out by means of a nar-
rative that concerns the details of the case. Our motives tend to be deeper and 
more complicated than they first appear. Another lesson, as we saw, is that 
when we spell out the desirability conditions in full, our picture of the inten-
tional object may change, too. What looked like the object appears as a gram-
matical construct that hides the psychological topics we need to discuss. The 
object disappears and a topic of desire appears in its place. We can ask, when I 
desire an object, what do I desire?
Graham Oddie puts his point in an impressively exact manner: “Goodness 
=df that property X such that, necessarily for any state P whatsoever, if one 
believes […] that P has X, then one desires that P.”8 This is to say, if I believe 
an object is good, I also desire it. However, if an object is good it is, therefore, 
8 G. Oddie, Value, Reality, and Desire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 13.
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 intrinsically desirable, but I do not desire all desirable objects, as I already ar-
gued above. If desire is a mental state or episode, to desire all that is desirable 
must be an overwhelming task; it defies all the laws of cognitive economy. To 
kill Bill is a desirable idea to me. I can kill Bill in two different possible worlds, 
in the first one with no risk, and in the second with the risk of dying myself. It 
is misleading to say I want to kill Bill in both worlds just because the idea of 
killing Bill sounds so good. In the theory of desire, one must make a clear dis-
tinction between desire and desirability. For instance, many desirable things 
are impossible to get and, hence, you cannot desire them.
The simplest possible desire theory comes from Brian Loar: “I shall use ‘de-
sire’ and ‘want’ interchangeably for the general pro-attitude.” He continues: 
“The contents of desire are a matter of their potential interaction with certain 
beliefs leading to decisions.”9 Here again we find a confusion between desire 
and desirability, or pro-attitude. Actually, I may have a pro-attitude towards 
something I do not find desirable. Moreover, most of our pro-attitudes have 
nothing to do with our decision making. My son introduces his new girlfriend 
whom I instantly like but I have no power to make any decisions in this situa-
tion. Loar’s idea resembles Brandt’s definition. Michael Smith’s definition is as 
follows, “desires [are] states that represent how the world is to be.”10 This fo-
cuses on the thesis of different directionalities of desire and belief, which says 
that desire determines a possible world and the actual world determines be-
lief. In other words, when I say I desire something I hope the world will change 
accordingly. I may say, “I want you to do X” and thus I issue a command to you 
to change the world so that X. In this sense desire is an immodest propositional 
attitude. Smith also is sympathetic to the dispositional model of desire, that is, 
if I desire to act I am disposed to act accordingly, given that my beliefs concern-
ing the relevant circumstance are correct.11 To put it simply, desire indicates 
a disposition to act. But this idea applies only to desires that one may label 
actionist. Many, or most, desires are not actionist in the sense that they do not 
mention action. For instance, John desires that Mary loves him vs. John wants 
to make Mary love him. Desires of the type “I want to act” are a special case. 
The source of the overemphasis on the actionist cases seems to be Elizabeth 
Anscombe’s idea, so elegantly formulated, “The primitive sign of wanting is 
trying to get.”12 Yes indeed, one may add, if one has something to get. I find it 
9 B. Loar, Mind and Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 87.
10 M. Smith, The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, pp. 7, 9, 116. This book has been 
quite influential.
11 Smith, 1994, p. 113.
12 E. Anscombe, Intention. Ithaca, NY: Cornel University Press, 1963, p. 1. See G.E. Schueler, 
Desire. Cambridge, MA: mit Press, 1995, pp. 1ff.
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strange that so many writers on rational action explanation use such an idea 
of desire; for instance, Richard Holton, “Desire in the sense we are after is a 
state that preoccupies an agent’s attention with an urge to perform a certain 
action.”13 Holton gives the reader an ad hoc definition of desire tailor made to 
serve action explanation, but then he needs a desire in a special sense. When 
a gourmand says, “I want that dish,” we cannot infer what he may do in order 
to get it, perhaps nothing. So, the problem is that an expression of desire may 
leave the relevant action ambiguous, or the very possibility of action is uncer-
tain. In some cases action is impossible: “I want that you forget what I did.” 
I may do something that is somehow relevant to the case, like pleading her or 
confusing her, but it is not quite like the action that I have in mind, namely, an 
act that makes her to forget. No such action exists.
Here is a simple argument against the idea that desires logically entail ac-
tions. I say, I want that I do not act, when I could act ceteris paribus. I may 
desire that I do not act, not in the sense of an omission that may itself be an 
action, but in the sense of bypassing all considerations of action. Action is then 
out of the question. This argument works also in those cases where one says 
that a non-actionist context excludes desire and calls for wish or hope. I do not 
think this is so but it of course is a possible standpoint. I say, I want her to want 
me, implying that I cannot directly, do anything about it. You may say, then you 
only wish or hope that she will want you. My first argument is immune to this 
caveat.
What about the dispositional theory of desire? This theory says desire logi-
cally entails the desiring agent’s disposition to react by acting, if he could, in 
order to secure the subjectively desirable change of the world. A lover would 
act if he could in order to get the partner he wants. He cannot act but still it 
is true that he would if he could. Such a disposition is said to be a mark of the 
mental state properly called a desire. I cannot actively better my situation in 
the life-boat on the ocean but of course I am disposed to do so – if I could. The 
counterfactual here is true. Obviously desire and disposition to act are closely 
connected. Yet it is easy to show that this is not a necessary connection. Sup-
pose you desire a change of the world such that its voluntary production is, for 
you, impossible either factually or normatively. In such a case it is irrational 
to want it in the dispositional sense. Suppose I want Bill dead. That does not 
imply I am disposed to kill him, if I believe that killing is wrong and I am a 
moral person. A young man wants to be a soccer star but he is too lazy to prac-
tice; hence, he is not disposed to act in terms of his desire. If he thinks he is a 
natural soccer star he has a reason that backs up his desire without allowing 
13 R. Holton, Willing, Wanting, Waiting. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011, p. 102.
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for any disposition to act. Suppose I want Bill dead but I have no disposition to 
kill him because I think I am no killer. Under no conditions would I kill him, or 
act with the intention to kill him or otherwise facilitate the relevant change of 
the world. I am not disposed to do so even if I want him dead; I have my good 
reasons for my omission. Of course someone may argue that I as a desiring 
person I am disposed to act regardless of the relevant impossibility, namely, 
in the following sense: suppose it were not impossible and then I would be 
disposed to act. This is too far-fetched to be plausible. The basic point is, I am 
not a person who kills and that is why I am not disposed to kill even if I desire 
him dead. The dispositional theory supposes that desire rests on a two place 
relation S – O, which is not true.
In this book I am interested in desire qua desire, or desire independently of 
action explanation. Human existence is so much more that action and hence 
desire as an explanandum should be taken seriously. William James puts it 
well: if the satisfaction of a desire, or obtaining its intentional object, is depen-
dent on action, the mental state is called the will.14 Given that I want to kill Bill, 
I can say it is my will to kill Bill: this usage does not seem to exist today in the 
relevant literature, which is a pity.
Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder famously promote a reward theory 
of desire: “[T]o have an intrinsic desire regarding it being the case that P is to 
constitute P as a reward,” when aversions indicate punishment.15 This only says 
that if I desire P, P must be a reward, which is to say that the only way an object 
can be desirable is to be seen as a reward. Therefore, here we meet another 
theory of desirability in disguise. To say whatever is desired must be rewarding, 
sounds like a prima facie plausible idea. Of course, a reward is not something 
like a social prize but some kind of subjective positive experience that tends to 
make me want more of it – but this sounds circular: if something is desirable it 
is rewarding, but only those things are rewarding that are desirable. There are 
desirable and undesirable rewards. I can imagine rewards that I find undesir-
able all things considered. I may find sexual voyeurism personally rewarding 
in the sense that I want more of the same; perhaps I feel like a potent predator 
and at the same time I shun from it. I may find it fearful and repulsive to find it 
rewarding. Voyeurism is rewarding to certain people, I know it is, but it also is 
too costly, or I may not find it fit for me as a person. If it is not, one’s voyeuris-
tic desire does not seem to be based on rewards. A good example is revenge. 
14 W. James, Psychology, Vol. ii. New York: Dover, 1890/1950, p. 486.
15 N. Arpaly and T. Schroeder, In Praise of Desire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 
p.  128. This point is originally made in Schroeder, 2004. I feel uneasy about the idea of 
punishment. How can avoidance indicate punishment in any sense of the term?
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I  consider personal revenge, and to get it is typically deeply rewarding; yet, I 
refuse to see it as a desirable strategy because I know revenge is unethical and 
I am an ethical person. Hence, Schroeder’s idea looks dubious: I may find a 
reward repulsive, and yet I want it; if I want it its desirability conditions must 
be found elsewhere.
In what follows, I will work under the assumption that whatever is attractive 
may also be desirable, and many types of attractive things exist. An attractive 
object pulls me towards it. Finally, it seems that the reward theory focuses on 
actions, which I said above is not a valid idea. Normally we think that some 
actions deserve their reward. Reward entails merit. If I get something from 
you, without my own effort, merit, or desert, I may be happy but where is the 
reward? Many desires are desires to get the object without personal effort. In 
a non-actionist context the idea of reward does not seem that attractive. One 
final point: instead of reward, we should talk about expected reward. Desires 
are often connected with time consuming projects where rewards are endless-
ly delayed. If my desire stays alive it must be for other reasons than expected 
rewards. I try to learn French pronunciation, which I know is endlessly frustrat-
ing. Where is my reward now?
Let us next take a peek on empirical psychology in order to see how psy-
chologists may understand desire. Here is an example: desire is defined “as 
those wants and urges that are intricately linked to motivation, pleasure, and 
rewards.”16 Like Schroeder’s definition this mentions rewards. However, as I 
said above, most philosophers do not like to link desire directly to motivation 
of action. The main problem, however, is that wants and urges are desires or at 
least so closely related to desire that the definition now becomes patently cir-
cular. The authors also say desires they are mostly interested in are appetitive 
desires, and they seem to mean desires that aim at some desirable object. This 
is the pull theory of desire based on the idea that the desiring person gravitates 
towards some desirable objects, or desire is based on reasons that motivate it. 
The opposite theory is a push theory that is normally understood as a natu-
ralistic causal theory: some physiological states called drives push us towards 
certain objects that are believed to extinguish them.17 No reasons are men-
tioned here. Such push-desires aim at their objects that signify the return of 
physiological equilibrium or status quo, which also can be seen as pleasure.18 
16 W. Hofmann and L.F. Nordgren, “Introduction.” In their (Eds.) The Psychology of Desire. 
New York: Guilford Press, 2015, pp. 1–14, p. 5.
17 See B. Russell, The Analysis of Mind. London: Allen & Unwin, 1921; and Schueler, 1995, 
p. 16.
18 S. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Tr. J. Strachey. New York: Norton, 1921/1961, pp. 3–4.
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In this sense, desire entails a specific physical and, hence, mental disturbance, 
which can be understood as a lack or a consequence of an experienced lack. 
Pull theories do not presuppose such a disturbance although some theorists 
have assumed otherwise, perhaps under Platonic influence. Push and pull the-
ories must not be conflated.
Finally, let me mention a strange new definition of desire, which “concerns 
the various things one would like to have or to do even if it is impossible.” The 
first part is typical of such short characterizations of desire and hence I need 
not comment on it, but the last part is truly strange. What could it possibly 
mean to argue that the intentional objects of desire are impossible to get?19 
What does it mean that I want to be the richest man of the world now; I may 
entertain this idea but that is all. I can say I wish I were rich, but then I use a 
counterfactual formulation. Of course, some varieties of desire, like longing, 
happily take an impossible object, as in “I long for my lost youthful vigor.” Or, “I 
wish Bill would not be here,” when he already is present, but here again we are 
dealing with a counterfactual possibility. If an object is believed to be impos-
sible to get, we must first ask whether this impossibility is a logical or practi-
cal problem. In both cases, one cannot keep it as the object of one’s desire. 
But if the problem is practical, we may still wish. If it is a logical impossibility, 
we cannot even wish for success. Thomas Hobbes wanted to square the circle; 
had he understood the self-contradictory nature of his efforts he should have 
dropped the project and quit thinking of it.
Now, one cannot desire objects one believes to be impossible or non- 
existent, or if they exist, impossible to get. I cannot desire my youthful years 
back. I cannot want to see a centaur. These objects do not exist. I cannot desire 
that President Trump would serve me tea each morning from now on. I believe 
that it is a practically impossible scenario. I have no chance here and to en-
tertain the idea is wishful thinking or daydreaming. Of course one can define 
desire so broadly that it includes such items as daydreaming and irrational de-
sires but I cannot see why we should do so.
It is easy to confuse wish, hope, and desire. About hope, I want to use “hope” 
mainly in the following context: Desire logically entails hope – I cannot de-
sire an object that I already have or that I cannot have. And hope entails de-
sire. Thus, when I desire or even act according to my desire, I also hope to 
have or get it. Of course, I can say, for instance, “I hope to see you tomorrow,” 
but then I want to see you and I hope that this will be the case tomorrow. If I 
wish, I may have no hope and therefore no desire: “I wish I were younger,” All 
this is  controversial and my view is partly stipulative, of course. But we need 
19 F. Grammont, “Introduction.” In Naturalizing Intention in Action, F. Grammont et al. (Eds.). 
Cambridge, MA: mit Press, pp. 1–17, p. 9.
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to standardize the use of these concepts for theoretical and argumentative 
purposes.20
Concerning rational desire, Brandt’s idea in his above mentioned paper 
looks attractive: A desire is rational if no amount of additional information can 
change and correct it; otherwise it is irrational.21 This is end-state rationality 
meaning a situation in which all our relevant reasoning and information gath-
ering is already done. However, a more natural way of thinking here is process 
rationality: A desire is rational if and only if it responds to new information 
in a positive manner, that is, becomes better adapted to its environment of 
beliefs, values, and other desires. If it does not respond at all, it can be called 
obsessive- compulsive. If it responds only partially and too reluctantly, it is de-
fective. Brand’s theory looks obviously wrong if you look at it from the process 
point of view: fixed desires are indeed obsessive-compulsive. One may view 
the theory from the end state perspective and then it looks better. It says, if 
you cannot fix your desire it must be irrational. If any new thought makes a 
woman endlessly vacillate between her desires to marry her fiancé or leave 
him, her desire is in bad shape, that is, irrational. Obviously, we can approach 
the problem of rationality in two mutually incompatible directions. Another 
well-known way to understand rational desire is to ask whether I desire my 
desire or not. I want to smoke but I do not want to want to smoke, hence my 
desire is irrational. I want to be a good father and find no reasons against it, so 
my desire is rational.22
 Two Types of Desire
Historically speaking, desire was an emotion, feeling, or passion of the soul, of 
which the paradigmatic type is love. Anthony Kenny says, “Aristotle, Aquinas, 
Descartes, and Hume all included desire among the passions of the soul.”23 
Love indeed is a perfect combination of desire and emotion, but I love what I 
already have, which is an anomaly. Normally we desire what we could but do 
not have, but I cannot love what I do not have. However, love is loaded with 
emotion and feeling. Moreover, when you say you love him, you express your 
20 See T. Pataki, Wish-fulfilment in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. London: Routledge, 2014.
21 Brandt, 1992.
22 See C. Norris, “Frankfurt on Second-Order Desires and the Concept of a Person,” Prole-
gomena 9 (2010), 199–242.
23 N.E. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion. Washington, DC: Catholic Uni-
versity of America Press, 2011, p. 8; and A. Kenny, Action, Emotion, and the Will. London: 
Routledge, Kegan & Paul, 1969, p. 100. However, the case of Aristotle is quite complicated; 
see G. Pearson, Aristotle on Desire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
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desire but you do not specify the object, or what you want. Proper, virtuous 
love does not want anything, does not demand anything, or seek personal sat-
isfaction – desire does all that when it is considered as a propositional attitude. 
Think of sexual love. Sexual love wants sex, and that is why it differs from virtu-
ous love that wants nothing. Yet, virtuous love entails desire, pure benevolent 
objectless desire that is like a feeling or emotion. It does not want anything. 
Yearning and longing are good examples, too. Both of them contain object-
less desire. I long for something better in my life without knowing what it is. 
Here desire blends with feeling, or a feeling that something better should come 
about. When I long for something it cannot be said that I want something. This 
is to say, the modern discussion of desire as want is one sided. Let me take a 
historical example, Thomas Aquinas. Nicholas Lombardo writes, “Desire is a 
movement towards a good, while love is an inclination or a kind of compla-
cency, and, as such, the principle of pleasure and the rest of passions.” Next, “It 
is difficult to imagine how love’s intentional object might be defined without 
compromising love’s status as a distinct and elemental passion. Only for love 
and hatred does Aquinas avoid any clarification of the nature of the inten-
tional object vis-à-vis presence and absence.” According to Lombardo, Aquinas 
fails to specify “exactly how love is different from desire.”24
Above I have sketched some basic ideas of desire as a propositional attitude 
that has its intentional object and whose desirability conditions are subject to 
their own motivational considerations. However, a different, Platonist context 
exists, where desire is a universal notion or a principle that lives its own life 
regardless of its instances. It is like the idea or form of desire as such and its 
role in human life and existence is far more fundamental compared to par-
ticular petty propositional desires. For instance, male desire as a phallic idea is 
not just a collection of propositional desires that happen to bother some men. 
Male desire is a universal principle of man and malehood and is only imper-
fectly or partially reflected in men’s life understood as male life. Like in Plato’s 
cave, men live a life determined by their propositional desires at the same time 
failing to understand that this is not what defines them. That is done by male 
desire and its phallic references. In Hegelian terms, men are alienated from 
their essence. Such a philosophical theory may sound dubious but in actual 
fact the concept of desire is still used in a way that corresponds with the Pla-
tonic usage.
24 Lombardo, 2011, pp. 58–59, 61. Edmund Burke writes: “curiosity is the most superficial of 
all the affections; it changes its object perpetually; it has an appetite that is very sharp, but 
very easily satisfied.” In his The Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful. Ed. P. 
Guyer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1757/2015, p. 27.
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
15Introduction: Depicting Desire
<UN>
In an analytical perspective, desire is a propositional attitude. Its paradig-
matic form is “Subject S desires that P,” when P specifies the intentional object 
O of S’s desire. When P occurs and S obtains O we say the relevant desire is 
satisfied and, as we may add, S is gratified. S got what she wanted. In this sense 
one can say that desire tracks satisfaction. In the same way, belief tracks truth, 
and therefore, G.E. Moore’s famous “The cat is on the mat but I do not believe 
it” sounds so paradoxical. Also, desire is synonymous with want; or “I want P” 
and “I desire P” are synonymous: they are connected with the idea of motiva-
tion in the sense that both are conative states or episodes that focus on a goal 
or an object that one finds desirable in a suitable, non-actual possible world, 
which means a world the subject may actually reach. Such a possible world is 
accessible when the idea of accessibility can be operationalized by saying one 
knows what, realistically speaking, will realize the new possible world. Some-
times our own actions may do it, sometimes not. Mere wishes and day-dreams 
are then another thing. They do not depend on any considerations of realism.
I hope this view of desire may sound convincing but, as I said above, we also 
can find an alternative characterization of desire. From the analytical point of 
view, its existence is dubious, but this is no reason to reject the idea. What I 
am saying is that desire is desire but the two contexts of the use of “desire” are 
radically different.25 Let me illustrate this by means of two quotations from a 
popular philosophical text:
Freud argued that the female homosexual is a woman with a man’s desire 
for a woman-phallus.
This sounds grammatically correct and thus prima facie familiar. Regardless 
of what it means, one can see that woman’s intentional object of desire is a 
woman-phallus. So far so good, but then we find something new and disturb-
ing (my italics):
Irigaray calls for a more adequate treatment of female narcissism, which 
psychoanalysis undermines by repressing the woman’s perspective in the 
imaging and symbolizing of her sexuality. Irigaray deconstructs phallo-
centric desire by replacing the single male organ with multiple female sex 
25 Think of G. Doherty’s book title Pathologies of Desire (New York: Lang, 2008) and its sub-
title, The Vicissitudes of the Self in James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. Its 
index does not mention “desire.” The question is, in what sense does Doherty mean desire 
here? Whatever the sense is, it is based on the literary uses of the term.
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organs, and in this way addresses a female auto-homo-erotic desire not 
mediated by phallic intervention.26
In this second quotation “desire” is used in a new context. The question is, can 
we reduce phallocentric and auto-homo-erotic desire back to some oratio rec-
ta reports of propositional mental states and episodes called desire? I suggest 
this is not the case, which is to say that the second, Platonic way of using the 
concept of desire is both plausible and interesting. I am not saying that the 
reduction is always impossible; on the contrary, sometimes it is possible and 
such cases open up new vistas on desire and its objects. As I said above, we 
can distinguish between conatively based desire, which makes want and desire 
synonymous, and feeling based desire that defies this synonymy. Let me illus-
trate. Prison as a social environment is infused with desire. Inmates, guards, 
and visitors wallow in an emotional whirlwind that oscillates between apathy 
and passion, hopelessness and hope, calm and anger etc. All this entails desire 
that is not reducible to individual wants. It is related to shared and culturally 
construed feelings as a frame of mind (I use feeling, in spite of its obvious inad-
equacy, but I cannot find a better term) that penetrate the whole social world 
that is prison.
Think of a football stadium just before the start of the match, or a boxing 
arena. All the spectators pack in to share the feeling and participate in col-
lectively shared desire. What desire? The desire to win and conquer is evident 
but equally well the desire to be there and share the multiple, complex desires 
that one can feel but not conceptualize. We desire to share the desire, which is 
then objectless. I want to be there, that is all I want; what is the object of this 
desire? It is “to be there,” which is not an object but a feeling and an ever so 
ambiguous state of social existence, an altered state of mind and new normal. 
It is not an object of desire but desire itself coming into being, or desire in 
flesh, the essence of being there. Of course, this kind of desire is never satis-
fied, it is not satisfiable at all. Of course it does not track satisfaction; on the 
contrary, it feeds itself until it collapses to apathy and then returns with ven-
geance. It is then stronger than ever wanting more of the same, not any object 
but itself as that special desire and its associated feeling.27 Football riots in 
England and elsewhere are a good example of the collective frustration that 
follows.
My last example is hospital, although school would be almost the same. 
What we have in a hospital is desire as quiet desperation and exaggerated 
hope, which means desire to get out of there – by the patients of course. For 
26 S. Phoca and R. Wright, Introduction to Postfeminism. Cambridge: Icon Books, 1999, p. 109.
27 S. Shepard, Seven Plays. New York: The Dial Press, 2005, “Tongues,” p. 310.
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the staff the same environment is diametrically opposite, but let us focus on 
the patients. Their desire cannot be reduced to individual desires and their in-
tentional objects. They want to be healthy, that is true, they all want to be pain-
less, some want to die, etc., but I am not talking about that. I am talking about 
an environment where desire rules as a kind of feeling of hope and hopeless-
ness, in this case as an expression of all that is undesirable; in the same way a 
prison works as a social frame. The desire in question is “Let me out of here,” 
“I wish I were somewhere else” or “I’d love to be somewhere else” or perhaps 
most accurately “I’d rather be anywhere else.” They all hate the desire they 
share. Formally, this is desire to get away from the desire. In the sport stadium 
scene the same is expressed by “This is what I love, let it stay forever like this.” 
The feeling we now understand as desire is objectless as it concentrates first on 
the situation and ultimately on itself. Or, as Jacques Lacan puts it,
The enigmas that desire seems to pose for a “natural philosophy” – its 
frenzy miming the abyss of the infinite, the secret collusion with which 
it envelopes the pleasure of knowing and of joyful domination, these 
amount to nothing more than the derangement of the instinct that 
comes from being caught on the rails – eternally stretching forth towards 
desire for something else – of metonymy. Hence its perverse fixation at 
the very suspension point of the signifying change […] There is no other 
way to conceive the indestructibility of unconscious desire.28
All this relates to an aspect of desire already known to Plato, that is, desire is 
unsatisfiable and always demands more. Or perhaps we want to read it as fol-
lows: Every instance of desire is satisfiable as such but desire itself is not – it 
has nothing to do with satisfaction because what it wants is more, first more 
of the same and then of something else. In that way desire is scary and anxiety 
ridden so that we want to control and even prevent it as much as we can.29 But 
notice, to prevent all desires distributively is a different project from eliminat-
ing desire itself. One can still act on particular desires after desire is eliminated 
from one’s life. Someone can say “I want to go to bed early,” in which case his 
desire is part of the explanation of his action; at the same time we can say in 
his life desire plays no role, which happens in the life of, say, a Buddhist guru. 
Desire can be eliminated unlike the effects of desires.
The main example of desire is sexual desire but others can also be men-
tioned, for instance hatred and revengefulness in addition to many violent 
28 Quoted in A. Lemaire, Jacques Lacan. London: Routledge, 1991, p. 195.
29 See about how to minimize desire, G. Agamben, The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and 
Form-of-Life. Tr. A. Kotsko. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013.
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urges.30 The analytical idea of desire fails to explain this; on the contrary, sat-
isfaction of desire looks like a simple fact. I want ice-cream and I get it, which 
satisfies my desire. I want to kill Bill – why would I want to kill other people? 
How about hoarding desire?31 I want stuff and then more until I drown in it, 
but the more I suffer from this mania the more stuff I want. It is easy to dismiss 
this as irrational behavior. It may be irrational but it is also real. Think of a hos-
pital without desire. Sam Shepard puts all this into a wonderful literary form 
when he writes about unsatisfiable and ever increasing desire, “When it comes 
back there’ll be nothing left but the hunger eating the hunger when it comes 
back. […] Nothing left but the hunger.”32 Here, analytically speaking, the ob-
ject of desire is the desire itself understood in a self-referential manner. Desire 
that desires itself is unstoppable even in those cases where desire is something 
negative like it is in a prison and a hospital. Even there, desire desires itself or 
feeds on itself. It is eternal and self-perpetuating.
I have used some mid-sized social frames as examples above, but what I 
said can now be said of individual cases as well. I love to be where I am now 
and I desire what I have; analytically, I cannot desire to be here now because 
I already am here. Yet, my desire is evident and unquestionable. I say I love 
the place. The explanation is, I want something one cannot conceptualize as 
an intentional object and that is why this something is not an object and, ac-
cordingly, my desire is no desire, or it is another kind of desire. The key to this 
mystery is feeling-for-here-and-now, or what we simply call feeling. I do not 
want as there is nothing to want but still I desire in the sense that I feel it all at 
the emotional level of my being.
Now, more analytically, we can dub this kind of desire that is not reduc-
ible to propositional attitudes feeling desire or for short f-desire, in contrast to 
propositional desires or p-desires. F-desires have their own properties, namely, 
they are typically but not necessarily shared, they stay unsatisfiable, and most 
of all they are self-focused and self-perpetuating, as if their intentional object 
or goal were the desire itself. Think of an expression like “male desire,” which 
as an f-desire is not the sum total of men’s p-desires. On the contrary, it is like 
an oration obliqua report on the male attitude towards male life understood 
as lust and striving after sex or whatever might work as if it were sex. Notice 
here the circularity, which replaces the linear drive towards the intentional ob-
ject. Male desire is man’s life as if constituted of, say, sex and violence, now 
30 See E. Berkowitz, Sex and Punishment. London: Westbourne Press, 2013.
31 See R.O. Frost and G. Steketee, Compulsive Hoarding and the Meaning of Things. Boston: 
Mariner Books, 2011.
32 Shepard, 2005, p. 310.
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 understood as topics and fields of desire where the relevant feelings roam. And 
part of this desire is that man wants to be man because this desire actually con-
stitutes him. All f-desires are circular in the sense that they, as desires, focus on 
desire itself, which is natural if you think that f-desire means feeling for what 
there is, really or in imagination. These feelings are not directed towards some 
better possible words as p-feelings always are here-and-now. Hence, male de-
sire understood as an f-desire is what men, as reported by others, desire as a 
feeling of the typical enjoyment of what they already have. Male desire is never 
what man reports oration recta. When I visit a hospital, prison, or a sports sta-
dium I feel and share the relevant f-desire but then it is not my desire in the 
sense p-desire is, or de se. F-desire is ambiguous since I may have it but at the 
same time it is a social construct to be reported oratio obliqua.
As a male I share what is called the male desire and in this sense it is my 
own desire but as well it is what is reported as if from outside of me. An es-
sential feature of male desire is male gaze. As a male, perhaps I never actually 
look at anybody in that way but still I may be accused of male gaze; I do not 
even know how to perform a male gaze but I find it easy to be guilty of it; that 
is, I do it according to others. The same can be said of male desire. Anyway, the 
main thing about f-desire is the feeling of being in a special place so that the 
desire reinforces my desire to be there. In what follows, I deal with p-desires. 
However, in some places, and especially in the case of Girard’s mimetic desire, 
we will witness the return of f-desire.
Finally, here is a note on desires, important and less important. Jürgen 
Habermas says about concepts like knowledge as true, justified belief, or the 
classical Socratic definition, that it cannot be the correct definition because 
knowledge is something important and the definition does not reflect that.33 
In a sense this is true, knowledge is power but much what we tag as knowledge 
is not, like I know that it may or may not rain today. Perhaps the Socratic defini-
tion indeed is lacking, or it is not. In the same way one may say desires are im-
portant so that “I want ice cream” is different from “I want to be a good father 
to my children.” Real desires introduce a new possible world, mere whims do 
not. From the point of view of my theory of p-desire this looks embarrassing: 
my theory requires that the subject situates the intentional object in a better 
possible world where it looks desirable everything considered. In other words, 
we consider the new possible world to be similar to our actual world except 
for the intentional object but then we allow the world change to see how 
much the emergence of the object changes it. When a good father emerges, 
33 J. Habermas, Knowledge and Interest. Tr. J.J. Shapiro. London: Heinemann, 1972, pp. 62–63, 
67.
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
Chapter 120
<UN>
much will change. But why talk about possible worlds and their changes if I 
just want a cone of ice cream? Minor desires that come and go like whims are 
different from major desires that alter and make the world better.
Why name such minor desires desires? They indeed seem to be p-desires 
and they possess all the necessary features of a desire, as it is easy to see. They 
have an intentional object and they track satisfaction. My solution is that the 
minor desires behave just like the major desires but the changes to the world 
that they entail are less important to us so that we do not bother to think about 
them. Therefore, minor desires are not really minor; what is minor is their ef-
fect on the world and that is why we are not interested in them or their full de-
scription. Their desirability conditions are seemingly simple: I like ice-cream 
and that is all. I want it, I get it, and I forget it; and to get it extinguishes the 
desire. It is an occurring desire that is conditional on its own satisfaction. If 
I want to be a good father, I know only approximately what the object is and 
what its requirements are. The object is intrinsically fuzzy. Hence now I never 
can reach the goal, except in the Pickwickian sense. I also must explain why I 
want what I want, and by doing it, I start playing with the idea of a novel and 
better possible world.
All this resembles Habermas’ idea that knowledge is important. Real desires 
are important but one still must admit that minor bits of knowledge and small 
desires cannot be dismissed. Certainly, certain varieties of unimportant things 
are so unimportant that we need to pay no attention to them in practical life. 
Nevertheless, they can be used as examples, at least in philosophy, because 
they are so simple, but then we should not forget that the big and complicated 
things are what we really should be interested in. That is where the money is. 
Knowledge is power and desire makes us switch between worlds. It is interest-
ing, though, that those perfectly good examples of minor knowledge and desire 
are meaningless as such. When a Buddhist says desiring makes us unhappy, he 
cannot mean such things as ice cream.34 It is perfectly plausible to say that I 
can satisfy such a desire even if we know that all desires are in principle un-
satisfiable. The answer to this dilemma is that ice cream desire is unsatisfiable 
but if we discuss it as an object of choice it may well happen that I got what I 
chose and in this sense wanted. I have already explained and will explain later 
what it is to desire ice cream in the full blown sense of p-desire. Its desirability 
conditions may grow until they look too grand to take seriously. Like Marcel 
Proust’s little madeleine expands the narrative until it covers all his life world.
34 Actually, the Buddhist case against desire is complicated, see M. Kozhevnikova, “Desire in 
Buddhism.” In Desire, T. Airaksinen and W. Gasparski (Eds.). New Brunswick, N.J.: Transac-
tion, 2016, pp. 135–155.
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 Wishful Thinking and Wish-Fulfilment
Let us start from an idea of Thomas Nagel,
That I have the appropriate desire simply follows from the fact that these 
considerations motivate me; if the likelihood that an act will promote my 
future happiness motivates me to perform it now, then it is appropriate 
to ascribe me a desire for my own future happiness.35
Here we see once again the dubious view of the essential connection between 
desire and action but let us forget and forgive it now. My point is, you may 
replace “an act” with “a thought” and rewrite. We get “if the likelihood that a 
thought will promote my future happiness motivates me to think of it now, 
then […]” and now we find something interesting, namely, the key idea behind 
wishful thinking. It is certainly possible to become happy by thinking of happy 
things. We want to think pleasant thoughts and we arrange our other thoughts 
in a way that satisfies the desire. All this comes to us naturally and it contrib-
utes significantly to our happiness levels. People who are unable to do it will 
find it difficult to live. They suffer from depression and other similar ailments.
Wishful thinking is somehow related to f-desires, although it is not always 
easy to see how. What is wishful thinking? The man from La Mancha, Don 
Quixote, is guilty of it for the following reason. He imagines a possible world of 
noble knights, a world that is inaccessible to him simply because it is fictional. 
It is not his private fiction, that is, it is not idiosyncratic, but derived from the 
contemporary genre of popular novels. His mimetic wish is to live in that excit-
ing world and do heroic deeds. He imagines he lives there and he dresses ac-
cordingly, performs heroic deeds, and treats the people around him as if they 
were living members of his new brave world. Don Q says he wants to be a hero 
and then he is gratified; he believes he is a knight. His wish is fulfilled.
The main point about wish and wish-fulfilment is that the same thought 
that constitutes the wish also satisfies it. This fact clearly distinguishes between 
wish and the other relevant types of mental states discussed here. When I read 
a book of poetry and see myself as a fellow poet, the thought itself is fulfilling 
or satisfying. I may not believe I am a poet – that would be both unnecessary 
and irrational. I simply think of myself as a poet and thus satisfy my wish. We 
do this all the time even if we seldom notice what is going on. It is also remark-
able that such wish-fulfilment may also be guilt ridden and anxious, think for 
example of nasty sexual thoughts and various types of unclean fantasies. This 
35 T. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978, pp. 29–30.
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is to say those wishes are not idle thoughts but on the contrary they are mental 
episodes we feel are part of our personality and something we are responsible 
for. Many wishes are delightful but they also can be anxious, or both at the 
same time. Now, the main point is that the same thought that constitutes the 
wish also satisfies it or is a sufficient condition of its fulfilment.
I argue that wish-fulfilment is spontaneous in the sense that wishes, if un-
derstood in the way I described above, are self-satisfying. This is the case be-
cause the wish in its new possible world is construed in a suitable manner. 
Think of Don Q. He imagines a world where he is a knight; he believes that 
he is a knight in a world that satisfies his desire to be a knight. He wants to be 
a knight and hence he constructs in his imagination a world in which he is a 
knight. To verify his success, he acts and deals with other people as if he were 
a knight.36
Don Q’s new world is imaginary in two ways: first, as a literary construct 
(what he reads about) and, second, as his own mental construct (what he 
imagines). The first world is devoid of him but the second contains him as a 
knight. Such a double jeopardy is not necessary, though. A small man wishes 
he were tall and buys platform sole shoes. His favourite world (where he is 
tall) is not available to him, even if the new world where he thinks he is tall is 
possible. No known path from here to there exists and, thus, the only way the 
short man can get there is in his imagination. Now, when he responds to his 
imaginary world he verifies its existence and validity by buying those shoes. 
Thus the world is construed in such a special way that his wish is fulfilled, or 
his desire is satisfied.
I do not say that all wishes are fulfilled in this spontaneous manner. I only 
say wishful thinking has this occasional property. Many wishes are not instanc-
es of wishful thinking. I may refuse to construct such a special possible world 
where I am spontaneously gratified. I say “I wish this cancer goes away” but I 
do it without constructing the world where my cancer has disappeared. Hence, 
I have a wish that is not an example of wishful thinking.
As we know from psychoanalysis and elsewhere that wishful thinking can 
also be painful. I may imagine a bad possible world and place myself there, 
which makes me bad. As I understand it, wishes are not necessarily good and 
personally flattering. I suffer, say, from guilt feelings and by constructing a 
suitably bad world for myself I make myself guilty, which is a painful feeling. 
Suppose a person has paedophiliac wishes, which play with the ideas of acts 
he knows are both socially condemned and dangerous. He tends to agree that he 
36 On imagination, see S. Nichols, Ed., The Architecture of the Imagination. New York: Claren-
don Press, 2006.
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should not entertain them and thus he should free himself of them.  Perhaps 
he should get psychological help, although his abnormal sexual preferences 
have remained latent. His problem is that he tends to construct imaginary pos-
sible worlds where he is an active paedophiliac predator, a world that is mod-
elled after the real world, as he knows it, containing real paedophiliacs. He 
knows he must not try to satisfy his sexual desires in the real world. He sees it 
as a royal road to a personal catastrophe, which is probably a valid belief. Next, 
he imagines it all and in this way satisfies his abnormal wishes. It is easy to see 
why this is painful to him because now he is an active paedophiliac, which 
promises him not only gratification but also the sense of personal catastrophe 
and verifies his belief that he is an abnormal, dangerous, and bad person.
Wish fulfilment does not necessarily entail a p-desire because desire en-
tails an accessible possible world. Think of Don Q. However, the sexual case 
above shows that desire and wish-fulfilment are systematically connected. 
Our paedophiliac possesses the relevant desires because he has an access to 
the relevant possible world. He just thinks he must not take that path. Instead 
he  constructs an imaginary world where he can satisfy his wishes. Empirical 
evidence shows that wish-fulfilment is often related to some surrogate actions, 
that is, it is not solely imaginary. As I said, such actions verify the success of 
wish-fulfilment to the person himself. Don Q actually starts wandering around 
dressed funny and followed by Sancho Panza. He attacks windmills and wine 
barrels. A small man buys platform shoes and the paedophiliac tries, inno-
cently, to relate to young people and, less innocently, say, collects their sugges-
tive pictures. Wish fulfilment may have its typical behavioural correlates. To 
move to the imaginary world where spontaneous wish-fulfilment is to occur 
one needs some behavioural items also as indicators of the pseudo-realism of 
the effort. In anxious cases, this makes one’s anxiety ever more real and true.
My last question is, how are f-desire and wish-fulfilment related? We already 
saw that the Don Q case can be approached from both sides with an equal suc-
cess. The difference is this: the existence of f-desire explains wish-fulfilment. If 
we do not mention f-desire we have hard time understanding why Don Q starts 
acting as he does, that is, what motivates his wishes. He starts a new life fo-
cusing on desire which he loves. He is a supreme expression of unadulterated 
desire. What desire? The desire to desire knightly things in the world where he 
believes he resides. Notice that only f-desire can do that, p-desire cannot. We 
know that p-desire always tracks satisfaction in an accessible possible world, 
unlike f-desire that loves the actual world of the person’s desire. Don Q’s de-
sire does not track satisfaction because it is already satisfied. But that does not 
stop our knight. When he rides out dressed and equipped as a noble knight, he 
indeed sees himself as a noble knight. The negative case of the short man of 
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course requires its own explication, which must somehow be consonant with 
the Don Q’s case – the difference between the two cases is illusory. Both agents 
create their own imaginary worlds where their f-desires flourish, and then they 
can proceed to the next stage, that is, wish-fulfilment. The construction of the 
imaginary world in question is now guided by the agent’s f-desire, which he 
cannot enjoy in his actual world. An f-desire is the desire to stay in this new 
world, and wish-fulfilment handles it as if it were the actual world.
 De Re and De Dicto: a Paradox
I will argue for the following paradox: Suppose that desire is a three place rela-
tion Subject – Object – Desirability Conditions, that is, all desires are condi-
tional in this sense.37 A desire sentence is open to de re and de dicto readings. 
The problem is, if you read it de re you miss the desirability conditions. If you 
read it de dicto you miss the object but retain the desirability conditions. How 
can you tell that both interpretations concern one and the same desire? Desire 
is de dicto if in the context of the sentence that expresses the desire is refer-
entially opaque; if it not, the desire is de re. I love Mary who happens to be a 
nurse. De dicto I do not love a nurse but de re I do. Notice that Frege’s Morning 
star/ Evening star puzzle is an epistemological variant of de dicto/de re, in the 
sense that once we know that the two observed stars are actually planet Venus 
we have our de re object of belief. Incidentally, we have now a good reason to 
say that desire de dicto has no object, except in grammatical sense; instead it 
has what one may understand as a topic. As long as I pay attention to the fact 
that she is a nurse, Mary is not an object of love to me. I will clarify this in what 
follows.
From a grammatical point of view, a de dicto desire is, for instance, “I want 
that my car is red and fast,” which picks a red and fast car as a desirable ob-
ject. Compare de re: “I want a car that is red and fast,” which picks a car that 
happens to be red and fast among other things. Here the de dicto topic is my 
car together with its essential properties, or its satisfied desirability condi-
tions. These conditions are part of a narrative concerning the good-making 
features of the car, and their function is to motivate my desire. As I said above, 
no desire is without its reasons, which is to say that desire is a three place rela-
tion. De re desire has its object that is complete in the sense that its context 
37 See K. McDaniel and B. Bradley, “Desires,” Mind 117 (2008), 267–302. Desires can be condi-
tional in many different ways.
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is  quasi-extensional or minimally intensional in such a way that the context is 
not  referentially opaque – even if we have an intentional object here. The ob-
ject has all the properties a car has. The car that I want may be red and fast 
but its colour may also fade fast. In de dicto context this does not make sense 
because the topic can handle only desirability conditions.
Think next of the following textbook style example of de re and de dicto de-
sire (S) “I want the fastest car on the planet, that is, F.” Then the world changes 
so that F no longer is the fastest car on the planet. If I originally read (S) de 
dicto, I no longer want F. I want B that is now the fastest one. If we originally 
read it de re, I wanted F and I still want F. In other words, I want the car, what-
ever car happens to be the fastest one now; or, I want this given car that once 
happened to be the fastest one. De re I desire the object in such a way that its 
change of status does not matter. In the de dicto case, to be the fastest car is an 
essential consideration: without it I cannot fix my desire. In a de re case this is 
not true. Once I have picked my intentional object of desire I have picked a real 
thing that has certain accidental properties. It remains the same thing even if 
it no longer is the fastest car on the planet. All this looks perfectly sound and 
understandable.
Alas, once you start thinking it in psychological terms you notice a trouble-
some fact, namely, the desirability conditions of the de re interpretation of 
sentence (S) have mysteriously vanished, yet you cannot desire without them. 
Why did I originally want that car that used to be the fastest on the planet. We 
have no hint. Desire is a three place relation but now the third place holder is 
missing. I say I want a car that is red, which does not mean that I desire the car 
de re because it is red. I say it happens to be red, among many other things. 
I must have a reason for desiring it, but now I cannot tell what it is. This is to say 
that de re interpretation of desire does not pick a desire but a bare object. In 
this way, desirability conditions figure only in de dicto interpretations of S. Let 
us look into this. As I said, the de dicto interpretation is clear: “I want F because 
F is the fastest car on the planet,” specifies high performance as the essential 
or necessary desirability condition in the sense that I desire F if and only if it is 
the fastest car on the planet. If it is not, I do not desire F. It follows that, given 
the new possible world where F fails to be the fastest car, I no longer desire F de 
dicto. In other words, if the world changes so that the desirability conditions of 
a given desire do not hold, the desire vanishes. According to its de dicto inter-
pretation, to be the fastest is, ceteris paribus, necessary and sufficient for the 
desire to emerge and endure.
How can one and the same desire have two interpretations one of which is 
a three place relation and second a two place relation? This looks as if de re 
and de dicto desires were two different desires, a fact that leads to a problem 
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concerning the individuation of desires.38 It is not possible to say only that de 
re and de dicto interpretations concern the same desire if and only if both of 
them are concerned with F as the given object of desire. When F fails to be the 
fastest car, the de dicto desire changes, unlike de re; therefore, we now have 
two different desires. Let me specify: I say “I want the fastest car on the planet, 
F” and then F loses its elevated status. If I lose my interest in F, my original 
desire was de dicto, if I do not, my original desire was de re. Now the question 
is, as I said above, why did I desire F de re in the first place? The question is ir-
relevant. The only thing that matters is that it is F that I desire de re. De dicto 
it does not matter that it is F because the only thing that matters is the speed. 
I have a hard time seeing that behind the two interpretations we can find and 
see one individual desire. First, we find no object and an explanation for desir-
ing, and then no explanation and an object. F does not join the interpretations 
and neither do the desirability conditions.
To solve this problem we need to give de dicto reading a priority position. 
I love the most beautiful man in the world (de dicto) and he happens to be Ar-
chibald (de re). When he no longer is so beautiful, I switch my love to Felix who 
now is aesthetically the best and my de re object changes accordingly. Why 
cannot I love Archibald now? The reason is that my de re reading of the situa-
tion mentions no desirability conditions, which is to say that I need to derive 
them from my current de dicto reading; hence, I de re love Felix. De re specifies 
the object but only de dicto tells us what the desirability conditions are in the 
given case. Archibald has de re all kinds of properties none of which are, con-
sidering my love, essential and hence I can love him for any different reasons. 
But only one set of properties is essential in the de dicto case and exactly those 
properties I must find in my de re object, if I am going to love him so that the 
de re and de dicto readings pick the same desire, or they are mutually comple-
mentary. If I still love ugly Archibald I must find myself a new desire de dicto. 
Most mysteriously, if I picked Archibald (de re) when I still desired the best 
beauty (de dicto), why did I pick him in the first place? If I still love him in the 
new world, I must have picked him for reasons that do not show in “Archibald 
is the most beautiful man in the world.” The world has changed and I still love 
him – why did I originally pick him? Here we see two different desires at work. 
To get back to one desire, we must require that de re tracks de dicto desirability 
conditions. In this case, when the world changes I no longer love Archibald.
Summary: Suppose I desire X because of Y, or my topic is XY. The object of 
my desire is X. What is the name of my desire? If you identify XY and X, you 
38 Cf. P.T. Markie and T. Patrick, “De Re Desire,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1990), 
432–447, p. 433.
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must tell why you do so. You can explain it by starting from XY and deriving X 
form it. In this way, the solution is by rank ordering the two interpretations so 
that de re becomes logically dependent on de dicto; or, de dicto is original and 
de re derivative in relation to it.
A de dicto desire may have no intentional object but rather a topic, which 
runs together with the description of the object and its desirability conditions; 
for instance “the fastest car.” Think of a non-definite description “Fast car” and 
think of de dicto “I desire a fast car.” De re this picks the class of fast cars, and 
any member of the class satisfies the desire. Now, it is strange to say that a 
class of fast cars would be the object of desire, except in a grammatical sense. 
This class is intrinsically fuzzy and anyway, it is a class of things, which to a 
non-realist is not a legitimate object. Hence, a definite description like “the 
fastest car on the planet” is misleading. It suggests that de dicto desires have 
objects. The dilemma is this: de dicto desire has no object and de re, while it 
has an object, does not specify any desirability conditions and thus one cannot 
say why it, and not something else, is the object of desire. Obviously, de dicto 
and de re must go together so that they are two aspects of one and the same 
desire. We need to know what the intentional object is and why it is an object 
of desire. This also becomes evident when we think of the following example. 
I want to marry John who is a serial killer, although I do not know it. De dicto 
I do not want to marry a serial killer, I want John. De re my object of desire is 
a serial killer.
De dicto: I want to marry John because John is so tall.
De Re: I want to marry a serial killer, who happens to be tall.
In this case the de re and de dicto desires do not share a common concept that 
would unify them and justify the idea that we have only one desire here. How 
do we individuate the desire? As I said, we must consider de dicto first and 
find the object in this way. I cannot say I want to marry a serial killer because 
I want to marry John. It may happen, of course, that I get a serial killer but 
that is another thing. De dicto desire fixes the de re object, which is the only 
object of desire, by specifying some desirability conditions that it alone pos-
sesses. Sometimes de re objects are not real objects. In that case, your desire 
fails altogether or you need to think of a very strange possible world where 
the object becomes real. I say, “I want you to know everything.” This allows 
for no object in the real sense of the term but we may construct a possible 
world where one knows everything. In this sense the topic is this world and de 
dicto is the all the knowledge in it. Again, we need to proceed from de dicto 
to de re.
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Let me make a couple of additional remarks. If I desire de re F that is not 
so fast, I need to tell why. Desire logically entails desirability. When I tell why, 
I refer to a desire that is different from the original that focused solely on speed. 
That is why in the de re case F must be speedy too. We only speak about F as 
if this fact were irrelevant. Of course I may still de re desire F in a world where 
it is not that fast, but then my desire has changed or the earlier desire de dicto 
was not a desire for the fastest car. It was for something else.
∵
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Chapter 2
Beliefs and Desires
The direction of fit thesis says that desire and belief are propositional attitudes 
that share an object, but in the case of desire the world should change so that it 
fits the desire; in the case of belief one’s beliefs should fit the world. Generally, 
this is how it goes. Next, we notice that desire depends on belief to a larger de-
gree than belief depend on desire. If beliefs depend on what we want, we deem 
them irrational. Desires on the other hand show legitimate dependency on be-
liefs. In order to desire I need valid beliefs concerning, first, the world where 
I am and, second, the accessibility of certain possible worlds, namely, those I 
desire. These beliefs show me what kind desires fit the world I aim in when 
I desire. This is to say that desires should fit the world, contrary to the direc-
tion of a fit thesis. For instance, I desire something and then I come to believe 
that I already possess the object – my desire collapses just like it does when 
I say I desire something I believe to be impossible in the intended possible 
world.
 From Wollheim’s Challenge to Human Needs
Take all your beliefs collectively, what do you get? You get, given that your be-
liefs are rational, an approximate picture or a map of the actual world. Take 
next all yours desires or wants collectively, what do you get? Wollheim argues, 
you do not get a possible world.1 What do you get? According to him, a dis-
tributed collection of snapshots of some desirable states of affairs that do not 
belong to one particular world. In other words, they collectively do not track 
a possible world. This seems to be another difference between beliefs and de-
sires. I agree with Wollheim but the case is not as simple as he assumes. He 
wants to consider all desires collectively. I try to show that, if desires are ratio-
nal, they are both evidence and belief based and duly constrained by beliefs. 
This is to say any individual desire should fit a possible world, or it should track 
one, where it will be satisfied. In other words, my desire should fit a possible 
world in the sense that it reflects its special demands. In what follows, I try to 
show how to understand these claims.
1 R. Wollheim, The Thread of Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984, p. 54.
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Beliefs should accommodate themselves to the actual world and the world 
should accommodate itself to desires or wants – such is the dogma. In oth-
er words, I receive my beliefs from the world that my desire aim to change. 
Sometimes my beliefs track the world properly, sometimes not. Sometimes the 
world changes satisfyingly, either independently of us or via our actions; often 
the world fails to change in the required way. Of course, we hope for success. 
Needs look more complicated than this.2 I discuss needs in the following sense: 
S needs X in order to have Y; or motor needs oil to run, which presupposes that 
the motor is made to run and someone may want the motor to run. Prima facie, 
such a need is a fact because the motor does not run without oil but it also has 
its normative dimension as the motor is designed and meant to run. It seems 
that when we talk about a need we talk about a fact or a state of affairs such 
that it favours the realization of a relevant desire. Sometimes needs, in this 
sense of the word, are called instrumental desires. As such this is misleading 
because motors desire nothing yet they need many things. This applies to hu-
man contexts as well: Your cancer sometimes needs an operation whether you 
want it or not.
Need is Janus faced concept because a need description may report a fact, 
which at the same time is what we want when we want something. Oil added 
to a motor is what the motor needs but suppose it also is desired by us and as 
such a desirable state of affairs. We can thus say needs are derivative desires 
in the sense that what is needed is also desired. I do not want oil except when 
I consider the motor and its proper functioning. We can then extend our ex-
ample by noticing that at the local service station I say I want to buy some oil, 
that is, I want oil. But I want it only if I need it. The desirability conditions of 
this desire are derived from the need in question. An interesting complication 
follows: I may not like what I need, yet I (derivatively) desire it; hence, it fol-
lows that I desire something I do not like, or what I find repulsive as such. This 
is interesting because desires form chains where something is a need from the 
point of view of desire and desire from the point of view of another need. I 
want to go home and thus I need a taxi; I need to go home because I want to go 
to bed; I need to go to bed because I want to feel fresh at work, and so on. Here 
for instance “go to bed” is a need and desire at the same time. I hate to go to bed 
but yet I want it. Epistemologically it is interesting that you cannot tell how I 
feel about going to bed by just listening me to say I want to go to bed. If I speak 
about it in connection with a need I may hate it. As a need I (instrumentally) 
2 See G. Thomson, Needs. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987, p. xi, for a “rudimentary char-
acterisation” of the concept of need. His approach is different from mine, for instance, he 
says “what we need is what we cannot do without.” This may true of food but not of taxis.
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desire it. Only the final and somehow ultimate desire may be unambiguously 
liked, and it is in this sense desirable and desired. It is an interesting question 
what this ultimate desire and its object is like when we say it can no longer be 
seen as a need. All other desires may be judged undesirable as such and yet 
desired, which hints at the possibility that most of our desires are derivative 
in nature and as such desired in an ambiguous manner. My suggestion is that 
needs behave like desires in the directionality argument although they also 
create the problem of the desirability of the desired objects in their derivative 
contexts.
I need a taxi to get back home, I hate taxis, although I say that I want a taxi 
now. Incidentally, this account does not conform to the idea, say, that desir-
ability is grounded on reward:3 satisfaction of a need may not be understood as 
rewarding in the same sense as that of desire; a reward is not an instrumental 
good. Yet, the same need is from another viewpoint a desire. Perhaps a better 
word is relief: when I get what I need I am relieved. Need indicates pressure 
and stress. I am then able to proceed to the next step on the path towards what 
is a higher order desire in the relevant chain, namely, to get to bed in order to 
be fresh and alert at work tomorrow. I need to be, but why? I want to look like 
a good worker, but why? I need my job, but why? What then is the ultimate 
desire here, this wonderful, ideal desire that explains the chain? The answer is 
beyond the methods of philosophy, as it seems. It is an empirical question, but 
whatever it is, it must be something one may hope to get with some justifica-
tion. In other words, the possible world that the subject aims at is available 
to me, or I must know the path to it. We choose a world where satisfaction is 
possible, and this depends on our beliefs concerning different available worlds. 
Perhaps we are made happy by world where all goes well?4 In any case, our 
needs and instrumental desires are dependent on our beliefs.
 Modality: Beliefs as Constraints
When I desire I believe, among other things, that (i) what I desire is possible 
to get, or I can hope to get it, (ii) I can make sense of what I desire, and (ii) my 
desire is not immoral or otherwise normatively unavailable. These are some 
basic beliefs although more can be found, for instance, I must believe that the 
desire in question is my own desire in two different senses, namely, it is my 
3 See N. Arpaly and T. Schroeder, In Praise of Desire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 
pp. 127–128.
4 See T. Airaksinen, “Desire and Happiness,” Homo Oeconomicus 29 (2012), 393–412.
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own desire in the sense that I myself am the desiring agent, and my desire not 
obsessive-compulsive. For instance, think of “The boss said I want coffee” is 
ambiguous because we cannot tell what the referent of “I” is. We disambiguate 
as follows: “The boss said ‘I (myself) want coffee’,” which makes it clear that the 
boss himself wants it, or the interpretation of the sentence is de se. Alterna-
tively, “I” refers to the listener.
When I desire I can ask myself, why do I desire this and the answer may 
be, because someone else desires it; this is to say I personally may not find 
the object of desire desirable. This we may call a mimetic desire (see Ch. 4). 
Often an agent regrets an apparent desire exactly for this reason – it is not her 
own. If the desire is obsessive-compulsive because, let us say, of an addiction 
it is not unequivocally my own desire in the sense that is relevant to us here. 
Kant calls desires pathological if they do not spring from the person’s free will 
but just happen to him.5 In other words, when I say I desire this entails that 
I believe it is my own personal desire. Such beliefs concerning desire owner-
ship are not restricted to actionist contexts in which I am supposed to act in 
order to realize the desired state of affairs or intentional object. I may enter-
tain desires that presuppose the change of the world independently of all my 
actions, as if spontaneously, but yet I must believe these desires are my own. 
Suppose I listen to a charismatic preacher who wants us to do good to our 
brethren. I feel his influence and for a while I adopt this desire. I have adopted 
his desire, which may well entail the false belief that it is my desire as well. Let 
us look into the role of beliefs when we discuss the possibility (modality), un-
derstanding (hermeneutics), and normativity (ethics) of desire.
First, modality. When I desire, I desire something that is represented by a 
proposition that describes a possible state of affairs that I somehow see as and 
believe to be desirable. It is an open question whether I can desire something 
that I believe already exists. Let us assume here that I cannot do so. Why would 
I want to get an object I already have? Thomas Hobbes for instance says, what I 
have I love but what I do not have I desire – presupposing of course that we are 
discussing desirable states of affairs. This also is a medieval scholastic idea.6 
However, it seems possible to provide examples where I want what I have, for 
5 Kant writes, “There are two sorts of love: practical love that lies in the will and in principles of 
action, and pathological love that lies in the direction the person’s feelings and tender sym-
pathies take.” We could also say the latter type of love is passive love, something that happens 
to a person (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/
assets/pdfs/kant1785.pdf). Another translation by H.J. Paton, Groundwork. New York: Harper, 
1964, p. 67.
6 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651. Part 1, Ch. 6, Love and Hate; and N.E. Lombardo, The Logic of De-
sire, Aquinas on Emotion. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2011, p. 61.
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instance, I have a wife and I believe our relationship is fully secure. I desire her 
not only sexually but as a person. I want to be with her although I am with her 
all the time.7 One can dismiss this intuition by arguing that when I desire what 
I have, I first imagine that I do not have it or that I am going to lose it and, thus, 
I desire it in this derivative and counterfactual manner. Therefore, I desire my 
wife as if she were not here; if I, on the contrary, consider her as being present, 
I could not desire her. In my thoughts I can alienate her from my life as it is and 
hence, as she is no longer there, start desiring her. Another way of putting the 
same point is to say that I am afraid of losing her. I believe, and this is a quite 
reasonable belief I think, that she may leave me for reasons I have no way of 
knowing now and therefore I desire her. All these considerations refer to her-
meneutical problems, namely, to the question what I actually desire. Also, we 
now understand why I am happy with my wife. I imagine that she is not there 
and thus I desire her. But because she in fact is there for me all the time, my 
desire will be satisfied and I am happy. If I am afraid of losing her, her presence 
offers me consolation, which again means my perpetual happiness.
Now, I believe that what I desire is a possibility in the sense that it can be 
satisfied, or the world may change in such a way that my desire is realized ei-
ther permanently or occasionally. Desires can be conditional or unconditional 
in many ways: “I want ice cream” is a conditional desire in the sense that it 
depends on my getting or not getting ice cream. I desire ice cream only on the 
condition that I did not get it yet. It is an occasional and conditional desire. 
I want to marry Diana and nobody else ever; I marry her – such a desire is a 
permanently satisfiable conditional desire. Now, I want to marry Diana only on 
the condition that she agrees.8 If she does not want it, our marriage becomes 
impossible – my relevant action is impossible – and I cannot desire things I 
cannot get. Of course, also a need constitutes a conditional desire, or it masks 
one. I desire something but only on the condition that I need it.
Also non-conditional desires exist: I dream of and then desire world peace. 
Suppose world peace comes about; the relevant desire does not disappear as 
it is not conditional on its own occasional satisfaction. I desire peace also in 
the time of peace because any peace is so fragile. And I presume no such ac-
cessible possible world exists where the human existence is guaranteed to rest 
in eternal peace. Kant’s joke in “Zum ewigen Frieden” is well taken: only in the 
graveyard! It is indeed weird to say, in time of peace, “I no longer desire peace, 
although I love it.” He who invented the aphorism “In time of peace, prepare 
for war” is right. Peace is a never ending process. Of course, this leads us to 
7 See Ch. 1 on f-desires.
8 See K. McDaniel and B. Bradley, “Desires,” Mind 117 (2008), 267–302.
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recognize another problem: if the desire is unconditional in this way it cannot 
be satisfied; if it could, it would be conditional on its own satisfaction; but then 
the desire is impossible, which is to say the mental state in question does not 
qualify as a desire. The dilemma is this, either the desire is conditional on its 
own satisfaction or it is impossible. Perhaps the solution is simply by saying 
that one focuses on a possible world in permanent peace as if such a world 
existed. Hence, it is an empirical truth concerning that inaccessible world that 
my desire for it will remain unsatisfied, although it is not logically impossible. 
I cannot desire objects that I believe are located in logically inaccessible worlds, 
or logically inconsistent worlds, but this is not one of them. All this somehow 
resembles the compatibilism-incompatibilism debate concerning the free will. 
Here we must argue that the current unsatisfiability of unconditional or per-
manent desire is, in the end, compatible with its in-principle-satisfiability.
This can be illustrated by another example, namely, my desire to be a good 
father. This certainly is a viable project although it can never be completed 
in the sense that the desire would be satisfied. It is impossible to satisfy, yet it 
makes sense as a desire. Its satisfiability can live together with its impossibility. 
All this is based on the idea that to be a good father is a struggle that can be par-
tially and temporarily satisfied, or we can satisfy it als ob. This makes the proj-
ect worthwhile and it keeps the desire going. Think of the case where I want 
to be the best footballer in the world when I am seventy years old. This project 
makes no sense at all. Nevertheless, some impossibilities are worth desiring.
Be this as it may, I must believe that the world may change as my desire 
 dictates – here we return to the directionality argument or direction of fit. If 
my desire is rational, the relevant beliefs are well grounded, or I have evidence 
for them. If I have no evidence for the possibility of the relevant changes that 
desire presupposes, or if the evidence suggests impossibility, the desire is either 
irrational or it is a fake, or I wish for the best. In other words, we may say that 
the desire is then irrational, or what I call desire is in that case something else, 
like a fantasy based wish – perhaps a mildly delusional mental episode. Sup-
pose I am in a life boat out on the ocean. I believe quite reasonably that ships 
sail around here and hence I may be rescued; if I believe that no ships ever go 
where I presently am, I stop desiring even though I may still wish for the best. 
Perhaps I lose all hope because of my gloomy belief but it is not necessary; 
I wish for a miracle, which is against all of my current beliefs, but it does not 
matter in this case. People often entertain unreasonable ideas that approach 
fantasy wish-fulfilment. Suppose I have a cancer that my doctors call terminal. 
I want to live, which is a reasonable desire because the world may change and 
thus I have hope. But in this case I also have solid evidence for the proposition 
that I will not see that near future possible world where I will count among 
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the living. I can still wish for the best because I know that a future world of the 
living exists and I can imagine that I am there. Hence, the new evidence does 
wreck my unconditional and permanent desire to live although my survival is 
now reduced to mere wish in the light of the new medical information.
Based on the doctor’s testimonial I have no hope of a cure but I still want to 
live, which is based on a different belief to the effect that people in fact contin-
ue to live in the future world. I want to be there with them. I want to be among 
the living is not an unreasonable desire because there is such a future world. 
Of course, my desire to be cured is a different desire that is indeed unreason-
able in this case. If I cannot desire something and I stop desiring it, I formulate 
a new desire with which I can continue living. This happens when a patient 
cannot desire a cure but says she wants to live. According to my current beliefs, 
I will not be cured but I can still be alive, not for long perhaps but alive anyway. 
Thus, I can say I want to live. It is then irrelevant that lack of cure entails death 
when I believe I can still be alive in the future.
In this way, when my reasonable beliefs do not allow for a desire I may still 
hope. In the first instance no hope means a full restriction to desire: I must stop 
desiring. In the second instance hope means what it means, namely, I still en-
tertain hope given that I find a suitable object. I know a better world exists and 
a path leads there from where I presently am, yet, such a world exists so that 
there is hope. People also hope for many far-away things like eternal life and 
resurrection of the dead. Anything that feels good makes them postulate far-
away worlds that suit their current needs. Hopes are what they are.9 They are 
dependent on evidence in the same way as desires, as we can easily see. A be-
lief that it is impossible extinguishes the desire but may have no effect on hope 
that picks another object. What happens seems to depend on the strength of 
the negative information in the sense that full and decisive information kills 
both desire and hope. All alternate objects become void and meaningless. Yet 
the traces of desire do not vanish that easily: I say I would have liked it, or I 
turn to counterfactual conditionals. She is now married to another man, thus I 
know it is impossible for me to marry her now, but I would have liked to marry 
her. Perhaps we also can say, I would have wanted to marry her had it been pos-
sible. It is easy to confuse desire and the memory trace of the same desire so 
that we think one may desire what one believes to be impossible only because 
it once was possible. In this way my beliefs constrain what I can desire.
Often my negative beliefs turn my desires into their wishful counterfactual 
versions. Desire is different from wish that also depends on beliefs, but in a 
different manner. Wish and desire are two different kinds of propositional 
9 See J.P. Day, Hope: A Philosophical Inquiry. Helsinki: Acta Philosophica Fennica 51, 1991.
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 attitudes. The main point is that wish is a modest and resigned mental state 
when desire has immodest urgency whether it is a mental state or episode. 
When I want I want the world change, which sounds like a demand on the 
world. As such desire is an immodest attitude while wish is modest. Wish 
means that I want a kind of blessing to fall upon me; desiring sometimes 
means that I would act if I could and hence force the ways of the world to 
change their direction. For this reason, perhaps, new information that changes 
my belief alters wish and desire in such a dissimilar manner. It is much harder 
to kill a wish than a desire, if we mean rational desire. In many cases a change 
of beliefs does not kill the desire but changes it into an epistemically irrational 
fantasy wish. Of course such a wish may be practically functional, too.
Let me specify the relationship between desire and hope. The point is, when 
I desire I necessarily hope to get the object. This is another way of saying that 
one cannot desire an impossible object because then I cannot hope to get it. 
I hope all goes well even when the evidence fails to fully support the idea. Hope 
has its independent psychological status but it also has a status that is condi-
tional on desire. The standard schema concerning conditional hope is,
I want/desire X and thus I hope I will get X, when I believe I have less than 
conclusive reasons to expect X to happen.
Some desires are action relevant and some are not. For instance, I want to walk 
back home just now, and I want her to love me for ever. The first sentence refers 
to action and thus entails action, but this is a special case. The second type of 
sentence expresses a non-actionist desire. Suppose I am in a burning house 
and I know that my neighbours are trapped in their apartment, too. I know that 
if the fire brigade saves me first my chances of survival are good and otherwise 
considerably less good. I cannot influence their choice and so I hope they will 
come my way first. I also want them to save me first. But how do I draw the dis-
tinction between hope and desire in this case? I may think that I can mention 
some good reasons why I should be saved first. My hope has strong support. 
I can insist on being saved first. However, if I believe that their right choice 
is a random one my relevant mental state is still that of hope – if I believe it 
is possible that they may save me first. We can read the narrative in the same 
way in the case of lovers: I think good reasons exist why she should love me 
and choose me before other men. If I am on a life-boat out on the ocean and 
I believe many shipping routes exist around where I am, I hope for my rescue. 
I can even say they should come soon. After I realize this is not going to hap-
pen, I only can wish for a miracle. In this way it is possible to draw a line be-
tween wish, hope, and desire. Of course this is not a line between natural 
kinds but rather a pragmatic linguistic convention. Look at the following 
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two propositions which illustrate the two ways we tend to use the concept of 
hope:
I desire X but after I realize I should not expect to get it, I have no hope, 
and only a wish remains.
Or,
I still hope that X but I realize it is unrealistic to expect X to happen.
In the second case hope resembles wishful thinking because it is independent 
of reasons. I do not expect X to happen but still I hope it will. In the first case I 
surrender hope. Dante’s famous “Abandon hope all ye who enter here” entails 
hopelessness in an impossible predicament where one no longer desires. This 
is a third case because now the loss of hope entails apathy or a kind of mental 
collapse after which I feel nothing and live without motivation to live.
 Hermeneutical Considerations
Should I entertain accurate beliefs concerning what I desire, when I desire? 
Can I have unconscious desires in the sense that I have no relevant beliefs or 
wrong beliefs on what I desire? Let us consider the following: my current desire 
is influenced by my belief on what I get when the world changes; should the 
prediction of what will happen be accurate on the basis of what I now believe 
concerning the case? The answer may be no, given that some of my desires are 
unconscious; yet, I do not think we need to talk about unconscious if we can 
explain the relevant phenomena by referring to some hermeneutical consid-
erations.10 The point is, desires are semantically complex mental entities. To 
speak of the intentional objects of desire as if they were automatically well-
defined is misleading. If we do not admit this we will soon be in trouble. One 
should ask, what do you hope to get when you desire an object?
Unconscious means that some of our desires are outside the range of our 
beliefs and reasoning. We do not know even that they exist. It is a dramatic 
concept with certain historical credibility but it should be avoided anyway.11 
This is done by reading the relevant cases in an analytical manner; in other 
10 D. Davidson, “Paradoxes of Irrationality.” In Philosophical Essays on Freud, R. Wollheim 
and J. Hopkins (Eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 289–305. David-
son thinks that our model of mind must somehow be partitioned or layered.
11 The full story is told in H.F. Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious. New York: Basic 
Books, 1970.
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words, we need not postulate any dubious, hidden entities or mental black 
boxes. Suppose I want to kill Bill but the Bride does it before me. I am not satis-
fied or am I? Let us say I am satisfied. How can that be when the Bride robbed 
me of the chance to do what I wanted? Obviously I wanted Bill dead and my 
conscious idea of wanting to kill Bill referred to my need to do so in order to 
reach my desired goal, a dead Bill. So, when I say I want to kill Bill I refer to my 
need to do so. As we know desires and needs are ambiguous in this way. We 
can then assume that a dead Bill is not only desired but as well needed because 
the final and ultimate desire is to get justice through revenge, or perhaps it is 
related to the demands of cosmic justice – there our search of the ultimate de-
sire vanishes into some narrative metaphoric thickets. Anyway, we can ask why 
we need the concept of unconscious in this case – we do not. Instead, we can 
explain what happens in this case by using the concepts of need and desire: 
I need to kill Bill if I want him dead. But then the Bride kills him and my desire 
is satisfied and I am contented. This is only one example of course but it shows 
how the distinction between needs and desires can be utilized.12
What should we know about desire and what do we desire when desire is 
rational? Let us start from some methodological considerations and then try 
to answer the question. When one reviews the relevant literature on desire, 
one soon notices that the definitions of desire are simple or very simple, for in-
stance, desire is a generic pro-attitude towards some states of affairs. One may 
think that it is enough to mention some key necessary conditions of how to 
use the concept. This is obviously fine if you use desire as an explanans when 
you, say, deal with the explanation of action, or action as explanandum. But 
the same does not do if you want to treat desire as an explanandum; in that 
case you need to focus on some sufficient conditions as well, and of course you 
worry about the argument that desire really is a cluster concept in a Wittgen-
steinian sense. Be that as it may, we should be able to specify what we desire 
when we desire, which may sound like a reasonable requirement.
If we understand desire as involving the attraction or the pull of desirable 
states of affairs it may sound like a good idea to come to know what they are. If 
desire is understood as a motivated push or a drive in the direction of the ob-
ject, the situation may change. If I want ice cream because this desirable item 
attracts or pulls me towards itself, I may well ask why it does so. I ask for the 
12 Sigmund Freud of course speaks about wish-fulfilment (Wunsh), which is not quite the 
same as desire. Wish-fulfilment is not the same as realizing a desire. Wishes are too close-
ly connected to fantasy and imagination: I wish I were dead does not entail the same 
desire. See T. Pataki, Wish-fulfilment in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. London: Routledge, 
2014, pp. 4–5.
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relevant motivating reasons.13 If, on the contrary, my ice cream-eating- motive 
pushes me towards a near-by ice cream parlour, I wonder what the drive mech-
anisms behind it might be. I may even ask, what is wrong with me, like an 
addict should do. In her case the strength of the drive mechanism bypasses 
the reasoned decision making. Here we are interested only in the pull-cases, 
though.
If you want to plan your life, or give it a proper direction, and not to get 
disappointed too often, you need to know what you really want. This is to say 
you need to acquire and entertain correct and complete beliefs, or clear and 
distinct ideas, concerning your desires and their objects. All this may look easy. 
I want ice cream so what I desire, or the intentional object, is ice cream. When 
I get my ice cream I get what I wanted and all is well; my desire is satisfied and 
in this case also extinguished. I no longer want ice cream because one cannot 
desire what one already has. After eating it you may even hate ice cream but 
that is another thing. However, from the explanandum’s side the problem does 
not look so simple, if you bother to give it some serious thought. Why do I want 
ice cream and not something else, why do I want it just now, ice cream is not 
exactly health food yet I crave after it? I want to be successful in life – what do I 
want? This is an example of such complex cases that are seldom mentioned at 
the analytical level. What about “I want wine” – what exactly do I want? When 
I try to understand myself and plan my future life answers to such questions as 
these sound important and even essential. Now, at least two approaches to my 
hermeneutical questions are possible: disambiguation and explanation. An 
example of the first task is clarification of what I want when I want wine and 
of the second an account of the reasons behind “I want that you buy me ice 
cream.” Moreover, we need to decide what we want to do about such complex 
cases as “I want to be successful in life.” I suggest that the methods of clarifica-
tion of the simple cases can be applied to the complex cases as well.
“I want wine” requires something one may call propositionalization so that 
we see what is going on. To do this we need to use the details of the context 
where the desire occurs. I may want to drink wine or to drink more wine; I may 
want to buy wine or to own wine. Suppose I considered expanding my invest-
ment portfolio when I say I want wine, that is, I want to invest in fine wine. 
Perhaps I never drink wine or buy wine but yet I want wine. Here the problem 
that concerns some distant third-person audiences who have no access to the 
13 As A. Goldman puts it, desires are not motives, instead he says they are “states of being 
motivated,” in his Reasons from Within: Desires and Value. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009, p. 7, also p. 87. I do not think the quoted idea is valid. See also J.M. Russell, 
“Desires Don’t Cause Actions,” Journal of Mind and Behavior 5 (1984), 1–10.
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details of my case. The desire and its expression occur in a given social situa-
tion where the disambiguation is normally easy, although difficult cases exist, 
too. A man tells a woman, I want you, and no one is immediately clear whether 
he wants a one-night stand or something like commitment. In such a case the 
person’s own beliefs about the case are decisive, if he has any beliefs about it. 
In many cases the person himself has no clear picture of what he means when 
he says it, and this gives rise to all kinds of post factum and ad hoc elucida-
tions and even apologies. Yet the rule is that by considering his own reasons in 
the situation the agent can form correct beliefs on them. If problems remain, 
which often is the case, they depend on the second hermeneutical problem, 
that is, explanation. To put it figuratively, explanatory reasons are sometimes 
so deep that one has difficulties following the line of reasoning that leads to 
the ultimate values. Let us see what this means in detail.
Now, an expression of desire always reveals a proposition that mentions 
what is desired, or the expression should be disambiguated so that this hap-
pens. As we already have seen, what is desired forms a chain of needs and 
desires whose terms are relative to the direction from which they are viewed: 
from above they are needs (instrumental) and from below desires (goals).14 
I also said that there is at the top end of this chain an ultimate desire that is 
as well the final and conclusive reason for desiring. Actually, all the reasons 
that explain the desires in the chain are desires, from the point of view of the 
agent. The key question is, then, what the agent may and should believe about 
them. It is easy to say that he should know them all but as we will see, this is 
pragmatically a dubious conclusion. The requirement is exaggerated and as 
such impractical.
Suppose you want wine because you want to diversify your investment port-
folio; again this may mean more secure or more profitable – let us say more 
secure. It may now sound unnecessary to ask why, but we can continue by say-
ing that you want to relax and sleep better. This is a figure of speech everybody 
can interpret; moreover, at this stage we may feel nothing can be added to the 
case. This is the final and ultimate desire here, or is it the final interpretation 
of the first desire to invest in a certain way? The question is: do we have one 
or more desires here? I would say we have one desire and its several readings, 
or in this case to want wine and to sleep well form one stratified desire or a 
system where wine is given the position of instrumental need. Yet, I say simply 
I want wine.
I want ice cream because it is summer and my dad used to buy me some 
during the best summers of my life when I still was truly happy. What do I want 
14 See also, Airaksinen, 2012.  
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now? It seems I want all that the narrative describes including ice cream but 
not ice cream simpliciter. The de dicto version of my desire now appears in 
full glory. My first and simple desire is for ice cream, but then I can formulate 
my full desire on its basis: to relive the best summers of my life. “I want to be 
successful” can first be disambiguated thus: I want that I achieve great things 
so that I am admired; or, I achieve something in life that is admirably great. 
This desire is explained by other desires located higher in the chain: I want to 
show that I am a great person, then I want to be the best of my kin, and finally I 
want to show that the way they treated me when I was a child was outrageously 
unjust. The development of such an explanatory chain of desires show that the 
initial desire is never what is really desired. It is also true that any link in the 
chain, except the last one, may not be independently desirable to the person. 
She may not care for ice cream as such but desires it anyway, on the condition 
that she needs it for starting her desire narrative. She desires it instrumentally. 
The highest level items in the desire chain are quite general and often meta-
phoric items whose effects then start resembling wish-fulfilment. Ice cream 
that is bought in the summer may make you happy in this sense. Perhaps sat-
isfied desires always make you happy? You want to eat ice cream so that your 
childhood summer memories would return. When they arrive they satisfy your 
wish in the sense that you wanted them back. At the same time this memory 
is a surrogate of the summer itself, so that you get the summer back. In other 
words, this memory and the summer together form a metonymic pair.
The lesson to learn is this, in simple cases we can follow the chain of desires 
all the way to the top with little trouble, unlike in the complex cases where 
the higher desires get too fuzzy all too quickly. Therefore, the likelihood of the 
agent herself having valid beliefs about them is small. She may have some be-
liefs concerning why she wants what she wants, when the desire is vague and 
complex, but that is all. Perhaps she does not need more because the original 
formulation of the need in question is a kind of sign-post that indicates the 
direction she wants and expects her future life to take. In simple cases, if I 
want ice cream why does it matter what else I desire in this connection? The 
agent may have quite limited interests in knowing what she really wants, at 
least in normal cases, or as we also may put it, in innocent and harmless cases. 
I have my beliefs concerning ice cream, its taste and its effects on me, and that 
seems enough. Why would I start thinking of deeper motives in such an in-
nocent case? I may be worried about my current desire if it is too urgent, say, 
to be successful, and then I may ask and explore why I am so keen on success. 
Many desires worry us and our society as well, so that I may feel that a look at 
the deeper level of my desires is appropriate or even necessary. Alternatively, 
I may be too anxious to do so. Some desires and the related ideas of desirability 
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are scary. In many cases, of course, I deny what I find there, or I even deny that 
such a deeper level exists. Such beliefs are self-deceptive.
We may now safely say that a person believes that her expressed desires 
have their explanations based on some higher level desires, which reduce the 
original desire into a mere need and occasionally explain why what I seeming-
ly desire is not prima facie attractive or likeable for me. As we will see, moral 
cases are especially relevant in this sense. It must be kept in mind that desires 
are a general source of personal anxiety and always strictly controlled in cul-
ture and society. The worry is that the higher level desires may reveal some-
thing that is shameful, improper, perverted, indecent, sick, abnormal, cursed, 
or immoral, or any combination of these. The second worry is that my needs 
or instrumental desires may look undesirable when I understand them as un-
conditional desires. I disapprove of alcohol but I now notice I need it and thus 
I say “I want alcohol.”
 Moral Beliefs
Here the dogma of directionality or the direction of fit makes a return: beliefs 
about the value and acceptability of what we desire restrict what we desire. 
This may show that desires are not independent of certain types of belief, or 
that desires ultimately behave like beliefs, all things considered. Here we dis-
tinguish between two possibilities: a negative belief concerning a given de-
sire, first, restricts its acceptability and the area of application, and, second, 
changes the desire itself. The difference is, of course, that in the first case belief 
does not touch the desire unlike in the second case. Perhaps we can say that in 
the first case the belief/desire relationship is external and in the second case 
internal; obviously the internal case presents a more convincing threat to the 
direction of fit thesis. How it does it is not immediately clear, though.
We may call bad desires normatively inadmissible, which means that they 
must be rejected or at least modified according to what we believe about the 
desire and the world before and after we witness the desired change of the ac-
tual world. In fact, many desires and classes of desire are inadmissible, includ-
ing some or all instances of violent, criminal, sexual, and perverted desires. 
I may believe my desire is inadmissible in the sense that after its satisfaction 
the world has changed into a direction that displays not only a marked loss of 
utility but also a violation of norms that I want to support and sustain. Those 
norms may be essential to me and my image of my own personhood. If the rel-
evant desire cannot be changed, which is quite possible, I must drop it from my 
portfolio of desires. This is what I want to say: an inadmissible desire is not a 
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possible desire, as the agent sees it. Of course, many fuzzy cases come up in the 
course of real life but in morally relevant cases they should not be left as such. 
On the contrary, we must de-fuzzify them and make a firm decision whether 
a given desire is admissible or not. This is clear especially when we consid-
er actionist desires, that is, desires that invite a change of the world though 
my intentional action. Many desires are non-actionist of course, for instance, 
“I want her to love me” or “I want better service in that restaurant.” In both 
cases I am impotent.
Now, the crucial questions are, first, do my moral beliefs restrict my non-
actionist desires and, second, do they restrict my desires as I entertain them 
in thought, imagination, and planning? This is analogous to the problem of 
whether non-actionist desires can be inadmissible. We observe that the cases 
above blend together when actionist desires drop out, in the following way. In 
the actionist cases, one may restrict or ban the action but keep the relevant 
desires intact, even if they were in some sense bad. It is possible that in non-
actionist cases some desires are inadmissible in the sense that they should not 
be entertained at all, or they should be rejected and forgotten. This is to say 
that you cannot, with clear conscience, sit and wait something bad and evil 
to happen, which also is what you desire, even if it is not of your own making. 
One can immediately ask, can you prevent that change of the world? If you 
can and do nothing, we meet a bad Samaritarian, but let us bypass it.15 Instead, 
we should discuss the stronger case in which I can do nothing to influence 
the bad situation – what then? I want you to die as painfully as possible, then 
you die of a horrible case of cancer; I am gratified and because of this also 
elated and happy. Should I think such desires are admissible? This example is 
closely related to banning the desires that are merely thought of, like Sigmund 
Freud’s fantasy wish-fulfilment, with no anticipation of any actual change of 
the world. A person may well suffer because of knowing that they are inadmis-
sible. Bad thoughts and along with them non-actionist desires may torture a 
person and thus imply a need of psychotherapy.
Perhaps Freud can help us here. His narrative accounts of his patient’s prob-
lems are full of cases where they entertain mere wishes and still grossly suffer 
from their inadmissible nature. They fantasize in ways that corrupt and ulti-
mately destroy their mental health. I cannot go any deeper into these issues, 
for obvious reasons. However, the following point is important: a healthy per-
son learns to control her desires as well as her thoughts, imagination, wishes, 
fantasies, etc. We really believe that we are responsible for our inadmissible 
thoughts, sometimes unreasonably sometimes not. Also, we educate young 
15 See J. Feinberg, Harm to Others. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, Ch. 4.
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
Chapter 244
<UN>
people not to fantasize about wrong things and certainly not formulate bad 
desires because we think this actually increases the likelihood becoming a cor-
rupt person in the future. Nobody knows what we think and quietly desire but 
yet we should control it as if our inner world were not private. We are social 
animals, which goes a long way in explaining these facts. Many religious ide-
ologies emphasize something they call the purity of thought and soul, which 
presupposes the inadmissibility of bad thoughts.
This is to say, when we desire our desires are internally related to our beliefs 
concerning their admissibility and inadmissibility; they are not independent 
of the beliefs.16 Another and similar case is the evaluation of desire as to its 
basic realizability as well as the consequences of its actual realization. Suppose 
I want wine in the sense that I want to drink wine now. Such a desire, like all 
desires, is by its nature unrestricted or in a figurative sense infinite. In a social-
normative vacuum, I want all I can possibly get, which can be called the om-
nipotence of desire – which certainly is socially an unrealistic and dangerous 
idea. I want her, in the sense that I want she is my wife; such a desire, when it is 
infinite, is too demanding and for her scary. I cannot want all of her, whatever 
that may mean. I may also want and get a part of her, that part that is specified 
by the social institution of marriage, or perhaps even less. All I can hope to get 
of her is a part, or a minimal part of an autonomous and free person. Analo-
gously with the case of wine I must have an idea what I may get and why. In 
this way I condemn, on the basis of my beliefs and consequent deliberations, 
the original infinite desire as inadmissible; yet, its suitably restricted part is 
admissible.
I can drink some wine and marry the woman of my dreams; moreover, I can 
hope all is well because my beliefs that regulate my desires are accurate and 
form a good deliberative basis. I know how to fit my desire to the world. Actual-
ly, I learn early in my life that infinite desires, whether they are actionist or not, 
make me anxious and disappointed and thus should be avoided. Think about 
the following non-actionist case: I want Bill dead when this desire is infinite. 
I do not restrict it any way as I really want him dead. I am not a murderer, so I 
wait and hope. I make inquiries about his life and try to find some evidence of 
his imminent death. This ruins my own life and makes me unhappy, so I must 
push such a desire into the background thickets of my imagination and more 
or less try to forget it. It does not fit the world that is so unwieldy. Therefore, 
I must admit that the omnipotence of desire is not only an invalid but also a 
dangerous idea. You never can have it all or all of it, so you must not desire it. 
16 See also, T. Airaksinen, “Psychology of Desire and the Pragmatics of Betterment.” In Prag-
matism and Objectivity, S. Pihlström (Ed.). London: Routledge, 2017, pp. 223–238.
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If you desire it, you must carefully restrict your desire so that it fits the world. 
You must acquire valid beliefs about what is right and wrong in the world, how 
it works, and what can be expected to happen. Hence, you must teach yourself 
how to restrict desires on the basis of beliefs, and this applies to all kinds of de-
sires. Also, society expects it and may not tolerate too many unreasonable ex-
cursions by you into the field of infinite desires characterized by omnipotence 
fantasies. Moral education is another name for this process by means of which 
we make desires conform to the world. Desires must fit the world.
 The Demise of Directionality
Desires are supposed to place a demand on the world by asking it to change ac-
cording to what the person thinks is desirable. As I said above, two alternatives 
apply here. First, I desire what I desire and then I legislate on it on the grounds 
of what I believe about the world, my desires, myself, ethics, and other relevant 
things. This keeps desire and belief as two separate categories. In other words, 
I restrict, on the basis of my beliefs, what I desire. This however does not tell us 
much new about desire and its directionality. Beliefs should accurately reflect 
and represent the world and desires place their corrected demands on it.
Second, desire represents the world in a certain way, and this violates the 
postulate of its unidirectionality, or its typical direction of fit. It is no longer 
the case that desire insists on a certain type of world because now desire, along 
with belief, must fit the world, too. When I desire I hope, suppose, or insist 
that the world can and will change in a certain desirable way but I also realize 
that my desire must fit the world in order to be possible and admissible. Oth-
erwise I terminate it and move on to replace it with something else. This is to 
say that desire itself contains a representative element, which is dependent on 
beliefs that are internally related to the desire in question. The simplest case 
is, of course, a desire whose realization I believe is impossible. This makes the 
desire impossible. Suppose I cannot formulate a clear idea of what I desire 
or I do not know what I want, therefore my desire is, in this sense, semanti-
cally inadmissible. Moral beliefs constitute, however, the strongest examples: 
I want Bill dead but I believe this is wrong – the desire is inadmissible. The rea-
son for this is that the belief in question puts a wrong type of demand on the 
world. Moral beliefs are special in this respect: they both represent the world 
and legislate on it by making a demand on how the world should be. In this 
case the world should be such that Bill lives. My normative belief makes my 
desire inadmissible by at the same time conflicting with my desire and having 
an overriding status. Notice that all these conclusions presuppose the validity 
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of the analysis of the internal relationship of belief and desire. This very fact 
gives desire its representative character. Desire must fit the world as well as 
the world must fit the desire. Desires that do not fit the world are inadmissible 
and should be dropped from one’s portfolio of desire. We can, via possible and 
admissible desires, read how the world is and how it can be.
Let me consider the last simple examples. I want ice cream in the sense that 
I want to eat ice cream now. Moreover, I want to eat only one cone because I 
believe the second helping is too much, so that such a desire becomes inadmis-
sible. In this way my current desire takes into account the fact that too much of 
the good stuff is bad for me and a fortiori undesirable. In this way, my second 
desire represents the world according to my normative beliefs: it represents 
the world of excess. Suppose I want to kill Bill. The realization of this desire 
creates a possible world that I cannot accept, or the world of murder and may-
hem. Hence, I struggle against the desire that represents such a bad world. It is 
not the case that first I formulate an infinite desire and then restrict it; on the 
contrary, I formulate the desire in such a way that it respects the nature of the 
world where I hope it can and will be realized. Omnipotent fantasy wishes are 
another thing, of course. In this sense well-formed desires represent the world 
in which they can be satisfied. By looking at my well-formed desires you can 
tell something about the world. Does this answer Wollheim’s challenge? Does 
the total collection of my desires represent a certain world or at least a certain 
type of world? A mature, well informed, and independent person has a portfo-
lio of desires that go a long way into that direction.
In sum: I often struggle against desire, which is to say I do not accept the 
possible world that is entailed by satisfied desires. Those desires do not fit the 
world I want to create, accept, and occupy. Suppose I desire A which entails a 
possible world that exemplifies something I do not accept and, therefore, I do 
not accept the world A represents. It follows that I replace A with B, which I 
can accept. The crucial fact is that in such a case my desire, that is desire for B, 
depends on how the world is. My desire for A does not fit the world as it should 
in order to be admissible. A represents a wrong world. Certainly desires are 
dependent on beliefs concerning the possible world they represent but desire 
for A is a wrong type of desire that tries to change the world but is not allowed 
to do so. A simply represents a bad world. Desires can tell us how the world is.
∵
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Chapter 3
Push and Pull Theories of Desire
The basic idea of this paper is as follows: there are two different approaches to 
desire, first, an externalist, naturalistic, and causalistic and, second, an inter-
nalist, normative and cognitivist approach. The first approach considers the 
motivational push essential when the second concentrates on the pull of desir-
ability. In other words, an agent is driven by a drive or he is attracted by the in-
tentional object of desire. I will indicate how to combine these two approach-
es. Also, I will show how all this helps us understand the variable strengths of 
desire. This is a difficult and somehow intractable problem. I utilize first F.H. 
Bradley’s interesting analysis of desire in his unduly neglected Ethical Studies 
(2. edition, 1927) and then move on to Bertrand Russell’s account of a pseudo-
naturalistic type of a push theory in his classical The Analysis of Mind (1921). 
Russell develops interesting and challenging ideas for example concerning un-
conscious desire and human happiness.
 Background Checks
Kant in his Metaphysics of Morals writes rather enigmatically, “Lust is called 
unnatural if one is aroused to it not by a real object but by his imagining it, 
so that he himself creates one, contrary to natural purpose; for in this way 
imagination brings forth a desire contrary to nature’s end.” Unnatural love is 
a “violation of duty to oneself.”1 As I read this, unnatural desire is a matter of 
pull and natural of push. An example of the latter is hunger that makes you ori-
ented towards nourishment (natural object), and of the former a gourmand’s 
imagination that creates desirable illusions of fine dishes (unnatural object). 
You should do what is right, which pushes you in the natural direction and 
turns you away from fantasies – these are as empty and unpredictable as they 
are haphazard. Natural desires do not depend on imagination, or if imagina-
tion is involved, it emerges automatically, that is, without implying the agent’s 
personal contribution. We do not say the agent actively imagines; we say some 
images appear to him. This is a push theory of desire. The problem is that many 
instances of push are dangerous and unethical. The agent may be aroused by 
1 I. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals. Tr. M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1797/1966, 6:425. Cf. Kant’s definition of desire, 6:211.
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not so laudable objects such as violence and murder. Be this as it may, we say 
natural desires depend on a special class of push generated mental states and 
processes.
Perhaps the easiest way to distinguish between the push and pull theories 
of desire is to use Thomas Nagel´s distinction between motivated and unmoti-
vated desires. Push theories deal with unmotivated desires. Nagel says the for-
mer “assail us” but the latter are “arrived at by decision and after deliberation.”2 
The first description is given in terms of a metaphor (assail), which seems to 
be apt but at the same time incongruent with the second, perfectly literary 
or metonymic idea (deliberation and decision). My suggestion is to say that 
the push theories work without reasons and pull theories utilize reasons that 
allow one to identify an object as desirable. Think about the desire to eat. My 
relevant bodily deprivation pushes or drives me towards food and eating: if I 
believe it is food I make an attempt to eat it. But suppose the food is repulsive, 
or not desirable, which may well stop the drive. Obviously, the push and pull 
are not fully independent of each other, except if hunger is very strong. This 
does not refute the idea that push desire fails to employ reasons – the point is, 
the source of desire is elsewhere and reasons are just side-constraints.
The next question is, what should we say about Nagel’s idea of decision and 
deliberation? The idea of deliberation may sound odd in this context: nor-
mally, the emergence of desire does not depend on deliberation although the 
selection of its object may show an influence of deliberation. I want a new car 
and then I choose the brand and the individual vehicle after deliberating it. 
Finally, I tell the sales person I want this particular vehicle. This may be true 
but we may still ask, can I decide on the basis of deliberation that I want a new 
car? Suppose I want a new car because my old is a wreck, it stopped working, 
and I need a car. Thus, I have my perfectly good reasons for wanting a new car. 
When I deliberate my situation, I notice that I want a new car, but to say that 
I decide to desire a new car is certainly beside the point. The relevant desire 
hits me when I notice that I have my reasons that make a new car a desirable 
proposition. De dicto, I want a new car on the basis of my considerations or 
deliberations of the desirability of a new car in my current life situation. But, 
de re, I do not have an object of desire yet. It is impossible to go and buy a car 
simpliciter. If you go to a dealership and say “I want one new car, please,” they 
will think you are out of your mind. Now you must make a decision concerning 
exactly what kind of car you want. I wonder if this de re case is what Nagel has 
2 T. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979. See the discussion 
by G.E. Schueler, Desire. Cambridge, MA: mit Press, 1995, pp. 16–17.
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in mind? You need to reach a stage in the life of the desire when you are able 
to say, “I want this vehicle” and point to it. Next, you may or may not form an 
intention to buy it. Its price tag may stop you from buying it.
I am not sure, however, at what stage the decision comes into the picture, 
at the level of de re desire or the intention to buy a particular vehicle. I sus-
pect the correct idea is to say that intention and deliberation belong together, 
which is to say that the de re desire may not be based on a decision. You work 
your way through all the alternatives until you find what you want and then 
it is time to decide whether to buy it or not, which means an intention to buy 
or no intention at all.3 What has happened is that you start with your de dicto 
desire and the relevant desirability conditions, you specify them step by step 
until you have a definite description of a relevant object, and there you have a 
de re object of desire. Notice that you work all the time at the level of desirabil-
ity conditions and only in a secondary sense at the level of desires. Desires as 
if emerge because of the given desirability conditions, given the relevant, com-
plex beliefs concerning the situation. In this perspective, we might invoke the 
idea of supervenience: desire supervenes on the desirability conditions of its 
intentional object plus the beliefs concerning the relevant background facts. 
Of course, Nagel is correct if he says you can deliberate on the desirability con-
ditions, not always but at least sometimes. Some of them just appear to you or 
are undeniable, like beauty, pleasure, and intuitive moral goodness. A beautiful 
object is intrinsically desirable; whether you desire it or not depends on your 
beliefs concerning the case. You cannot decide whether beauty is desirable or 
not and neither can you decide on what you believe. Of course, you may de-
liberate on whether the object is truly beautiful and whether your beliefs are 
valid, but that is all. In sum: I follow the Nagel’s lead by saying that push theo-
ries need not mention reasons unlike pull theories. Pull desires are motivated 
because they are dependent of their desirability conditions.
Now, the key problem concerning any naturalistic push theory of desire 
concerns actions; the pull theories of desire have no essential connection to 
action or bodily behaviour. I can desire in situations where action is not pos-
sible. For instance, my desire entails an intention not to act or to stay passive. 
Push theories, on the contrary, look as if they were necessarily action oriented, 
or are they? Desire, as such, is not a motive for action, and thus if push theory 
is going to be a theory of desire, it must allow for push without action. This is to 
say some push desires or drives have only mental consequences just like some 
pull desires that only shape one’s mental landscape. Of course, push desire can 
3 On desire and intention, see my “An Introduction to Desire,” Homo Oeconomicus 31 (2014), 
447–461, pp. 449–450.
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do the same. Here we need to imagine a case in which one does not refrain 
from action merely because of one’s beliefs, for instance, that the action is too 
costly. We need an example of a case where action is impossible because of 
its description; the description is then intrinsically non-actionist. An example 
of the first case is, “I was hungry but I did not start eating because the top dog 
wanted food.” I am not sure good examples of the second case exist; all the 
possible cases look actionist in nature, like “I am afraid of him and therefore 
I want to be quiet.” Notice that you need not deliberate your fear that brings 
about quiescence. This is an actionist case in disguise. Perhaps this works: 
“I want Bill dead,” uttered by a person who is deeply committed to non-violence 
but who passionately hates Bill. Now his hatred brings about the push towards 
the death of Bill as the object of his desire. Yet, I do not want to kill Bill. In what 
follows, I suppose drives are desires along with the motivated pull desires. 
I will specify the relation between the two types of desire at the end of this 
paper.4
A good example of actionist push theory of desire comes from F.H. Bradley, 
who writes in his Ethical Studies,
The essence of desire for an object would thus be the feeling of our af-
firmation in the idea of something not ourself, felt against our feeling of 
ourself as, without the object, void and negated; and it is the tension of 
this relation which produces motion.5
I call this definition negative, actionist, and semi-naturalistic. The definition 
also makes explicit a traditional, actually Platonic, but today often neglected 
problem, namely, whether the proper object of desire is positive or negative. 
Most philosophers today seem to think that desire is dependent on something 
positive whereas the tradition says it is all negative. A person is not complete 
without the object of desire, and therefore, when she believes this is the case 
she also desires the object, or she is driven to desire the object. Bradley’s defi-
nition above is Platonic in that he speaks of the inner void and personal nega-
tion in the sense that what I lack is, metaphorically, like an open gash in my 
soul. If I desire something that logically entails that I miss it or I do not have 
it. Moreover, this lack is anxious, or the person feels she is “void and negated.” 
We cannot desire what we already have, this is true, and hence I always de-
sire what I do not have. But this is not all that Bradley and the Platonists say. 
4 Aristotle systematically distinguishes between push and pull theories, or irrational and ratio-
nal desires; see G. Pearson, Aristotle on Desire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 
p. 201.
5 F.H. Bradley, Ethical Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927, p. 68.
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They  drastically simplify the idea of what a person does not have by making 
the lack categorical in the sense that without it the person is not what she 
should be. This is an oversimplification as the lack may as well be relative and 
conditional.
Suppose I want money. Does this fact logically entail that I (categorically) 
do not have money and, hence, this is the reason why I want it? If this is so, 
my categorical lack of money is a negative state of affairs that psychological-
ly speaking indicates an anxious mental state, which I need to attend to and 
also amend. When the world changes favourably and I get money the mental 
disturbance vanishes, which is to say the relevant desire is satisfied. An obvi-
ous problem then arises, namely, my lack of money is a problem only if I find 
money desirable and I desire money. This makes the lack conditional on a de-
sire. If I do not desire money, however good and desirable I may find moneyed 
existence, I am fine even when I do not have money, which is to say that the 
idea of the negatively characterized object of desire is problematic to the core. 
In other words, the categorical negative characterization of the lack of money 
itself cannot be a part of the definition of the relevant desire. We need a condi-
tional characterization, that is, lack of money is bad only on the condition that 
you want money. The idea of lack logically entails a relevant desire when we 
mean a painful or otherwise disturbing deficiency. Looking back to Bradley´s 
definition, I certainly do not want to be “void and negated”; on the contrary, 
I want to be fully and positively recognized or recognizable.
What happens when I have money and I still want more money? In this 
case the lack of money is relative and conditional. If I already have money 
I cannot want money simpliciter, because you cannot want what you have, 
but I can want more money. In a way, I lack money but only in a relative sense. 
Also, if I want more money than I already have the previous logical problem 
concerning the characterization of lack does not matter. Now I have money 
and I want more of it: I want more only if I want money; if I want money, 
I want more money. This is unproblematic. To want more looks like a positive 
characterization although it also implies a relative lack. Therefore, I can still 
say I lack money, that is, the money that I now want. A rich man thinks he 
sorely lacks something, that is, more money. If he had enough he would not 
want more, as he may argue, but because he still lacks so much, compared to 
what is enough, he wants more. This example shows that the problem of the 
negative or positive characterization of the desired change of the world is a 
bogus problem. The difference between them is semantic or stipulative. More 
money or love is always a good thing as such but on the other hand it entails 
a definite and permanent but relative lack of the good thing. This looks like 
paradox: as long as you desire you must feel that you are missing something, 
although you just want more of it. Your desire for one more million or an extra 
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lover is not an expression of real lack of something good; what you want is 
more of the good thing. A major difference obtains between a person who has 
no money or love and the person who has plenty but never enough. What we 
see here is something like greed in action. Therefore, both Bradley and, as we 
will see, Russell are wrong, however different their philosophical perspectives 
may ultimately be.
Another way of putting the same point concerning the positive and nega-
tive characterizations of desire is in terms of enjoyment and felt relief. Some-
times you desire an object that brings you pure enjoyment, like a new car, or 
you may serve and satisfy your greed by getting more money. Sometimes you 
aim at equilibrium, as in the case where lack of love troubles you and therefore 
you want to find love. The result is relief. In this way the aim of your positive 
desire is enjoyment and negative desire relief, which in itself is an emotionally 
neutral mental episode.
How does Bradley’s theory deal with the problem of desirability and its rela-
tion to actual desiring? The problem is that one can desire anything, includ-
ing perhaps harming oneself.6 Some philosophers have explained desirability 
in terms of pleasure, value, or reward. Accordingly, one finds an object worth 
desiring because one hopes to find pleasure, the object appears to be valu-
able, or it is believed to be rewarding as such. To hurt one’s enemy may not 
be valuable or even pleasurable but it certainly is rewarding. Binge drinking 
of alcohol may bring about pleasure even if it is not rewarding as such and 
hardly valuable either. To donate money for the poor is not pleasant but it may 
be rewarding, and it certainly is valuable. Such considerations prove nothing, 
though, since for instance Bradley refers to the tension within that drives the 
agent to move and act on her desire in order to relieve the tension, as he calls it. 
All kinds of potential sources of tension exist but some of them become actual 
and even urgent so that they bring about action. It is hardly necessary to adopt 
Bradley’s simple actionism without qualifications. According to his theory, the 
goal of desiring is to remove a felt tension that is a type of mental pain. There-
fore, the object of desire is pain reduction – I already argued against such an 
idea.
What brings about desire, according to Bradley, is not the desirable object as 
such; what brings about desire is the lack of the object or the fact that I do not 
possess it. I focus on the object more or less clearly, at least so clearly that I can 
6 See H. Pickard, “Self-Harm as Violence: When Victim and Perpetrator Are One.” In Women 
and Violence: The Agency of Victims and Perpetrators, H. Widdows and H. Marway (Eds.). Lon-
don: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp. 71–90; and M. Stocker, “Desiring the Bad: An Essay on 
Moral Psychology,” Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979), 738–753.
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see what I miss – this is painful and then my desire emerges. Notice that this 
explanation does not apply to small and personally insignificant types of lack. 
Yet, when told in this way the push theoretical narrative is naturalistic or in 
this sense causalistic: I aim at something I believe to be desirable and I feel the 
void when I face the lack or the loss of the object. This I experience as mental 
tension that feels like pain and finally I formulate a desire that may lead to ac-
tion, the context allowing. Also notice Bradley’s account of desirability: I find 
desirable anything that alleviates my bad feeling of being “void and negated.” 
If I want to be a good father I indeed will feel void and negated as long as I am 
not a good father. Once the world changes so that I am a good father all is well; 
or, all is well as long as I believe I am a good father.
Anyway, the main point is that desirability alone cannot generate desire. 
It is only when the lack of the desirable object becomes painful enough in a 
suitable context that desire emerges in order to compensate for the loss and 
the lack in one’s soul. However, as I said above, such a negative theory is not 
so easy to accept. In some cases no such tension may occur. As I said above, 
the problems concentrate around small desires. Suppose I want ice-cream. I 
find it difficult to believe that anyone would feel “void and negated” without 
a cone of ice-cream. Here the lack of ice-cream (push) may not be important 
at all compared to the temptation of eating ice-cream (pull). Suppose I want 
beer but I also feel it may be a bad idea. Hence, the lack of beer does not feel 
bad at all but having a beer still feels wonderfully tempting. Indeed, both the 
lack of the desired object and having it may be tempting, as long as having it 
remains more so.
 Russell on Desire
In his Analysis of Mind, Bertrand Russell first presents an account of the cogni-
tive theories of desire and then his own naturalistic and behaviourist ideas. 
He divides the theories into push and pull theories.7 I suppose he knew Brad-
ley’s views because he certainly knew his main theories and works. In his own 
times, Bradley was famous and his books widely read: sic transit gloria mundi. 
Push theories are similar to Bradley’s theory, which says an agent is pushed to 
formulate a desire and then act on it because of the painful tension he feels. Or, 
as he says, the tension brings about motion. A pull theory is a theory according 
to which the agent feels the pull or attraction of the desirable objects he faces, 
7 See also A. Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969, Ch. v.
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
Chapter 354
<UN>
or perhaps he imagines them. Desirability entails attraction and focuses on a 
hope for, say, a reward or relief. The two theories can be summarized as follows:
Push Theory: An agent feels unpleasantly disturbed and then she either 
withdraws from the situation or compensates for the feeling of displea-
sure by doing something appropriate; if she believes that she can do 
something about the disturbance she desires whatever it is.
Pull Theory: The person finds an object desirable and as such attractive 
in the sense that it promises so much situational good that the agent be-
lieves he now has a good reason to consider it, which entails the relevant 
desire.
Also an irrational version of pull theory may exist, namely, I have a reason not 
to desire although I still do. I desire X although I know X is definitely not go-
ing to happen, which constitutes a reason not to desire, or rationally I should 
not desire X. In such cases, I may use a special counterfactual expression like 
“I would have liked X to happen.” For example, more indirectly “I should have 
been a male model,” when it did not happen – which masks the desire in ques-
tion, or “I would have wanted X to happen.”8 This expresses a kind of nostalgia 
for my long-lost opportunity to desire for X. I will argue that both theories are 
needed when one develops a full theory of desire. The pull theory is inade-
quate alone because it cannot explain the urgency or strength of some desires; 
the push theory is too stubbornly actionist and, moreover, it cannot handle 
hope – in this sense it is not a complete theory. Surprisingly, at least some push 
theories can accommodate wish-fulfilment.
Let us now concentrate on Bertrand Russell’s version of the push theory, 
which he defends energetically, although not always with clarity or care, in his 
hastily composed little book. Say, I am itching, which is a highly motivating 
feeling, in the sense that I want to stop it. No more itching is my desired psycho-
logical equilibrium state, and thus I am driven to act accordingly: I scratch.9 If I 
cannot, I am still inclined to act, or I would scratch if I could; and I know in nor-
mal conditions I can do so. Moreover, my beliefs concerning the desire related 
states of affairs are supposed to be valid. In other words, I believe I can allevi-
ate the relevant bad feelings by certain means when the feeling brings about 
my desire, whose Russellian, radically revisionist push definition is as follows:
8 In some languages, e.g. in Finnish, Spanish, Italian, and French this is a normal way of de-
scribing the situation; in French, j’aurai voulu (Futur antérieur).
9 See S. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Tr. J. Strachey. New York: Norton, 1920/1961, pp. 3–4.
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The initial mental occurrence involving discomfort is called a “desire” for 
the state of affairs that brings acquiescence.
Desire has a purpose:
The state of affairs in which this condition of quiescence is achieved is 
called the “purpose” of the cycle.10
The discomfort in question brings about action towards the state of affairs 
whose occurrence alleviates it. For this to happen, the person must entertain 
a belief to the effect that the desired remedy works as intended. This is a push 
theory because “[we] must suppose that the stimulus to the performance of 
each act is an impulsion from behind, not an attraction from the future.” Or, in 
other words, what we have here is “a push, not a pull, an impulsion away from 
the actual, rather than an attraction toward an ideal.”11 This sounds clear.
Russell’s theory is simple if it merely says that some states of discomfort are 
connected to beliefs concerning their alleviation and hence desire refers not 
to anticipated disappearance of the discomfort but to the fact of discomfort it-
self. In other words, I desire anything that I believe will bring about quiescence 
or status quo or equilibrium of the mind. The question is, what is the object 
of desire? Example: I want money and that indicates an uncomfortable state 
of disequilibrium, or a desire. I can fix it by getting money. That is why I say I 
desire money. Money is now the object of my desire, although it is mere means 
for the purpose of a desire, which is mental equilibrium. The initial disequi-
librium causally makes me act according to my belief about what helps in this 
very case. In this way a push theory avoids the problem of intentional objects 
of desire and their desirability conditions, which are impossible to handle in 
terms of the extensionalist language of science. Any disequilibrium is causally 
and non-cognitively motivating and thus one can learn what to do in order 
to fix the problem even without thinking of it. I just do what I have learned I 
must do to make myself comfortable again – or, I may be conditioned to act in 
a functional manner. Russell says, I believe, that scratching (purpose) alleviates 
discomfort (desire) and hence I scratch (motions). Next, I automatically revise 
my belief system to the effect that scratching helps if I act accordingly. Hence, 
I desire scratching, which is the purpose of the relevant desire in service of the 
10 B. Russell, The Analysis of Mind. London: Allen & Unwin, 1921. I have used the Digireads.
com Book, 2008.
11 Russell, 1921, p. 31.
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act cycle. This is of course unintuitive because now one desires the means and 
not the end-state. In other words, according to Russell, one does not desire 
relief but what brings about relief. Perhaps we should call it an instrumentalist 
theory of desire. Push and pull theories are radically different, of course. The 
object of desire in the pull theory is not the same as the purpose in the push 
theory where the focus is on instrumental desire or need: you need to scratch 
if you itch. However, in the pull theory what is desired is an intentional object; 
we think of how to get rid of the problem, when we are advised by our relevant 
beliefs. In push theory, desire spontaneously tracks its own disappearance, 
which here means something like satisfaction.
Unconscious belief: Let us next take a look at Russell’s important distinction 
between conscious and unconscious desire because this allows us to see how 
different the push and pull theories really are. He says, a “desire is called ‘con-
scious’ when it is accompanied by a true belief as to the state of affairs that will 
bring quiescence, otherwise it is called ‘unconscious’.”12 Suppose I suffer from a 
terrible headache and I wrongly believe that it will be alleviated by a medicine 
man’s inspired dance around my sickbed, when explanation is brain cancer 
in need of surgery. Now, what I desire is the medicine man’s visit and his in-
spired dance around my bed because I believe this helps better than anything 
else. Russell calls such a desire unconscious, which may sound mystical. Here 
is how I understand the idea. My cycle of desire and action in this case has its 
purpose, that is the inspired dance, and thus I aim at the best help against my 
present state of disequilibrium, or desire. I act accordingly. The point is that 
my desire for the medicine man’s action brings about results that in fact indi-
cate a purpose that is different from the original restitution of the equilibrium 
state of mind. I do not know what that purpose is as I think falsely that it is 
the equilibrium of no headache. What is the effect the dance brings about? 
Let us say it is the medicine man getting some money from me. This key fact is 
hidden from me and hence my desire is unconscious in the sense that I do not 
know what the inspired dance is for, hence my actions have their unintended 
consequences. Russell says the unconscious desire is to provide money to the 
medicine man. If my relevant beliefs concerning the effects of my actions are 
correct, they aim at the purpose that is the same as the intended purpose of my 
desire. This is now a conscious desire because its whole structure is transpar-
ent to me. Wrong beliefs mask the purpose so that it will remain obscure to me 
and in this sense unconscious.
As one may suggest, contra Russell, I do not desire the medicine man’s dance 
because it does not help, and yet it prevents me from understanding what my 
12 Russell, 1921, p. 35.
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real desire is, that is, the thing that helps. Accordingly, my real desire remains 
unconscious. It exists although it is unknown and in this sense unconscious. 
However, according to Russell, real desire is necessarily conscious. Let us see 
what happens here. When the medicine man dances he brings about effects I 
cannot see or understand. This is because I falsely expect my headache vanish. 
His dance serves another purpose than the original one but because I cannot 
understand, realise, know, or imagine what it is, it is unconscious or hidden. 
We can also say I confuse two different desires, that whose purpose is getting 
rid of the headache and another one whose purpose is unconscious to me. 
In this sense, some desires are unconscious because we have a wrong idea of 
their purpose and the effects of the desired actions. When I believe that brain 
surgery helps, as it does, the whole cycle becomes conscious: I will reach the 
purpose that is present in my mind. The medicine man’s dance, on the other 
hand, brings about a purpose I do not know, that is, an unconscious purpose.
When the medicine man dances, what is the hidden purpose of his actions? 
Suppose it is wish-fulfilment. Surprisingly, Russell’s theory can accommodate 
the Freudian idea of wish-fulfilment; or perhaps this should be expected be-
cause Russell is influenced by Freud at this stage. Now, when the medicine 
man dances that dance may well make me feel better. This is because I hope it 
works, or as I realize, hope in this case is not based on warranted relevant be-
liefs, which makes it a wish. I wish I become better, and hence the dance makes 
me feel better as if directly and not via a link to my headache. Therefore, the 
dance works as wish-fulfilment. I wish it helps and indeed it helps because it 
directly satisfies my wish. Perhaps this is how the patient reasons: I want him 
to dance because that alleviates my pain; he is dancing; hence, my desire is sat-
isfied; and because my desire is satisfied, my pain is alleviated. In other words, 
I use modus ponens: If he dances, pain disappears; he dances; therefore, pain 
disappears. As I see it, most Russellian unconscious desires may work in this 
way. This also explains their popularity and sustainability in the long run. They 
work although only in the sense of wish-fulfilment. As such the dance has no 
relevant effect; it does not change the world in any such direction. Yet it satis-
fies my need for cure.
As Russell himself writes, “a belief that something is desired has often a ten-
dency to cause the very desire that is believed in.”13 Perhaps this should read: 
“the very cure that is believed in.” He may mean that the belief in a cure is 
the cure. As he actually writes, he says that a belief that I have a painful situa-
tion may bring about the pain – this is true, too. By desire Russell, as we know, 
means the original state of disequilibrium, which does not make sense here. 
13 Russell, 1921, p. 34.
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He cannot mean that, say, a belief in a brain operation may bring about pain-
ful headache. However, consider this example: I think of beer and that very 
thought that beer is desired makes me painfully thirsty, when drinking beer 
cures the desire called thirst as a lust for alcohol. In other words, a belief that 
something works by helping to solve a painful problem (desire) has the para-
doxical tendency either to cause the very effect (cure, purpose) that is desired, 
or to bring about the problem (disequilibrium, desire). Says Russell, “It is this 
fact that makes the effect of ‘consciousness’ on desire so complicated.”14 This is 
what wish-fulfilment does.
Suppose I take arsenic to cure my headache. Now the unconscious purpose 
is my imminent death because that is the effect of arsenic. It does not take 
long to learn that the method is wrong and thus the mistaken belief vanishes 
because it was an unconscious desire to die, as I will learn. In the case of the 
medicine man’s dance this does not happen. The dance has no adverse con-
sequences and therefore we have hard time learning anything from it. Yet, it 
satisfies my wish in the special sense of wish-fulfilment. Concerning hope, it 
is easy to see that we can find no role for hope in Russell’s theory. Desire is an 
action based mechanism that works or does not work. To talk about hope is 
to talk about a pull theory: we hope that we get the object that exerts the pull. 
In the push theory, the push starts a causal mechanism that either fulfils its 
purpose or it does not. Hope entails a kind of psychological uncertainty no 
push theory may recognize. The mechanism makes me act without interven-
ing thoughts.
Russell says, the scientifically uninformed mind entertains mostly uncon-
scious desires, which is true. People pray for God to heal them and so they re-
sort to wish-fulfilment: the prayer is the cure quite independently of its causal 
effects; here the “is” is the “is” of identity, or prayer is in itself the cure. How-
ever, what he may mean is this: when my belief system is corrected so that I 
learn the falsehood of my present beliefs my desire for the medicine man’s 
visit disappears along with my beliefs. My desire was, in this way, conditional 
on false beliefs while the desire for, say, a surgical operation as a cure for my 
headache would be dependent on a true belief. But why is a magical desire 
called unconscious? I do not think Russell succeeds in making this clear. What 
he could say is that, counterfactually, if I knew that the operation helps I would 
desire it. In this way, my desire for an operation is unconscious, or should we 
say, latent. Figuratively speaking, the desire slumbers waiting my better beliefs 
to wake it up. Again, Russell definitely does not say so. According to him, I 
may think I desire something I do not desire. This happens when the chosen 
14 Russell, 1921, p. 34.
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purpose does not exist, in the sense that the purported cure in fact does not 
work against the disequilibrium in question. In other words, when I say I desire 
X, I may be wrong. I say I want to see the medicine man dancing when in fact 
I do not. According to pull theory, this is impossible because desire is a subjec-
tive affair. I cannot desire without believing I desire. According to push theory 
my existence of desire depends on the truth of some key propositions because 
it purports to be a naturalistic theory. It follows that I can desire without be-
lieving I desire, or I desire X and I think I desire Y.
Secondary desires: Another rather surprising Russellian invention is what he 
calls a secondary desire. He writes,
A secondary desire, derived from a false judgment as to a primary desire, 
has its own power of influencing action, and is therefore a real desire 
according to our definition. But it has not the same power as a primary 
desire of bringing thorough satisfaction when it is realized; so long as the 
primary desire remains unsatisfied, restlessness continues in spite of the 
secondary desire’s success. Hence arises a belief in the vanity of human 
wishes: the vain wishes are those that are secondary, but mistaken beliefs 
prevent us from realizing that they are secondary.15
Russell’s point looks like this: unconscious desire has its purpose, which I 
sometimes adopt as a new and known purpose. I suffer from recurring head-
aches and desire massage to cure it. This involves an unconscious desire be-
cause massage does not help. However, I learn that massage relieves tension by 
relaxing me, and hence I accept it as the new purpose. I have thus acquired a 
new conscious desire. In fact, I have created a secondary desire that is still tied 
to the primary one, the cure of my headaches, whatever it is. As Russell says, 
the secondary desire is problematic. It successfully serves its own purpose, that 
is, relaxation which relieves tension. Hence the desire is real and conscious, 
yet it does not eliminate the primary problem, or headache. In some cases the 
secondary purpose may even make the situation worse. Every time I have a 
headache I order massage, which indeed is dysfunctional in the long run. To 
follow Russell here, he says life becomes better if such secondary desires can 
be dropped, which in my example is quite obvious, but only if the primary de-
sire can then be taken care of, that is, the real cure can be found. The secondary 
purpose offers at least some comfort to me. Anyway, the secondary desire may 
make the elimination of the primary one more difficult.
15 Russell, 1921, p. 34.
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The definition of secondary desire is as follows: A secondary desire is a new 
desire that emerges from the realization that an unconscious purpose has cer-
tain good effects. These confirm the new purpose and thus the secondary de-
sire becomes conscious and real, when it serves the new purpose, even if it is 
misdirected. In the case of a secondary desire, its purpose tracks the original 
purpose. In the case of the primary desire, the desired action tracks the pur-
pose. Secondary desire: I notice that some actions feel good, thus I will de-
sire them (the means determine the goal). Primary desire: I do not feel good, 
this is why I will desire whatever makes me feel good (the goal determines the 
method).
Another example that is more in line with Russell’s own rather florid rheto-
ric is as follows. Any secondary desire results from a misunderstood primary 
desire, as follows: I want to kill Bill, which desire is based on my disturbing 
bitterness towards Bill caused by his earlier actions. However, I believe that 
revenge is both morally wrong and prudentially speaking dangerous, which 
worries me; on this basis I do not want to kill Bill but this again entails a false 
belief about what would bring quiescence to me, instead of killing Bill, that 
is, an act omission. The omission then determines a secondary desire: I want 
to do nothing as I feel this helps against mental disturbance. So, in order to 
void a motivational conflict between killing and not killing, I want to travel 
around the world – this sounds like a third-level desire that is consonant with 
the original omission. Very quickly I notice I do not enjoy the trip as much as 
I should; and the reason is my primary desire for revenge, which still indicates 
an unresolved mental conflict. Then I go and kill Bill and return, and the rest 
of the trip is perfectly lovely, which shows that the belief concerning the effect 
of my trip was false. Russell’s own exposition here is too hurried and sketchy to 
allow a more faithful exposition.
Desired Beliefs: Russell’s third interesting point concerns desire for beliefs. 
This looks like an interesting topic. Suppose I believe I do not live for ever 
and this causes considerable discomfort to me, hence I desire eternal life. I 
realize this is possible only if there is a good God and, therefore, I want to be-
lieve the good God exists. I also believe God helps me, from which it follows 
that I can live forever. This is another instance of wish-fulfilment, which we 
discussed above. Russell writes,
This desire for beliefs, as opposed to desire for the actual facts, is a par-
ticular case of secondary desire, and, like all secondary desires its satis-
faction does not lead to a complete cessation of the initial discomfort. 
Nevertheless, desire for beliefs, as opposed to desire for facts, is exceed-
ingly potent both individually and socially. According to the form of be-
lief desired, it is called vanity, optimism, or religion. […] It is very largely 
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
61Push and Pull Theories of Desire
<UN>
through desires for beliefs that the primitive nature of desire has become 
so hidden, and that the part played by consciousness has been so confus-
ing and so exaggerated.16
According to Russell, such a desire for a desirable belief, or for the truth of 
such a belief, is an example of secondary desire and of course of unconscious 
desire. As we know, a mere belief can alleviate the discomfort that brings about 
the desired belief in question. Nevertheless, my belief that there is a good God 
who provides me with eternal life may not fully justify the idea that eternal 
life is available, and therefore some pain continues. Russell also says that the 
belief in God exemplifies an unconscious belief if it is false – let us suppose 
so. This is to say it cannot bring about the final quiescence even if it may pro-
duce optimism and give the person more courage to meet the pain of mortal 
existence. Thus emerges a new desire for God’s help. The belief in God works 
now like the dancing medicine man. Dancing and believing have their effects 
that are not quite what one wants, but they produce, anyway, effects that may 
be beneficent. But because they are not the effects that are originally wanted, 
they do not produce the final quiescence. The new purpose is the relief general 
optimism provides. All this is psychologically plausible. When I say I believe 
that God gives me an eternal life, this phrase hides not only the unconscious 
desire for eternal life but also the conscious secondary desire for a more op-
timistic attitude towards the ever troubling possibility of the personal end of 
life. Russell’s ideas concerning desire are coherent and interesting but I must 
say they also are unintuitively formulated. He aims to refute the cognitivist 
non-naturalistic theories of desire and, therefore, his approach is radically dif-
ferent from them. However, Russell may well be right when he thinks that a 
push theory must be formulated in a language that does not respect the intu-
itions derived from a pull theory. I will argue that pull theory is more funda-
mental than push theory but at the same time some idea of push is needed in 
the complete theory of desire.
 Desirability Demystified
I will defend the following position: instrumental desire or need can be un-
derstood according to the naturalistic push theory although the final desired 
state of affairs, Russell’s purpose, can be understood only via the cognitive and 
teleological pull model. A simple example illustrates this. Suppose I love Mary 
and I want her to be mine – what it means “to be mine” is an open question of 
16 Russell, 1921, p. 35.
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course but let it be so. According to Russell, this state of affairs troubles me like 
an open sore, and hence I desire consciously or unconsciously a cure, whose 
direct purpose is to make her mine and indirect purpose to alleviate my pain. 
I may generate a secondary desire that I should avoid and also a desire for good 
beliefs. The situation quickly grows conceptually complicated but then I tap 
my belief system and under its guidance start desiring certain best means for 
solving the problem and reaching quiescence.
Now, I want to buy Mary expensive and impressive gifts and ask my friends 
to talk to her about how good I am as a person and future husband and father. 
I want to believe this helps, as it indeed may, and thus I desire the whole pack-
age. Russell is an actionist theorists who puts his faith on the power of action; 
for instance, he would not stay put and wait and hope until Mary makes here 
decision about her lover, or perhaps such an omission is action, too. This is 
to say, for Russell, psychological causation is somehow related to the springs 
of action and creation of new beliefs. This also is what push means. Pain and 
discomfort push me to do something about it. This is what I call a motivational 
drive here. Its route is determined by the relevant beliefs concerning the di-
rection where relief is to be found. Russell says the content of both attitudes 
should be the same, that is, what I believe and what I desire are based on an 
identical proposition. So, I believe X helps to alleviate my discomfort and the 
same X becomes the content of my relevant desire.
What we see here is, as I said above, a theory of the generation of instrumen-
tal desire or need. I want a new car and hence I need money that I also desire: 
I want the money to buy a new car. Strangely enough, Russell has nothing 
much to say about the final desire, in this case of the car. Why would I like to 
get a car, or why do I desire it? If the lack of car is simply disturbing and painful 
to think of why not get rid of the idea rather than start the complicated process 
of getting a car. The point is this: if the lack of the object or purpose of desire 
is painful I naturally try to avoid the idea. The desire simply pushes me out of 
its context because of its painfulness. We know this happens in real life and 
in philosophy: many theorists have recommended escape from the shackles 
of desire.17 But think of Bradley who says the purpose of desire is somehow 
necessary for the person; without it he is “void and negated.” Some desires are 
like that, unavoidable, some are not. I want a car and I drop the desire because 
of the simple reason it is too difficult to satisfy. Bradley’s idea does not apply 
to this case. A samurai has humiliated his master and now he must commit 
17 For instance, S. Weil, Gravity and Grace. Tr. E. Crawford and M. von der Ruhr. London: 
Routledge, 2002. She writes, “Desire is impossible: it destroys its object [...]. Because to 
desire something is impossible, we have to desire what is nothing.” (pp. 94–95).
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seppuku. He cannot drop the idea because then he really is “void and negated.” 
Russell seems to follow Bradley too closely here.
I cannot get rid of an instrumental desire too easily if I already am commit-
ted to the purpose of it. This indicates that Russell’s push theory may apply 
only to those cases in which the discomfort is of the type we cannot forget, 
avoid, get rid of, or ignore. Instead of trying to satisfy a desire I cannot drop I 
may try to circumvent it. Considering the push theory, one must specify what 
triggers off a desire, that is, the relevant cycle of actions. We do not act on any 
possible source of discomfort. I may well think that a given discomfort is what 
it is and nothing can be done about it. For instance, I have done something 
wrong and accept the pangs of conscience as a justified punishment. What can 
I do about it, nothing.
Why continue to talk about discomfort and its linguistic relatives? We can 
avoid it: I have plenty of wine at home but I want some more. I feel void and 
frustrated without this extra batch of wine, but then I tell myself that the idea 
is foolish and the desire vanishes – or at least it should. In many cases it does 
not, why? The reason is that the itch, or the discomfort and pain, caused by not 
storing more wine at home, refuses to disappear because more wine is such an 
attractive proposal; hence, the pull exhibits its typical effect here. The desire 
for the object or purpose is based on its pull, or the attraction of the desirable 
states of affairs, rather than the push generated by discomfort. Notice that the 
original discomfort is based on desirability considerations: More wine at home 
appears so good that the lack of wine feels painful. It is hard to be without 
good things that one believes are available. This is to say the push, or drive, is 
explained by desirability considerations, or attraction as pull.
Of course, it is implausible to argue that all push is generated by discom-
fort, analogously with physical discomfort like an itch. Such metaphors lead us 
astray. For instance, an artist need not feel first some acute discomfort before 
he can start working, as if pain had triggered off his desire to make art. It is 
enough that he believes he is an artist and artists do art. He formulates a nor-
mative belief to the effect that he as an artist should do art. Notice that in pull 
theories desire itself is not motivating unlike belief. Anyway, an artist should 
be interested in art; whatever that means, at least it means that an artist finds 
some artistic themes convincingly desirable. He becomes vulnerable to artistic 
desirability, so to speak. His life is characterized by sensitivity to art and hence 
he finds some art desirable but some, perhaps, repulsive. His values, as the 
normative elements of his psychological constitution, dictate what he feels is 
interesting and worthy of his attention and serious consideration. I do not say 
this example can necessarily be generalized. Its purpose is to show that desire 
is certainly not uniformly dependent on mental disequilibrium, discomfort, or 
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lack of acquiescence. We certainly know contexts where an emerging desire is 
pleasant and as such eagerly anticipated and sought for. Sometimes I cannot 
wait to get a chance to get philosophical, say, about some arcane historical 
problems. Those problems pull me towards them, but I must then ask why. The 
answer is, because of the drive under whose influence I currently am. Desire 
has both a pull and push component.
 Push Theory Returns
Desires must be explained. The objects of desire are desirable, but why? They 
are good, pleasant, or rewarding. What then is the source of the pull? At this 
point it is instructive to think of negative desire whose object is bad, painful, 
and punishing. When you look at it, it is clear that desirable and undesirable 
things behave in a radically different manner. Good/ bad is not a problem: you 
like what is good and dislike what is bad. Pleasure/pain is a problem, just like 
reward/punishment: you may be nonchalant about pleasure and reward, while 
admitting that they, intrinsically, are desirable. But their opposites are of much 
more serious nature. Pain is unlike pleasure in many ways. You may lose your 
interest in pleasure and some excessive pleasures turn into pain in the long 
run. But it never happens that pain turns into pleasure or that I lose my interest 
in it.18 Pain, and in some cases punishment as well, has a forceful and coercive 
quality that cannot be denied or neglected. Pain bypasses cognitive level of 
reasoning and reasons. Pain can grow until it is intolerable and then the victim 
goes into a pain shock. A person reacts to pain via drive away from it, when the 
drive is not a reasoned attitude. A push away from pain is a fact. What about a 
push towards good?
A desire that is based on good, pleasure, or reward looks different from 
negative desire, which is drive based unlike reason based positive desire. This 
is a mistake. Positive and negative desires must be in a symmetrical position 
concerning their typical objects. They are not two different types of desire. 
Therefore, if negative desire contains a push component positive desire has 
it as well. This is not to say that negative desire lacks a reasoned component, 
it does not. Suppose I cannot get a good thing without some pain. I may think 
the level of pain is such that I can accept it, or I may think I cannot. In the same 
18 People sometimes seem to seek pain and deal with it as if it were pleasure; about bdsm 
and S/M, see my “A Philosophical and Rhetorical Theory of bdsm,” The Journal of Mind 
and Behaviour 38 (2017), 53–74; and Ch. 10 of this book. Also, S. Newmahr, Playing on the 
Edge. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011.
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way, I desire and anticipate something good. I feel the urgency of my desire 
and realize no reasoning can diminish it. I love Mary who loves anybody else 
than me. Is my desire here negative or positive is hard to say, but the urgency 
of my attitude cannot be denied. My conclusion is that positive desire has its 
urgency level that we can explain in terms of push or drive. In positive desire 
we find a component, drive, that is not cognitive or reason based or voluntary.
This is to say that I find an object desirable in the sense that I would like to 
see my actual world change into a better possible world such that the object 
occurs there. However, this is not yet a satisfactory description of the situation 
because in normal cases I feel for it and am ready to invest into it. Sometimes 
my desire is a strong urge that I am afraid I cannot resist. Some desires are weak 
and meek, some are demanding and strong, some are overpowering. They have 
what I call here a variable urge factor. This entails a cause or, as I put it, drive. 
I am serious about the change of worlds, I tend to focus on it, I do hate to miss 
the opportunity, I wait for it to happen, or I invest in it somehow – but no-
tice this may not include action, not even in counterfactual sense. I may invest 
much, sometimes so much an outsider cannot figure out why. In the case of an 
obsession or addiction the investments may indeed be irrationally high and, 
moreover, I myself may realize that this is the case.19 Such situations are irra-
tional or even pathological, but as such they do not interest us here except as 
reminders of the strongest urges. Also, cases where I say I desire something but 
pass it by, or fail to invest anything much at all in it, are anomalous in their own 
way. These cases may exemplify a confusion between actually desiring and rec-
ognizing desirability. We find many things desirable that we never desire or 
even come close to desiring. They may be somehow below me or as well above 
me, or to put it colloquially, they are not my cup of tea. Some desirable things 
get buried under other desirable things – you should not want everything as 
you will learn early on. You must choose. Many other psychological reasons 
exist for neglecting objects that as such are desirable. An interesting case is 
this: desirability ascriptions apply to a broad category of things, so broad that 
I find it too tedious and difficult to select one specific item that I desire. This is 
a well-known problem in consumer research: I go to a supermarket to buy tea 
and hence I presumably want tea. Yet I do not buy tea because I cannot choose 
from their excessive selection. I decide to postpone the acquisition by utilizing 
some more or less self-deceptive moves, for instance, I say I still have some tea 
at home. I want tea but I find out I do not want any of the displayed packages. 
In other words, the drive is still there although corresponding the attraction 
19 See N. Heather and G. Segal, Eds., Addiction and Choice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017.
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has vanished. I am unable to feel for any of the offered items and therefore I 
fail to invest in any of them. The self-deception shows that the drive remains.
Now, desirability is a necessary condition of desiring but what is the suf-
ficient one? How and why do I move from a desirability ascription to actually 
desiring something, which entails a commitment to the case and willingness to 
invest in it? As I said above, I want to argue that it is a matter of a combination 
of my relevant drive (push) and the attraction (pull) of the desirable object, 
or an interplay between them. If I am not pushed, I may well consider a state 
of affairs desirable, even very desirable and as such tempting, without com-
mitting myself to it. I am not ready to invest in it. We find two distinct but not 
mutually exclusive possibilities here: the causally efficient push (drive) and its 
level of urgency can be explained by my beliefs concerning the situation, or it 
is based on some causally relevant, psychological background conditions. The 
two alternatives can be called cognitive and naturalistic.
A paradigmatic example of the naturalistic case is hunger. Food deprivation 
causes a bodily state called hunger, I have learned how to free myself from it, 
I believe that eating helps, and I eat. At some stage of this chain I may say I 
want food and start the relevant behavioural cycle that hopefully ends up in a 
better possible world where I am no longer hungry. All this can be explained in 
terms of Russell’s theory of desire but it is easy to see that we need more. The 
naturalistic theory fails to explain the selection of the object of desire. I may 
be hungry but I do not want eat because no food looks desirable to me, and 
hence my prospective desire fails to emerge. I say, I need to eat and I would like 
to eat if I found edible fares. Drive is then necessary but not sufficient, as I said 
above. Of course most cases of desire are not as simple as hunger but a caus-
ally created drive is still necessary for the agent’s prima facie commitment to 
the case. Think of emotions like anger. They often bring about relevant desires, 
like the desire to get even, which sometimes is so urgent that the selection of 
means can be less than perfect. Most emotions create drives, and this is true of 
positive emotions as well, which then lead to desires whose satisfaction modi-
fies the emotions in the right way.20 Many emotions bring about relevant de-
sires, hence the drive is there, too. Emotions also make us committed to certain 
strategies of desire. Once the person is committed, she needs an object that 
cannot be chosen in terms of causalistic considerations alone. I feel strongly 
20 I cannot go here into the details of the effects of emotions on desire. See for an empirical 
study in behavioural economics, D. Ariely, Predictably Irrational. New York: Harper, 2008, 
Ch. 5. Emotions change the agent’s reasoning and valuation and this influences of what 
she takes to be desirable. The push theories can easily accommodate such results. An 
object, A, is not seen as desirable but A accompanied with a suitable emotion is desirable.
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amorous and thus I want a sex partner tonight but I do not find any of the pos-
sibly willing partners desirable. Here the urgency of my desire (drive) makes 
me naturally less selective but still leaves some room for deliberation. This may 
not always be the case when the urge is extreme. The pull factor does not van-
ish easily, or the desirability conditions remain.
Let me then get back to the hunger case. My bodily deprivation generates a 
drive that pushes me away from the hungry state towards a new equilibrium, 
which I consider essential to my well-being. Next, I believe I need food and I 
say I want food, I choose what food I find desirable – if I have a choice or the 
drive is not overwhelming. I eat and that leads via a causal chain back to bodily 
equilibrium. Now I feel no hunger. Notice that in this case we normally speak 
of instrumental desires or needs as if they were the final desire and its goal. 
The reason is that eating food causally and as if automatically takes care of 
the hunger problem. Nevertheless, in this case eating is not the final desire but 
mere means.
Suppose I want fine food, which means hunger may be absent. I eat because 
fine food is attractive for me as such. I expect some enjoyable aesthetic and 
culinary experiences, I believe people in my position are supposed to eat fine 
food, and I am fully aware of my future bragging rights. In this case the drive 
is constituted through a complex system of personal and social beliefs, or ex-
pectations of the basis of such beliefs. As Russell says, all these beliefs are de-
sirable beliefs in the sense that I am at least comfortable with them, or they 
are actually desirable and as such attractive to me. It follows that I want these 
beliefs, which is to say that my belief induced drive cannot be based on them. 
On the contrary, we must locate the factors that generate the drive in question 
at the deeper psychological level. In the case of fine food I have learned that 
these beliefs, which are now desirable as such, have been good and beneficial 
to me earlier. In other words, I believe that these beliefs are desirable as such 
and, moreover, I do not see any reason to negate them just now. Obviously the 
problem of belief based motivation has moved to a deeper level and so we 
need to ask whether the deeper beliefs as ur-beliefs are causally generated, as 
they should according to this naturalistic model of motivation.
Suppose I want to be a good father; what are my drive related ur-beliefs that 
explain my desire for the beliefs that I happen to desire in this case. We can 
use a reduction argument here as we must locate some beliefs that are not 
desirable as such but can explain the desirable beliefs that motivate the desire 
and explain its generation. Without such beliefs my desire is floating in thin 
air. It has no foundation. The only possible foundation seems to be a causal 
one, namely, in the course of my life all kinds of events and perceptions have 
causally generated beliefs in me such that they explain my desirable beliefs 
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that contribute to the creation of my ideas about what I want and why, that is, 
my desire oriented drive. For Russell, these experiences are always painful ex-
periences of lost equilibria but this is obviously too narrow a view. The earlier 
experiences that generate our motivating ur-beliefs allow for a wide variety of 
situations, both pleasant and painful. Moreover, they need not be closely con-
nected to desires that they generate according to the push model. The belief 
chains may be long and varied; who can say what experiences ground my de-
sirable beliefs concerning the possible world where I am a good father? Good 
people have such-and-such beliefs about good fatherhood and hence those be-
liefs are desirable. I do not think a philosopher should try to go any deeper on 
this empirical psychological issue.
Notice that such psychoanalysts as Jacques Lacan and writers like René Gi-
rard claim that our desires are social copies or they are acquired through mi-
metic processes.21 I cannot take a stand for or against such a theory here, yet it 
illustrates my view as stated above. Human beings are social creatures whose 
biology is tuned to social life and made sensitive to social cues. Clearly a causal 
connection exists between other peoples’ desires and mine, simply because 
my social existence is impossible without my ability to copy desires and hence 
the influence of others to me is necessary and automatic. It is independent of 
my efforts and beliefs. I may sincerely believe their desires are crazy and yet I 
mimic them. Such desires may hurt me but that does not matter. I live my life 
copying some desires and rejecting others but I must copy a large number of 
them and do it again and again. All this starts when I am very young so that at 
this developmental stage the generation of my desires must be automatic and 
as such causally grounded. When I am a mature and rational adult I am able 
to manipulate to certain degree the desires that enter my social life through 
mimesis. I may reject some and adopt some, not really freely but still not de-
terministically either. My ur-beliefs must, nevertheless, be causally formed so 
that with their help I can figure out what later beliefs are desirable and what 
are not. All this contributes to my motivation that provides the drive towards 
certain objects and allows me to commit myself to certain selected desirable 
states of affairs and the related instrumental beliefs. In a word, a hidden push 
can be found however deeply it is buried and hidden in my epistemic system. 
Without it no pull can do its work, but without the pull no desire may make 
sense to me personally. I need to commit myself to some, and only some, at-
tractive possibilities and go along with them.
21 R. Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel. Tr. Y. Freccero. Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1965, Ch. 1.
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The last but not the least question I ask is, what explains the strength of de-
sire, that is, the urgency or the degree of my personal investment in its object? 
The answer is, not the degree of attractiveness or desirability of its object but 
the strength of the push. Notice that very strong desires, or urges, are some-
times independent of the quality of the object once it is desirable per se. Those 
who really want strong alcohol, drink anything, whether it is desirable as such 
or not. They no longer care of what they consume. Perhaps, if push is weak the 
emphasis on desirability is strong and the other way round, strong push entails 
a diminished importance of the pull. A strong urge is not going to be stopped 
or sidestepped only because some attractive objects are unavailable. A starv-
ing person eats anything. A gourmand does not want to go hungry because 
he wants to enjoy his meals. However, in some cases such an inverted scale 
may not apply. A true wine connoisseur is supposed to enjoy a strong pull and 
strong push at the same time. Perhaps this is an illusion. Anyway, the main 
point is that I may not desire a fully attractive object and I may desire a less 
attractive one. My conclusion is that pull or desirability explains the direction 
and meaningfulness of the desire towards certain objects and push or drive 
explains its urgency, which again explains the amount of my investment in the 
object.
∵
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Chapter 4
Our Anxious Desires
Desires tend to be anxious. A historically important pessimistic tradition sup-
ports such a view. The general interpretation of the anxiety thesis depends on 
the fact that desires are difficult and even impossible to satisfy. Sociologically 
speaking, desires have been constricted and controlled in many ways in all so-
cieties. We also know that some schools of thought and belief have insisted 
on getting rid of all desires, or at least in minimizing their impact in social 
life. Also, some writers have promoted the belief to the effect that one should 
only desire what one already has. Such an extremism is not a viable solution 
to the problem. We must get along with the core of our desires. In this paper I 
focus on increasing and non-increasing values as desiderata, negative or zero-
desires, and the problem of immodest desires. In my general model of desire 
and possible worlds such an immodesty requirement can be at least partially 
corrected: we aim at possible worlds that we can realize, or which are close 
enough to our own actual world.
 Preliminaries
People tend to get anxious and desires can be problematic in a way that we can 
call, in a metonymic sense, anxious, too. We could as well talk about unhappy 
desires but we have a good reason not to do so: happiness and unhappiness are 
so general terms that their informative usage becomes difficult. It is better to 
talk about anxiety, or a specific type of unhappiness. Actually, to say what we 
mean by happiness, or to give a definition, is a hopeless task; yet, we may hope 
to understand what we mean by anxiety. Anxiety as a folk psychological term 
is, of course, a multifaceted concept but I suggest that the following account of 
it is sufficiently clear: Desires are anxious if a person anticipates or experienc-
es personal frustration, that is, her desires will not be satisfied. Such negative 
anticipation may be rational or irrational; namely, the person may have her 
reasons or no reasons for his negative anticipation, and if he has good reasons 
his anticipation is fully rational. In this paper, I deal with rational anticipa-
tion of frustration but I do not explicate any theory of the relevant type of 
rationality. Irrational anticipation means more or less pathological pessimism, 
depression, or life in bad faith, which are psychological issues I cannot take 
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into account here. Of course, anyone may become depressed after experienc-
ing a long string of anxious desires, in which case depression and pessimism 
start looking rational too. I will, however, concentrate here on the rationally 
anxious desires.
Not all desires are prone to immediate anxiety. One notable class of such ex-
ceptional desires is Sigmund Freud’s wishes and wish-fulfilment: I wish I were 
good in mathematics but I am not. This does not necessarily imply a frustrated 
desire, for the following reasons. If it is a pure daydream, all is well. We often 
entertain ourselves with such daydreams. I also may act on the wish; for in-
stance, I buy mathematics books, keep them in my bookcase, and even read 
them here and there. This makes me happy because now I feel as if I were good 
in mathematics. In fact, my wish is self-satisfying. When I look at those books 
for a while I am good in mathematics and a mathematician and this is enough 
for me in my present state of mind. If I desire or want to be a mathematician, 
I am prone to disappointment and frustration: I want to be something I can 
never be. Suppose a cancer patient who knows he will die soon. She wishes to 
be healthy but in her resignation she knows she is only wishing. In this paper I 
discuss desires that can be satisfied and the person has good reason to believe 
this is the case.
I assume that desire tracks satisfaction or that it is an essential truth about 
desire that it exists only to be satisfied. There are not idle desires. Sometimes 
we can easily see what this requires. For instance, I want a glass of water and 
when I get it I say I got what I wanted. Sometimes the situation is more com-
plicated. I want to make more money than before. What do I want? Do I want 
money, more money, make money, or to make more money? The object of my 
de dicto desire is not immediately obvious. Certainly I do not want to make 
money in the sense that making money could satisfy my desire. To make mon-
ey is just a means for getting money. It is something I need to do. It is possible 
of course that a person wants the means to reach an object but that always 
requires its independent explanation. Normally, I want the object of the desire 
and not what I need to reach the object. To answer the last question, namely, 
do I want money or more money, I need to spell out the whole situation. In 
other words, I need a narrative account of the desire. This entails spelling out 
the desirability conditions that motivate the desire, or answering the question 
“Why do you want it?” As I see it, the answer may prima facie look quick and 
simple but after some probing desires entail deep and complex explications, 
perhaps not in the case of a glass of water but then at least in the case of earn-
ing much money – why bother if the needed procedures are laborious, time 
consuming, and inherently risky? In this way, we say desires track satisfaction 
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in such life situations that are in most cases incompletely understood even by 
the person himself. He aims at objects that he supposes can satisfy his desires 
and make him content or gratified and in this special sense happy. He aims at 
such a possible world where he has what he wanted. Notice that sometimes 
this means acting sometimes not. In many cases we want to act or we need to 
act but often we only can wait and see how the world turns.
 Sources of Frustration and Anxiety
Some sources of frustration are simple, for instance, the case of returning de-
sire. Some desires are of the type that they extinguish when they are satisfied. 
Some of those return, some do not. Some desires are not of the returning type 
in the sense that one cannot extinguish them at all, for instance, one’s desire 
to get attention and admiration from others. In this case, the more you get it 
the more you want it, and this means not only more of the same but more 
and more intense attention and admiration. Let me say something about these 
cases although they are not very interesting as such.
I satisfy my desire and then it vanishes permanently. This is fine, normally 
no frustration follows. Next, I satisfy my desire that vanishes and returns later. 
This case may be frustrating or not: In some cases desires are such that I want to 
get rid of them by satisfying them and, hence, their return is frustrating. There 
are painful desires, like hunger, or more generally, those that are generated by 
push and not pull. In some other cases, I welcome back the desire in question 
and enjoy the idea that I can entertain it again. Sex is a good example, but only 
if you do not think it is bad and sinful. Frustration seems to be case specific 
because objects are valued in different ways. In other words, some objects are 
desired wholeheartedly or without reservation, unlike some others towards 
which our evaluative attitudes are more complex. It all depends on how we 
describe and judge the desirability conditions of an object. Figuratively speak-
ing, we may say some of the desirability conditions are clean and some are not. 
Let me give a simple example: I desire normal sex with my loving wife, which 
is a clean desire. I desire kinky sex with one of my students, which is a danger-
ous and in many way dubious object, and therefore it is not a clean one. In this 
way it seems that desires can be anxious even when they are not frustrated: it 
is enough that they are not clean. In this case they represent a threat. However, 
in this case we can say that unclean desires cannot be fulfilled in toto and that 
is the reason why they are anxious. Such desires contain mutually contradic-
tory elements, which logically entail partial dissatisfiability. I want the object 
of desire and also want to avoid it; I cannot satisfy this combined desire. You 
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act according to the strongest push or pull, which does not bring about full 
satisfaction. You get one half and miss the other, which entails frustration.
If this is so, we can see why the Buddhists say unhappiness follows from 
desires and Arthur Schopenhauer condemns the will. Actually, they belong to 
an age-old pessimistic tradition that condemns desires. It extends from Hera-
clitus to Simone Weil.1 I have no intention to delve into the history of this pes-
simistic tradition here. I only ask what it tells us that such a tradition exists 
and then look into some facts about desires that make them likely causes of 
unhappiness, and more exactly of frustration and anxiety. Other reasons may 
exist as well, like the Platonic worry that strong and irrational desires come 
to dominate our mental landscape, or pathos rules instead of nous and logos. 
This may bring about its own variety of frustration.
Think of two different types of value, increasing and non-increasing, like 
being alive and money.2 The first type of value you may fail to recognize (only) 
when you possess it. The reason for this seems to be that you cannot increase 
it: you are alive and it does not make sense to say that you want to increase 
this good. Of course, figuratively speaking you may say you are only half alive 
or you desire to live more, but this is not what I have in mind. The hard fact is 
that you are either dead or alive. If you want to focus on such a value you first 
need to play with it. You imagine a counterfactual possible world where you 
are either dead, or close to being dead, and then you may enjoy the feeling and 
value of being alive. By doing so you satisfy a desire, namely that of realizing 
the value of being alive – but this desire is bound to be unclean. You are playing 
with dangerous goods when you remind yourself of the painful fact that this 
value will not last. You may experience the value of life in full when you think 
of death but then also the death becomes, perhaps too obvious for comfort. 
This is another anxious thought.
Concerning health, you certainly value it when you lose it. You value it be-
cause now you can imagine an increase of this value, which makes your life 
feel better. A sick person wants to become better, which is to say she wants the 
value called health to increase, perhaps to its maximal degree experienced by a 
healthy person. But to want to be better is in itself an anxious thought because 
it presupposes that you are not healthy and you hope to be better. In this sense, 
health unlike life is a semi-increasing, bounded value: it has a maximum that 
one reaches only rarely. Life is an absolutely non-increasing value so that we 
1 P. Wheelwright, Heraclitus. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959, pp. 58/#51, #52, and 84/#96; 
and S. Weil, Gravity and Grace. Trs. E. Crawford and M. von der Ruhr. London: Routledge, 
2002.
2 A. Gewirth, Reason and Morality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978, pp. 240ff.
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can say you enjoy life only when you are going to die, really or in your imagina-
tion; however, you cannot get better like in the case of health.
Next, let us look at the case of increasing value like money. Above I already 
hinted at the fact that only an increase of value is desirable. Take any increas-
ing value and it loses its desirability when it remains stable without any im-
mediately imaginable threat to it or a promise of increase. If you have much of 
the increasing value in question you need to be reminded of its value or other-
wise you lose your interest in it. The main point is, however, that no maximum 
amount of money exists. You always can get and have more. If you have little, 
or subjectively too little – this also applies to people who possess much of the 
value in question – then you will enjoy every little bit of increase of this value 
in your own case; there is no limit to this. I think this is what Simone Weil refers 
to when she writes that desires are heavy to bear and the only way to get rid of 
them is to amass the desirabilia until you become too exhausted to carry on.3 
The desire will vanish when you no longer have the strength to desire what is 
desirable. This looks like a strange and demanding strategy but at least we can 
now understand what it is. The problem with increasing value is that you never 
have it all or enough of it.
Now, increasing value as the foundation of desirabilia forms the prototype 
of frustrated desire. In other words,? if you desire something that is based on 
increasing value you are bound to be disappointed. Paradoxically, the reason is 
that you can never reach to the top where you have all of the value you want. 
Why is this paradoxical? In the case of non-increasing value, you find yourself 
in the situation in which the appreciation of the value vanishes, namely, when 
you have the value to its full degree. In the case of increasing value, you as if 
(intentionally) aim at such a maximum where the appreciation or enjoyment 
of this value will then (unintentionally) vanish. Is it not paradoxical that a rich 
person aims at a situation in which his most valued objects become subjec-
tively worthless? If he realized this, would he become even more frustrated? 
Of course, in this case such a maximum does not exist. Therefore, in one case 
we do not appreciate what we have if we do not imagine we lose it; in the other 
case we aim at the situation where the appreciation of the value would vanish. 
The conclusion is that, in the case of a non-increasing value, we realize or at 
least we should realize that we aim at something that has subjective value to 
us but we cannot enjoy it and yet we aim at it. All of this is bound to be anxious 
because it is painful. In one case we work hard to get something that does not 
allow satisfaction; the object duly escapes us. In the other case we reach the 
maximal object that is now without subjective value. We need to pretend that 
3 Weil, 2002, p. 121.
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
75Our Anxious Desires
<UN>
we lose the value, that is, we deliberately frustrate ourselves and then check 
our present situation to make sure that we still have it all. In this sense we aim 
at something that cannot satisfy us, and this is frustrating and anxious.
I said above that both in the case of pseudo-increasing value, which is a 
value that tends to increase but also has a maximum, and non-increasing value 
the way to make the corresponding objects look desirable is to focus on their 
incremental growth, when it takes place factually or counterfactually. Such di-
alectics makes them subjectively valuable. The normal intuition in such a case 
seems to be that all of this is painful, in the sense that the person is reminded 
of life without the value in question. It is painful to rejuvenate your love by re-
minding yourself what it is to be unloved and unloving. If you are a consistent 
Epicurean you do not accept such strategy of making yourself conscious of a 
value by first suffering the pain brought about by the lack of this same value. 
You should avoid suffering whenever you can.4
Now, situations exist where you are able to enjoy the thought or reality of 
living without a given value. This holds true of any of the value types I reviewed 
above. Is this perverse or not? Here is an example. Safety is, perhaps, a semi-
increasing human value we all appreciate when we have it in a partial sense. It 
is terrible and terrifying to live without it, that is, to feel the danger. Now, when 
we feel safe the subjective value of safety tends to vanish and so we remind 
ourselves about the life of those who must manage without safety and security. 
This is the standard strategy as I explained above. However, another strategy 
exists and along with it our thesis of universal frustration gets into trouble. 
When I am safe I may delight myself by playing dangerous games. If I am in an 
unsafe environment I may be less inclined to do so, but this is not important 
here.5 The main point is that the loss of the maximal value – I only deal with 
this case here – can feel positively good or, in other words, it expresses some 
other, unrelated values that make this loss independently desirable. I under-
stand the importance of safety so that I do what I do in a maximally safe way 
but what I do is as such dangerous. Alpinists use safety gear but that does not 
make them safe. It sounds like an oxymoron that I do dangerous things safely. 
I find it independently enjoyable and delightful to play with danger, if I do 
it safely; how is this possible? Perhaps in some atavistic manner I intend to 
prove, by taking risks, that I am unbreakable and invulnerable. In this magical 
way the idea tends to enhance my personal sense and appreciation of safety. 
4 See D. Wolfsdorf, Pleasure in Ancient Greek Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013, Ch. 7.
5 An interesting study is E. Freedgood, Victorian Writing about Risk. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000, Chs. 3 and 4.
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I love money but I gamble, which looks like contradiction. Of course people 
deceive themselves so that they think that risking what is valuable you can get 
more of it. But this is not the point. The point is that I enjoy gambling as such 
while it reminds me of the value of money. Winning is so wonderful because of 
the risk and the risk is subjectively the greater the greater is my love of money. 
In both cases we correct our perception of value by means of strategies that, in 
this context, are independently and intrinsically desirable. This removes any 
traces of frustration from my situation. I do not mean, of course, the frustra-
tion that follows from failure and loss, but losses are what you should expect 
when you gamble. You know all the time that radical frustration is close by 
but you enjoy exactly that thought. Dialectically, you enjoy a non-increasing 
value when you play with the idea of losing it; but you enjoy it even more when 
you independently enjoy the play. Dangerous play is invigorating as such and, 
moreover, it keeps you focused on the non-increasing goods in your life.
 Immodest Desires
Desire logically entails the lack of something desirable, is this true? I do not 
have money, hence I want money. If I have money, I do not want money al-
though I may want more money. As Thomas Hobbes says, you want what you 
do not have, what you have you love.6 This tradition is based on Plato in The Re-
public and it still seems to survive for instance in the theories of Jacques Lacan: 
“The term ‘lack’ is always related, in Lacan’s teaching to desire. It is lack which 
causes desire to arise.”7 However, this is a mistake, in the following sense. To 
understand desire, the main term is desirability in the sense that you desire 
what is desirable. Some things are generally and continuously desirable, like 
power, love, and money. I want what is desirable; why would I want it only 
if I lack it? My main point is that desire entails a change of worlds from this 
actual world into something better, or a possible world that actualizes desir-
able qualities. Any desire aims at a better world that typically is similar to the 
actual world except for its additional, desirable features. In this sense, desire 
always aims at something more, so to speak, but this does not entail any lack 
in the actual world. However good the conditions in the actual world are, they 
can be better and then you have a good reason to desire accordingly. They can-
not be better in terms of non-increasing values, of course, if you possess the 
6 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651, Part 1, Ch 6, Love and Hate.
7 D. Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. London: Routledge, 1966, 
p. 95.
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 maximum. Anyhow, this is irrelevant because you cannot desire what you can-
not get. You cannot get an increase of a non-increasing value. In the same way, 
you cannot desire what you already have.
The lack-theory is a theory of desire that says nothing of desirability consid-
erations. Yet, they explain our reasons for desiring. Now, do we need a motiva-
tional theory like the lack-theory? I do not think so. I desire something on the 
condition that I can see and understand – or imagine – a better possible world 
in terms of its desirable features. This is enough both to motivate and justify 
a desire. This decision eliminates a traditional source of frustration. The point 
is that lack is bad and a failed attempt to correct the situation is frustrating. 
If all desiring entails a lack and we know that the lack remains regardless of 
our efforts, desire itself is a frustrating proposition. Anyone who desires will 
learn this fact. In this sense one must associate desire with suffering, that is, the 
starting point of desire is always lacking and in this sense bad. Some desires are 
like that but not all. Notice that desire always aims at a better possible world 
but the starting point may be categorically bad. Sometimes it is good, although 
it could be better. If it could not, one cannot desire.
Next, an additional distinction is needed, the distinction between occur-
ring and potential desire. This may somehow relate to unconscious or subcon-
scious desires, but I cannot go into the details of this old and deep problem 
here.8 Now, a rather strange and certainly difficult problem is, when exactly do 
I occurrently desire something? Perhaps we must postulate something like an 
opening, invitation, or opportunity for desiring in the sense that I find some-
thing desirable and also I see an actual opportunity to imagine the relevant 
possible world, and then the relevant desire occurs. Notice I am not talking 
about action except in the metonymic sense of mental action. Therefore, the 
opportunity does not entail a chance of acting in any behavioural sense. It only 
means an opening for a thought of the better world that then makes it pos-
sible for an actual desire to emerge. I want a new car. Most of the time this is 
a potential desire, but when I actually see a nice new car this provides me an 
opportunity or invitation to desire a new car in the occurring sense. In this way, 
an occurring desire entails a thought of a better possible world that I happen to 
entertain just here and now. This possible world has its desirable features and 
I happen to have an opening to think about it. Desire is like a belief. I believe 
that 2+2=4 but I do not think about it all the time. When I think of it, I epis-
temically assent to 2+2=4. This means that belief is different from belief plus 
8 See H.F. Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious. New York: Harper, 1970; and T. Pataki, 
Wish-fulfilment in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. London: Routledge, 2014.
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actual assent. In case of desire, I as if succumb to a desire, say, to possess a new 
car. Desire may be a mental state or an episode.
To complicate matters, I must put some restrictions on my desires – and at 
this point some anxious feelings will return. When I want something, I may for-
mulate the object in general terms. I would like to love somebody. I want a new 
car. I may as well put the object in specific terms. I want the classic Ferrari I saw 
today in front of my house. I want to marry Ms/Mr X (add you favourite name). 
What happens here? The basic axiom is: I want the best and I want everything 
that is desirable. As such my desires know no limits. They are megalomaniac 
and absolutely immodest. Why this is so? The answer is simple: why would 
they not be immodest? If you want love or sex, why would you not want the 
best quality in maximal degree? You first evaluate the matter, you decide what 
is best, and then you want a maximal amount of it. If you want some good of 
course you want it all; I find this to be an obvious assumption. Next, I must 
recognize my limited powers in the real world. This happens because I want 
to reduce the risks and control my anxiety level, and we all have learned how 
to do so. We learn it early in life, actually at the same time when our first de-
sires emerge. We will learn that potential desires are free but occurring desires 
requite control and various types of negative amendment. This brings about 
anxiety: I potentially desire max-X when I now need to reduce such an unre-
alistic desire to a realistic X. The tension between max-X and X is obvious and 
its case is disappointment and frustration. I always wanted a Ferrari but I drive 
a Fiat Punto. What you ideally desire and what you can get are two radically 
different things. Of course, a perfectly adjusted and realistic person learns to 
forget her maximal potential desires. It may happen that she is so modest that 
she only wants what she can get, or paradoxically, what she already has. Most 
of us also want what we cannot get. The worst case scenario is of course that 
where the person’s occurring desires are or tend to be unrealistically immodest 
or maximal. This person must be unhappy.
To want too much will bring about frustration. If I desire too little, I will suf-
fer in another way. The trick is to find the balance between too much and too 
little. Too much means either self-deception as to success or instant frustra-
tion. Too little means, figuratively speaking, a life of starvation, which at some 
point will come evident and cause suffering. It entails a life not lived. Too much 
modesty is a curse in the long run. This dilemma applies to everybody regard-
less of however powerful they may be. Perhaps some of us can dream of and 
desire much bigger things than I ever can manage without feeling the pangs of 
frustration. I cannot desire big things although I can day-dream of them and 
find my occasional happiness via wish-fulfilment. Desires are different, they 
must have a touch of realism in them in the sense that the better world must 
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somehow be possible when it is seen from my personal point of view. I would 
say, I can imagine a path that actually takes me from this actual world to the 
desirable possible world. Of course the path is missing if the possible world is 
the same as the actual world or if the possible world is internally inconsistent 
or impossible. However, we can say that the path is also missing if it is too dif-
ficult or, in other words, if the possible world is too far away from the actual 
world. If I say I desire a bigger yacht than any of the Russian oligarchs ever had, 
I do not think this qualifies as a full-fledged desire in the sense we are discuss-
ing here. The path to that possible world is too difficult for me or, in other 
worlds, it is too far from my actual world.
Obviously, we have a problem here. First, I said that desires are basically 
unlimited in quality and scope but now I say all desires are a priori limited 
by our path-related distance considerations between possible worlds. What I 
want to say is that desires are not day-dreams, empty wishes, or vain hopes; 
they are something more concrete as they entail the said path between the 
two worlds. Nevertheless, all desires are as unlimited as possible and in this 
sense they are immodest. I want as much as possible and perhaps a little more 
so that my desire flirts with vain hope and wish-fulfilment – and there I must 
stop. My desires are initially limited only by my realization that they are impos-
sible, unfeasible, or perhaps silly. The basic idea here is as follows. In the case 
of potential desire I imagine a path to the better, desired possible world but the 
description of this path need not be realistic. In the case of an occurring desire 
the path should be at least minimally realistic or something that may take you 
to a better possible world. I want to be rich, which potentially means I want 
to multibillionaire, why would I not? I can imagine how this might happen 
but certainly not in any realistic sense. In daydreaming and wishful thinking 
the path does not figure at all. I as if jump directly to the ideal state of affairs. 
I quickly learn that such desires are a waste of time. If I play state lottery, I know 
the path to riches and I can even calculate the probability of my success. Yet, 
I should realize that money will not come to my direction.
When I want love I want a beautiful, rich, and young person who is desired 
by everybody – but this sounds silly. This cannot be a realistic occurring de-
sire because it has no specified object and I am not that desirable myself, as I 
know painfully well. This is the first step towards anxiety via frustration. The 
lesson to learn is that I must restrict my desires in two ways, or to make their 
objects more concrete and less lofty. Therefore, when I say I want to marry Ms 
X and I want this individual Ford car I am fine. I did my homework and thus 
I now know what I can and should desire in the sense that my desires have 
some relevance to my life and its projects and programs. All realistic desires 
are restricted in this way although some other desires still may be more or less 
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outlandish and hopeless. I may desire something that is not within my range, 
considering my personal power, because the main thing is that the object is 
somehow relevant to my life, or the object is in my ball-park.
Concerning frustration, it may not be my main worry here. I may feel no 
frustration if I am a mature and well-educated person. I am happy with my 
restricted occurring desires so that I do not bother with my potential whimsies, 
as I see them. Yet, we can argue that only the total lack of desire may provide 
peace of mind without a trace of anxiety.9 This is to say that even the best 
adapted desires may be anxious, why? The explanation is that controlling one’s 
desires requires mental effort and moral work. Many desires are depended on 
a push factor, or they are brought about by emotive and conative drives that 
are not cognitively controlled, for instance, hunger and sexual urges. A nor-
mal person cannot ignore these even if one is properly trained to control them 
when they emerge. They are a constant source of mental effort or even struggle 
and therefore prone to bring about anxiety. It is hard to work against them. 
Heraclitus says, it is hard to struggle against your desire that wants everything 
and buys it by the price of your soul.10 However, also frustration pays its part 
here: it is disappointing to notice how vulnerable one is and how hopeless the 
struggle against unacceptable desires can be. Finally, obsession and addiction 
make life really painful.
Some people desire a lot, some people desire very little, always depending 
on their personality, life history, and their sense of personal power. If you desire 
and hope to get too much you will be disappointed, frustrated, and anxious, 
so you learn to balance immodest desires in relation to life’s modest realities, 
always depending on how much anxiety you are able to tolerate in your life. 
In our liberal commercial culture people might be happier if they did not de-
sire so much, yet we are constantly pushed to desire even more. Air travel is a 
good example: in coach you want a business class seat that you know you could 
but should not buy; you may not want to fly first class because you say it does 
not add anything desirable to the experience – deep down you know you are 
deceiving yourself and that entails bad faith. Studies show that that air travel-
lers in coach are bitter and anxious when they see business class cabins and 
passengers; they come to think of what their own life is like during the twelve 
hours ahead. Desire management is a battle to stay within some reasonable 
limits and yet retain the imaginary pleasures of that little extra provided by the 
9 A relevant story is told by G. Agamben, The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-
Life. Tr. A. Kotsko. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013. The point is, if you follow the 
rules without thinking it and regard them as all that matters, you are free from desire.
10 See n1.
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desirable thing, in this case the flight itself. Too little means your inner life is 
bland and boring, too much means you are always disappointed and anxious. 
Is a balance possible? Actually, when people are asked they tend to say their 
life is good as it is and they do not desire anything special. They say the small-
est good things make them happiest. In Finland, at least 82 percent of people 
report, when asked, happiness or great happiness.11 They refuse to desire big 
things, which is too risky and thus frustrating. Life is good as it is, whatever it is 
like – this what the relevant mental self-defence mechanisms do to you.
 Zero Desires
In the literature on desire and desiring, I think I can detect a definite tendency 
towards positive and action related examples. I say I want a new car or I want 
to buy a new car, where a new car is the intentional object. I know I can afford to 
buy a car, or I can go and buy it; hence, the relevant action is in the books, so 
to say. Desire does not entail action, however, or even motivation but this is a 
difficult thing to remember when we think of desiring.12 But we can find novel 
examples once we focus on what I call here zero desires. They have some inter-
esting properties that are relevant to frustration and anxiety. I mean cases like, 
“I never want to see him again,” which is a restriction on a general desire like, 
“I never want to see any unpleasant people around me,” which as such clearly 
is an unrealizable desire that comes very close to a vain hope and empty wish. 
Even the word “never” sounds like too much to desire for. Hence, the properly 
restricted desire is, “I do not want to see him again,” at the same time believing 
that this may still happen.
Zero desires (z-desires) are common. What are their desirability conditions 
like? In the example above, I want a possible world where he does not appear, 
so that his absence is what is desirable. In such cases what is desirable is the 
absence of something so that a desirable world is that which you can travel 
through without finding this person. Here the object of desire is the lack of 
something, like the world without poverty and gratuitous violence. Notice that 
z-desires have no object in the same sense as other desires have. This is a good 
11 This figure is based on several studies, but what they show is unclear. Why do researchers 
jump from “They say they are happy” to “They are happy”? For instance, if 90 per cent of 
all people are happy, why do the medical experts say mental depression is a major medi-
cal problem in Finland; see (https://www.mielenterveysseura.fi/en/home/mental-health/
mental-disorders/depression).
12 I want a high grade from an exam. After the test I desire and hope for the best. Notice the 
ambiguity here: before the test my desire entails action but after the test it does not.
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reason, perhaps, to stop talking about an object of desire, or objects of desire 
in a non-contextual sense. “I want an apple,” seems to focus on an apple whose 
arrival will satisfy the desire and that is all. However, in order to understand 
any desire we must contextualize its object in the sense that now we focus on 
the accessible possible world where we find the apple. This is to say that we 
never want an apple as such. Such an intuition fits well the case of z-desires: 
their object is a desirable world, namely, any world where the key repulsive 
fact is missing. I prima facie want any of these worlds. Of course, we also could 
say that the desirable thing is a negative fact like, “not seeing this person.” 
I may say I am satisfied and happy as long as I do not see this person, when the 
negative and desirable fact is, “not seeing this person for a long time, possible 
never.” This looks like a narrative or an interrelated chain of facts and hence it 
may be a good idea to place it in a context in a new possible world. Then it is 
easier to specify what the desirable state of affairs really is: it is the world where 
he stays away from my field of perception and perhaps also from social neigh-
bourhood so that there is no chance of meeting him. This sounds like a good 
idea, namely, to tell the whole story and not to say simply that the person is 
currently unseen. In this way, it also seems better to talk about a possible world 
without such a repulsive object and say that this world is desirable.
What then makes z-desires so frustrating? The fact is that z-desires are not 
satisfiable in the same way as other desires whose object looks so much sim-
pler. I get an apple, a new car, or passionate love, if I do the right thing or (in-
clusive or) I get lucky. Sometimes things turn out as I hope, I know that, and so 
it is not irrational to desire those things. Such objects can be ambiguous, met-
onymic, metaphoric, fuzzy, undefined, too general, etc. but they will still retain 
their connection to positive facts. One may notice that no desired objects exist 
but the truth is that we at least have some signposts for tracking the ways the 
objects tend to move. If I want a car, the linguistic idiom does not tell too much 
but at least I know in what direction I should look when I am dealing with this 
desired object. It has something to do with cars or some other things that are 
somehow related to cars, perhaps figuratively, but anyway. Perhaps I want my 
manhood back but when we analyse this we can and must start with fine cars.
Now we should ask, are z-desires unique and more problematic than other 
desires? I argue that they indeed are because they do not have an object in 
the same sense as other desires do. Let us first notice the following ambiguity: 
“I never want to see you again” may mean “Stay away from my field of vision,” 
so that the relevant object is the fact that this person indeed stays away from 
my field of vision. But the same sentence may as well mean that I want to live 
in that kind of the world where I may have nothing to do with him. This is an 
example of the expansive nature of desires, or of their inherent  limitlessness. 
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What starts as a simple fact concerning the contents of my field of vision ex-
pands, when we consider it more closely, towards the idea that you totally 
disappear from my life. Then, because I must somehow limit this, I arrive at 
some middle ground position concerning your visibility in my life. Whatever 
this final position is it concerns the whole, or at least of a considerable slice, of 
a good possible world.
Now, a crucial asymmetry between positive and negative objects of desire 
exists, namely the second object cannot be satisfied in the same way the first 
one can. Compare, “I want to see you,” and “I do not want to see you.” In the 
positive case, every time I see you I feel good about the event – my desire is 
satisfied. In the second, everything is different: Every time I do not see you, 
I feel good – my desire is satisfied. This is nonsense, of course. When I do not 
see you I feel nothing. If I see you I feel bad because my desire is frustrated 
and I am anxious as long as I anticipate this. This happens because I might 
see you. Nothing guarantees that I do not see you, so I am always afraid of 
it, or at least I stay uneasy. I must anticipate disappointment and this entails 
anxiety. Therefore, z-desires are a source of continuous anxiety, perhaps it is 
mild and more or less hidden but it still lingers on. In the case of z-desire I can 
anticipate nothing but anxiety. The only way to feel satisfied about a z-desire 
is when you get some definite guarantees that the repulsive fact will not occur. 
If you do not want to see Bill you may desire that Bill is dead. But this sounds 
like a potential and immodest desire that you aim not to recognize. Bill´s de-
mise is possible, of course; however, this is a novel fact that was not part of the 
original z-desire narrative concerning its desirable possible world. It is another 
expansion of the original z-desire. Think of it: “I do not want to see him ever 
again” is not the same as “I want to have guarantees to the effect that I will not 
see him ever again.” These are two different desires. Moreover, the latter one 
concerning guarantees happens to be a positive desire: “I want guarantees …” 
To conclude: z-desires promise us no happiness through satisfaction; on the 
contrary, they promise us frustration through failure. The only positive aspect 
of z-desire is this. I do not want to see him ever again and I am anxious that 
I will see him. In some special cases I believe that the situation is particularly 
dangerous but he does not appear. I feel relieved and in this sense happy. But 
this is a special case.
One can make z-desires feel good as if they were satisfied. Here we can use 
the same strategy we used in the case of non-increasing value. The strategy 
was this simple: when you have the full count of the value you cannot get more 
and it all starts feeling unimportant, but you can recover your sense of value 
by imagining the loss of the value in question, or you may risk the value if you 
need a more concrete reminder. For a while your appreciation of the value 
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will return although it will not last. We can play the same game with z-desires: 
Imagine that the repulsive thing will appear or somehow risk the value and 
then you can feel the satisfaction. Remind yourself how good things are now 
when the repulsive possible world has not materialized and think of how bad 
it would feel if it did. You simply tell yourself that Bill is here and when he is 
not, you feel good. All this helps you keep conscious of the good thing, which 
feels good, although it does not change the basic truth, namely, you are bat-
tling your frustration and anxiety. Z-desires keep the good thing valueless and 
as such non-desirable unless compared to its repulsive alternative, which itself 
is less than ideal thing to do. To constantly remind yourself of what is a re-
pulsive possibility is in itself a source of anxiety. Therefore, you cannot avoid 
anxiety, regardless what you do. When the bad thing stays away, the situation 
may stay indifferent to you but, of course, when the bad thing emerges you are 
unhappy; the threat exists so that when you expect bad thing emerge you are 
anxious; the only way to feel happy is the counterfactual strategy of imagining 
the emergence of the bad thing while it stays away; but to imagine a bad thing 
is in itself anxious. We are in trouble with our z-desires, which is based on the 
idea of the desirability of the absence of repulsive things. The situation is a 
good example of the Catch-22.
 Desire as a Metonym
Here I follow Lacan, who says desire is a metonym.13 We say de dicto “I want 
that the world is without war” and de re “I want the world that is without war.” 
In the first case, if the world goes to war I do not want it any longer. In the 
second case, I may still desire it. In the first case, the lack of war is essential, in 
the second case it is not. De re you got what you wanted, a world that happens 
to be without war, and thus it does not matter if war breaks out later. In the 
case of de dicto interpretation of a desire the problem is my inability to spell 
out the exact meaning of desiderata. This is to say that I myself may not know 
what I want or what the intentional object of my desire is. Yet, most of the time 
we think the contrary to be true, and thus we refuse to see any problem. If you 
want to be a good father, what do you want? It is hard to say. What about “All 
my life I wanted to be as free as possible”? The de dicto interpretation focuses 
on the meaning of the desired proposition making it vulnerable to all the prob-
lems that stem from the semantics and pragmatics of language. For instance, it 
13 Evans, 1996, pp. 38, 113f; and A. Lemaire, Jacques Lacan. Tr. D. Macey. London: Routledge, 
1970, pp. 195f.
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is hard to believe that someone really wanted to be a sadistic monster, even if 
he says so, simply because such a self-ascription is socially so inadmissible, ex-
cept if it is pronounced ironically or it implies pathological self-hatred. Never-
theless, “I want to be a sadistic monster” is a perfectly good desire description. 
A de dicto desire may surprise me and hence also frustrate me. I say to myself, 
anxiously, “I really did not want that.” Let me bypass these problems and move 
over to the world of de re desires.
De re cases focus on the intentional objects of desire, when an object dis-
plays one single package of intentionality and desirability. Ice cream is some-
times an object one can appreciate by ascribing desirability and intentionality 
to it. It is good and I myself (de se) aim at it. In this way, ice cream as an object 
is the object I think of and aim at on the basis of its desirable characteristics. 
What can go wrong with de re interpretations of desire? I may not exaggerate 
too much if I say, everything.
Suppose I know what I want when I say, “I want a car that is red.” However, 
I do not know that red paint fades significantly quicker than any other colour. 
If I knew it, I would be deeply troubled by the fact. In other words, I would be 
frustrated because now I must reconsider my preference for the colour red. Ac-
cording to another interpretation, I did not get what I really wanted. Another 
anxious choice is now facing me – I do not like it, namely, to keep the car or 
not. I want to marry a beautiful person but I should realize that with him or 
her comes an ugly family. All de re desires seem tainted in the sense that along 
with the good thing comes a bundle of bad things. Of course you may say you 
got more of the good thing than you ever wanted but then you must forget the 
other side of things. Moreover, at de re level we lose contact with desirability 
conditions. That the car colour is nice and fades quickly does not say anything 
of why I wanted it: they just happen to be properties of the car.
No desirability considerations occur in a vacuum, even if one may try in 
good faith. Typically, people think that their de dicto desires are motivated on 
the basis of some truncated account of them, especially when the object is 
rich in tempting features. I want her so much that I am unable to focus on the 
total package formed by all the relevant features of it (de re). The problem is, 
of course, that a simple object comes de re with a big baggage of other things, 
some of which not so attractive, some even repulsive. The basic rule is, when 
you have your object and possess it, you get many occasional or irrelevant 
things as well. Moreover, the evaluation of these extras should be independent 
of the desirability characteristics of the object itself. Often it is not so, which 
indicates a certain degree of irrational reasoning.
Psychologically speaking, we tend to desire something independently of the 
evaluation of its extra baggage. Is this irrational? I want a red car but now I 
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am told about the red colour. I may regret it but I still want it. I want a shot of 
whisky and I am told that it may be, in my current medical condition, a danger-
ous idea. I still want whisky although I regret that I should not have it. In this 
way, the extra features of my de re desire may not influence the desire itself but 
my decision to act on it, or the object’s acceptance is in danger. Suppose I have 
paedophilic desires. I am fully aware that I should not entertain them because 
they are sick and shameful. I also know that such desires are dangerous but this 
is an actionist worry. Yet, my moral reservations may not suffocate my desire.
I call this phenomenon the independence interpretation of desired objects. 
When I fix my de dicto interpretation of the object, or I think I know what I 
want, I also am committed to it. When I consider the de re interpretation of 
the same desire I follow the principle of the priority of de dicto over de re, in 
the sense that the extra features of de re object do not matter – I desire the 
object regardless of them, or even regardless of any of its features. Of course, 
one may suggest that my de dicto desired object is originally formulated and 
accepted as desirable on the basis of my considered opinion of the de re object. 
For instance, I research the properties of red cars and learn about the fading of 
the colour. I still desire a red car and that means I do not mind the fading. This 
seems to be so in some cases, but not generally or as we may say, only partially. 
I may consider some of the extra features de re but only some and then fleet-
ingly. The proof of this point is indirect. As I said above, our de dicto desires 
tend to be resistant to the introduction of repulsive de re considerations. I may 
have a hard time getting rid of some of my desires I know I should not have 
just by reminding myself of their intrinsic problems. Desires track their satis-
faction persistently and even stubbornly, that is, a desire tends to be immune 
to criticism and counter-evidence. This may not be irrational because it only 
proves, as I said, that desires track their satisfaction. All this indicates that our 
de dicto desires are formed independently of a full evaluation of their full de 
re package. This is one reason why desires are, in the end, anxious: I should 
pay more attention to the de re side of desire, or I should not give de dicto 
such priority. The battle is between dreams and reality. I give an example of 
de re vs. de dicto. When a man (women are stronger) buys a new car, the sales 
person calls him a couple of weeks later just to see how he now feels about the 
car. This is important because at this time reality has hit and his dreams may 
be frustrated. He may be suffering from post-purchase blues. The best of all 
desires tend to be the most vulnerable.
All this makes desire frustrating, anxious, and even scary, so to speak. We 
instinctively know it is not a good idea to give a free range to our imagination 
concerning de dicto desiderata. The nature of frustration brought about by de-
sire is, therefore, twofold: it is frustrating that desires are so stubborn, or hard 
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to extinguish, and in many cases the extra baggage that comes along with the 
de re object is something one finds too repulsive for comfort. I may have fixed 
my de dicto object without paying due attention to the problems at the de re 
level, or what I will get. It also seems that when I fix the object as something I 
actually desire this mental act does not allow for a realistic evaluation of the 
relevant extra features. Let me explain: I say I want to marry this beautiful per-
son and I remind myself of the ugly family but I say I do not care. Epistemically 
speaking, I should consider the whole set of relevant properties of the case but 
I am unable to do that. When I focus on beauty I leave other relevant consid-
eration aside as if they did not exist. If I am lucky enough to realize my desire 
or move to the new and better possible world, I am bound to notice that this 
world contains features that I do not want or even features that I find impossi-
ble to tolerate. Sometimes they come as a surprise, sometimes not. I may have 
known about them but, because of my desire, I did not form a realistic picture 
of them. The rule is, beliefs must remain independent of desire. Your desires 
depend on your beliefs but not the other way round.
Once I realize how risky desires are I cannot avoid of being anxious of them. 
I try to stay away from such desires, that is, desires may be dangerous. I do not 
want to expose myself to certain kind of desirability considerations. One way 
is to restrict your diet of commercial information and persuasion. Of course, 
nothing you do may eliminate all anxiety because it is embedded in the nature 
of desire. Whatever you desire ultimately disappoints you. Jacques Lacan says 
desire is a metonym in the sense that what you want and what you get are nev-
er the same but at least they are metonyms, that is, somehow related to each 
other at the linguistic level.14 You want a horse and then you get this horse, 
so at the level of horsehood all is well but nothing guarantees your personal 
gratification. On the contrary, de re the horse is never the horse you wanted 
de dicto. Lacan’s point is, what you wanted, an idealization, is related to what 
is, or the real thing, only metonymically. In this sense, you got what you got 
when you wanted a beautiful horse, and these two still form a metonymic pair. 
Actually, you can form as many such metonymic pairs as you like and then 
wonder if you got what you really wanted. What you want and what you get 
form a set of metonymic pairs. Given that you wanted a horse, what you get 
can be characterized in so many different ways. How to certify that de dicto 
14 But for Lacan at least this does not mean that desire can be simply reduced to the idea 
of yearning or pining for something lost. Desire for him is always a desire for something 
else, because it is caught in what he calls “the rails of metonymy.” (www.lacanonline.
com/2010/05/what-does-lacan-say-about-desire/). Also, Evans, 1966, pp. 36ff., 116; and 
D. Leader, Why Do Women Write More Letters than They Post? A Meditation of the Loneli-
ness of Sexes. London: Faber & Faber, 1996, pp. 118–110.
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and de re interpretations still concern one given desire? They need not share a 
concept, that much is certain, like “horse” and a “bag of bones.” Or what to say 
about the highly ambiguous Biblical metaphor, you want to give “no pearls to 
the swine”? It seems you need to start from de dicto desire and trace its effects 
all the way to the real world. If the de dicto object can be traced back to reality 
we have one given desire. Think of this example: de dicto I want to be a good 
father and de re what one gets is a sadistic monster. The key problem must be 
that de dicto and de re depend on different types of intentional interpretation. 
De re comes close to being an extensional context while de dicto pics a super-
intensional one. The former recognizes all properties of the object unlike the 
second which is dependent on what is included in the intentional object. You 
do not want to look at what you actually got in life, it is far too risky.
∵
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Chapter 5
René Girard and Mimetic Desire
René Girard is famous for his mimetic theory of desire across different fields 
of scholarship. My aim is to scrutinize his theory from a philosophical point of 
view. His basic idea and theory appear to be deceptively simple. The theory has 
two parts, namely, the main thesis and its implications. The thesis says, a desir-
ing subject always copies her desires from a model, or it has a relevant source. 
Desire is triangular or based on a three-place relation: subject – model – 
object. Next the main implication: subjects are anxious and hate each other 
because their desires are not properly recognized as their own. How could they 
be so recognized, they are copies and copies always are less valuable than the 
original. Paradoxically, no original exists because all models are desires and 
all desires are copies. I analyze and criticize Girard by showing how complex 
and unintuitive his theory actually is. I pay attention to the genesis of anxiety. 
I develop a sketch of an alternative view in terms of scripts of desire on the 
social stage.
 Girard on Desire
René Girard says all desires are mimetic, or copied from some identifiable 
sources.1 His first and, as it seems, foundational example is Don Quixote of 
La Mancha who read too many historical romances and now wants to be a 
wandering knight. Of course, he recreates himself as fiction and therefore this 
is him as fiction in fiction, which is to say that first his readers speak about him 
in oratio obliqua and then he himself is driven to do the same. When we speak 
of him we refer to him via the fictional narrative created by Cervantes. When 
Don Quixote speaks about himself he refers to himself via the fiction he has 
1 See R. Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure. Tr. Y. Freccero. 
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1965. This theory is evidently too simple to be psy-
chologically valid. We sometimes copy desires but we also modify and reject them. I may not 
desire X simply because you desire X. My desires may represent other subjects’ desires but 
to say they are copies is an oversimplification. However, from an analytical point of view, the 
simple view is fine. Girard’s scholarly output is large but I focus only on his basic thesis. We 
cannot benefit from extensive empirical considerations here. They may lead us towards the 
ideas presented in J.D. Holden, Second that Emotion. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2012; 
and K. Greenfield, The Myth of Choice. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011.
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read, say, when he compares himself with the mythical and fictional heroes of 
the past. Girard says his character Don Q now is mimetic in nature, or a repeti-
tion or a copy of those knights that he finds on the pages of the novels he read. 
Girard says desires – all desires – are mimetic and his audience has listened.2 
They have copied Girard’s thesis. Anyway, we should ask what Girard means by 
his rather grandiose hypothesis.
It is of course possible that the man from La Mancha is the innocent victim 
of the following logical blunder, namely, he thinks he wants to be a wandering 
knight and believes that such a desire is satisfiable. The intentional object is, 
obviously, “wandering knight,” so that “I am a wandering knight” is a proposi-
tion whose truth gratifies him. This is not so, as one can easily see, for instance, 
he fails to perform great deeds. Of course, once he has convinced himself that 
he indeed is a wandering knight he starts wandering around seeking for heroic 
opportunities. He made himself what he is now, a fictional character, but next 
he must write the narrative of his own adventures and this is what he is go-
ing to do. When you read the legend of Don Q you learn that to be a knight is 
what our man wants de dicto; thus, he lives like a wandering knight, from one 
imagined heroic deed to another doing good and punishing the bad. What he 
says is that he wants to share in the virtues of those immortal knights. He has 
not really copied the objects of desire, rather he has copied the essential desire 
itself, and then these objects constitute his new self-image. Fictional desires 
make a fictional self, of course, like Don Q a wandering knight. In this sense, it 
is the desire itself he wants, not some specific and special intentional objects, 
like rescuing young ladies. Or, we can say that he directly wants the desire and 
indirectly the heroic exploits. He always is happy with the overall scheme, or 
the grand desire itself, although his exploits never make him happy or satisfied. 
The noble knight attacks windmills that he thinks are hostile monsters, and 
that hurts.
He wants to be a wandering knight, which now is his new identity. We can 
emphasize three points here. First, what he imagines, his heroic adventures, 
follow from his desirable and desired new identity. In this sense “wandering 
knight” is what I call a desire frame, which is not an object as such, indepen-
dently of the heroic deeds. He needs to save fair maidens only because he wants 
to be a wandering knight who necessarily rescues them; it is all based on this 
one grand desire, or desire frame, that determines his needs and deeds. The 
concept of need is not instrumental but constitutive in this context because 
he does not say “I want to save her” but “This is what a wandering knight does: 
2 On mimesis, see A. Melberg, Theories of Mimesis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995.
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I as a knight save maidens, she is a maiden, and therefore I save her.” Second, 
Don Q as a wandering knight lives through a grand desire that he shares with 
his fellow fictional characters, the greatest of the hoary great knights. Third, 
Don Q enjoys it all, or he is as if immersed in the feeling of knightly virtue, 
the excitement of adventure, and the sense of power and capability etc. The 
key term here is feeling, or an emotive state without its fixed object or even 
descriptive sense. It is the feeling of being of a correct type of agent, and this 
feeling is good. It may be called pride but as well humility or any of the other 
relevant emotively charged states of mind. In sum: What do we have here? Don 
Q lives through a grand desire that works as a desire frame determining the 
actions that constitute his knightly identity at the same time sharing the great, 
proud feeling of being a knight. Accordingly, it is highly misleading to say that 
he wants to be a knight in the sense that “to be a knight” form the de dicto in-
tentional object of a specific desire. Such a desire can be satisfied by the person 
becoming a knight, but Don Q does not want to become a knight or even to be 
a knight in this sense; what he wants is to live through the desire and enjoy it. 
In this sense, he desires the relevant desire. What is this desire? It is being what 
one already is. According to the propositional attitude theory of desire, this is 
impossible. You cannot desire, in the propositional sense, what you already 
have.3 You may love it, as Thomas Hobbes says, but what you have you cannot 
figure as the intentional object of a given desire. Desire in this sense requires 
that you figure out a new possible world where your desire can be satisfied. 
But Don Q does not only love what he is and what he does; on the contrary, he 
wants to do what he does and what, fictionally, he already is. In this sense, he 
enjoys his desire and in this sense he desires his satisfied desire, which there-
fore cannot have an intentional object and therefore cannot be a propositional 
attitude. He desires his desire; he desires to be a wandering knight, which in 
itself is a desire. Then his subsequent actions are based on his identity and mo-
tivated by it. Not all actions require propositional desires in their background.
The greatest of ideas are often simple but the simplest of ideas may be 
deceptive because simplicity does not guarantee the truth or originality of 
the idea. René Girard argues that desires are mimetic and his large audience 
tends to agree: “there is an irresistible impulse to desire what Others desire, 
in other words, to imitate the desires of others.”4 This is empirical psychologi-
cal point. The logically stronger idea follows: all desires are copies. These two 
theses are mutually independent and their relationship remains obscure to the 
3 See the idea of f-desire, Chapter 1.
4 Girard, 1965, p. 12. Thorstein Veblen figured this out already in 1899 in his classic The Theory 
of the Leisure Class. New York: Dover, 1899/1964.
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end. What Girard says is that I desire things but such a mental state or episode 
cannot be described by means of a two-place relation; we need a third vari-
able and consequently a three-place relation, or as he sees it, a triangle. I do 
not only desire something but I desire it on the basis of a relevant model that 
I copy. Girard seems to say that such a model is provided by other people whom 
we witness and from whom we adopt what we desire, when we desire. In this 
way, I desire X because of a model provided by other people. In other words, 
I know what they desire and therefore I desire it as well.
Now, I ask only one question: How should we understand Girard’s point that 
desire is a triangle in the sense that “I desire X …” must be completed by men-
tioning the source of this desire, or a model, that I copy when I desire.5 We 
know that X has its source, or a model that I copy. This is to say that my desire 
is not autonomous but, on the contrary, derivative. Are all desires derivative in 
this sense? Perhaps Girard should say he is interested in only those desires that 
are derivative? I can find no simple answer in Girard’s own writings. They tend 
to be heuristic rather than analytical, suggestive rather than convincing, and 
literary rather than discursive. He is more like an inventor than an architect 
of ideas, and a preacher rather than a teacher. Here I approach his writings 
as if his grand vision of desire were a theory, however impolite that may be. 
However, it is clear that the mimetic theory is interesting because it postulates 
triangular desires and, thus, we should focus on it.
Let us say all desires are triangular; if we say some are and some are not we 
no longer have a triangular theory of desire. On the contrary, we have a two-
place theory that is supplemented by certain ideas of triangularity, which is not 
that interesting a view. Only if we argue that all desires are triangular, do we say 
something exciting. Let us keep it all simple and stipulate that Girard presents 
a theory of mimetic desire saying that all desires in the end are copies of some 
given models. These models are persons, although in the case of Don Q the 
models came from literary sources. But this was Girard’s initial first example, 
and in his later writings the sources of desire are persons. Therefore, let us say 
all desires are copies of other agent’s desires. This may create a tricky problem: 
certain types of agents are sources of desire and others are recipients. I do not 
want to raise the question of how those authoritative positions are created 
and maintained. Instead, I suggest that all agents are at the same level: we all 
copy other people’s desires; I copy them, they copy me. If we dismiss this point, 
we also need to explain where the authorities get their characteristic desires. 
Whom are they supposed to mimic? Who are the authoritative super-sources 
5 Girard, 1965, Ch. 1 “‘Triangular’ Desire.” See also M. Kirwan, Discovering Girard. Lanham: Cow-
ley Publications, 2005, Ch. 1 “Desire is Mimetic.”
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
93René Girard and Mimetic Desire
<UN>
and why? Notice that Girard’s theory is not new if he speaks of the mimesis of 
desire simpliciter, which has been known since Antiquity in all forms of hero 
worship. The Christians speak of imitating Jesus Christ as a special model. If all 
desires are mimetic, what about Jesus’s desires?
Of course one may still ask what happens to unique or idiosyncratic desires. 
A person desires something new in the sense that the desire is peculiar to him 
and only to him. It may well happen that other persons possess or have pos-
sessed such a desire but our person has no previous experience of it. Her desire 
is certainly a normal desire but, anyway, exhibits a two-place relation. Should 
we say that a unique mental state cannot be a desire but something else, like a 
perversion, whim, quirk, or craze? Of course, if the desire is unique to the sub-
ject, it may be such. Logically and analytically much depends on the answer 
but, for Girard, it does not matter. He says that all desires exhibit a three-place 
relation, although he cannot really mean it. What he means is that all interest-
ing desires do so. Two-place desires are, therefore, oddities we need not worry 
about. They may or may not be desires and that is all one can say. When you 
think of it, it is surprisingly difficult to describe a desire which is totally unique 
to a given subject in the sense that no one never heard about it, or it is not a 
combination of some familiar desires. This psychological difficulty speaks for 
the three-place theory of desire.
 Model, Not Desirability
Now, if we accept the three-place relational theory of desire, what are we speak-
ing about? Notice that desire is usually depicted by means of a two-place rela-
tion: I desire X. However, according to Girard, desire entails a three-place rela-
tion: I desire X as Q, that is, as desired by others. But this is not an immediately 
convincing novelty; I always desire X as something, namely, as desirable. I can-
not desire something that is undesirable or repulsive. For instance, I desire X as 
something pleasant, valuable, or rewarding. This theory has one glitch, though. 
Some objects of desire are intrinsically desirable, for instance, I desire her love 
or I want a reward. Perhaps I want pleasure. In this case I cannot ask for an 
explanation of the desirability of love, reward, or pleasure – these objects are 
intrinsically desirable. If I want ice-cream, you always can ask why, which is an 
invitation to produce the third element of the desire triangle, that is, the desir-
ability condition. In this case, one may get something like some quick pleasure. 
I suggest the following solution: suppose X is an intrinsically desirable object, 
which is to say it represents a two-place version of the original three-place 
one. In other words, I want X because of D but now I need not mention D. It 
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
Chapter 594
<UN>
is redundant. I truncate the original three element desire because the third 
member is now tautological. Hence, all desires are not explicitly triangular. Of 
course, the easy way out is to say that, in the case of an intrinsically desirable 
desire, the third element is there but it need not be explicated. “I want love” is 
an abbreviation of “I want love (because love is desirable)”; compare, “I want 
ice-cream because it is sweet (because sweetness is desirable).”
In this perspective we can say, Girard has created another theory of desir-
ability, namely, X is desirable to me when it is actually desired by others. There-
fore, desirability means “actually desired by others.” Notice how radical an idea 
this is: other people do not desire X as something pleasant, valuable, or reward-
ing because they inherit their desires from others, or in other words, the only 
thing I find directly desirable is other subjects’ objects of desire, whatever they 
are. The desirability of X means “desired by others.” This entails the fact that 
no object of desire is desirable as such. For instance, a pleasure that is reject-
ed by all others cannot be desirable. If some subjects desire it, it is desirable. 
This is to say that we always need three terms to describe a desire: the subject 
who desires, the object of her desire, and the source of desirability, which now 
specifies the mimetic option. In this sense mimetic desire constitutes the new 
normal: if we are normal subjects our desires are copies, or our normal desires 
are copies, from which it is only a short leap to the idea that the desired X is a 
normative entity; that is, I should desire X because others do so and, hence, X 
as a desired object conforms to the new normal. If I fail to desire X and instead 
desire idiosyncratic Y, I am abnormal, which is something I should avoid. In 
this way desire tends to create second order normative desires: If I desire X, 
I also should want to desire X and so I desire to desire X. I will return to the 
import of this idea below.
Girard and his followers may also emphasize desire as a three-place relation 
in a deeper sense. They may argue that I desire X not only because X becomes 
desirable to me via others desiring it but because I copy the desire itself. Notice 
that desirability does not logically entail actual desiring because desirability 
is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition of desiring. Many, or most, 
desirable objects are such that I do not desire them. I simply fail to do so. Do 
not lust after your neighbor’s spouse, however desirable he/she is, is a good 
idea but it presupposes that some desirable things are not desired. In the same 
way, I understand that X is desirable to other people and I may also find X 
personally desirable without desiring it, but I cannot desire X if it is not desir-
able. Now, Girard seems to say that I actually desire X because others desire 
X; that is, I desire X along with the others; this is a theory of desire acquisi-
tion that bypasses the problems of desirability altogether, why? The standard 
theory might be something like this: I find X desirable, X is significant to me in 
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my present situation, and I hope I may get X from where I am now, so I desire 
X. Perhaps Girard’s theory says that I believe X is desired by others, I recognize 
this, I relate to these people, and I believe I can get X, so I desire X. Notice that 
I need to restrict the class of people I imitate; it can be called my model class. 
We can now talk about a mimetic imperative, which triggers off my actual de-
siring: desire what others desire and never ask why they desire it. This makes 
desirability conditions vanish. We come close to having a novel push theory of 
desire. Those do not play with desirability conditions.
Next, Girard’s three-place theory of desire radically changes the way we 
talk about desire. I normally say “I desire X,” which now logically entails “We 
desire X” because my desire of X necessarily is shared with others. However, 
I never can be sure of other people’s desires – I must infer them from their 
behavior and testimonies, which tend to be incomplete and even misleading 
sources of information. Therefore, I copy what I believe they desire. Hence, 
I say something like “I desire X since, I believe, among other things, that they 
desire X,” which entails “I believe we desire X.” Perhaps they do not desire X or 
they desire X* that is not quite the same as X. Here we find a novel three-place 
relation, “It appears (1) to me (2) that we desire X (3).” Or even “It appears to 
me that I should desire X like my sources do,” which, for two reasons, does not 
entail “I desire X.” First, strictly speaking, no such thing exists – proposition 
“I desire X” is empty; as a two place relation it is only a linguistic shortcut. Sec-
ond, obviously I may resist the force of “should.” The third term indicates my 
leap from a two-place relational expression to a three-place expression, which 
brings about the additional thought that makes my expression an instance of 
oratio obliqua. In other words, it is no longer true that I desire X oratio recta or 
de se. I cannot say “I myself desire X” because now we desire X.
When I say I desire X, I use an ellipsis, which can be true only if it is accepted 
in the mood of linguistic generosity. This mood comes in two different types: 
first, in regard to evidence and, second, to abbreviations and shortcuts, that is, 
ellipsis. We often accept propositions whose evidential support is inadequate 
when we think, counterfactually, that the full support to it would be easy to 
find. The proposition may also be so conventional that we accept it regardless 
of evidential lack, like “Mothers love their children.” However, we are now inter-
ested in the second type of linguistic generosity, namely, tolerating shortcuts. 
We do this all the time. When I use a two-place relational expression instead 
of a three-place one, this is what happens. In most every-day situations I can 
be generous but situations where I should not may exist as well. Too much 
generosity is not a virtue because in that case I may miss, so to speak, the true 
nature of some key facts, events, and attitudes. In Girard’s case, it is almost 
too easy to be generous because three-place relational expressions tend to be 
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so clumsy and tedious to use. I then use a simpler expression hoping that my 
audience understands that I mean something much more complicated. It is 
indeed difficult to see how to formulate the relevant oratio obliqua expres-
sions. I suggested above something like “I think we desire X,” although that 
does not sound quite right. How should we formulate it in order to express 
Girard’s seminal and celebrated idea correctly?
As we know, Girard’s main idea concerns desire acquisition and not desir-
ability, expressed in its core form as follows,
I desire X because others, whom I mimic, do so.
This causalistic formulation requires a counterfactual background: If others 
did not desire X, I would not desire X regardless of what it is like. Girard must 
think that this entails something like a principle of dependence of desire: de-
sire depends of mimesis, or
I would not desire X or Y, if I did not mimic others,
This entails a set of general conditions that hold of all desire, for instance: I am 
in a suitable position to mimic others, there is something to mimic, and I have 
the relevant abilities and prior interests. Then, I mimic others and desire what 
they desire, understood in terms of the idea that desire always has its object. 
Mimesis will, therefore, look like a process of object acquisition. If and only if 
I believe that they desire X, it follows that, granting some relevant background 
conditions, I also desire X. I desire X because they do so. If I find X unsuitable, 
I may instead desire Y, if I first locate a suitable set of other people desiring 
Y. Of course, I cannot copy all the desires I happen to observe in my social 
environment.
Now, what is the correct oratio obliqua formulation of a desire sentence, 
if Girard is right? One may suggest that the following sentence tells us what 
desire really is,
(s) I realize that I prima facie should accept X, which my source appears 
to desire, to be the object that I am to copy in the right socio-mental con-
text and call it oratio recta “I myself desire X” under the principle of lin-
guistic generosity.
It follows that, according to Girard, I no longer desire X simpliciter but my rel-
evant mental episodes change into something else, like the acceptance of oth-
ers’ desires and their objects plus a normative condition. Of course, we cannot 
say of others that they desire X, except in terms of the principle of linguistic 
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generosity. We can change their desire descriptions into three-place relations. I 
then imitate desires that are not desires simpliciter but something else under-
stood in terms of (s). We are all in the same boat, so to speak, because we all 
mimic each other. This should be easy to accept: we cannot create two differ-
ent classes of desire, those that we copy and those that are results of copying.
Now, we may say that desire is, by definition, something that I accept as the 
object of my relevant propositional attitude that we usually call desire. Next, 
we need to eliminate the word “desire” because otherwise our account is cir-
cular. We do it by replacing “desire” by its nominal definition, such as a “propo-
sitional attitude that entails the direction of fit of the world to the thought”; 
in other words, in the case of desire, I think of a possible world that should 
conform to my thought of it. When I want to be rich, I am invited to think of 
a possible world where I am rich and my actual world should change accord-
ingly. We then get something like this, call it (s’):
(s’) I myself accept X, which my source appears to desire as X, as the ob-
ject I am to copy in the right socio-mental context where we all accept X 
as the object that one should recognize as what we desire, when we face 
an accessible possible world that is better than the actual world.
Now, sentences (s) and (s’) refer to actual episodes of desire: according to (s) 
and (s’), I myself actually desire X. This of course requires that the background 
conditions are right so that I can move from considering X in positive light to 
actually desiring X.
Notice that (s’) gives rise to a problem, which is its reference to possible 
worlds. The mimetic theory does not need it because now desire does not track 
its satisfaction. But along with it also disappears the direction of fit argument 
that looks essential to any theory of desire.6 We may well argue that this fact 
refutes Girard, but I will not pursue that line of criticism here. Let me explain: 
When I copy another subjects’ desire X, I need not think that X indicates a bet-
ter possible world. Neither do I think that that world should conform to what I 
desire; on the contrary, I feel the normative force of X and thus I copy it. What 
happens when X is realized, if it is realized? The world may have not changed 
into a better one from my personal point of view. I did not desire X because I 
wanted a better world; I desired X because this is what the others desire. Actu-
ally, it does not matter whether I get the desired object, or not. I need not pay 
attention to why my sources want X because it is enough for me that they do 
so. Hence, mimetic desire is not desire in the normal sense. Here is a simple 
6 See Ch. 2 in this book.
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example. I cannot eat ice-cream. It makes me sick. My reference group desires 
ice-cream and therefore I desire it. I get it but the consequences are bad. I have 
desired something of which I know it is bad for me, or the object is not desir-
able for me.
It does not matter why exactly my sources desire X. It follows that it does 
not make sense to talk about the satisfaction of the desire for X in connec-
tion of mimetic desire. Getting X may not make my world any better. In other 
words, I did not acquire the X-relevant desire because it promises to make my 
world better but simply because others desire X. If my better world mattered, 
it would not exhibit such blind copying, and so it is essential to Girard that the 
desirability of X is not mentioned.
We now talk about desire and desiring in a novel sense. Suppose we adopt 
Girard’s triangle, or his three-place theory. I then argue that we also must 
accept the causal or push idea of mimetic desire. In this case it follows, as I 
showed above, that Girard sketches an idea of some socio-mental processes 
that do not generate desires in the standard sense of the term. None of the for-
mulations above really qualifies as an account of desire, as the term is usually 
understood. Perhaps Girard talks about a causal theory of action where mime-
sis is the driving force? I see that all people wear blue jeans and so will I do the 
same. My motivation is mimetic in such a way that it bypasses desire and leads 
directly to action, that is, to buying and wearing blue jeans. We can then, post 
hoc, say I desire blue jeans but this is a backward looking explanation meant 
to convince my audience that I knew what I was doing. In other words, the use 
of the term “desire” is an ad hoc rationalization in foro externo. Actually, I act 
because I am causally driven to act, and thus I need to tell about it to others 
using our common language of desire. Mimesis bypasses desire when it is in 
an actionist context. We move from imitation to action and afterwards explain 
it all by means of desire language. If I adopt their desire, I cannot say I de se 
desire the given object.
 Scripted Desires
Next, let us consider another possible triangular theory of desire inspired by 
Girard. Objects of desire are socially scripted for their desirability on the social 
stage and this is to say they are not copies of other persons’ desires. I need not 
mimic others because we all act according to shared scripts. What is important 
is that we share the socially constructed scripts.7 Also, we need to talk about 
7 For an another type of approach, see N. Rescher, Unselfishness: The Role of the Vicarious Affects 
in Moral Philosophy and Social Theory. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975, Ch. 2.
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life on social stage where we play our designated roles. How the scripts are cre-
ated must be addressed as well. All this comes very close to what Girard says.
Let us first look at the structure and dynamism of individual desires. The 
main point here is that de dicto desire can be understood as follows: An agent 
desires de dicto X, which entails that he understands X in terms of a narrative 
about X; I call this the narrative account of de dicto desire. Suppose I want X 
and I say so. This should be followed by a why-question, except in those cases 
where X is understood to be prima facie intrinsically desirable.8 This is to say 
one finds X desirable as such, for instance, when X is morally valuable or aes-
thetically pleasing. However, in most cases I must answer a why-question by 
referring to an explanation of my choice of X in such terms that brings X closer 
to something that is prima facie intrinsically valuable. This question-answer 
game may contain more than just one move and it also may end up in a posi-
tion where no common view on the desirability of X can be found. We are here 
dealing with subjectively and culturally open ended value judgements, so this 
is something to be expected. The main point is, however, that such a dialectics 
generates and utilizes narratives that constitute socially understandable de 
dicto desirability conditions.
An example: I want to be a good father. It is hardly plausible to ask why but 
necessary to ask what I mean, or what I think a good father is like and what 
one needs to do in order to become a good father. I say I want to be a stern and 
strict father to my children, and then a why-question is in place. The reason is 
obvious: stern and strict are evaluations that normally do not carry a positive 
tone of value in today’s normal context. I then explain that I want my children, 
girls included, to be ready for the armed services where they will be warriors. 
Many of us might disagree on the desirability of such an object and hence ask 
for additional explanations. When these arrive the narrative gets richer and, 
hopefully, more convincing in terms of its desirability ascriptions. Of course 
such an account of the creation of de dicto desire and its narrative basis may 
not require actual social exchange; I will relate it to myself in my own terms 
when I reflect on my desires and the values behind them – everyone can do it. 
We tend not to do it when the desire in question feels uncontroversial or con-
ventional. When the desire is weird and normatively challenging, my relevant 
soliloquy may show signs of self-deception.
Let us then look at what I called social scripts of desire. By referring to them 
one can say desires are socially constituted without saying that they are copies 
8 We also use desire language to give motivational explanations, for instance, “Why did you 
steal the money?” Answer: “I wanted to buy something.” Also, we can issue hidden com-
mands like “I want you to go and get it.”
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of other people’s desires. Let us take a closer look into the notion of a script. 
Scripts are socially recognized and shared ideas of what is and can be desir-
able. Such scripts are more or less widely shared, or more or less partisan. 
The latter category is interesting because it creates and follows certain social 
divisions that can be and will become problematic at many different levels 
and ways. However, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that when we desire we 
desire according to a shared social script, or that our desires are scripted. Of 
course, we have a large number of scripts available to us, some I may not un-
derstand, some I find repulsive, and some I find understandable and attractive 
in the sense that they actually exert a pull towards them. A simple case is like 
this: a given script is normally accepted by my own social reference group and 
therefore I find it attractive.
Let me give more examples: you might refuse to understand some religious-
ly motivated ascetic regimes. Many people find sadomasochistic sex-plays dif-
ficult to accept as reasonable or attractive – they cannot imagine they would 
feel the pull of them. One may find social generosity in terms of voluntary 
work and financial donations valuable objects but nevertheless feel no pull. 
Here one recognizes the script without personally adopting it. Finally, one may 
find learning foreign languages a valuable object as a script, recognize it, and 
also adopt it. Learning a foreign language may be an actionist or non-actionist 
desire, depending on how one reads the term “learn.” It may imply one’s own 
activity and action or it may not. I may hope to learn a language by some pas-
sive adoption method, especially if the targeted competence level is low. Be 
this how it may, the pull depends on the acceptance of the given script in my 
social reference group.
The scripts are socially available to guide individual desire selection and for-
mation processes, or in their extended form, to instruct one of what there is to 
be desired, what to expect of one’s desires, and what to be aware of in terms 
of negative consequences. Scripts can be divisive and controversial: my idea 
of fun may include criminal and violent desires for which a full set of scripts 
are available via competent model agents, for instance in prisons. Notice that 
one may adopt a criminal script even if my actual social surroundings are law 
abiding. This is because the person can imagine an accessible possible world 
in which such scripts are in normal use. Later on, she may find herself in a situ-
ation in which the relevant social reference group is a real one; again, prison 
is a relevant example. Therefore, I only require the known social existence 
of the script that explains its pull. But it is a prima facie plausible to argue, I 
think, that a person gravitates towards the actual social groups that support 
and develop the scripts that the person finds attractive. She finds such groups 
desirable.
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By recognizing a script one starts on a slippery slope towards adopting it and 
the relevant social identity, which is sometimes cursed sometimes admirable. 
Notice that many types of scripts are mutually exclusive, or they imply mutu-
ally incompatible social identities; a person with multiple identities may exist, 
or course, like the mythical Mafioso who is at work a cruel killer and at home 
a tender father, thus realizing the respective, mutually incompatible scripts of 
his two roles side by side. The explanation of this is simple: the scripts need 
not be universalizable. Anyway, any unscripted goals imply Otherness due to 
unrecognizable desires that lead to socially impossible and false identities. We 
may call them perverted. We may then fail to know what to say about your 
alleged desires. The key principle is, if you personally desire something X a 
relevant script also exists.
Scripted desires are located on social platforms, or whatever you may call 
them, for instance the stage and the backroom.9 On the stage you need to dis-
play desires that suit your present role and social identity, support them, and 
continue them as expected by those who know, recognize, and adopt related 
scripts and roles. If there is a backroom, which I doubt, we are free to adopt dif-
ferent desires without role related constraints – there we are free. But, as I said, 
I doubt the existence of such private social spaces. It seems that any backroom 
behavior is scripted as well, or in other words, it is just another type of social 
stage. For instance, locker rooms are far from the arenas where one performs 
but they are not backrooms. We are in this sense totally and unavoidable social 
creatures who are bound together by our scripted desires on the social stages 
where we play our designated roles. However, if we want we can draw a distinc-
tion between the stage and the backroom, in the following way. On the stage 
we utilize the scripts adopted from our actual social reference group. We ex-
press ourselves as we should. In the backroom we may desire whatever pleases 
us, in the sense that there the scripts are based on the desires of alternate social 
groups. These must exist but not in the actual world where the person happens 
to live. He may adopt all kinds of imaginary models in the sense that he imag-
ines his membership in some existing reference groups. In other words, he 
imagines a possible world where these groups are his social reference groups. 
The backroom is where the person is free in this limited sense. It is not a place 
where he can desire without any scripts. It is not a madhouse.
I cannot develop this special theme any further here. I only hope I have 
made it clear how the argument proceeds: our desires are socially scripted 
9 E. Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Anchor, 1959, Ch. 3 “Re gions 
and Region Behavior.” Together with Veblen, Goffman explains much of the mimetic life of 
social beings.
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cultural entities without any clear-cut formation process or procedure; the 
scripts are so basic to our social life that they cannot be explained in any sim-
ple terms. They are there and they have always been there as dynamic and 
malleable as ever. We live by them. Moreover, all this happens on the social 
stage, which is partially defined and constituted through the scripts that 
we play over there. The next step, would we like to continue on this track, 
is to consider the relationship between the stage and social roles, but obvi-
ously this would take us too far from my intended Girard interpretation and 
criticism.
The next question is, then, what is the relationship between our personal 
narratives of de dicto desire and social scripts. These considerations take us a 
long way towards a definite criticism of Girard’s idea of mimesis. What looks 
like mimesis can be explained as follows in a way that exhibits at least some 
analytical clarity. A script is a model for personalized narratives of desire or, in 
other words, we formulate narratives according to a given script, which guar-
antees them at least some social communicability, comprehension, and accep-
tance. This would not happen without scripts because I might form a narra-
tive of my de dicto desire that I could not communicate, perhaps not even to 
myself. This is to say I cannot tell what I desire and consequently I must say I 
do not desire – my attempt to generate a desire fails both in foro interno and 
externo. I may feel an urge in a certain direction or in a certain field of con-
siderations but I cannot tell what it is. Therefore, I need a script according to 
which I formulate the narrative for my prospective desire and the desirability 
of its object. An example: all people eat ice cream in summertime in the park, 
when the sun is shining and birds are singing. This is a well-known script for 
that special stage performance that most of us willingly partake in our summer 
fun roles. We then formulate our narratives accordingly so that we may answer 
the questions about our willingness to eat ice cream then and there. In some 
cases, the script is so obvious and recognizable that I do not even notice its 
influence on my desire – it comes forth as if automatically.
Here we need to consider two different types of cases. First, I de dicto desire 
an object whose full narrative is such that it provides both some clarification 
of the meaning of the object and an explanation of its intrinsic desirability. 
Suppose a case where it is not clear what script I have adopted and, therefore, 
I have to review and question the narrative in order to get answers to the ques-
tions concerning the missing features of the object, both normative and ana-
lytical. I want to marry Mary. We all know several different suitable narratives: 
my parents want it and I want to be a good son, I want her money, I lust her, 
I love her, or I cannot get anybody else. I need to tell a full narrative concerning 
the desire and its object before you or I know what is going on. Second, we have 
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many cases that are clear from the outset, so I need not formulate a narrative – 
instead I adopt the script as such and let it replace my prospective narrative.
Another type of case exists as well, namely a case in which the obviousness 
of the narrative conclusion is not based on the prima facie intrinsic desirability 
of the object of desire, like in the good father case. In the ice cream case we 
cannot say that ice cream in the park is somehow an intrinsically valuable ob-
ject of desire – it is not. Instead we say that its script is so well-known, widely 
spread, and easily acceptable that we do not need to explain it any further. If 
you do not know this kind of action on the social stage, how could I explain it 
to you? No one should come and ask why I eat ice cream in the park or what 
it means to do so. If I want to learn Medieval Latin I must be ready to answer 
questions unlike if I want to learn English. The only possible questions in the 
latter case are when, where, and how, all of which in a minimal sense clarify my 
narrative. However, its desirability is obvious and the meaning of the relevant 
desire clear. As I have argued, I do not copy other people’s desires, nor do they 
copy mine; instead, we all act on publicly known social scripts according to 
which we formulate our narrative de dicto desires. Scripts and narratives are 
thus logically connected: there is no desire without its narrative and no narra-
tive without its script; this is the law of the land of desire so that only madness 
may live beyond its borders.
What then is wrong with Girard’s mimetic theory? Better theories can be 
formulated but this is not the same as saying the mimetic theory fails. To put it 
briefly, any account of the mimetic process of desire acquisition is a simplifica-
tion of the script/narrative dialectics. Mimesis may work as a heuristic tool, or 
as an explanans for some more interesting phenomena, such as religious rem-
edies for persistent social violence – as Girard himself does. However, if desire 
is the explanandum the mimetic theory does not do much work. Nevertheless, 
it is obviously true that we copy each other’s behavior, emotional reactions, 
values, desires, and many other things. The question then is, what is behind 
it. To copy is to affirm and contribute to the existing script that allows one to 
desire according to one’s own desire narrative.
 Desires, Not My Own
Let us suppose that the Girard’s mimetic theory of desire is valid. Then it is 
fit to explain a peculiar phenomenon, namely, the anxiety that is so often as-
sociated with desires for instance in such fields as sex and religion.10 The main 
10 See M. Foucault, Abnormal. Tr. G. Burgchell. London: Verso, 2003, Ch. 8.
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point is that copied desires are not the agent’s own as I already explained; 
they still belong to others. One borrows them or they are mere reflections in a 
mirror that is the agent. If I copy my desires I may wonder what I have copied, 
what those desires are, and, most basically, what these desires mean to me 
versus the source of them. Girard says I envy and even hate the source because 
the source is somehow prior and supreme in relation to me.11
How can I make desires my own, or how to identify with them? In this sense, 
the copied desires look like alien entities and unmanageable intrusions by the 
Other. How could this fail to trouble me, especially if I realize that all my de-
sires are copies or reflections of the Other? I feel as if I had no identity nor self. 
My desires are no longer my own and yet I am supposed to express myself – my 
unique and invaluable selfhood – in terms of them; the desires I have, must 
be my own. Such psychological dissonance must trouble me no end and lead 
to nameless and objectless, free floating anxiety.12 I am not what I am sup-
posed to be. Girard writes, “The subject is convinced that the model considers 
himself too superior to accept him as a disciple.” This provides one possible 
explanation of the gap between the agent and her model/source: a model is 
always better and preferable to a copy so that the two players’ relations are 
characterized by their mutual alienation. Notice, however, the following facts. 
All desires are copies, therefore no model enjoys original desires. It follows that 
a model may consider herself superior to me but because her desires are copies 
as well, she must feel the relevant and related negative effects, too. Moreover, 
because she copies she must copy me, which is to say I can feel superior to her. 
The result is that no privileged model agents exist; on the contrary, we all copy 
each other and thus we also hate each other, as if democratically.
An obvious solution is identification, or a mental process by means of which 
I somehow make those mimetic desires my own. Alas, we know we tend not 
to succeed because our desire induced anxiety levels in fact remain high and 
thus we quarrel and fight, just as Girard says. This indicates a lack of a process, 
method, and filter that systematically reject such desires that are bad, mean-
ingless, or unsuitable for me. As an old man, I should not copy the desires of 
young men. Moreover, when I am already equipped with a characteristic set of 
desires, I only copy such desires that fit the already established desires of mine, 
or if they do not fit directly, at least they tend to make my original set of desires 
11 Girard, 1965, pp. 11, 41.
12 See R.A. Wicklund and J.W. Brehm, Perspectives on Cognitive Dissonance. Hillsdale, N.J.: 
Lawrence Erlbaum, 2013, p. 1. Cognitive dissonance implies a desire that the agent wants 
to reduce or eliminate but has trouble of doing so. This brings about anxiety, see Ch. 4 in 
this volume.
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somehow better – which presupposes the existence and use of some criteria 
of betterment. This shows that Girard’s mimetic theory of desire acquisition 
requires some rather complicated psychological theorizing if one wants to keep 
it going. Anyway, I want to concentrate on the problem of alien desires, the 
desires of the Other, or copied desires, those that are not my own and remain 
so. The problem is this: mimesis as the source of desire does not explain the 
right thing; the reason for this being that no copied desires are mine. In many 
cases, when I copy a desire I do not know what to do with it, so to speak. What 
should I copy when the set of sources for copying is so immense, even when 
I restrict it to those of my social reference group? What we need is a method 
or a process that allows me to find and own my prospective desires. Then the 
two main questions are, what are the desires I identify with and how do I do it?
Think of Don Quixote, Girard’s original hero and inspiration. The old man, 
Mr. Alonso Quixano of La Mancha, reads too many chivalric romances and 
because of them wants to be a wandering knight himself.13 He is going to per-
form heroic deeds all over Spain. Girard starts his own, rather quixotic project 
together with the knight, but what that starting point is, is not at all easy to say. 
Mr. Quixano reads historic fiction and finds some narratives of desire there 
that he promptly copies and puts into action in his own inimitable manner. 
He is mimicking some outlandish narratives about heroes whose desires Mr. 
Quixano takes to be invaluable in the sense of being sublime and noble, and as 
such intrinsically desirable. This presupposes his own values point of view that 
allows him to say the chivalric desires are admirable in their nobility and the 
corresponding actions heroic and as such worth trying. However, the narrator 
says the old man goes crazy in the sense that he is incapable of understanding 
properly what he reads: “In short, his wits being quite gone, he hit upon the 
strangest notion that every madman in this world hit upon.”14 In this way, he 
identifies with the knights of these chivalric romances because he is mad, or he 
goes mad by reading them. In both cases the idea is that no one in his normal 
state of mind would do so. Obviously we need better examples of the genesis 
of mimetic desire.
Perhaps we should read Don Quixote’s madness as symptomatic of the dis-
crepancy between his normal desires and his novel, simulated desires. Indeed, 
the material he copies and mimics is so outlandish and improbable that he 
13 P. Tabori, The Natural History of Stupidity. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1993, Chs. 3 and 
9. Tabori describes very well the world where Don Quixote wanted to live. It was a mad 
world and that is why he was mad. It is mad to want to imitate madness; his is mimetic 
madness.
14 Don Quixote, Ch. 1. Tr. J. Ormsby (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5921/5921-h/5921-h.htm).
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must be crazy to identify with it. Hence, it is not really the case that the read 
material, chivalric romances, make him mad but that he is mad to identify with 
them in the first place. The author, Cervantes, certainly plays nicely with this 
crucial ambiguity in the beginning of the novel. We also can say the old gentle-
man’s madness is a metaphoric expression of the experienced anxiety when 
one lives by so many desires that are not one’s own and make life a mere show 
of impersonation on a misconstrued social stage. His desires are, therefore, 
mere caricatures of what they might and should have been, that is, his own. It 
is undoubtedly a different thing to desire de dicto in the mood of oratio recta 
or oratio obliqua. I may desire X or apparently and allegedly desire X, which 
indicates a major difference between the relevant attitudes towards the re-
spective desires. In the first case you can honestly stand behind your desire 
ascriptions and their communication knowing it is your own desire based on 
your unique role on the social stage. In the second case the same can be said 
only if you personally recognize certain desires and they, as copies, actually fit 
their models, so that your own already existing desires support the new items. 
However, all this presupposes either that some of your existing desires are orig-
inally your own, that is, they are not copies, or that an independent identifica-
tion procedure for occurring desires exists and works. If all desires are copies, 
you can never make new desires your own.
In any case, you can avoid the problem of alien desires that tend to cause 
anxiety or presuppose a bout of madness. We need something that helps us 
deal with alien desires. It seems hard to accept the claim that you could live on 
by such alien desires when all of your desires are equally alien. If it is indeed 
the case that all our desires are copies of the desires of the Other, we must have 
developed some mechanism of identification of what is our own, or otherwise 
we were still grappling with our endless desire based anxieties. Perhaps we to 
some extent do so, as we can see when we think of how anxious so many of our 
desires still make us. We are driven to copy, act out, and live through so many 
desires that in the end are alien to us and whose fruit is denied from us.
Let me suggest the following: Many desires are forbidden on the social stage, 
for instance, certain sexual desires, all blatant expressions of egoism, many re-
ligiously suspicious ideas, etc. In some Muslim countries blasphemy is punish-
able by death via sentencing that can be official as well as based on vigilantism. 
Here the idea is that desires become visible in action and speech. Now, desires 
and their outward expressions can be dangerous, so the first step is to forbid 
them and educate people to avoid them; then, bad desires are simply not avail-
able for copying. Once we know this, it is much easier to identify with those de-
sires that are still available. Various kinds of sanctioning systems control what 
one can and should copy, like do not copy female desires if you are male, and 
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so on. It is therefore true that the life on the social stage is carefully regimented 
in terms of what desires are available to whom to copy and all this tends to be 
sanctioned. Yet, such procedures can never overcome the final and ultimate 
problem, namely, the desires that I am allowed to mimic are not my own de-
sires and they never will be.
The only way to overcome this fundamental problem is to say that, if I 
may hope to be a happy and fulfilled person, I copy those desires the source 
of which is such that I can identify with it. In this way, I identify with model 
persons and then their desires, which I copy, if they are such that I can adopt 
them as my own. I need to recognize my models and find them acceptable, 
and only after that can I safely adopt some novel desires. In this case, I doubt 
if one still can maintain that we copy all our desires. If I identify with a desire 
model A and because of that adopt desire X, am I still copying X from A? I do 
not think so. To copy entails another kind of relation to the source, a relation 
that is in the sense external and not internal. This is the difference between 
internal and external relations: My desire for X is internal if and only if I am not 
what I am without my desire for X. In this sense, my desire for X constitutes me 
as a person; otherwise the relation is external. Perhaps we can say that many 
desires are external but those that matter must be internal. Of course, such 
minor desires may well be copied; it does not matter. The major desires must 
be internal or the person is in major trouble; one must not copy such desires – 
even the scripted desires may prove to be problematic, if we hope to be unique 
individual persons.
Here a new problem emerges. How do I mimic desires? Such desires must 
be available to be mimicked, which they normally may not be. On the contrary, 
desires are mental entities and episodes, of which the agent and only the agent 
herself may be aware of. Desires are displayed on the social stage, that much 
is certain, but how does that happen? The common assumption is that desires 
become visible in bodily actions and verbal behavior, which may be true to a 
certain extent. However, we should not make assumptions to the effect that 
desires are visible on the social stage because they are motives for action – they 
are not motives for action. Sometimes desires are of the actionist type in the 
sense that their formulation refers to action, but this is not always the case. 
Many desires are of the non-actionist or idle type. If desires are not motives 
and they are idle, how do you copy them? The only possibility is through verbal 
behavior or written accounts; Don Quixote reads books and many of us listen 
to verbal reports of others. This leads to the following situation: many desires 
are hidden, they are fictionalized, or they are made known via inherently unre-
liable and often untrustworthy testimonies. Desires are not as straightforward 
to mimic as Girard may make us believe. What we get is a kind of double oratio 
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obliqua: I copy something like “He says he desires X” or “She behaves as if she 
wanted Y” and so the result is not something like “I copied X” and therefore 
“I accept that I now must desire X” but
I copy (I must desire what (he says he desires)), that is, X
or,
I accept I must desire X that is what he seems to desire on the basis of his 
actions on the social stage.
To me, such a construction seems dubious. If taken seriously, the mimetic 
theory looks intractable. Obviously, we are able to desire X de dicto and oratio 
recta and thus Girard’s theory of desire acquisition is too complicated to be 
valid, even if it initially looks so simple and appealing.
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Chapter 6
Death, Desire, and the Generation of Metaphor
The metaphoric account of death is constructed in terms of transition and 
travel, another metaphor. But then, all metaphors travel. Just like in the case 
of desire, the originally metonymic idea turns into a metaphoric one once its 
transitionary and transcendental nature is developed in full. Desire, under-
stood as a metonym, becomes a metaphor when it travels along the same path 
that any metaphoric construction must use, from this world to another desir-
able possible world, from one realm of discourse to another. Ultimately, my 
desires are flights of fancy and they blend in with wish-fulfilment, just like the 
ideas of death do. The point is, therefore, that a metaphor itself is a process 
that is characterised by a meaning moving over to another field of discourse. 
In this sense, death, desire, and metaphor exhibit a dynamic isomorphic struc-
ture: death takes one from here to eternity, desire aims at a novel desirable 
possible world, and every metaphor evokes a fresh field of discourse beyond 
the limits of the ordinary.
 Prelude: Death and Dress
Tom Paine, in his once so famous pamphlet Common Sense, makes a brave lit-
erary effort in terms of figurative language when he writes,1
Government, like dress, is the badge of lost innocence.
What he means is that society may be good for people, or a blessing, however 
troublesome social life may sometimes be, but government, the seat of coer-
cive power, is nothing but a “necessary evil.”2 It is our own fault that we do not 
manage to preserve the sphere of social life intact but need the weapons of 
violence implemented by the state and its elites to guarantee our life and limb: 
this is what he means by “lost innocence.” The government threatens us and 
we listen. We all wear that badge when and because we succumb to the power 
of the government as a purveyor of violent death and serfdom. Indeed, gov-
ernment associates both with safety and violent death, which is not far from 
what Paine intends to say. Government is the agent of death both literally and 
1 T. Paine, Common Sense. London: Penguin Classics, 1776/1986, p. 65.
2 Ibid.
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metonymically (wars, death penalty) and metaphorically (the law as a sword, 
mortal god).3 However, how he says it is more important than what he says.
Let us first modify his original aphorism thus,
Death, like dress, is the badge of lost innocence.
What is then the true paradigm case of the badge of lost innocence, or death? 
It must be the Biblical event of Eve offering Adam the forbidden fruit of the 
Tree of Knowledge. They ate it and then saw their nudity in dire need of cloth-
ing to cover their shame, which indeed entails the loss of innocence.4 Their 
shame, masked with clothing as scant as a fig leave, was accompanied first by 
fearful doom of labour and death and then by death itself. Of course, whatever 
they do or wear they cannot hide their crime and hence die they must, first 
metaphorically and then literally. They try to hide their crime with a badge of 
lost innocence, which is nothing but an oxymoron – to hide is to announce. 
Their dress reveals their crime. Now the man and wife are metaphorically 
dead – they have lost their life – although they still walk about and out of the 
Garden of Eden and live a long, productive life afterwards.
Paine’s contemporary audiences knew full well what that paradigmatic case 
of “lost innocence” is: sin and death in Paradise. It is not like death, one should 
not exploit such a simple simile where a metaphor is clearly needed. Govern-
ment is the badge of death as the fruit of crime, a cause of lost innocence that 
must be camouflaged as quickly as possible by a dress – another metaphor 
appears here. For example Hobbes and Hegel both agree that all governments 
are initially based on violence and conquest, even crime, so that Paine just fol-
lows a long-lasting tradition here.5 Hence, if death is the original badge of lost 
innocence, then it follows that Government is death, or death of freedom and 
individuality. This is easy to see via a simple substitution of “death” for “badge 
of lost innocence”:
Government, like a dress, is death (of innocence), or Dress is death.
3 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651: “laws are of no power to protect them, without a sword” (Ch. 21). 
The sword is Hobbes’s recurring metaphor.
4 For instance, Adam in John Milton’s Paradise Lost (1674) says about Eve: “Defaced, deflow’red, 
and now to death devoted? / Rather how hast though yielded to transgress” (Book ix, 
901–902).
5 Hobbes: “Conquest, is not the victory itself; but the acquisition by victory, of a right, over 
the persons of men.” (Leviathan, Review, and Conclusion). G.W.F. Hegel: “Heroic coercion 
is a rightful coercion,” when heroes found states in the condition of nature (Philosophy of 
Right. Tr. T.M. Knox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952, § 93, Addition). Hegel repeats this 
Hobbesian idea in many places, for instance, §§ 102, 167, 350.
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Obviously, one can wear death if dress is death and death is dress – all mortals 
do. As Plato says, all humans live their life under the false pretence that they 
are alive.6 What we normally call life is bodily life but everything that is depen-
dent on the body is an illusion. It follows that life is an illusion and the body 
death, or body is the badge of death, or a dress. In this sense, body is what dies. 
In other words, independently of its illusory temporal contingencies a body is 
dead. Real life is elsewhere.
The key metaphor, namely, a dress is “the badge of lost innocence,” is how 
Paine puts it. Then death is a badge or dress, something that tells us a story, and 
not a state of affairs. No dress fails to tell a story, which is to say that dress/death 
is a metaphor. We can call this a transitional metaphor that mediates between 
a terrible crime, or our lost innocence, and the consequent shame and death. 
Dress covers our shame, our sex that is; death shields our lost innocence and 
this is its sole function in this literary context. When Paine says that the dress 
covers us as a badge, is it the badge that covers and not the dress? Although 
we know that a badge, in its metonymic sense, covers nothing as it just indi-
cates the right direction of thought and perception by labelling something that 
needs a label to indicate how to take it. It reveals what there is. Hence, a badge 
covers nothing but that very fact makes the dress look like something that la-
bels, directs, and reveals. “A dress as a badge” is a strange metaphor, because a 
dress that does not cover is not a dress. At the metonymic level this indicates 
a paradox, which is easily resolved through its metaphorization. Now a dress 
covers (metonym) but it also reveals (metaphor) when it is used as a badge 
that reveals. A dress can be a badge but a badge cannot be a dress. When you 
wear your dress you tell your story. When you wear a badge you remain naked.
Now, death is the strangest of badges, why? Because death as a metaphor 
first hides and then, as a dress, covers it all and hence moves one across the 
boundaries of discourse to somewhere unimaginable, that is to the Promised 
Land. In other words, metaphor moves the thought via a transition towards 
transcendence; this is what metaphor does just like death itself does as a meta-
phor. Let me explain. A metaphor always is about distant and strange realms 
of meaning, just like death is about the faraway lands where we travel when 
we die. A badge attempts the same, namely, it tells us to move across the fixed 
boundaries of this world. Think of a badge of honour: it invites us to move over 
to the dream world of the ideals of virtue, honour, and heroism. The badge is 
then no longer a mere label that indicates what there is and what to think of 
its carrier; on the contrary, it is now a badge that refers outside of itself, like a 
medal of honour that refers to some distant battlefields or the red badge of 
6 See Plato, Republic, 514a–520a: The real life is outside of the Cave.
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courage that moves its bearer to a world of imagination and fiction. Think of a 
yellow star: it is a badge that directs deranged thought to fictional crimes that 
necessitates both shame and the dress/badge. A dress code, therefore, refers 
to the iconic cult of dressing prim and proper, or fancy and lavish; it is a para-
dox and parody, as it is easy to see, a vain attempt to forget what a dress is all 
about – an attempt to write the name of our crime in nice lettering. The proof: 
your dress must cover your sex. Your dress is then the badge that commemo-
rates the original sin whose reward is death. But you play with and around 
this truth when you follow a dress code that covers the original purpose of the 
dress; it is all ironic. The badge refers to death and yet you dress fancifully.
 Meaning of Death
Gerald Doherty writes in his seminal Theorizing Lawrence about death as a 
metaphor and a metonym.7 I agree with him, how could I not, as he makes 
this detail foundational, namely, the transitional and transcendent nature of 
death, or the ascending/descending travelling metaphor of death that is so 
dear to people in the Christian and Muslim cultures, or the Heaven and the 
Hell in afterlife. For a strict anti-Catholic Buddhist like Doherty himself, such 
notions must remain totally alien but, yet, they are there to be seen and pon-
dered about. He is not a Pure Land or Field of Merit Buddhist. He believes in 
Nibana, which is written on his gravestone in Rymättylä, Finland. Let us look 
at Doherty’s seminal ideas.
I already referred to the transitional and dynamic death metaphor: death 
is a trip either to Heaven or Hell. Also static metaphors can be formulated, 
although one might argue that they do not make much sense without their 
transitional counterparts. Think of the old Aristotelian eudaimonistic rule, “No 
one can be called happy before death” and its Japanese militaristic version, 
“No man can be called brave before his death.” Here death, at its metaphoric 
level, is the ultimate pinnacle of meaning, the final thanatological truth about 
the purpose of human life and about its supreme moment of judgement – as 
Doherty reminds us. A person dies and the true nature and meaning of her life 
is thus revealed in full at that crucial moment when nothing can be added or 
taken away as one’s life is now complete. Completion is a fitting sub-metaphor 
7 G. Doherty, Theorizing Lawrence, Nine Meditations on Tropological Themes. New York: Lang, 
1999, pp. 51–56. When we call the end of life death we are dealing with a metonymic pair. 
When we call death the end of everything we introduce a metaphor. Unlike in the metonym-
ic case, we hesitate to say it is true/false.
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here. The same idea can be seen in the Christian idea of Last Judgement where 
all humans are classified as good or bad by some absolute Celestial Authority. 
Here they are, beyond time and place, all souls, naked and bare, without dress, 
so that their careers can be seen at a glance and judged accordingly – such is 
the positive but static metaphor of death. The problem of this static metaphor 
is that it is impersonal: the static metaphors of death are different from the dy-
namic metaphors of personal death and dying. Death is the completion of life, 
we said, but where is then the person? All death assumes a person. Now she 
is no longer there so that we need as if to deny her death and make her travel 
across some distant lands towards a transcendent goal. Only in this way can we 
make sense of her death qua personal death. She cannot die, on the contrary, 
she only moves from here to there. In other words, death is not real when it 
means a person traveling between worlds; when death is not real it becomes a 
metaphor of the person’s ultimate destiny. The static idea of death as an end 
loses the person when her transition from here to the goal preserves her. This is 
because an end is the static stop and the goal where one aims at. What reaches 
the end disappears; whatever aims at a goal lives on. When a runner reaches 
the end he no longer is a runner; when he aims at the finishing line he must 
move on.
This is the starting point of fundamentally dynamic narratives, the essence 
of which is a vertical metaphor of transition and transcendence. Some of these 
metaphors are religious but not all. A medic turns to shocked relatives and 
says, “I am afraid he is gone,” which is to say the patient has passed away, not 
only out but all the way out and away. When you pass out you may still come 
back unlike in the case where you pass away. Now you are gone and that is to 
say you are not coming back. This is a simple unidirectional and horizontal 
transition metaphor that utilizes the idea of some kind of border that you cross 
and a gate you go through, and that is all – the dead person just vanished from 
our view but she still is out there somewhere as a traveller. Religions may then 
utilize much more detailed travel narratives.
The plot thickens when the dead person goes to Purgatory, approaches 
Heaven, meets its Gate Keeper, reaches the Paradise or the Elysian Fields, the 
Pure Land, or the Upper Room, and then perhaps meets her Maker. Perhaps she 
goes to the deepest Hell to suffer there. Obviously, the dead person is not really 
dead; on the contrary, their death is a badge of his rebirth and a rite of passage 
that opens up the gateway to something that is so much bigger and better be-
yond all time and place. This is the land of salvation, purity, eternal happiness 
and ever-lasting glory, or the new life of pure joy, adulation, devotion, harps, 
and white dresses under angelic wings. In this way death paradoxically turns it-
self into a firm denial of death in terms of a transcendent  narrative that utilizes 
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the widest variety of desirable notions, when death turns out the be the gate-
way into such rich applications of desirable images. The key metaphor here is 
the gateway and the route of access to the realm of transcendent existence – 
whose purpose is the firm denial of death as a metonym. Here the metonym 
itself is the enemy to be conquered, if you want to live forever. Death as the end 
of life sounds intolerable indeed. It is a nasty and demeaning metonymy.
Of course, death must be treated as a metonym, too. It is something that 
happens to all of us when one’s time has arrived. Death is then the end of life as 
a hard fact, which now exhibits its metonymic garb: death is the moment your 
life ends, when your key organs stop working, when you draw your last breath, 
when you kick the bucket, when you give up the ghost, or however you might 
want to describe this final episode of your life, dying. Notice, incidentally, that 
such phrases have no metaphoric import; on the contrary, they support the 
metonymic notion of death. They illustrate the fact that one’s life has ended. 
Now, the metonymic language of death also resists death in its peculiarly stub-
born manner, as if we refused to admit the very possibility of death and dying. 
All this is understandable because death is the final, dark, bottomless abyss 
and dying the chaotic maelstrom that sucks you in ever so relentlessly, as Edgar 
Allan Poe so masterly narrates.8 Nobody can help you, yet all that lives dreads 
death and screams for help, when death is treated at the metonymic level of 
discourse. Only the ascending metaphor of a paradise can relieve your anguish 
and hence you need and desire it. You aim at it, yet the cruel and depressing 
metonym is always there for you to think about. I will argue that such a met-
onym struggles against death while death as metaphor celebrates it by say-
ing that life beyond death is your real life and your earthly wanderings but a 
shadow of it. You advance from death to life in Heaven – here we have first an 
ascending and then a vertical metaphor in a true Platonic context.
The metonyms of death wage their endless war against death. Think of this,
George was such a good person. We all miss him so much now when he is 
deceased and we stand by his grave.
Such a metonymically construed narrative of the dead George can be expanded 
at will without making it feel too strained or misleading. It simply tells us how 
things are. George is dead when we stand there, the participants in his burial 
ritual listening to the stream of positive jargon straight from the priest’s lit-
urgy book. However, metonymic language, unlike the metaphors that  celebrate 
death, struggles to admit the key fact, namely, the end of the life of the person. 
8 E.A. Poe, “A Descent into the Maelström.” In Complete Tales and Poems. New York: Vintage, 
1975, pp. 127–170.
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This entails no person. We say, “We miss him,” as if he were there to be missed; 
or, as if there still were somebody called George around. There is nobody. We 
stand at his grave; whose grave is it? The proper name no longer refers because 
George fails to exist. Yet we still treat George as an existing personal entity 
when we use this proper name. What we should have said is, “We miss what 
used to be George,” or “We stand by the grave of a corpse that, when he was a 
living person, was named George.”9 But how could we love a corpse? Nobody 
misses a cadaver; one misses a person.
It is impossible to miss the person who does not exist – there is nobody 
to miss – and a proper name fails to make sense when the referent simply is 
no longer there. It is all fictional. Such a fake manner of treating metonymic 
death is not just a matter of linguistic convenience, as it might be, but a matter 
of deep metaphysical fear. The metonymic treatment of death is intolerably 
cruel and painful to us. Hence, we need to escape to the more tender realms 
of ascending positive metaphors. Sometimes we do not go along that route, 
for instance, when we actually stand by George’s grave and remember him 
ever so sweetly. Alas, the cruel fact is that this is not George’s grave, and thus 
there is nobody to remember, sweetly or not, must be intolerable to the liv-
ing; hence, we must modify our metonymic language of death accordingly. We 
keep George alive by our linguistic conventions, which obviously consoles us 
enough to make the idea of death somehow tolerable. Alternatively, such met-
onymic games provide us an opportunity to make the crucial leap to the happy 
lands of transcendent metaphors, or Hic Rhodus, hic salta:
We now stand by George’s grave but we honestly believe that He him-
self is knocking at the Gates of Heaven and entering the Upper Room 
where we will meet Him. When our own time is up we are ready to follow 
George and to give up this Vale of Tears in order to start living anew.
The parallel incongruities of the metonymic and metaphoric accounts are as 
obvious as they are revealing. First, we say (metonymically) that George lies 
dead in his grave here and now but then we continue to talk as if he still were 
present. Second, we say that our dear dead George is now alive somewhere 
else, that is, in Heaven (metaphorically). Ever so paradoxically, George is now 
in his grave and also in Heaven, in other words in two different places at the 
same time. Such contradictions do not sound so bad if both the  metonymic and 
9 K. Burke, in his The Rhetoric of Religion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961) ex-
plains this phenomenon as follows: it is the “personal name that can be said to survive the 
physical death of a particular person who bore it.” (p. 209). A person’s name is a talisman that 
keeps the person alive for us. This is the thesis I try to argue for above.
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 metaphoric language tell us the same story: George is still somehow around 
first here and then there as well. The metonymic language struggles and threat-
ens to break down due its grammar but metaphors reign free and as supreme 
as ever. Hence, the Land of the Dead is ruled by metaphors that are immune 
to such paradoxes. Ultimately our metaphors must win or otherwise we could 
not face death. We may try to manage by using a metonym: “This is George’s 
grave,” and thus deny the death of George. But we know this is false. We need 
a metaphor even if we may not use the full travel story from here to eternity. A 
minimal metaphor may well suffice: “George is gone.” This is enough to expel 
the truth that no George exists, just a rotting body in a cold grave. At the full 
blown rhetorical level, death is a mixed metaphor: at the same time static and 
dynamic, good and bad, ascending and descending account of life outside all 
life – it is a notion that is rich in content but always in denial of itself.10
 Meaning of Desire
Tropologically speaking, desire is a transitive and transitionary notion, just 
like death, and it, like death, helps us understand metaphor and metaphoriza-
tion. One of our very basic desires is, anyway, the desire not to die. Two sorts 
of desire are relevant here: (mere) wish-fulfilment and (true) want; I also call 
them wishes and desires because not much hinges on such a choice of words 
adopted from the morasses of folk-psychology. Of course, wish-fulfilment is a 
Freudian term but, again, not much depends on this historical detail.11
Notice that a wish is self-satisfying: what you wish you also get just by wish-
ing for it; this is called wish-fulfilment. This is different from longing for some-
thing you know you do not have and cannot get. Actually, the object of a wish 
and longing may be the same, just the attitude is different. When I wish to be 
young again, I feel I am young; when I long for my youth I know I will never get 
it back. For this reason one can speak of wish-fulfilment even if you never fulfil 
your longings. Wishes are sweet and longings bitter. Wish-fulfilment is con-
ditional only on the properly developed wish itself and its narrative content. 
Desires are not so easy to satisfy: their satisfaction depends on something that 
10 I have benefited from K. Burke’s Appendix D: Four Master Tropes, in his seminal A Gram-
mar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). I regret I cannot deal with 
the ironic aspects of the topics I focus on in this short paper. Most of them suggest a 
dialectic reading, which indicates irony; also Doherty, 1999, p. 55.
11 See for instance T. Pataki, Wish-fulfilment in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. London: Rout-
ledge, 2014.
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is outside of the desire itself, or their de re object. Therefore, desire as want is 
different from a wish.12 Suppose I want to be a decent person and good father. 
What I want is a new possible world where I am a decent person and a good 
father, that is, a world that is otherwise similar to this actual world where I am 
what I am now. In other words, I want something that satisfies my desire and 
hence gratifies me personally, a world where I am a better person than I actu-
ally am here and now. More specifically, what I want is to transit to that world; 
hence, desire is a transitionary idea. Notice, and this is important, that the dif-
ferences between the new possible world and my actual world is dictated by 
my desire, otherwise no satisfaction of desire may emerge. This is of course 
unrealistic: the new world where I am a good father must have many non-in-
tended features as well. My wife may not like me anymore and my friends may 
change as well. We can take this into account by means of the standard distinc-
tion between de dicto (what I nominally mean concerning my want) and de re 
desire (what I actually get as the object of my want). De dicto I want the world 
where I am good and no other changes; de re I get a world that has changed 
much more than that. Notice also that de dicto desire entails, as above, a narra-
tive account of the intentional object and goal of desire. Hence, to make sense 
of my current desire I must narrate my account of good fatherhood and decent 
personhood so that they make sense to me and my intended audiences.
The same is true also of such trivial desires as I want ice-cream. Ice-cream is 
not desirable as such – even if some people like it – hence I need to tell more 
about it so that it starts looking desirable to me. I say, I always eat ice-cream 
when the sun shines, which reminds me of my late dear father who always 
bought me some. Of course, certain objects of desire are desirable as such. If 
I say I do not desire good life, a special explanation is needed. Also notice the 
difference between wish-fulfilment and desire here: I desire that I go and get 
ice-cream unlike in the case of a wish when some imaginary substitute may do 
the work for me. For example, I look at children in the park enjoying their ice-
cream, I mentally re-live my childhood, and that is that – I wish I could be like 
them. It is like the difference between being in the audience of a boxing match 
or climbing into the ring wearing boxing shorts and donning a pair of gloves. 
One more basic point is crucial concerning desire: what I want and what I get 
always are two different things. Strictly speaking, I never get what I want: I 
want to relive my childhood summers but whatever I do or get will not bring 
them back. I may want ice-cream and get some ice-cream, but I did not want 
12 See T. Airaksinen, “Desire and Happiness,” Homo Oeconomicus 29 (2012), 393–412; and 
“Narratives of Desire.” In Desire, T. Airaksinen and W. Gasparski (Eds.). New Brunswick, 
NJ: Transaction, 2016, pp. 3–58.
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just ice-cream but so much more, and this is to say I did not get what I wanted. 
Of course it is not necessary to be so strict because you also may adopt a more 
moderate approach: if you get something somehow comparable with the de 
dicto object of your desire you may call it satisfaction. We learn to be flexible 
and modest with our desires in order to avoid disappointment.
Now, wishes are describable as metonymies unlike desires that combine me-
tonymy with what I call the two directions of metaphor, one trivial and occa-
sional and the other essential and necessary. Let me start from wish-fulfilment. 
I wish to be a logician and I visited the mathematics library to fulfil my wish 
there where I, in my mind, miraculously transform myself from a philosophy 
professor into a logician. This change can be described at the level of meton-
ymy because both terms philosophy professor and logician indicate the same 
person; this philosophy professor is a logician in my new wish-defined world. 
It is a metonymic pair. My two personal characterizations are here mutually 
compatible although this need not be the case. I know I am not a brave person 
but when I watch war films I am a brave hero, which is fine. But I may wish to 
be a soaring eagle in the sky, which is impossible, or I imagine I am immortal. 
All such cases display metonymic pairs.
Jacques Lacan says all desires are metonyms, which may be true but not 
unconditionally, because desires have their metaphoric elements as well. Let 
us begin from their metonymic aspects. Look at the following example: I want 
you to love me and I expect to find a proof of that. Now, your love – first as I 
want it and then as I get it, if I get it – includes two different things that are 
related in metonymic terms. As I see it, this is Lacan’s point.13 There is a pseu-
do-temporal gap as all gratifications are deferred: I want your love and I get it 
later; what I already have I cannot desire. Hence, what I get is never the same 
thing that I wanted. Of course, such a pseudo-temporal argument is figura-
tive meaning simply that the de re object is different from the de dicto object. 
What happens is that I, ambiguously, want both as if they were the one and the 
same object, which would guarantee desire satisfaction and my gratification. 
Such an ambiguation is a practical blessing as it allows you to keep up the il-
lusion that you in fact are gratified – though it is an illusion. Once you notice 
the nature of this ambiguity you also will see the metonymic language at work: 
your quest for ice-cream specifies an object that is not the ice-cream in your 
hand. You probably believe it is because you protect yourself by introducing 
the relevant ambiguity, which is based on the metonymic relation between the 
two different intentional objects, objects understood as de dicto and de re, as 
13 See D. Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. London: Routledge, 
1996, p. 38; and A. Lemaire, Jacques Lacan. Tr. D. Makey. London: Routledge, 1970, pp. 195ff.
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ice-cream as you think of it and as you may find it after getting it. Both are 
present to you in the given situation so that you may freely pay attention to the 
one or the other without making any changes into the actual world or intro-
ducing any alternate possible worlds. You have both objects at the same time 
so that it does not really matter if they are mutually different. This is how the 
metonymic language of desire works to save your day.14
This is just a beginning because desire has its twin metaphoric aspect as 
well, as I said above. Trivially, I want to be a stud, where stud is a conventional 
metaphor for a sexually active male. Such a metaphor is easy to rewrite in met-
onymic terms: I want to be a ladies’ man, or perhaps I want to be admired as 
such, or I want to compensate for my earlier disappointments. Whatever we 
say the original metaphor disappears. Of course, in some cases such a linguis-
tic reduction is tricky. When you say men are dirty pigs, what are you saying? 
What do you want to say? Such metaphors pack an overdose of meaning.
The second type of metaphor is a deeper one. As I see it, a metaphor always 
travels through the fields of discourse in an unpredictable manner when its 
purpose is to impress and perhaps stun the reader by revealing something new. 
A metaphor is meaning in transition so that its import is ultimately transcen-
dental. It moves over gaps and traps ending up in a realm that transcends con-
ventional linguistic borders, except perhaps one: it must somehow make sense 
however outlandish it may be. It may try to shake off all sense, yet sense must 
it make. When I say I want to be a stud I travel to the world of horse breeding – 
but not that of winter tires – and invoke all the images of wild stallions in heat. 
If men are dirty pigs, we discuss life in pig sty, which does not sound nice. The 
first metaphor is obviously ascending and the second descending. These two 
examples are trivial as methodological pointers. The truth is that metaphors 
travel to distant lands where they celebrate their newly found transcendent 
semantic liberties. Metaphors and desires work in the same way.
Death as a metaphor evokes a transition through a gate or across a river to 
the distant Pure Land, Paradise, Upper Room, or Heaven; what then are the 
truly transcendent realms that desire aims to occupy, or what are those desir-
able possible worlds where desire comes true and one’s personal gratification 
a fact? To answer it is to admit that desire has its own camouflaged metaphoric 
aspect, just like death does. Death can be treated metonymically and desire is 
open to the same kind of treatment but both also evoke a more complex and 
ultimately more rewarding treatment in terms of metaphors of transience and 
transcendence.
14 See my “Psychology of Desire and the Pragmatics of Betterment.” In Pragmatism and Ob-
jectivity, S. Pihlström (Ed.). London: Routledge, 2017, pp. 223–238.
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Desire certainly possesses its own dynamism and, along with it, a metaphor-
ic, transitionary, and transcendental structure – but what about its content? 
Death has, as a gateway to the better world, its unequivocally metaphoric con-
tent; we can then ask whether desire manages as well. The prima facie meta-
phoric treatment of the object of desire is often trivial, as we saw. However, 
in the non-trivial transitionary cases desire opens up vistas and conceptual 
possibilities that certainly compare with the rich metaphoric means of death, 
such as the last moment of truth that condenses the whole life’s career into 
one fleeting but final perception, as described by Doherty. I may say my best 
literary projects are now dead; that is, their place is in the Great Waste Basket 
from where I can never recover them.
Now, the focus of desire, or what we want, travels from here to there, or to 
another possible word where it finally unravels its true meaning. Here is a nar-
rative example: We are on a lifeboat out on the ocean. We have spent a long 
time in it, we are thirsty, hungry, sunburnt, afraid, and increasingly desperate 
and we desire a rescue. It is not implausible to want it yet we can do nothing 
but sit and pray. Then a ship emerges from behind the horizon and saves us. We 
want to be able to move from the world where we are helpless into another one 
where help arrives. How are these two worlds related to each other? They are 
related metaphorically, of course. In our present example this is not so readily 
perceivable perhaps, but before going into more complex cases we must deal 
with the present one – if all desires are metaphoric this one must be so as well.
Obviously, to be saved in this new and still imaginary possible world where 
a ship appears on the horizon is loaded with symbolic meaning. What hap-
pens is that the people must now describe the event of the emerging ship in 
novel terms. What they do is to rewrite their de dicto narrative account of the 
object of desire. How the shipwrecked see the event depends on many differ-
ent things, their psychology, belief systems, religion, culture etc.; however, they 
must react. Just like the moment of death the moment of desire satisfaction is 
a transcendent event, which entails the realization of a new possible world as 
a revelation and game-changer, or as the truth of the matter. The desiring agent 
now reacts to it in a characteristic manner that is not be without metaphoric 
elements. The emerging ship is sent by God, it is a miracle, it is an answer to 
our prayers, it is a solution to all our problems, it is whatever you want to call 
it except a ship whose legal duty it may be to do something about the life-
boat. That would be a metonymic treatment of the case at the level of de re 
interpretation of desire. But to say that the ship saves us is to say it is a saviour, 
which comes very close to Saviour. However, we now discuss the de dicto case, 
the meaning assigned by those people to their emerging desire satisfaction, 
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the rescue. For them all of it is bound to be metaphoric. It was metaphoric all 
the time as they were waiting for a miracle to happen but now, when the ship 
is there and the de re desire reactivates, all the metaphors become visible and 
they force themselves to the speech and vision of the people in need. Such a 
case is nicely analogous with that of death that we discussed above. The Jaws 
of Death are now avoided.
Indeed, a less trivial example is the will to live, when we give it a metaphoric 
treatment and forget the corresponding metonymies of death and dying. I say 
I do not want to die, which is to say I want to go on living. I tell myself a nar-
rative about the event of my dying, my suffering, my fear, etc. I also imagine 
how my relatives and friends suffer both mentally and materially when I am 
no longer there to support them. All this takes place in a new possible world 
that does not exist yet and which I do not want to exist in the future. In normal 
conditions, this world is not desirable as such and thus I feel I need to avoid 
it. But what can I do? I know I must die. I then metaphorize my fate, for in-
stance, in this way: I will pass away; hence I do not die but move on to another 
realm of existence, which I know is better than the present one. I relate to 
myself the traditional and conventional narrative about such a transition as 
travel towards Heaven, which is a complex ascending metaphor, or even an 
allegory, of my newly found better life beyond what I used to know in this Val-
ley of Tears. I know people around me share the same allegory and so I need 
not worry about that. In this way, the metaphorization of death by means of 
the traditional travel narrative works to satisfy my desire not to die. I do not 
die but I live because I travel towards Heaven – this is what I want. The ques-
tion whether such a desire is satisfiable is beside the point. Desire may also 
be wish-fulfilment; as far as it is not, the harsh reality of facts will prove to be 
disappointing.
I have argued that desire can ultimately be understood in metaphoric terms. 
In other words, the idea of satisfaction of desire brings back the previously 
supressed metaphoric content. I have no car but when I get it, I get the miss-
ing part of my manhood back. It is a long trip from cars to manhood and that 
is why we need a metaphor here. When I get the car it is the moment of truth 
when all the hidden metaphors become visible, or a moment of celebration 
where nothing will be left hidden. The car emerges under the cover of heavy 
metaphoric meaningfulness revealing the true nature of the de dicto object of 
a desire that is a hidden metaphor.
Now, my main point is that the full narrative de dicto object of desire grows 
more and more metaphoric until its contact with its original field of discourse 
vanishes, like car that is transformed into something else. Think of what all 
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this entails to the realizability of our desires.15 How to realize a metaphor in 
the real world, when the metaphor is ineliminable, unlike in our trivial “I want 
to be a stud” example? Of course, after eliminating the initial metaphor, you 
can grow it back by expanding the given object narrative. This is the return of 
the metaphor.
Now, it seems the foundations of our conative life are metaphoric. When 
we reach this level, we are at the end of the discourse that also threatens to be 
the death of discourse. After the full and final metaphors have emerged you 
have nothing else to say; if you say, you cross the limits of understanding, you 
stop making sense, you do not communicate, and this is the same as opening 
the gates to somewhere over there that is like the dark abyss of death, or the 
veritable hell of idiosyncratic private language no one deciphers. Obviously, 
this means “hell” as a descending metaphor; however hard I try I cannot lead 
you back to the heaven of understanding. After the last metaphors a gate opens 
to the foreign world of non-communication and confusion that is devoid of an 
alternative. In other worlds, my desires, if they indeed are mine, do no longer 
communicate. They make social interpersonal sense only as long as they are 
not private, or as long as they are read mimetically, but then they are lacking 
as desires. They are now more like desire frames or prototypes I am invited to 
develop further so that they become my own – and then they gradually lose 
their interpersonal meaning. Or, we stay at the mimetic level and do as others 
do, but this is no longer the game of desires we are interested in this paper.16 
It is just mimesis-coordinated social game, a kind of monotonous ritual per-
formance to the highly syncopated music of the social stage, or a dance to the 
end of time. True desires, when they are my own, always flirt with the limits 
of communication; this is because of their metaphoric de dicto content. You 
always can ask, meaningfully, why should you want it?
15 Pessimist have denied the possibility of satisfying one’s desires and hence eudaimonia 
and ataraxia on that very basis, from Buddhists to Simone Weil; see her Gravity and Grace. 
Tr. E. Crawford and M. von der Ruhr. London: Routledge, 2002, Ch. “The Impossible.” 
The case of Buddhism is, of course, complicated. Desiring brings about unhappiness, 
think of the following: “I once asked Soen Roshi, ‘Why did you want to become a monk?’ 
‘I so badly wanted to become a monk’. he answered. ‘But why?’ ‘I so badly wanted to 
become a monk’. His wow was truly profound. The intensity of it was remarkable [...].” 
(K. Tanahashi and R.S. Chayat, Endless Wow: The Zen Path of Soen Nakagawa. Boston: 
Shambhala, 1996, p. 17). Soen professes a strong desire but his words are at the same time 
so ironic that the whole skene reads like a parody. He refuses to tell why, which is to say 
the object of his de dicto desire is missing. This is impossible, if we discuss a desire. The de 
re object is monkhood. Consequently, he cannot be disappointed if he is a monk.
16 See Ch. 5 in this volume.
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 Generating Metaphors
We have seen that metaphor, death, and desire all share the same structure, 
that is, they all transfer a rich set of meanings from one field of discourse to 
another, death from here to eternity and desire from here to some desirable 
possible worlds.17 In this sense, their trajectory is a one way road – the respec-
tive meanings travel but they will never return – and, because of this, they 
are genuinely transcendent. By this I mean that once the meanings have been 
transferred to the novel fields of discourse, they cannot return back to their 
original fields. If men are dirty pigs, it does not follow that you may say dirty 
pigs are men. That does not work. Of course, you can play with this impossibil-
ity: standing by a pig sty you say “Look, so many men there,” which counts as a 
rather sophisticated irony without metaphoric content. We see that the case of 
metaphor is different from that of irony and metonymy. If Alexander’s armies 
conquered the world, it is equally true that Alexander conquered the world. 
In other words, “Alexander” and “Alexander’s armies” (metonym) can be used 
interchangeably whereas “man” and “dirty pig” (metaphor) cannot. Moreover, 
in the case of a metaphor, the corresponding sentences are not true/false. The 
paradigmatic case of transcendence is of course death: no one comes back 
from Heaven and Hell. Yet the Ancient Greeks, like Pythagoras, Ulysses, and 
Orpheus, could return from Hades, which makes the foundations of their tales 
of death and afterlife metonymic: life and death can also be seen as a met-
onymic pair whose terms are in some cases mutually interchangeable.18 The 
effect is curious: a person in Hades is by definition dead but because he can 
return he is alive – this idea of the returning dead is an oxymoron and perhaps 
also ironic. Metaphoric meaning travels so far that they cannot return and the 
dead soul does the same. The unidirectionality of travel is crucially important 
here, although the concept of travel should entail the possibility of return. 
Roads can be travelled in two directions. Therefore, the idea of travel as it ex-
ists in metaphor, desire, and death has its typical mysterious aspect.
Desire, when its narrative is developed in full, also travels to a point of no 
return. When it passes this point the desired object never returns back to its 
original metonymic parent form. After realizing what a car really means to 
him, a person can never again consider car as a mere technological industrial 
product, if it remains as the object of his de dicto desire. When a young man 
17 Doherty writes: “Like the death-process to which it corresponds, metaphor posits as fun-
damental the crossing from one semantic domain to another” (Doherty, 1999, p. 52).
18 See P. Kingsley, Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009, for 
instance Ch. 10 “Plato and Orpheus.”
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finally understands what he desires when he desires the woman of his life, 
there is no return back to the former normal. Perhaps this is why in our West-
ern Christianity based culture desire is so scary to us. We do a lot of work to 
supress, deny, avoid, and sublimate our desires. “Desire” is a suspicious and 
even anxious word, especially sexual desire. This can be understood as follows. 
Desire means anxiety exactly because of its transcendent nature. Once you 
meet the deepest metaphoric aspects of our desire you also face and feel its 
transcendent nature; the first aspect entails unsatisfiability and the second ir-
reversibility. You are tempted into a direction of travel that promises no return. 
When your desire becomes metaphoric, how could you satisfy it? You remain 
unhappy, yet you cannot find your way back. You now carry the emblem of lost 
innocence, like a dress you cannot undress. You have what you have and you 
cannot give it back regardless of how you think of it. Your world has changed ir-
revocably. Obviously, the fate of Humpty Dumpty illustrates successful desires.
In this way, death, desire, and generation of metaphor all behave in the same 
way, only their respective degree of concreteness varies: death is an (simple) 
event, desire a (complex) mental episode, and metaphor a (useful) linguistic 
trope; hence, I can desire death as a metaphor. All three share a structural 
similarity, which seems to entail that we need to draw a distinction between 
metaphor and meta-metaphor that covers all three diverse cases. In fact, what 
we normally call a metaphor is actually a meta-metaphor, I mean we can treat 
metaphor as another metaphor just like we treated death and desire as meta-
phors, or metaphoric linguistic structures.
Example: The verifiable fact that you are a witch anchors your destiny to the 
age-old tradition that is delivered to us from the dawn of time. This sentence 
contains three key metaphors, anchoring, delivering, and dawn of time. The 
second is a dead metaphor that no longer works as a metaphor. Dawn of time 
may sound pompous. Anchoring is a better metaphor, although certainly not 
too fresh or interesting one, but it is a working metaphor anyhow. This is to 
say that the meaning of the sentence travels from a factual social description 
to seafaring and its methods of keeping a vessel from moving in current and 
wind. It is a simple horizontal metaphor that amasses new meanings to the 
case and solidifies our imagery assuring us of the reality and seriousness of 
the case that is witchcraft. Think of these metaphors whose target is the for-
mer Romanian dictator Mr Ceausescu who was Romania’s Hero of Heroes, the 
Genius of the Carpathians, and the Danube of Thought. These come very close 
to mixed metaphors. They spread their meaning in diverse directions, like a 
scattergun of one’s own cursed imagination, allowing us to form no unified 
idea of what is said or intended. Hence, we want to give up dead and mixed 
metaphors and concentrate on those that travel with us towards some new 
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and fresh realms of allusion, thus proving us with new insights on what one’s 
linguistic intentions and imagery might do. Metaphors, when we focus on 
their creation and construction, are both transitionary and transcendental, or 
even transitory, just like death and desire metaphors are. It is all about mak-
ing meanings travel between the realms of discourse, first to Heaven and Hell, 
then to new possible worlds, and finally anywhere where a meaning can go – 
when the travel is a one way road.
Metaphor is a novel cluster of meanings, true, but I do not mean this basic 
fact; what I am interested in is how we may construe our metaphors in terms 
of flight of fancy. The metaphoric process brings about metaphors like those of 
death and desire; here the metaphoric process is a dynamic frame whose slots 
take in various ideas and images and turn them into specific metaphors. When 
you consider death as a metaphor you are bound to travel to distant lands and 
realms all the way to Heaven and Hell from where no one ever came back – this 
is what the metaphor-generating process does to us. An abstract truth, death, 
gets its concrete formulations in terms of Heaven and Hell, or the reification 
of the place where the metaphoric process will necessarily take you anyway. 
There is no metaphor without transition and travel of meaning that now admit 
its concretization in terms of the Land of the Dead on the other side of the 
River Styx or, if you like, the Gates of Paradise watched respectively by Charon 
and St. Peter.
The case of desire is similar: your travel between possible worlds is embed-
ded in the essence of desire. This is what desire is, our feeling and percep-
tion of the pull of the better world, our imagination reaching out from here to 
the place where what is desirable lies. As we know, such a process is isomor-
phic with what generates our metaphors; it follows that desire generates its 
own metaphors as long as we pay close attention to the de dicto desire, or the 
meaning of what we desire. We never desire what we seem to desire. We desire 
something that is metaphorically specified by its de dicto object, as I tried to 
show above. However, the most fundamental truth is this: because they follow 
the rules of metaphor generation, death and desire end up being metaphoric, 
too. We create them like we create all our metaphors. To put it in the simplest 
possible manner, all travelling meanings are in the end metaphoric; or, mean-
ings when they travel become metaphors.
∵
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Chapter 7
Kafka: Tropes of Desire
This paper focuses on Kafka’s The Trial and The Castle paying close attention to 
the metaphors and other tropes employed in the text. I will show that the first 
is metaphoric throughout, unlike the second, which relies more on metonymy. 
Also the third master trope, irony is identifiable in the texts. All that is based 
on the dominant desires of the two main characters in the novels, a bank clerk, 
Joseph K, and a land surveyor, K: to know the name of his alleged crime and to 
find a way to the Castle who has promised to employ K. Concerning the inter-
pretation of Kafka’s meaning in the novels, I argue that both texts are mean-
ingless in a special way. The texts do not allow for a literal meaning, because 
their tropological structure is devised in such a way that ultimately nothing is 
meaningful. The main examples are the priest in the Cathedral and the story of 
the man and his own Gate of Law in The Trial.
 Introduction: Two Persons, Two Tasks, Two Desires
Both novels, The Trial and The Castle begin by introducing a meaningful looking 
event: Joseph K, a bank clerk, is arrested at home for an unspecified crime, and 
K, a land surveyor, arrives in a snow covered village next to the Castle of Count 
Westwest.1 These two events immediately introduce the reasons for their dom-
inant desires, desires that will rule the narrative throughout, relentlessly but at 
the same time hopelessly. Through these two obviously innocent events, both 
men are trapped in the web of desires that will from now on dominate their 
life and action and in the end prove hopelessly demanding and even fatal. The 
two narratives appear to me mimetically related. They reflect and repeat each 
other as if they were two variants of one extended idea or allegory.2 Both men 
are doomed to suffer and fail although they will never admit their defeat. Their 
respective situations may not look exceptionally difficult or extraordinary in 
any sense. Joseph K wants to know what the charge against him is, as he has 
done nothing, as the narrative says as if it were objectively true and not merely 
a subjective opinion of Joseph K. It is remarkable that such an oratio recta 
1 F. Kafka, Complete Novels. Trs. W. and E. Muir. London: Vintage, 2008.
2 See A. Melberg, Theories of Mimesis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
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expression is used here by the author and not an oratio obliqua like “He thinks 
he is innocent.” He in fact is innocent; so, in this sense his crime cannot have 
a name but he is still charged of something. He wants to know one name, the 
name his accusers have put on his alleged crime. Next, of course, he wants to 
clear his name. In order to do so, he must find a location where to do it, or to 
meet his accusers or at least their authorized representatives. All this proves 
to be impossible. His desire cannot be satisfied but he fails to understand it. 
Obviously his conception of the law and personal guilt is inadequate, which 
is to say that his respective beliefs are hopelessly wrong. This is surprising 
because as an educated citizen Joseph K should know how the legal system 
works – we all do in our own country.
The situation of K, the land surveyor is much simpler: he needs to go to the 
Count’s Castle where he has been invited to work as a land surveyor. He knows 
all the relevant facts, he has work to do up in the Castle but for some unspeci-
fied reason he cannot enter or even approach it; in fact, he is not even allowed 
to try. He is stuck in limbo down in the valley, in the village, and its various 
Weinstuben. He wants to go up to the Castle, yet he cannot, and he has no idea 
why. Again, there is something he does not understand – he never will. When 
the novel ends, it was never completed by its author, he is still where he was 
when the story began. He is reduced to the role the Willie of the Valley, ulti-
mately a rather suspicious and dirty character, who has sex with bar girls while 
the cave he has entered slowly collapses on him. This plot is much simpler than 
the first one: to try to understand the metaphysics of crime and guilt is a task 
of altogether different scope from an attempt to enter a building. In the same 
way, the sufficient conditions of success are different: at what point do you 
think, with justification, that you know what the law is, compared to knowing 
when you have entered a building? Of course, in the case of Joseph K, we may 
hope to simplify his task by simply requiring that he should know the name 
of his alleged crime. But then, in a legal context, the name of the crime may 
well be and remain a mystery to all who are involved, an essentially contested 
ascription suggested by the prosecution. In many legal cases, the true title of 
the crime emerges only in the decision of the court and may well change when 
the verdict is appealed. This is of course a problem because the accused can-
not know the name of her crime, or what she did; how could she have known 
that she committed a crime when she acted? Is it enough to argue that she 
must have known she did something wrong but not exactly what it is? And 
how can we say she did something wrong if we do not know what she did? In 
this sense, Joseph K’s situation is not that outlandish. The accused may ask, 
plausibly, what did I do, tell me?
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I suggest that Joseph K faces a metaphysical abyss where he enters at his 
own peril. K on the contrary faces a practical task, a job he cannot do, and this 
draws him into an endless circle of failed attempts, a stuck wheel he is unable 
to turn. He has the relevant evidence to the effect that he cannot and he must 
not enter the Castle but he refuses to recognize this evidence and modify his 
beliefs accordingly. This allows him to desire a goal that, simply, is unavail-
able to him. His problem seems to be his inability to find the reasons for his 
own failure; and because he finds no reasons he is unable to change his beliefs, 
which keep alive his vain desire to enter the Castle. If somebody told him why 
he probably would turn around and go back home. But no such reasons will 
appear and thus he cannot alter his relevant beliefs and desires. He learns all 
kind facts about the Castle and its officials, but nothing that would be relevant 
to his key desire: to enter and then start working there. In this way The Castle 
is an endless narrative that cannot have an ending. The only ending would be 
the death of K. Joseph K of course dies in the end since he is guilty and this 
dictates the logic of his fate, but K is only working hard to be able to go a place 
where he should be able to go. What kind of a logical ending could there be? 
Perhaps it is impossible to say. You try until you die, which entails a narrative 
that is hardly worth telling.
 Tropological Considerations: The Castle
The hypothesis is that the narrative of The Castle mainly utilizes metonymy 
without allowing much metaphoric content to enter its plot whereas The Trial 
is through and through metaphoric. However, the master trope in both con-
texts is mocking irony whose rule is both undeniable and all-conquering.3 To 
give a simple example: first, introduce desires that are crucial to the narrative 
plot, around which everything turns, and then at the same time make it imme-
diately clear that such desires are unsatisfiable – this is an application of irony. 
The reader quickly realizes what the plot is, namely, that the main character’s 
desire is impossible, or even quixotic – this is the second source irony, or a 
kind of narrative meta-irony that is lifted out of the text to come and trouble 
the reader. The reader comes to know so much more than the characters in 
3 See K. Burke, A Grammar of Motives, D: Four Master Tropes. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1962. Irony oratio recta indicates a denied disturbance in information flow when the 
speaker knows that the audience understands what is happening. You pour a drink to my lap 
and I do not react except by saying “nice work.” Another type of irony is irony oratio obliqua: 
only the audience knows that the information flow is disturbed and disturbing although the 
observed speakers should and could see it that way, too.
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the novels that the reader is ultimately mocking them. Why would they go and 
search the law and the route to the Castle when they must fail? Obviously their 
respective beliefs about their own situational context are all mistaken and 
even unreasonable.
Kafka’s literary strategy is to embed this into a narrative frame that resem-
bles what we say and read about any normal, everyday life. Both Joseph K and 
K both try to live as usual although they are constantly troubled by their unful-
filled desire to know the name of the crime and discover a path to the Castle. 
When the narrative progresses, normal life dominates it as if the author want-
ed to tell about it and not of something else that is so much more important. 
This is another source of irony: from the point of view of the narrative what is 
important is treated as of secondary importance. Especially in The Castle this 
ordinary life aspect dominates the narrative, less so in The Trial. In the latter 
novel we find some embedded narratives that are highly symbolic and loaded 
with metaphors, for instance, the discussion with the priest in the dark and 
old Cathedral. A parallel embedded narrative in The Castle tells the story of 
a young girl, Amalia, who is accused by the Castle of a rather strange crime, 
namely, disturbing the peace of mind, because of her beauty, of an official of 
the Castle named Sortini. However, this narrative is totally different from the 
episodes told in The Trial; the mysteries of the former have not much meta-
phoric import. The crime mentioned is like that of Oedipus: Amalia intended 
no harm, she could not avoid the damaging incident, yet she is guilty in the 
eyes of all. She must suffer because of her crime; actually, all her people must 
suffer as if her guilt were contagious. As I said, here Kafka plays with some 
ancient punitive principles in a context where they become merely atavistic 
and vengeful. Metaphors are largely missing here as the narrative is played 
at the level of metonymic language accompanied by some bitter ironies just 
like Amalie’s beauty that enrages Sortini. How did he see Amalia? Whatever 
the answer is, it must take into account a disturbance in the information flow 
between the two persons. This is case of oratio obliqua irony. The audience 
knows that Sortini’s perception of Amalia is all too weird. On the other hand, 
males may react in this way. Female beauty sometimes is disturbing and hence 
it brings about an aggressive reaction.
Another ironic point is that Sortini, as a high-ranking official from the Cas-
tle, behaves like a drunken sailor (the language he uses) or an adolescent boy 
(hating what he could not immediately get). The effect of the narrative style 
and technique in The Castle is certainly sinister and depressing, starting from 
the surrounding nature, the snow covered isolated valley continuing to its nas-
ty and in a way primitive inhabitants ending up with the description of the 
Castle itself. The Castle is not a castle in the same sense as the Castle of Prague 
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is; on the contrary, it is just a group of peasant houses on the hill looking so 
nondescript that a careless observer would not pay attention to it. The gestalt 
of the Castle is not right, it does not look what it is and, hence, K’s failed desire 
to get there gets more and more difficult to comprehend. We know that he 
wants to find his way there, he insists on an invitation, he is morally aggravated 
because they break their contract with him, all that is true; but at the same 
time the visual cues we are offered tell us that the place is not that important 
or interesting. Again the information flow in the text is disturbed. The follow-
ing metonymic pair of terms is obvious here: Castle and houses, in a sentence, 
“This castle is a group of houses.” Again the effect is ironic: why try so hard to 
enter a building like that? It cannot be a worthwhile effort, passion, and de-
sire, not worthy of all the aggravation that leaves K stranded in that miserable 
village. The reader here understands so much more than the land surveyor, 
although the same information is available to K as well, that the effect is ironic. 
The picture is like this:
K wants, more than anything else, to enter the Castle
He believes that the Castle is an important place and its officers are noble 
men in the centre of his own mental universe.
The Castle, which he has seen, is just a group of ordinary houses and its 
officials, whom he knows about, daunting thugs.
The second and third sentences are certainly mutually inconsistent, yet K re-
fuses to see this crucial fact. The reader can see it, it is obvious, and hence 
one cannot escape the ironic effect in this case. Another point concerns the 
metonymic aspects of this same example. The ironic effect is now created by 
means of a simple metonymic pair: an aristocratic Castle is a group of peas-
ant houses. The two terms are freely exchangeable with each other or they re-
fer to the same physical, real entity, which is at the same time a Castle and 
a group of houses on a hill. The hill binds them together, isolates them from 
the rest of the village and, in the text, emphasizes the crucial importance of 
this very metonymy. “A fine Castle it is” counts as an ironic statement when 
it refers to that bunch of houses, that fata morgana, on a hill, given that the 
audience knows how the things are – K certainly does not. This mocking 
statement then adds to the overall nasty atmosphere in the narrative of The 
Castle.
In relation to such visual considerations, we can find the testimonial of 
the teacher K meets: there is not much difference between the Castle and 
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
133Kafka: Tropes of Desire
<UN>
the peasants,4 yet K feels he himself does not belong to either group. The cru-
cial point is the lack of differences that again indicates a metonymic pair of 
terms, the Castle and the peasants. Moreover, the gap there is so narrow, where 
should K place himself in this classification? He is the Other, a stranger, an ab-
normal intruder in a community that does not seem to recognize and even less 
respect such outsiders. On the other hand, when the narrative progresses the 
reader quickly notices that for instance Klamm, an official from the Castle and 
a frequent visitor to the village, is really much different from the peasants. For 
instance, he has no stable visual form and he is intolerable to see.5 When one 
reads about him it becomes clear that he indeed is different from the peasant, 
so different that they look like opposites. From a tropological point of view it 
is of course possible to form metonymic pairs of terms that are opposites or at 
least mutually incompatible. This again indicates an application of irony here. 
Klamm is unlike the peasants but an official like Klamm and a peasant anyway 
form a metonymic pair: their properties are different but at the same time the 
teacher is right when he says the differences are insignificant; in other words, 
they are not real. Klamm and a peasant are both, from K’s point of view, mys-
terious, strange, repulsive, rude, difficult human beings whose presence offers 
him no hope, no fun, no purpose, and no satisfaction. Klamm himself may be a 
strange individual whose characteristics challenge K but at the same time their 
meaningful aspects hide a reference to a person who is equally identifiable by 
listing the characteristics of a peasant. The two terms are freely exchangeable 
if you pay attention to the reference and not meaning. If you say, “I see a Castle 
official and I see a peasant,” the difference is illusory, at the level of meaning; 
at the level of reference they refer to a class of people who are and are not dis-
similar. Actually, when you read the various descriptions of Klamm and draw 
a summary you notice that Klamm need not be a person but a name of a class, 
type, or principle of people. That is why he changes his looks all the time and 
is so hard to look at. Klamm behaviour resembles that of Sortini, so much so 
that the Klamm-class and Sortini-class of people behave linguistically like a 
metonymic pair, too. Deep down there they are not different.
The Castle and its people become stranger and stranger when the narrative 
develops even if it never quite reaches any metaphoric depth. Of course one 
4 The Castle. Kafka, 2008, p. 12.
5 This is called polymorphy. “Jesus was capable of appearing in various different forms simulta-
neously.” The same applies to the Devil, or “the polymorphous Satan” in early Christian writ-
ing. If the change is permanent, it is metamorphosis. Klamm may indeed be polymorphic. 
(I. Czachesz, The Grotesque Body in Early Christian Discourse. London: Routledge, 2014, pp. 
115, 117). Of course, demons may have no fixed shape and thus Klamm can also be seen as a 
demonic character.
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may always read such strange narratives metaphorically and ask, for instance, 
what the Castle is a metaphor of, but in this case this temptation should be 
resisted. The narrative is designed to stay at the level of metonyms. Not all 
strange stories are metaphoric. The noble Castle can be just a group of peas-
ant houses without inviting any significant metaphoric readings. The strange-
ness of the metonyms that are employed here is only ironic, not metaphoric. 
Dreamlike, surrealistic episodes need not be read metaphorically either. Here 
is an amusing non-metaphoric example. Soon after his arrival to the village K 
makes an effort to walk up the hill to the Castle. What can be more logical or 
practical? Walk there along the road, knock on the door, and ask for an audi-
ence, and your business in the Castle will get a head start. Now, from the point 
of view of the main narrative it is crucially important to block that route; the 
narrative must close all the obvious routes to the Castle. K cannot get there, 
he has no means to do it; so, the reader will ask the question why not walk up 
there. Here is how it is done, like in a dream:
If he forced himself to walk at least as far as the entrance to the castle, 
that was more than enough in his present state. So he walked on, but it 
was a long way. For he was in the main street of the village, and it did not 
lead to Castle Mount but merely passed close to it before turning aside, 
as if on purpose, and although it moved no further away from the castle, 
it came no closer either. K. kept thinking that the road must finally bring 
him to the castle, and, if only because of that expectation, he went on. 
Because of his weariness he naturally shrank from leaving the road, and 
he was surprised by the extent of the village, which seemed as if it would 
never end, with more and more little houses, their window-panes cov-
ered by frost-flowers, and with the snow and the absence of any human 
beings – so at last he tore himself away from the road on which he had 
persisted and struck out down a narrow alley where the snow lay even 
deeper. Pulling his feet out of it as they kept sinking in again was hard 
work. He broke out in a sweat, and suddenly he stopped and could go no 
further.6
This is a great surrealist paragraph. It is the correct road as K is later told, yet 
when he walks it the village never ends, the road turns so that it keeps the 
same distance from the Castle regardless of how long he walks. It is like trying 
to reach the end of the Universe that is infinite but limited. The road is mock-
ing him, teasing him until he gets too tired to continue. K also notices a time 
6 The Castle. Tr. A. Bell. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
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distortion: a couple hours have been a whole day. Again no metaphors are 
needed here. The road is strange, its exhausts him, and makes him look stu-
pid; obviously the road is not meant to take him to the Castle – yet, it is the 
right road that leads to the Castle. It is simply the road to the Castle that does 
not take you to the Castle. This inconsistent pair is both a paradiastole and 
a metonym: the same road takes you to the Castle and does not do so; again 
the meaning is different but the reference is the same, the very same road. 
The author applies the ancient rhetorical trope of paradiastole here, or com-
bines two mutually inconsistent predicates as if it all were unproblematic. It is 
a paradiastole because a mere deviation is now called the road to the Castle.7 
For K, the right road leads him nowhere. Next I try to show how and why Kafka 
uses metaphors in The Trial. This allows us also to see why the central and most 
memorable tropes on The Castle need not be read as metaphors.
 Tropological Considerations: The Trial
The Trial is a metaphoric narrative through and through, unlike The Castle. The 
text is a process in its treatment of metaphoric emphasis: from the description 
of the everyday life of Joseph K, a bank clerk, and its metonymies the narrative 
progresses ever so gradually towards its metaphysical and metaphoric depths, 
culminating in the epic discussion with the priest in the old and gloomy, deso-
lated Cathedral, to say nothing of its crowning allegory of the old man at the 
Gates of Law. The main narrative has its sub-narrative that again has its sub-
narrative. How could a mystery that is embedded in a mystery in a mysteri-
ous main narrative be understood? Obviously one tries to read the narrative 
about the priest and the narrative by the priest as two mutually independent 
stories, but this cannot be right. This leads us towards a deep and unresolvable 
mystery, into the dark night of interpretation where all cows are black – as 
Hegel once said about Schelling’s philosophy. As I said above, I have nothing 
to say about such mysteries; the deepest of allegories I accept as what they 
are, allegories that either have an obvious meaning or no fixed meaning at all. 
Allegories are easy to read because they have their known and undisputable 
meaning or no meaning at all. In other words, allegories tend to be conven-
tional, for instance religious mysteries. What the devout see as deep truths are 
7 Wiktionary defines “paradiastole”: A form of euphemism in which a positive synonym is sub-
stituted for a negative word. Actually, the relevant expression need not be a euphemism as 
it may be used ironically, like here. The Bible says, for instance, the last come first and first 
come last, which is a paradiastolic depiction of the human condition.
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to others mere platitudes, or nonsense, like the following: “Mind as a whole 
wholly enclosing itself, free of all body, unerring, unaffected, untouched, at rest 
with itself, capable of containing all things and preserving all that exists and its 
rays (as it were) are the good, the truth, the archetype of spirit, the archetype 
of soul.”8
Now, what makes The Trial progressively more symbolic is the nature of 
Joseph K’s desires. They grow so complex that the simple desires of the land 
surveyor K look insignificant; K wants to enter the Castle, meet the people who 
hired him, and start working. To find something metaphoric here is a big task 
that can be done but not within the limits of the actual narrative. The case 
of the bank clerk Joseph K is different: when the narrative progresses the ini-
tial metonyms change into metaphors and then into ever more challenging 
metaphors until the whole narrative structure vanishes into a chaos of allego-
ries. This is what happens to Joseph K, psychologically, when he learns more 
and more about his own case and the social context where he is and where 
it all happens. He is a professional person, an educated man, who should be 
familiar and knowledgeable of the legal institutions of the country; it is totally 
surprising that he has no clue about what will happen once he is charged of 
a crime. A new gate opens up in front of him, arrive two bailiffs who have a 
message to him, then he is arrested because of an unspecified crime although 
he has in fact done nothing. This is an ironic hyperbola because certainly he 
has done something and also something wrong in the course of his life. Yet he 
case is clear, two persons have emerged from somewhere through an invisible 
door that opens up to and from somewhere where he has never been, which 
is called the Law. He now faces an existence he has no idea of. This the Law. 
Now he wants to know the name of his crime and also the Law and its relevant 
agents and agencies, the judges and law courts. Logically enough, he wants to 
proceed as far high up the ladder as necessary in order to find the persons, the 
high judges, who accuse him of the crime, whatever it is, that he never commit-
ted, and who also can absolve him. He wants to clear his tarnished reputation 
and, what this entails, avoid the punishment. However, K does not seem to 
think of the punishment too much, except in the end.
Let us look at the desires of K. If we simplify a little we can find the follow-
ing intertwined desires that he feels must be satisfiable; these are cognitive, 
knowledge related desires that look satisfiable in any developed society: I want 
to know the name of my crime, who accuses me, where can I find them, how 
can I clear my name. All these are normal and as such innocent desires. Never 
8 Hermetica, “Corpus Hermeticum ii.” Tr. B.P. Copenhaver. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995, p. 11.
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does it occur to Joseph K to ask any deeper questions like, “What kind of door 
has opened up to the Law?” The priest in the Cathedral seems to focus on that 
problem. Why is all this new to you? Why have you not heard of the similar 
problems with the law in the case of other people you know? Or, what is hap-
pening to you, where are you now? Joseph K approaches the new and surpris-
ing situation in a matter of fact manner, as if all were normal, and he only must 
do some research to clear the matters up. The final allegory of the man and 
the guard at the Gates of Law shows how wrong he has been. Is this his crime?
The situation indicates a deep irony and even ridicule. Joseph K is unable 
to recognize his new situation as new and hence he continues as usual. The 
ironic construal of the oratio obliqua case progresses as usual: Joseph K does 
not know what he obviously should know, the reader knows that the world and 
its description have changed, and this gap is the source of the inherent irony to 
be found in the case. Joseph K finds out that all the attics of Prague are actually 
offices of the Law but, nevertheless, he keeps on searching as if it were some-
how normal that attics have been turned into offices without him knowing 
it. Basically the foundational irony of The Trial is even simpler than that: the 
first sentence of the narrative, namely “Someone must have been telling lies 
about Joseph K, for without having done anything wrong he was arrested on 
fine morning” is the foundation of all the subsequent ironies: fine morning it is 
when you get arrested!9 Joseph K was arrested although he had done nothing 
wrong. You must pay attention when you think of it because of the fantastic, 
metaphysical implications of all this, but only when you have read the whole 
narrative from its innocent beginning to its horrifying end-scene the vertigo 
hits you. The first sentence opens up all the gates of hell, the infinite and ev-
erlasting tortures of the cursed valley of Gehenna, from where no convicted 
person ever came back. In the end Joseph K is taken to an old quarry, his own 
Gehenna. The supreme irony now is that the reader may anticipate it all, un-
like Joseph K, whose innocence in the long run approaches stupidity as he is 
unable to change his very frame of thought.
To approach the metaphoric structure of The Trial, let us pay attention to 
the transcendent approach there compared to the dominant immanence of 
The Castle. K knows where the Castle is, he has received an invitation, and he 
even found the road leading to the Castle; yet, he cannot get there. All this is 
within the category of immanence as it takes place in the same world where 
he already is. The Castle may be far, both literally and figuratively, but yet it is 
where he himself is. He knows people who are from the Castle and who go to 
the Castle.
9 The Trial. Kafka, 2008, p. 3.
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Joseph K’s situation is different, it is transcendent, although initially it may 
not look so: the two bailiffs enter his room through a door, he visits a court 
to attend the preliminary hearings of his case – all this is normal. But then 
the context starts changing as he learns how strange the facts actually are: the 
court is everywhere, in every house, in every attic; everybody belongs to the 
law, even the little giggling girls he meets in the staircase; the indictment can-
not be denied or overturned although the proceedings can be postponed in-
definitely; he sees paintings of high judges although they are not really high; 
the highest judges are so high they cannot be said to exist or they exist in some 
inaccessible realms, they cannot be depicted, which is to say their existence is, 
somehow, another thing.
Here we see the narrative process extending from some simple facts to the 
metaphysical realms of the law that are so deep and profound that they are 
far beyond Joseph K’s normal abilities of comprehension. The narrative is now 
transcendent. Joseph K has left through the same door where the bailiffs once 
entered and now he is in another realm of existence where his guilt is obvious 
and his ability to influence his own destiny is totally lacking. The door is the 
key metaphor. Think of what he sees when he opens the door of a closet: a cru-
el and awful whipping scene.10 This underlines the significance of the door as 
a gateway to another world and its transcendence – I do not think this strange 
and isolated scene has any other function or interpretation than that. What I 
mean by transcendence is this: Joseph K is reaching towards facts and truths 
that are no longer knowable because they reside not here but there. Joseph K 
hardly understands the situation. He is totally unable to figure out the fact that 
what he wants is beyond his capabilities as an indigenous dweller of a wrong 
world; the problem is that he cannot come to know the law that is independent 
of everything he knows and believes on an experiential basis, or on the basis of 
what he has learned during his life.
This is what metaphors do: a metaphor moves the original meaning to a new 
field of discourse that is prima facie disconnected from it, to a new context 
that opens up rich sources of novel meanings, associations, ideas, contrast etc. 
transforming what is said into another thing. I say after narrowly escaping a se-
rious accident, this time I got lucky, the guardian angel was with me. The point 
then is, I was not lucky in terms of what happened to me. I do not say, I was 
lucky that speeding car did not hit me. I say, the guardian angel has not always 
been with me but in this case she was. The guardian angel indeed  protected 
10 The Trial. Kafka, 2008, Ch. 5 “The Whipper.” This chapter is easy to read as an expression 
of Joseph K’s raw guilt feelings: he is as if responsible for the suffering of the bailiffs be-
cause he has filed a complaint about them, which he knows he has not done. Again he is 
accused of something he has not done.
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me. Such a linguistic move changes the context into a metaphoric one, or into 
a rather childishly construed semi-religious perspective where the close call 
gets an altogether different reading, now full of allusions, reminiscences, emo-
tions, and delight. The threatening accident metamorphoses into an event full 
of promise, gratefulness, and a kind of joy; the metaphor of the guardian angel 
is by its nature a celebratory one, a tell-tale sign of my new attitude, and an 
entrance into a novel mythical world. In this way a meaning, that of a near ac-
cident, has travelled to a transcendent realm of myth and metaphysics.
The example above belongs to the category of intrinsic metaphors, or meta-
phors that are created to be metaphors, so that their only role in discourse is as 
metaphors. In other words, they do not have a literal meaning in any discursive 
model. They certainly have their metonymic uses, but metonym is a special 
type of metaphor. Think of this: a guardian angel and God’s protecting hand 
form a metonymic pair in which both terms refer to the same thing, whatever 
that might be, perhaps good luck or a happy coincidence in a threatening situ-
ation. Such intrinsic metaphors show clearly what it means to say that meta-
phors are essentially transcendent in the sense that they break the immanent 
limits of a discourse and travel to some distant lands where they gain their 
fresh halo of ever richer meanings. Notice that intrinsic metaphors need not be 
mythical; think of “albatross,” or “a burden that is psychological and sometimes 
might feel as if you are cursed because of that burden,” and compare it with 
“a heart of stone.”11 The former is an extrinsic metaphor because albatross, the 
bird, actually exists. The word “albatross” can be used metaphorically or liter-
ally. The latter is an intrinsic metaphor because no heart is made of stone and, 
hence, the phrase is nothing but a metaphor.
Certainly the intrinsic master metaphor in The Trial is the Law whose mean-
ing is explained by the priest in the Cathedral. It is indeed an intrinsic meta-
phor. At this point we see that what the Law is and what it entails is no longer 
something one can understand literally in reference to positive law. The Law 
is not the law. Certainly it is not the same as the law we mean when we talk 
about the law, law court, and the rule of law, namely, a certain set of published 
norms that are created by the lawgiver in a certain authoritative order. No, the 
Law is a metaphor of something that the reader does not quite understand. In 
fact it is an intrinsic metaphor because it deals with the Law that has nothing 
to do with the law. From an ironic point of view, it is clear that Joseph K can-
not see this crucial point, namely, that the Law is an extended metaphor of 
something that is non-existent. However, it is a deadly metaphor as we learn 
in the end when Joseph K is taken to an old quarry to be killed with a butcher’s 
11 http://metaphors.com/metaphor/albatross/.
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knife through the heart, like a dog. This indicates that the Law is something 
because it has such concrete causal consequences: even if the Law is merely a 
far-fetched metaphor what the high judges think and say may kill people – this 
formulation is a mere guess as we do not know the mechanisms of the Law. 
Metaphors are just linguistic constructions, but in the case of Joseph K, meta-
phors may kill. And his death certainly sounds and feels real.
I cannot offer any ideas of what the Law is in Joseph K’s newly found uni-
verse. I suggest that it is a mistake to attempt to do so. What we have here is 
a trap: the author teases us with a number of misleading clues as if trying to 
convince us that the new Law has something to do with the old law. It has 
not; what we have here is a misleading and empty metaphor, or a metaphor 
of something we cannot say what it is. The effect of such narrative is surreal-
istic. The first sentence already says it all, Joseph K has done nothing, yet he is 
arrested – although he is not really arrested. Next, he is interrogated but that is 
not really so. His case is processed somewhere, which does not seem to be true, 
and finally he is punished in a way which has nothing to do with a legal execu-
tion; actually, he is butchered (the knife) or put away like a dog (as he says). All 
the evidence is there, The Trial is not about a trial – there is no legal process 
or trial in the book. The title of the book is a misnomer. What Joseph K is so 
ardently chasing is a metaphorically construed end that is in the end no end; it 
is not what it looks like to be; it is not even what it is said to be.
Therefore, what I want to say is this: The Trial is first about the Law and then 
Joseph K in the hands of the Law, but this Law is not the law. It is a dark and 
hidden metaphor we cannot decipher, some kind of a metaphor of itself. The 
same alien and nameless Other comes into the room through Joseph K’s door 
that opens up to a foreign, transcendent reality where an odd, reified meta-
phor called the Law reigns supreme. He has no idea what is it, except that it 
misjudges and threatens him. Perhaps the Law is the metaphoric, or allegoric, 
expression of some kind of an existential threat. That may work, although in 
the end it is a trivial idea. Another possibility is that the Law is the metaphor of 
universal guilt that harasses us endlessly and relentlessly, if we give it a chance. 
Both suggestions can be adopted, if you like, but I cannot see any direct evi-
dence for them. You may say that Joseph K enters his own subconsciousness 
without being able to do any analytical work there. He meets his guilt but he 
cannot make sense of what his superego tells him. He lives in denial, thinking 
that he is innocent, although the Law knows better.
I reject all such suggestions simply because the narrative fails to support 
them. I see the narrative as the story of an impossible desire, just like in the 
case of K in the Castle, which is not a castle. The whole point of Joseph K’s 
effort is his attempt to understand the metaphor that is now called the Law. 
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Above I already listed his apparent desires, or an interconnected set of desires, 
but that is ultimately misleading as well. What he wants to get, the ultimate 
goal of his de dicto desire, is to know the import of the metaphor of the Law. 
This he cannot do because the Law is, as such, meaningless, or it has no de re 
interpretation. Look at the following two sentences that are parallel to what 
Pontius Pilate asks during the trial of Jesus: What is truth (de dicto)? And, 
What is (the) truth (de re)?
I want to know what the Law is; that is, I am asking for the definition of 
it (de dicto).
I want to know what the Law says; that is, I am asking for a verdict in my 
case (de re).
It is clear that Joseph K cannot draw a distinction between these two formu-
lations. If he does not figure out the first problem, the second one remains 
meaningless. If he starts from the second sentence, he assigns a meaning to 
the first one without thinking of its justification. He indeed seems to assume 
that what is now called the Law is what is conventionally called the law. He 
fails to see the intrinsically metaphoric nature of it. Joseph K should not be 
asking any of those questions he is asking as if the Law were law. The more he 
keeps asking the more confusing the case becomes. No castle on the hill exists 
as a place where K could try to get. This is the difference between a metonym 
based desire (Castle) compared to a metaphor based one (the Law). In fact, no 
metaphoric formulation of the goal of desire allows for the satisfaction of the 
desire. How could it? The task of metaphor is to enrich and divert the relevant 
meanings until they are intractable. This is to say, in the end you do not know 
what you want. This entails no satisfaction. If he wants to be a stud, what does 
he want? You need to provide an exact answer if you want to see what de re 
object corresponds with this de dicto formulation of the desire. We talk about 
a stud simply because we do not know, we cannot know, and we do not want to 
know. We leave the strange business of desire satisfaction to rest in the dense 
cloud of fog raised by an apt metaphor.
As I argued, metaphors travel towards some transcendent realms where 
their meaning feeds itself from novel, unexpected, and rarefied sources, which 
is to say that metaphors sometimes reach the state where they seem to work 
well but they in fact are meaningless, at least if we talk about cognitive mean-
ing. Normally we compensate this by fixing the meaning of the metaphor by a 
convention, rather than dropping it altogether. Somehow the metaphor feels 
so fine and valuable that we do want to keep it. But then we require a meaning, 
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which it can get only by conventional means. In the same way, Kafka invents a 
fine metaphor but at the same time leaves it meaningless. Now, the community 
of authoritative interpreters can come up and tell the readers what the mean-
ing is and, if they have the authority to achieve this, that is then the meaning. 
They may say the Law means guilt – and it indeed does. Religious Christian 
authorities do this all the time.12
I already offered an example of intrinsic metaphors: all these are undeci-
pherable without authoritative conventions. God the Creator is a possible ex-
ample. Think of it. If an artist creates a statue, is this what creation is and God’s 
work its metaphor? I do not think so. God’s creation is the original case and 
artistic creation is its metaphor. But if it goes this way, we have no idea what 
creation means, except that it is something that an artist sometimes achieves. 
Holy Ghost is a metaphor of what? This metaphor is meaningless without an 
authoritative advice and decision. What about secular cases? You can turn 
many would-be metaphors into meaningless suggestions by spelling out their 
meaning in a narrative form, just like Kafka does in The Trial and refuses to do 
in The Castle where mere metonyms rule over an ironic universe. Think of the 
door as a metaphor in The Trial: a bailiff enters through the door, “At one there 
was a knock at the door and a man entered whom he had never seen before 
in the house.”13 When you say that much, the metaphoric use of “door” disap-
pears. Suppose you for some reason do not know the metaphoric meaning of 
“He is a stud.” You tell a full story of the life in a horse breeding farm, how se-
men is collected, the insemination done, and the mares treated. Do you think 
anyone can connect these facts to the life of a successful and good looking 
young male? Metaphors always seem to contain conventional elements un-
like similes and some poor metaphors that are only simple, condensed similes. 
Kafka plays with this very idea by creating an unconventional yet familiar look-
ing metaphors without ever providing a key to their interpretation. The end of 
the book, in the old quarry, makes this clear. The end is ironic to the core: that 
way of killing a person has nothing to do with the law, neither has it nothing 
to do with how to resolve your guilty feelings or experienced threats. Persons, 
however timid or guilty, do not perish like stray dogs.
Joseph K pretends that he might come to know what the Law is and even 
meet with its representatives, or the high judges. He deceives himself and he 
is wrong, but this is not the main point. The point is that he at the same time 
12 In his excellent biography Kafka, The Early Years (Tr. S. Frisch. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2017) Reiner Stach offers some typical, biographical interpretative keys, as 
if he could not resist the temptation, see pp. 66f. Then p. 71 seems to condemn the earlier 
interpretative method as definitely “naïve.”
13 The Trial. Kafka, 2008, p. 3.
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draws his readers into this maelstrom of misleading desires. The reader wants 
to know and spell out what the Law as the law is, at the same time getting 
blinded by and to the fact that no such knowledge exists. The source of the 
mistake is easy to see: we should not say that all metaphors, however good and 
interesting they are, have their cognitive meaning, or even that they can be 
given such a meaning.14 Joseph K’s destiny forms a narrative but narratives do 
not work like true life histories. Narratives as literature may contain cognitively 
meaningless metaphors. To leave the main metaphor meaningless is the ulti-
mate expression of irony in fiction.
∵
14 Cf. E.R. MacCormac, A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor. Cambridge: The mit Press, 1988.
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Chapter 8
Lost in Kafka’s America
Notorious, English, adjective, meaning
reputable and disreputable
Franz Kafka’s Amerika, or The Man Who Disappeared, may be a relatively ne-
glected work. Whether this is true or not, I find the text rich and stimulating. 
Young Karl Rossmann lands in America and then runs away from everything 
that is America, as it is depicted in Amerika, all the way to Oklahoma Theater. 
Among other significant places is the Grand Hotel Occidental where Karl tries 
to settle down, unsuccessfully of course. All his desires are meek and weak, 
and the surroundings are nothing but overpowering. He is a virtual Mann ohne 
Eigenschaften; hence he is the person who disappeared. In this chapter I de-
velop a theory of metaphor without target, that is, original or empty metaphor, 
which corresponds to desire without object. Sometimes metaphors, like those 
in America, do not allow a cognitive interpretation in the sense that we could 
say what they are metaphors of although we know what they say. They are 
what I call original or empty metaphors. Hence, we cannot interpret Amerika 
in the sense that we tell what it all means, or indicate what the object Kafka 
talks about is. The Grand Hotel Occidental has thirty lifts that move incessant-
ly up and down like pistons; what does this mean? It means what you want 
it to mean, that is, nothing. Nevertheless, it is a fitting picture in Amerika’s  
America.
 Preliminaries, or False Starts
Kafka is strange and Amerika even stranger in the way that its text has no in-
terpretation. In other words, it does not interpret itself. Or, it does not say what 
it says. It is just a text and should be approached as such. Of course one may 
suggest any number of interpretations and then try to say what it all means but 
this is bound to be subjective: we say what kind of impression the text makes 
upon us. But some of these impressions are more interesting than others. It is 
as if one said what the text looks like and then recommends a certain vision. 
Of course, any reading, including the present one, must offer some kind of in-
terpretation of the text at least in the sense that one explicates what is said in 
the text and analyses some aspects of it. But it is a different matter to identify 
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the reasons of why the author said it, what the author wanted to say it, and 
what the purpose of his writing project was. Also, one can try to locate some 
more or less hidden references to the author’s life, life-world, and personal 
characteristics in his texts.1 This second strategy is to overwork the connection 
between Kafka’s biography, or his life, his actual experiences, and their overall 
circumstances.2 For instance, Kafka was an anxious mind, hence his fictional 
characters are often anxious and troubled. He knew what anxiety is and hence 
he wrote about it. This is the methodology I want to avoid. Literary scholars 
may like it and use it for their benefit, but from the philosophical point of view 
I rather avoid it. Notice that I might say that Kafka’s text looks like, say, a pas-
sage to hell, but I do not say he wanted it to look like a passage to hell or this is 
what the text is all about. I write about how I see the text, not how it was meant 
to be seen or should be seen. Some fiction looks socially and psychologically 
programmatic, I know, but not Kafka.
Of course, whatever a person does, including artistic activities, has its ex-
planation but in many contexts such explanations are beside the point. The 
product may be more interesting than the process of production. And the 
product can be seen and appreciated independently of the process. Sometimes 
we read better when we do not know much about the author. The same is true 
of philosophy: in order to appreciate George Berkeley’s arguments for imma-
terialism, I need not know who he was. It is relevant to know something, for 
instance, that his works were written in the early 18th century, but do we really 
need much more? To a certain degree philosophical texts function indepen-
dently of their historical genesis.
Biographies are interesting in a voyeuristic sense, like Reiner Stach’s monu-
mental biographical Kafka trilogy, but I notice I read them with certain embar-
rassment: for instance, in the second volume Stach hints at Kafka’s incestuous 
desires towards his sister. He does not index the word nor does he elaborate.3 
Why should we know this fact? He also makes a funny mistake on the Picture 
38: he says that “Felice has her arm around the mother’s waist.” Actually the 
mother has her arm around Felice’s waist. This page is typical of the wordi-
ness of Stach’s writing and shows how dubious biographical interpretations 
and tales tend to be. Should we really know all this about Kafka in order to read 
1 See for instance H. Binder, Kafka – Kommentar zu den Romanen. Rezensionen, Aphorismen 
und zum Brief an den Vater. Bochum: Winkler, 1976.
2 See for instance the excellent introduction by D. Shields Dix, “The Man Who Disappeared: 
Kafka Imagining Amerika” (http://www.kafka.org/index.php?aid=239).
3 R. Stach, Kafka, The Decisive Years. Tr. S. Frisch. Orlando: Harcourt, 2005, p. 297.
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his text with interest, sympathy, benefit, and pleasure? Stach reads like faction, 
or a type of historical novel rooted in fact. We might even call it a fantasy biog-
raphy. He imagines so much psychological detail it makes me uncomfortable. 
How can he know all of this? Should I really base my reading of Kafka on it?
To read Kafka’s fiction with the intention of saying what he wants to say is 
suspicious. Of course it is a key convention in literature that a novel contains 
narrative elements that tell something about something. It may even have a 
plot that is somehow recognizable or familiar to the reader. However, in the 
case of Kafka, that he should say something else than what he is saying is a 
kind of fallacy of over-interpretation. To explain my own approach, let me first 
sketch the problems of such a strategy. It feeds on the reader’s curiosity whose 
background is one’s inability to read novels as fictional pseudo-narratives that 
ultimately turn out to be empty, or the text as text. One somehow wants to get 
more, to peek into the mind of the author and get an account of his hidden 
thoughts and intentions as if it were obvious that she had some, as if she could 
not write a text without embedding some messages in it. Alternatively, one 
says the hidden meaning is unconscious thus creating an hierarchy of hidden 
messages: the text is just a surface that hides the narrative messages of the au-
thor when a certain portion of them are invisible even from the point of view 
of the author himself; that is, they remain unconscious but yet undoubtedly 
real. For instance, in Amerika, Kafka wants to tell the reader in a critical tone 
about the miseries of the German speaking immigrants in New York.4 Perhaps 
he even wanted to warn his compatriots of dangerous Irishmen such as way-
ward Robinson. In this sense, it is as if his book contained a message to its 
readers.
The next question is biographical: what did Kafka know about New York 
and how did he get the information? Such questions can be answered to a cer-
tain degree so that the required detective work becomes an engaging pursuit. 
Certainly Amerika tells something about Karl Rossmann and his adventures 
in America sometimes in a realistic tone, excluding of course the last chapter 
about the Oklahoma Theatre but definitely including the first one, “The Stoker.” 
However, even in that case one may ask why Oklahoma and where did he get 
the idea of that obscure state. The book also contains all kinds of factual mis-
takes, which may well be deliberate, like the Statue of Liberty wielding a sword, 
no harbor piers in New York, a bridge between New York City and Boston, high 
hills around New York, and mountains like the Rockies between New York and 
Oklahoma. Also, Karl is given a ticket to California by his uncle, Senator Jacob, 
but this is never mentioned again although Karl needs to get away and escape.
4 Amerika. In F. Kafka, Complete Novels. Trs. W. and E. Muir. London: Vintage, 2008.
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Now, I am fully aware of the norm that one should not quote student pa-
pers, but because the following quotation illustrates too well my critical points, 
I cannot resist the temptation: “To a certain degree, by creating his own con-
ception of America, Kafka takes the role of master and creator, producing for 
himself a feeling of power and superiority over the supposed land of freedom. 
This sense of superiority enables Kafka to criticize the capitalist and indus-
trialized America through his description of the streets of New York.”5 The 
very argument Edmond Lau is making here, that Kafka criticizes the capital-
ist and industrialized America – of course a reading of the novel as old as its 
 publication –  contradicts the very impossibility of interpretation I argue for 
elsewhere.  According to Lau, Kafka’s unconscious feelings are at work together 
with his conscious intentions: he wants to criticize usa and especially its thin 
idea of freedom. In fact this is done in the very first paragraph of the book. In 
this view America, not Amerika, is a megalomaniac project, which breathes 
paranoia and explains the sufferings of Karl in and around New York as well 
as his escape to the Oklahoma Theatre as a Freudian wish-fulfilment.6 Lau is 
convinced and assures us that Kafka wanted to criticize America and its falsely 
propagated institutions and values. How can we know this? We know that he 
read material on the American life and social realities before starting to write 
his book. Of course a reader may speculate about what Kafka wanted to say in 
his fiction, how his text is related to his own life and person, where he got his 
ideas, and who are those real life persons who are immortalized as his fictional 
characters. This may satisfy the reader’s curiosity and entertain him. At the 
same time Amerika will lose a part of its fascination as fiction. For instance, 
Reiner Stach writes,
These days we consider whether Kafka intended to depict the erosion of 
the bourgeois individual overwhelmed by social structures or whether 
his literary work was only a symptom of this erosion. It makes no sense to 
speak of Kafka’s “realism” or “decadence,” especially when these catego-
ries are exploited in ideological, heavy-handed arguments. It is indisput-
able that Kafka’s work contains experiences that would soon prove highly 
significant for the history of the 20th Century. […] But how did he gain 
access to these experiences?7
5 E. Lau, “Franz Kafka’s Amerika: The American Dream” (http://people.csail.mit.edu/edmond/
writings/amerikan-dream.pdf).
6 See T. Pataki, Wish-fulfilment in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: The Tyranny of Desire. Lon-
don: Routledge, 2014.
7 Stach, 2005, p. 294.
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Stach also writes, “Of course he [Kafka] he could never have written a quasi-
political book like Brod’s, even in optimal conditions. Kafka wished not con-
vince or prove, but to give pure literary form to what inspired him.”8 It follows 
from these two quotations that Kafka’s work was only a “symptom of this ero-
sion.” It also logically follows that Kafka was interested in such an erosion of 
the bourgeois individual, which may or may not be true, who can say? Did he 
have this concept? Did he like it? The idea of law certainly interested Kafka, 
but who can say what he meant by the enigma called “the Law”?
Think of Mr. Pollunder’s vast, dark, incomplete country mansion where Karl 
spends an unforgettable night when he is harassed by the host’s wild daughter 
Klara. He gets lost in the house only to discover that he will be kicked out of 
there. Does this mean Kafka intends to mock the young and wealthy New York 
ladies and the grand building projects of their parents? Kafka’s women are 
what they are both in Europe and usa – rather special creatures.9 Moreover, 
the description of the big house is a kind of metaphysical nightmare, an empty 
and dark world that opens up towards the vast universe that blows through the 
house as a wind from nowhere. It is not a house, it is an allegory, pure gothic: 
“A breath of dark emptiness met him” when Karl gets lost in the dark, window-
less, never-ending corridor. “What purpose could be served by this great, deep 
chamber? One stood here as if in the gallery of a church.”10 This paragraph 
resembles us of Edgar Allan Poe’s gloomy houses. It is Karl’s House of Usher.
Less metaphysical, but not much, are the depictions of the Grand Hotel Oc-
cidental where Karl works, motor traffic, and finally a political rally. The first 
is a beehive, the second an enormous machine, and the third a tragedy as the 
wonderfully popular looking political candidate has no hope of success any-
way. He is doomed but they still celebrate him. All that happens in Amerika is 
or is not a picture of America. Here is one more example of a less than com-
mendable reading of Amerika:
Karl Rossmann, however, refuses to accept responsibility for his desires, 
and it is a mark of Kafka’s own immaturity that he allows Karl to be con-
stantly seduced and abused, never to act as seducer or abuser. Compare 
Karl’s childlike description of sex with K’s wholly knowing, wholly mu-
tual encounter with Frieda, in The Castle: “She sought something and 
he sought something, in a fury, grimacing, they sought with their heads 
8 Stach, 2005, p. 62.
9 S. Delianidou, Frauen, Bilder und Projektionen von Weiblichkeit und das männliche Ich des 
Protagonisten in Franz Kafkas Romanfragmenten. New York: Lang, 2012.
10 Amerika. Kafka, 2008, p. 257.
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boring into each other’s breasts; […] like dogs desperately pawing at the 
earth they pawed at each other’s bodies.”11
I am not sure if this describes “wholly mutual sex.” In fact, it looks like two per-
sons attacking each other without caring of the partner or responding to his 
or her desire. Well, Karl’s rape scene is pretty impressive, too. Again, an uncon-
scious motive for writing this allegedly exists, this is “Kafka’s own immaturity,” 
accompanied by a couple of inaccurate textual references: Karl viciously at-
tacks Delamarche in the fat singer Brunelda’s flat, opera singers are supposed 
to be fat, and this is certainly more than K or Joseph K ever did in The Castle or 
The Trial. K’s sex life may be better than Karl’s but then perhaps Karl’s initial ac-
count of the rape is a lie.12 And Joseph K and K are certainly not anything like ag-
gressive and abusive persons; on the contrary, both are victims beyond relief or 
hope. Both certainly try to solve their problems, Karl just runs away from them; 
when he is abusive it is because his escape road is blocked. He also gets actively 
and aggressively involved in the case of the Stoker, his new friend.13 Finally, why 
would Karl’s immaturity make the book look less interesting or the author him-
self immature? Think of Simplicissimus, or Der abenteuerliche Simplicissimus 
Teutsch (1668) by Hans J.C. von Grimmelshausen, which may well have been 
a model for Amerika, something I might suggest were I using the comparative 
method here. There the young and perfectly innocent half idiot hero wanders 
from horror to horror during the Thirty Year’s War. Perhaps Kafka’s Amerika 
mirrors another classic where a young innocent hero meanders through the 
thickets of pain and suffering, namely, D.A.F. Sade’s Justine, ou Les Malheurs de 
11 K. Kirsch, “America, ‘Amerika’” (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/books/review/
Kirsch-t.html).
12 According to Stach (2005, pp. 42–43), and Kafka, The Early Years (Tr. S. Frisch. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2017 pp. 331–332) Kafka visited prostitutes but had a deep 
seated fear of impotence and considered sex with women somehow disgusting. He even 
considered white marriage with Felice Bauer. It is very tempting indeed to say that these 
facts are relevant to the understanding of the women in his fiction. But such temptations 
should be resisted.
13 However, the two chapters, “The Stoker” and “The Nature Theater of Oklahoma” are ex-
ceptional. The first was written and published independently of the rest of the text, so 
Karl’s active involvement is untypical. And the last chapter was written later and it indeed 
is different because of the introduction of something like a fantasy element. The recruit-
ment office is fantastic: Hundreds of women on platforms dressed in white as winged 
angels blow into golden trumpets. Everyone is promised a job. Many are called and all are 
chosen – what a parody of the Christian idea of salvation this is, if you are willing to see 
it that way (Matthew 22:14; Amerika. Kafka, 2008, p. 420). Incidentally, picture 51 (a movie 
theatre) in Stach, 2017, looks much like the recruitment center in Amerika.
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la Vertu (1791). Karl Rossmann belongs to a long and noble  tradition of comic 
wanderers, like those in Voltaire’s Candide, ou l’Optimisme (1759). For a mod-
ern minded reader one may recommend The Tin Drum, or Die Blechtrommel by 
Günther Grass (1959). In film, a good example is Forrest Gump (1994).
 Empty Metaphors
My own strategy is as follows: I read Amerika in all its amusing and thrilling 
detail but avoid saying why that is and what it all means; instead I may say 
what it looks like to me. Even less do I try to say something about the historical 
person F. Kafka. I do not know him and I accept that. What am I doing then? I 
say I savor the text and get my satisfaction out of its wonderfully exciting and 
mysterious features that prove the unique genius of its author. What amazes 
me most in Kafka’s text is its strangeness, its notoriety, in the sense that its 
richly detailed texture may look like a realistic description of what there is 
and what takes place, how things look and events turn out; yet, something is 
wrong. It is difficult to pinpoint what it is however strongly the reader may feel 
the effect. Very seldom is something truly and openly weird in the surrealist 
sense but throughout the text the details are somehow unreal, in a way that 
is difficult to specify, for instance, the action around the hotel elevators where 
Karl is employed as a lift boy. The description of them grows into a grotesque 
vision without mercy.
Now, what I want to study in this paper is the ultimate aimlessness of this 
all. I do not mean the content of the narrative in a psychological sense. Cer-
tainly we can say that Karl’s desires are negligible as he only wants to get a 
job and shelter – it is all very minimalistic indeed. He would have liked to stay 
in the Grand Hotel Occidental and remain in the custody of the fine women 
there, the Governess and her secretary Therese. His desires also are negative as 
he wants to get out of trouble and get rid of his pesky companions Robinson 
and Delamarche. It is not at all clear that he wants to stay with his uncle Jacob 
and he certainly runs away from the scary country mansion of Mr. Pollunder 
and its intrusive inhabitants. Much of this is psychologically ambiguous. As 
I see it, the unique strangeness of life in Amerika results from its rhetorical 
features, which at the same time constitute remarkable literary innovation. All 
this depends on what I call the openness of the rhetoric of narrative. The rest 
of this paper tries to explain what it is.
Let me provide a summary account of my more concrete aims. Normally in 
metaphors like “Men are pigs,” we find a target (men) and a source (pigs), but 
not so in the case of Kafka. He operates at the level of sources without allowing 
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us to see what the target is, hence the confusion of those interpretations that 
pretend to find the targets. In regard to desire, we have the typical proposi-
tional attitude and then the proposition that specifies the desired object, but 
not in the case of Kafka. His texts, Amerika included, operate with simple one 
place metaphors and desire ascriptions that are seemingly impossible. To give 
three simple examples: New York traffic is depicted in such a detailed manner 
that we must take it metaphorically, yet it shows no target, which creates its 
special effect. The sword displayed by the Statue of Liberty, what does it say? 
This clearly is not the statue we know. What is Mr. Pollunder’s mansion that, 
as incomplete as it is, opens up into the void darkness? Perhaps it depicts the 
gates of hell, the darkness visible, but there is no telling. We cannot read it like 
that, which again indicates a story that only pretends to be readable.14
Travel, including motor traffic, running from the police, walking between 
cities, and the incessant up and down motion of hundreds of lifts, are both 
away and towards something. Strangely, travel leads to morally judgmental 
encounters that display implied guilt and explicit threat of punishment. Ac-
cordingly, travel is a key theme and a main metaphoric source here. Metaphors 
travel, too, from one given meaning to a cascade of new meanings that must 
be read anew and construed as related to the original target. In other words, 
what the target loses in this exchange the source gains, as in “Men are pigs,” 
where men lose their status as men and move over to the category of domestic 
ani mals , their looks and behavioral patterns. We may mean bad table man-
ners, as if pigs had any manners, or their looks as pink, hairy, smelly, clumsy 
sty dwellers, always depending on the context. This is to say, once you meet 
a source you need an interpretive key, provided by some extraneous cues, if 
you want to get back to the target or to what is left of it after the attack by the 
source. Once I am called a pig it is impossible for me to recover my former 
status – the stigma sticks. Once a pig, always a pig. In other words, you cannot 
infer from pigs back to men. However, Kafka provides us with no such key and 
this is the reason why we do not know what he is talking about, or his tar-
get. What are those hotel elevators that pump up and down for ever driven by 
those unruly boys Karl once identified himself with? We cannot tell, yet we feel 
we should. The customers are beautiful and demanding, the boys who wear 
stinking uniforms can demand nothing; if this is about social class and class 
society, the target is worth mentioning. Is this the reason why Kafka does not 
14 R. Barthes has a theory of unreadability: “The language they founded is obviously not 
linguistic, a language of communication. It is a new language, traversed by (or travers-
ing) natural language, but open on to the semiological definition of Text.” (Sade, Fourier, 
Loyola. Tr. R. Miller. London: Cape, 1977, p. 3).
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allow it to be  mentioned, because in a novel all such readings are out of place? 
The upper class customers are not much more than ghosts. Such social themes 
are too banal to mention and specify, and you, together with the author, live 
better without such infamy.
Metaphoric tropes travel away from the world of targets into the new, 
fuzzy and ambiguous world of sources that mock the targets. Their diction-
ary meanings start looking like shackles in their fixed rigidity we struggle to 
free ourselves from. Metonyms represent one way of getting out of the traps of 
 language. They work like the lifts in the Grand Hotel Occidental. They provide 
a set of terms all referring to the same case but in such a way that you can 
move from one to the other, at the same time not moving at all or changing the 
world. I say “My king won the battle against your king,” what do I say? I could 
have said his army won, but then it is just a metonym that does not add any-
thing to the case as it really is. I could have said “My king’s army’s soldiers won 
the battle,” but I am still in the same lift that travels between the co-referential 
meanings. I do not speak about kings or even armies but of a battle that is like 
the Grand Hotel where the lifts move up and down. They, like metonyms, never 
produce anything good unlike true travel from one location to another, that is, 
a metaphor. Travel leads Karl to new places where he faces new challenges and 
new tasks of reading the case right, which are the necessary conditions of his 
survival. That is, anyway, the only thing that Karl may want.
When meanings travel from a target toward the chaos of the source, or Karl 
makes progress towards a new challenge of judgmental confrontation, the task 
is the same: to make sense of what is said and to see what it all entails. Here the 
metaphor’s progress towards its interpretation corresponds to Karl’s travel to-
wards his accusers he must make sense of. The source and Karl, they both need 
to succeed if they want to remain as what they are, a novel cluster of meanings 
in a text and Karl in Amerika. But how could they do that if no key is provided? 
What then is the source and what is Karl’s way out? Kafka depicts a meaning-
less struggle against impossible odds leaving one insoluble riddle behind so 
that one can face another. This is the true meaning of travel in the case of the 
extended metaphor that is Amerika, or an allegory that we fail to model.
Notice that here travel is not from target to source, or from one solved criti-
cal riddle to another more mysterious one that we can then call in metaphoric 
names, or to make it a source. No, travel is always between metaphors, from 
one to another, just like Karl moves from one trouble to another, or perhaps 
we should say from one attempt to locate a target to another. In this way, we 
move at the meta-level from one context of motion to another without stop-
ping between them. Karl does not stop before he is stopped, not after his val-
iant first attempt to defend the nameless stoker on the ship. After that he is 
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lost as he  becomes the lost person15 Kafka intends to depict. After one good 
try Karl starts vanishing, growing thinner and thinner as a character – while 
accusations against him grow – only to be lost in the train to the Oklahoma 
Theater. The theater has a place for everyone, which is to say no one figures 
there anymore.
In what follows I use allegory in the sense of an extended metaphor, which 
entails that its parts are metaphoric as well. Therefore, it may not look like, for 
instance, that Karl’s mad dash away from the police officers – only to be saved 
by the deux ex machina in the garb of Delamarche – has any metaphoric mean-
ing, although it must. An allegory is a totality of interconnected metaphors and 
hence I try to read the details of Amerika metaphorically, too. In a traditional 
painting, for instance, the allegoric symbolism is defined by convention: apes, 
dogs, and human skulls all have their conventional and thus identifiable mean-
ings. They refer to and represent their targets. Another example, a book is a 
book, or the Bible is the Book, which creates an instance of metonymy. There 
is only one book worth reading, the Bible, and hence the book is the Bible – 
 otherwise we miss the point. The Bible and the book is a metonymic pair under 
the present set of conventions. However, in the case of Amerika we move and 
travel outside such well-known conventions. We are now on our own, unaided, 
traveling along not knowing what accusations will hit us next. Of course, one 
may say that I already gave a key that opens the lock of Amerika, namely, travel. 
It is then an allegoric journey, a kind of Pilgrim’s Progress set in ironic terms, 
from home to nowhere, which should reveal the target. I wish this were true. 
Alas, it is not. The problem is that this travel is not metonymically related to 
motion, decline, or progress. On the contrary, this travel makes the same point 
that I mean when I say a target changes into a source and finds for itself a new 
meaning, albeit a contested one, in the new set of strange possible worlds, like 
the world where pigs’ table manners are mentioned. The travel is metaphoric 
in the very special sense in which the essence of metaphor itself is travel. In 
this sense, Karl’s travel is the metaphor of a metaphor. Or, Karl when he travels 
is like Jesus who is God walking on Earth, or perhaps he is like an incomplete 
sensory image falsely derived from its eternal Platonic realm of ideas as univer-
sals. Travel illustrates what metaphor does and how it works in its own rhetori-
cal realms.
Some metaphoric sources do not allow for targets. These are special, deep 
metaphors whose whole life is dedicated to being sources. The term “pig” refers 
and hence pig is a shallow simile-related metaphor, in the role we gave to it ear-
lier, and pigs can have a metonymic role as well. But think of “heart of stone” or 
15 The original tittle of Amerika.
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even “Light my fire” both of which, understood as single metaphoric sources, 
have no other use that this. They do not refer and hence we cannot identify 
them as targets. Instead, they come close to “cold hearted” and “Love me dear” 
although that closeness does not permit their metonymic use together with 
“heart of stone” and “Light my fire.” Of course, cold heart is not necessarily 
made of stone and dear is not a fiery term. If you do not agree, how do you 
argue that stone and cold mean the same here? Your only chance is a detailed 
narrative in which you treat these terms as metonyms and claim that they both 
make sense in the narrative. But original task was to compare two metaphoric 
sources, so the argument forms a vicious circle. Suppose a metonymic pair. 
Then, if a target has been given a metaphoric garb, we cannot argue that this 
same metaphor also takes as its target the second item of the original met-
onymic pair. Metaphors, as to their sources, are metonym specific.
Amerika can be understood accordingly: the allegoric narrative is, in itself, a 
deep metaphor whose reader necessarily misses its target. “Heart of stone” and 
“Light my fire” are meaningless exactly because we cannot find their targets 
via similes or metonyms without retorting to a known convention, but Kafka 
refuses to rely on conventions, which forces the reader to read the allegory as it 
is, without a target. In other words, deep metaphors cannot be understood as 
wayward similes that would help us find their source: “What a pig” is an easy 
case. You say men stink like pigs and they eat like pigs, and then you know the 
target is a certain kind of man, like in “Men are pigs.” But when you say “Light 
my fire” I have no idea what you mean, if I try to find a corresponding simile 
– it does not exist. I need to listen to the song (The Doors, 1966) and pick up 
the convention there or ask someone. Amerika works its deep allegories in this 
same sense.
Textual allegory of the type one meets in Amerika can also be understood in 
the following way. Sometimes a metaphor displays a clear connection between 
a target and a source, like in “Men are pigs.” Sometimes this link grows weaker 
and more negligible, like in “Light my fire,” where the metaphoric elements do 
not seem to connect in any obvious manner, yet they do so in a way that can 
be called implicit. “Light my fire” means “Make me want to make love with 
you,” or something like that. The emergence of a target is, therefore, a matter of 
interpreting a background narrative, which can be done in so many ways that 
the results are necessarily subjective. The same applies to “That woman has a 
heart of stone,” which also requires its narrative background, although “heart 
of stone” can certainly be read in a conventional and even stereotypical man-
ner. In that sense the first of the two metaphors is a much better poetic effort, 
unlike the second that is a mere phrase without much independent interest. 
When a metaphor is truly banal its effects start sounding like an intentional 
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play of words, which as such is a laudable achievement even though it may also 
be a dangerous move – it is easily missed and misunderstood.
We are now interested in metaphors without target, or the target and the 
source are the same thing. I call this an original metaphor in order to remind 
the reader of the way such a metaphor is created. In the case of an original 
metaphor we take a metonymic pair and start piling up meanings on one side 
of the pair, and we continue until the term is reborn as a metaphor. But what is 
it a metaphor of? It is possible that the second member of the given metonym-
ic pair looks, say, like the opposite of the metaphorically described member, 
that is, the given co-referent object has disappeared. This again means that 
the term is no longer simply a metaphoric expression of an identifiable target. 
Through its metaphorization the target has disappeared. It has lost its mean-
ing, and along with it, its identity as a target. Of course, it must retain some 
connection to the original metonymic pair so that it hangs on to this given 
setting via a narrative that utilizes certain conventions and other standardized 
associations.
Let me take an example before moving over to Karl Rossmann’s sad adven-
tures in the fictional New York. The metonymic pair is death and the end of 
life. We know that both refer to the same thing, whatever its definition might 
be. The basic point about this referent is that the members of the given met-
onymic pair provide the most basic meanings of what we are talking about. In 
this sense “death” refers to death or the end of life and nothing more basic can 
be said about it. We all know what it is. Some obvious metaphors exist – they 
all work as euphemisms – some colorful like “kick the bucket” and some less 
so like “pass away” or somewhat less idiomatically “he is late.” We can however 
adopt another way to the metaphorization of death. We start by enriching the 
meaning of death by saying it is the moment of truth that culminates the life 
of a person and ultimately allows us to say whether a person had a happy and 
meaningful life, or did one waste it? Aristotle says that a person can be called 
happy only after his death. The Imperial Japanese Army gave higher medals of 
honor only to dead soldiers because only a dead man never fails to act like a 
brave soldier. In some criminal law codes the dying man’s testimonial is taken 
to be a priori veridical. In this sense we enrich the meaning of death. Next we 
say death is a transition to a better world that is pure and happy, where one 
meets one’s Maker and one’s own relatives with whom one then joins the cho-
rus of heavenly souls singing the praise of the Lord – depending on your meta-
physics and religion. Now we have made death a transition to another realm, 
a radical metaphoric move, which has severed all its connections to death as 
the end of life. In terms of a magnificent paradiastole, we make death the op-
posite of the end of life myth. No end of life exists since what looks like the end 
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is actually a new beginning, which is recommended as a new verbatim and 
even factual truth. This is an original metaphor that does not permit a target. 
We cannot say that the end of life is the beginning of life. What we mean is 
that death becomes a metaphoric death and as such it moves over from the 
metonymic realm to that of metaphor. We have created a metaphoric account, 
or an allegory, of death such that it qualifies as an original metaphor; in other 
words, it is a metaphor of itself. This nicely corresponds to the idea that we 
know what dying is but not what death is. We know when the person is dead 
but not what happened to him, in the present metaphysical and metaphorical 
sense. We need to perform some rites over the dead body to make the allegory 
more concrete and, in a paradoxical sense, understandable.
Amerika is an original allegory in the sense that we really cannot tell what 
its target is. Certainly it is not New York. Now we also know why everything in 
Amerika is in its own way subtly strange and disturbing. It is because we are not 
looking at targets, even if it may appear so, but derivative sources. Normally our 
sources are primary sources and as such readily recognizable as sources, but in 
the case of an original allegory we utilize derivative sources of metaphors, or 
metaphors that presuppose the main narrative and derive their meaning from 
it. The main problem is that we cannot say what the allegory is meant to say 
and, therefore, we cannot say how the derivative metaphors work.
As I said above, a key derivative metaphor in Amerika is travel, which in this 
case indicates aimless and circular wandering or something even worse, the 
eternal but repetitive motion of hundreds lifts going up and down in the hotel. 
The juggernaut of motor traffic rushes on along the straight and wide roads 
so that we get a picture of three types of motion and travel. Karl’s wandering 
leads him from trouble to trouble until in the end he finds his chance for re-
demption. The Oklahoma Theater emerges as if from nowhere, it is a deux ex 
machina that may save Karl from further travel. He is a modern Ulysses who, in 
the end, finds his way back to Ithaca, although we do not know what will hap-
pen there. They promise all kinds of good things, most of all inclusion in the 
mock biblical sense of “You are all invited and all are chosen.” There is a mean-
ingful position to everyone in that grand theater and its infinitely large produc-
tion machinery. This theater is a Paradise. Suppose we have here a reference to 
industrial production and its factories where all are indeed chosen but in what 
terms, that is another question. However, this is exactly what we must not do, 
try to guess what the Oklahoma Theater really is. It is nothing but the conclud-
ing derivative metaphor embedded in the great allegory that is Amerika.
In the case of the hotel lifts, what makes them appear so odd is their great 
number, thirty. Imagine a hotel lobby with thirty busy lifts. The traffic is  always 
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odd and wonderful in Amerika. What is this traffic, then? It is another  original, 
empty allegory, an extended metaphor of something one cannot tell. Karl gaz-
es at a road:
[M]otor-cars flew lightly pass one another as they had done the whole 
day, as if a certain number of them were always being dispatched from 
some distant place and the same number were being awaited in another 
place equally distant. During the whole day since early morning Karl had 
not seen a single car stopping, not a single passenger getting out.16
Cars never stop, the drivers are like ghosts sitting motionless in their vehi-
cles that rush forward like a stampede of metal monsters so that traffic itself 
looks like the depicted target, not the vehicles and even less the drivers. “Now 
and then an automobile shot out of the mist and all three turned their heads 
to gaze after the large monsters, which were so remarkable to look at and 
passed so quickly that they never even noticed whether anyone was sitting 
inside.”17
Karl’s travels become meaningful, and this is the only form of travel that 
is meaningful, because it leads him to trouble. He was guilty of wrongdoing 
when he left the Old Country and he still is wherever he goes. For him, every 
road taken is a wrong turn, until the last one that is announced by some angels 
blowing their horns. What they do is to announce the allegoric nature of it all, 
an extended original metaphor of something we may be unable to recognize. 
Amerika is an allegory in the sense that it depicts the Other as a realm that can-
not be depicted and travels that explore what is in these realms unknowable, 
like the house of Mr. Pollunder that opens up into a dark abyss and houses 
such a female fiend as Miss Pollunder, Klara, an American mimetic expression 
of the servant women at home who, as Karl sees it, raped him at home. But the 
American version is also her opposite, a rich, elegant, young, and resourceful 
lady. The reader travels with Karl, first to a new land and then explores it, and 
finally escapes to the Oklahoma Theater that is or is not a trap, alternatively 
an industrial hell or a heavenly paradise. Karl may be able to stay in the sweet 
land of metaphors or in the end he is on his way back to that of metonymies of 
work and suffering.
16 Amerika. Kafka 2008, p. 291. This is just one of many remarkable depictions traffic. The 
lifts move up vertically, cars horizontally.
17 Amerika. Kafka, 2008, pp.  283–285. The context here is trucks and cargo transportation.
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 Irony: from Here to Eternity
Karl Rossmann’s worldly desires are deplorably weak but yet oddly persistent. 
They also are objectless. Mainly he wants to survive, or stay away from trouble, 
and find and keep a job, but nowhere do they materialize as full desires since 
they consistently lack a de re object. At this point the key desires are related 
to the condemnation of him by various other people, and then they judge on 
his guilt and its consequences. Karl does it, too, but others do it much more. 
The rule is, to exist is to judge, to judge is to denounce, and to denounce is to 
 punish – it is not a desirable world this one.
To survive is not an object of desire, for the following reason. The agent, 
when she desires, wants to change her present world into a more desirable 
one, or in this sense, into better world. In this way she travels from one world 
to  another – desire has the same structure, that of travel as a metaphor. All of 
them are modelled in the same way. However, when you want to survive you 
are already surviving, otherwise you cannot desire, and hence you desire the 
status quo. In other words, you do not want to travel away from this given world 
where you are surviving just now. On the contrary, you want to remain exactly 
where you are. Logically speaking, you cannot desire what you already have; 
you may love or hate it but to desire you cannot. To desire means to change the 
world into another and better one, but because Karl is in the world where he 
survives he cannot desire to survive.
So, in this sense Karl remains without desire. What he is going to do is to go 
on with his life, which he of course finds very difficult to do in the world where 
he is all the time accused and made look guilty of all kinds of bad things. So he 
must travel although he may not agree to do so. Basically his travels mean es-
caping the bad things that harass him day after day. His accusers want to catch 
him and punish him, so they have their desires. The Head Porter in the Grand 
Hotel Occidental even wants to torture him, as he actually does. In fact, Karl 
meets people who insist condemning and punishing him, although he also 
meets some women who want to help him in the grand hotel. Among men, 
Robinson is even weaker than Karl and therefore cannot threaten him. He is 
just pesky. Karl, in the original plan of the book is the man who disappeared, 
and this must mean him as a recognizable person. But every attack against 
him diminishes him and weakens him until he responds to the trumpet calls 
of those angels. This is the end of the road for him, although it also is a new be-
ginning in the train bound for the Oklahoma Theater. He is now dead, we can 
say so, because Karl’s story has a structure that is isomorphic with the standard 
account of death. You reach the end that is a new beginning that takes you to 
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the Promised Land where everyone has a place. The end is abrupt and chilling 
like a descent to the cave that is Hades. Stach seems to read it as a happy end 
where “Promises and fulfillment take the place of threats and disappointment.” 
He also reports on Kafka’s idea of the “paradisiacal magic” of the ending and 
then adds “It was not the whole truth.”18 The ending is ultimately ambiguous.
What is irony and how is it related to allegory and its metaphors in this 
case? The answer is, the metaphors here are original and corresponding de-
sires empty or objectless. Kafka’s great narrative achievement is a tale about a 
semantic void, or there is much ado about nothing. Incidentally, this also ex-
plains why Amerika as a novel is relatively neglected compared with The Trial 
and The Castle. Amerika is pure irony and as such a formalistic effort, unlike 
the two other books which we can read as traditional, albeit expressionistic, 
novels that contain a plot one can follow. This need not be so: in The Trial 
no trial emerges and in The Castle the castle is a Fata Morgana, a group of or-
dinary houses on a hill. These false facts and fake news constitute the ironic 
frame of these two novel novels. In spite of this, they cannot be compared with 
Amerika whose ironic aspect is overpowering like it is in all novels that wander 
so aimlessly. To go around in circles is a paradigmatically ironic idea of travel 
as is desire without an object. The same is true of course of original metaphors 
that are really metaphors of nothing and as such void. Such metaphors are like 
Mr. Pollunder’s house, which is a grand construction without walls. When you 
explore it you will only find the wind that blows through it as if coming from 
nowhere.
Let me first explain how I understand the master trope of irony and then 
how it applies to the case of original metaphor and void desire. We find sar-
casms as well as delightful ironies. I drink cheap beer and tell a group of con-
noisseurs that I absolutely love it. That is a simple sarcasm, if I know what I am 
saying. On the wall of a cheap bar in a working class neighborhood one can 
read: “Drink always when you can!” This is a rather sophisticated joke, partially 
because of its inherent ambiguity and, of course, because of its patent invalid-
ity. Those punters drink always when they can, of course, whenever they have 
money and they are able to walk in, but even they may recognize the irony. Iro-
ny rules any situation where the speaker utters a falsehood knowingly and her 
audience knows that she knows how it is and also knows what she really thinks 
about the matter. Irony is about an attempt to mislead when it is not supposed 
to succeed. It is like masking the truth that need not to be masked and the 
audience knows it. In this sense the speaker depends on her audience and 
18 Stach, 2005, pp. 251, 252.
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their knowledge and understanding. The situation is complex as irony needs 
a speaker, audience, various sets of true beliefs and at least one  falsehood. But 
this is only a basic frame. Irony takes many forms, just like metaphor. Actually 
many, or even most, metaphors are ironic, if you want to read them so. For 
instance, “Men are pigs” certainly has its ironic reading as it is false, as the audi-
ence knows, and yet it is treated as if it were true. Of course one may say that 
the sentence is not meant to be true but merely valid in a metaphoric sense. 
That, however, is not enough to dispel the feeling that it is sarcasm.19
Now, I will argue that both the grand allegory of Amerika itself and Karl 
Rossmann’s related desires are ironic, that is, Amerika as a text is an allegory 
that may and even should be taken in an ironic sense. The great, final carnival 
of irony comes along with the idea of the Oklahoma Theater. It is throughout a 
pure, desperate irony and cursed joke; yet, all along the textual tone is factual, 
seldom exhilarating but mostly bitter and sardonic, which is not to say that a 
certain type of reader could not laugh at it – I do. How does this irony work? 
Kafka is a sophisticated writer, which is shown in how he deals with his meta-
phors and desires: the first trope misses its target or refuses to recognize one, 
and the second dismisses its object as if deliberately.
Both metaphor and desire suggest a false impression, namely, that behind 
the rhetorical trope and the mental episode lurk the terra firma of the real 
world. That is why the crux of the matter is that both metaphor and desire are 
designed and exist only for the purpose that they circumvent reality. In the case 
of desire the agent dismisses the real world and aims at a better, alternate pos-
sible world that houses the object of desire. In the case of metaphor he masks 
what there is by an expression that moves the discourse into another, possibly 
distant and foreign field of meanings, thus confusing the original issue. But as 
we already saw, Kafka dismisses such simple opportunities because he writes 
as if no reality existed. For him, no de re object makes sense and the target of 
metaphor vanishes leaving us to struggle with original metaphors. Therefore, 
here lays the deep source of irony, or one of the reasons why Kafka is such a 
wonderful writer and great literary inventor. The allegory is ironic in the sense 
that it speaks as if America in Amerika were real and at the same time signals 
that it is not when no one in the audience knows what that reality would be 
like. Kafka amasses a load of meanings upon what once was real, New York 
and America, until it all becomes unrecognizable. The details of the narrative 
look like errors but are in fact designed to indicate the allegorical development 
that leads toward the original metaphors that the overall technique generates.
19 Another, more general, way of understanding irony is to say it indicates any effort to cel-
ebrate an abnormality or discrepancy in what is familiar.
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Here is an example: In Grand Hotel Occidental the Manageress declares 
Karl’s guilt, “The Head Waiter […] has clearly pronounced your guilt, and I must 
say it seems undeniable to me. Perhaps you merely acted without thinking, but 
perhaps too you are not the boy I thought you were. And yet […] I cannot help 
still thinking of you as a fundamentally decent lad.”20 Karl is here the person 
who disappears because his attributes get all mixed up. His supporter the Man-
ageress first takes Karl to be Karl and then dismisses his personal identity. He 
is good and bad, trustworthy and not, he deserves punishment or perhaps not. 
Karl’s crime was to leave his lift unattended for a couple of minutes while he 
helps Robinson, but this little error grows into massive proportions when his 
enemy the Head Porter gets involved. He tortures Karl by painfully grabbing his 
arm but Karl somehow manages to escape. What does the Head Porter want? 
He wants nothing, he accuses him of an unspeakable crime, he treats him like 
shit, he just rages over the case and torments Karl, becoming more and more 
unreasonable while the situation progresses. He grows when Karl diminishes. 
For him Karl is a terrible criminal but again Karl is absolutely nobody: even his 
crime is unmentionable.21 Here lies the irony of the case; Karl is dragged to the 
limelight as if he were somebody, a bad man, a criminal or something like this, 
which he is not. The scene develops and spins out of control as if spontane-
ously without the influence of any of the dramatis personae. How could they 
influence the proceedings as they do not know what has happened, or even 
what happens, and they cannot say what they want. As usual, Karl escapes, 
runs away, and continues his wanderings only to face the threat that a suspi-
cious and paranoid police officer takes him back to the Grand Hotel, where he 
can only expect to face more torture.
The irony of the situation is created through an original metaphor. What 
looks like a metaphoric target is Karl’s brief absence from his lift – of course 
such a target is just an illusion as I explained above. Now Kafka amasses mean-
ings on top of this little event until it becomes metaphoric, or a metaphor of 
doom, guilt, and suffering when one is facing an insignificant failure. In the 
same way death as the end of life is an insignificant minor event as such but its 
metaphoric development gives it all the significances it may need to qualify as 
the greatest of all events. The same pattern is repeated here. We know Karl is 
nobody but now he is treated as if he were John Dillinger, a number one public 
enemy, to an ironic effect. In the case of death we miss the corresponding irony 
because we feel we must take death seriously and experience it as real and true 
20 Amerika. Kafka, 2008, p. 352.
21 Amerika. Kafka, 2008, p. 355.
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threat. This may not happen, think of dance macabre: in this way his enemies 
dance around Karl ever so malevolently as if they wanted something from 
him. As we know Karl is nobody, you cannot want anything from him, he is 
 unfit to be an object of any desire, a person who already disappeared – the ef-
fect is superbly ironic. You harass somebody who is nobody.
∵
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Chapter 9
Thomas Hobbes on Intentionality, Desire, and 
Happiness
Hobbes offers a surprisingly modern account of happiness, or felicity, as con-
tinuous success in life. At the same time, he recognizes its paradoxical aspects, 
namely, happiness is never devoid of anxiety. His idea of happiness is based 
on desires, which is to be expected because for Hobbes persons are dynamic 
agents who aim at their own good directed by deliberation. I pay attention to 
the problems of intentionality. Deliberation is presented by Hobbes in exten-
sional language, according to the principles of his scientific project, although 
intensional language is clearly needed when we discuss the success of projects 
and something like hitting a set target. I review and criticize the views of some 
authors who write as if Hobbes’s project were plausible, or he could reduce 
causa finalis to causa efficiens. In the end, I offer some comments on Hobbes’s 
alleged egoism.
 Theories of Happiness
The following theories of happiness have been popular. They answer the ques-
tion, when can we say a person is happy? I provide a brief sketch of each of 
them, relate Hobbes to some of them, and finally go deeper into his theorizing. 
Here are six typical views of happiness:
A virtuous and only a virtuous person is happy, or happiness is 
virtuousness.
A person who enjoys life is happy, or happiness means maximal pleasure 
and avoidance of pain. This is hedonism.
A person who is calm and contented is happy, or happiness is peace of 
mind (ataraxia); it is also possible she enjoys the benefits of apatheia or 
freedom from passions.
A person is happy when she systematically gets what she wants, or hap-
piness is fulfilled desire.
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A happy person is, somehow, a complete person, or happiness is flourish-
ing as self-realization, or “becoming what you are” in terms of one’s real-
ized potential. This is eudaimonia.
A happy person enjoys a full range of social goods, such as loving family, 
prosperity, and overall appreciation and success in her social and politi-
cal life, in addition to such natural goods as good health.
The idea that happiness is or follows from moral virtue has been the dominant 
theory from antiquity to the early modern times. Socrates is perfectly happy in 
his prison cell although he is sentenced to die and he is innocent. One could 
expect that these two conditions over-determine his unhappiness, but they do 
not. He is happy because he is virtuous. This has been called a “Socratic para-
dox” in ethics, and a paradox it is, namely, to say a virtuous, happy person is 
immune to the vagaries of the world is clearly an exaggeration. Normally, we 
think the world makes one happy or the world takes happiness away. However, 
the Socratic view does not respect this intuition.
Hobbes’s own view of virtue is rather bleak, perhaps even ironic. He knows 
perfectly well how important and central this notion has been and still is. 
Therefore, he plays down virtue’s import in a way that he knows so well, by 
ironic belittlement:
[T]herefore that modesty, equity, trust, humanity, mercy (which we have 
demonstrated to be necessary to peace), are good manners or habits, that 
is, virtues. The law therefore, in the means to peace, commands also good 
manners, or the practice of virtue; and therefore it is called moral.1
In the Aristotelian lore, moral or practical virtues are acquired character traits 
but no one would call them mere good manners. Nevertheless, Hobbes says 
that the laws, both natural and civic, command the good and that is why they 
are moral. Perhaps they are moral because no peace can prevail without those 
virtues and in this sense the law’s purpose presupposes them, but that alone 
does not make them moral virtues in the traditional sense. Hobbes says virtues 
are moral when they aim at peace, peace makes it possible to act and succeed, 
and hence virtues promote happiness; but virtues as such do not make men 
happy. Hobbes could well ask, why would they?
Now, it is still possible that virtue brings about happiness and if it does, it 
certainly is valuable happiness. Obviously, many types of successful  happiness 
ascriptions are devoid of value or they may even be evil – hedonistic 
1 De Cive, 1642, Ch. 3, Sec. 31. All references to Hobbes’s works are to the standard Molesworth 
edition.
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 happiness has been the main culprit here. Today, many philosophers may find 
it difficult to explicate why exactly virtue should make a person happy. Here 
I mean, of course, the tradition of Aristotelian and medieval virtues as character 
traits, the so-called pagan virtues like moderation, courage, justice, and practi-
cal wisdom where also the Christian virtue of benevolentia can be added.2 As a 
personal reminiscence, let me tell that I, while lecturing on virtue ethics, easily 
counted nine different theories, including of course the Roman-Machiavellian 
virtù as manly capability and the Kantian virtue of consistently following 
one’s moral duty. There are also many popular watered down views of vir-
tue, such as the 17th century British view of natural virtue meaning not much 
more than decent social behaviour of a good Anglican, a view supported by, 
e.g., Edmund Burke, George Berkeley, and Jonathan Swift.3 Such a view is 
clearly related to Hobbes’s view but in their case without any trace of irony or 
disdain.
Why does virtue make the virtuous happy? Nicholas E. Lombardo puts the 
point succinctly:
Virtue’s more characteristic affections are joy and pleasure. Virtue gener-
ated joy because the will attains goods that it desires through virtue, and 
when the will attains some desired good the volitional affection of joy 
necessarily results […] There is usually some sensible pleasure too as the 
joy spills over into the sense appetite.4
Stanley Cunningham further explains,
While happiness has to do with the reasoning and intellectual part of the 
soul, it would be wrong to conclude that it does not also include pleasure. 
[…] Albert characterizes the pleasure element of happiness a profound 
element of flourishing, an expansivess and tranquillity of the [virtuous] 
soul.5
I find these ideas highly interesting in the sense that they blend most of the 
listed theories of happiness together. For this reason, it seems that we cannot 
pretend that all the happiness theories are fully independent of each other. 
On the contrary, happiness theories should be named after their dominant 
2 See J. Casey, Pagan Virtue, An Essay on Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
3 S. Breuninger, Recovering Bishop Berkeley: Virtue and Society in the Anglo-Irish Context. Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave, 2010, pp. 18, 19.
4 N.E. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Uni-
versity of America Press, 2010, p. 107.
5 S.B. Cunningham, Reclaiming Moral Agency: The Moral Philosophy of Albert the Great. Wash-
ington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008, p. 261.
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element, that is, the virtue theory of happiness is what it is because the idea 
of virtue dominates it. Yet it employs pleasure, ataraxia, and desire as its sub-
elements, as the two quotations above make clear. Perhaps we can continue 
and expand on this line of thought by saying that some theories of happiness 
are less significant than others. The criterion would then be how many differ-
ent elements of happiness theories they include. For instance, hedonism does 
not seem to mention any other happiness theory. The self-realization theory 
does not necessarily include virtue, but virtue theory mentions self-realization 
and flourishing as well as pleasure.
Of course one may remark that the role of the notion of desire and desire 
satisfaction is inessential. The fact that some desires as desires get satisfied is 
not important at all; all that matters is what one gets, or what it is and how one 
gets it, when one’s desire is satisfied. This is uncontroversial, as far as I can see.6 
A more difficult problem is that of pleasure in hedonism. If virtue is essentially 
a matter of intellect and reasoning; that is, it is cognitive in nature, its conative 
and emotive aspects are secondary but real. The next question must be, is the 
virtue derived pleasure of the same type of pleasure as that spoken of by the 
hedonists proper? My intuition says that answer must in the negative. Let us 
focus briefly on the early hedonists like the Cyrenaics: “living pleasantly is a 
synonym for ‘happiness’”; moreover, “if we could accomplish the goal of living 
pleasantly, there would be nothing further to desire.”7 It is also significant that 
all this applies mainly to the present time events: “directing too much care and 
attention to the future is self-defeating.” This is easy to understand for the sim-
ple reason that to take care of the future is often incompatible with enjoying of 
what you have here and now. Any worries about the future tend to destroy, or 
at least postpone, the present enjoyment.
Hedonism may also lead to pessimism, namely, you calculate and compare 
the ratio between pleasure and pain, and you notice a systematic bias towards 
pain. What can you do? Obviously your life is not worth living. You have basi-
cally two alternatives, try ataraxia or commit suicide. Of course, one should 
try the first alternative first and then, if it does not work, reject hedonism alto-
gether. An interesting philosopher in this respect is the Cyrenaic Hegesias “The 
Death-Persuader” who wrote a book named The Man Who Starved Himself to 
Death, obviously to avoid a life with a surplus of pain and misery. It is said 
that Hegesias was banned from teaching philosophy in the Ptolemaic Alexan-
dria because people committed suicides after listening to this teaching. It is of 
6 See T. Airaksinen, “Desire and Happiness,” Homo Oeconomicus 29 (2012), 393–412.
7 K. Lampe, The Birth of Hedonism: The Cyrenaic Philosophers and Pleasure as a Way of Life. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014, p. 88.
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course well known that also Socrates talked about the life after death so con-
vincingly that Cleombrotus of Ambracia leaped from a high wall to his death.8
It is difficult to know how much weight one can put on the stories like this, 
but at least we can say that hedonism can be a dangerous philosophy of life 
and it was traditionally understood as such. What about ataraxia, which was 
later developed in its fullest by Epicurus and his school? Hegesias recommends 
autonomy and autarky as medicine against unhappiness. If you are indepen-
dent and self-sufficient you need not worry. Other people’s opinions cannot 
shake you and your resources suffice to repel need and vacuous desire. The 
result is the feeling of indifference: “Slavery is just as indifferent as freedom 
to the measure of pleasure.”9 This is not easy to accept, I admit, but the main 
message is clear: it does not matter if you are a slave or a free person, the plea-
sure or its lack is still of a similar type. What you feel does not depend on who 
you are or what you are. Here autonomy and self-sufficiency mean indifference 
to external conditions, such as slavery. If you need and desire nothing, noth-
ing can shake you. You stay beyond the pleasure-principle; but are you still a 
hedonist?
I have sketched above two main theories of happiness, virtue theory and 
hedonism. The former is quite demanding as it requires virtue in the holistic 
sense: a cardinal virtue can be ascribed to a person only on the condition that 
the person possesses each one of the set of virtues. Otherwise you will meet 
the Platonic “Courageous robber” paradox. In other words, a virtuous person is 
born at the moment when the last of his missing virtues is added to the total-
ity of his good character traits. The set of virtues is meaningful as long as each 
virtue in the set is individually meaningful. Moreover, its parts are called potes-
tative: “A person in possession of the virtue itself possesses all the capabilities 
of all that virtue’s parts.”10 Very few of us can even dream of being virtuous 
in this all-inclusive sense. Happiness obviously belongs to a mature sage only. 
The sufficient conditions of virtuousness seem too demanding to be realistic. 
The hedonist theory, on the other hand, is dangerous. A true hedonist may find 
out that she will be unhappy the rest of her life, which is to say that her life is 
totally meaningless from now on. What should she do? Is a meaningless life 
worth living in the long run? Of course a hedonist may focus on this moment 
now, but when she looks back only to find unhappy moments and memories 
what should she think?
8 See F.C.S. Schiller, Our Human Truths. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939, p. 140.
9 Lampe, 2014, p. 129.
10 M.J. Tracey, “The Moral Thought of the Albert the Great.” In Companion to Albert the 
Great,” I.M. Resnick (Ed.). Leiden: Brill, 2013, pp. 347–379, p. 360. Also, Cunningham, 2008, 
pp. 104ff.
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 Happiness and Desire
Thomas Hobbes draws a difference between happiness in this life and eternal 
happiness in the Christian heaven. “What kind of felicity God hath ordained to 
them that devoutly honour Him, a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy; be-
ing joys, that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of school-men beatifi-
cal vision is unintelligible.”11 For instance, when is God happy? Can we make 
him happy? This is certainly a traditional question. For instance, George Berke-
ley struggles with the problem of earthly happiness in this Vale of Tears and 
Misery as late as in the middle of 18th century.12 According to some reports, 
early Christian thinkers did not tolerate earthly happiness at all before Alber-
tus Magnus or so. Let us see what Hobbes has to say about the heaven.
Furthermore, concerning attributes of happiness, those are unworthy of 
God which signify sorrow (unless they be taken not for any passion, but, 
by a metonymy, for the effect); such as repentance, anger, pity. Or want, 
as appetite, hope, concupiscence, and that love which is also called lust; 
for they are signs of poverty; since it cannot be understood that a man 
should desire, hope, and wish for aught, but what he wants and stands in 
need of. Or any passive faculty; for suffering belongs to a limited power, 
and which depends upon another. When we therefore attribute a will to 
God, it is not to be conceived like unto ours, which is called a rational de-
sire; for if God desires, he wants, which for any man to say, is a contumely; 
but we must suppose some resemblance which we cannot conceive.13
This quotation is highly revealing as to our human desires and happiness, too. 
God cannot have what are traditionally called irascible feeling and emotion 
and the same applies to concupiscent feelings, or something we want in the 
positive sense. Hobbes applies here the rhetorical trope of metonymy, as he 
says, or the replacement of a whole with a part or the other way round. God 
is totally autonomous and autarchic – but for some reason not indifferent – 
which is to say that we can only talk about His actions and their effects on us 
and the world. These we can observe.
Hobbes says here that man wants what he is missing; God does not want 
so he does not miss anything, and consequently he cannot desire anything. 
11 Leviathan, 1651. Part 1, Ch. 6.
12 T. Airaksinen, “In the Upper Room: Metaphysics and Theology in Berkeley’s Ethics,” 
Philosophy & Theology 27 (2015), 427–456, pp. 448ff.
13 De Cive, Ch. 15, Sec. 14.
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
169Thomas Hobbes on Intentionality, Desire, and Happiness
<UN>
He feels and experiences no aversion or attraction as if a mere object could 
influence Him. We desire because we need, and a need logically entails lack 
and suffering. In other words, we are not autarchic and we will stay that way 
as long as we live. So, we must always desire and desire as such entails suffer-
ing; desire is its birth and starting point. We lust and we wish and hope simply 
because we want something we do not have. In this way Hobbes rejects all 
the theories of ataraxia; the point is that we are not autarchic and hence we 
always need and want something, which logically entails a perturbation of the 
mind.
In the quotation above, Hobbes makes it clear that we must desire, we can-
not avoid that. He also talks about rational desire, which refers to and rests on 
deliberation. Rational desires depend on deliberation unlike irrational desires 
that function independently. When my tooth aches more or less intolerably my 
relevant desires may not be rational at all: they are not reason based. However, 
I need to think what to do next in order to get rid of that irascible desire, and 
this is a rational process that brings about rational desires. This is not to say 
that my rational desires are always optimally good; they are just rational. If I 
deliberate on the matter and decide not to go and see a dentist, my solution is 
not optimal but it is still rational due to the preceding deliberation.
Let us next look at some well-known paragraphs of Leviathan on desire and 
happiness. These texts are so well-known that it is more or less unnecessary to 
repeat them here, but let me do it for the reference’s sake so that we can discuss 
some of their details. To put it simply: “Continually to be out-gone, is misery. 
Continually to out-go the next before, is felicity.”14 Hobbes seems to say here 
that a winner is happy, which sets the path for his subsequent ponderings on 
happiness or felicity. The following three lengthy quotations make it perfectly 
clear how Hobbes handles the theory of happiness. Clearly, he is a desire theo-
rist. His is also a value neutral theory as he does not take a stand on the relative 
merits of virtue and pleasure based desires. However, he seems to be closer 
to the hedonist theories simply because he fully recognizes the danger inher-
ent in seeking happiness. Happiness flirts with anxiety, a truth that is totally 
foreign to any proper virtue theory. A sage is never anxious. At the same time, 
the Hobbesian style of happiness is open to anyone almost on any basis, when 
virtue theory is open to a limited number of the members of the moral and re-
ligious elite. In this sense Hobbes’s theory is radical and in many respects novel 
as well – in the case of Hobbes we are used to such creativity.
He breaks away from the virtues theories without lapsing to full hedonism, 
or the theories of living a pleasant life here and now. Hobbes also sternly 
14 The Elements of Law, 1640, Part 1, Ch. 9, Sec, 21.
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rejects any prospects of ataraxia in this human world of ours. It is obvious that 
life is restless and also anxious to the end. I do not think Hobbes even thinks 
of ataraxia in the sense of giving it a place in this philosophical account of the 
real prospects of life. He is also an instrumentalist value theorist. There is no 
supreme good or summum bonum, which again goes against the virtue theo-
ries, but there is a supreme instrument, which is called power. Some philoso-
phers, like Berkeley, think that a future state or place in Heaven is our final end 
and ultimate goal (see note 10). Hobbes as an enlightenment thinker cannot 
say so. We have a life to live here on earth and that is the only life we got. What 
happens afterward is another thing. We need to be ready of course in the sense 
that we are good Christians, but that desire, goal, and value has no influence on 
what he says about “felicity in this life.” He would never say, for instance, that 
we consider suicide when our power is gone and desires unsuccessful. Life is a 
struggle and hence we must struggle on. This also puts an end to all talk about 
Epicurean ataraxia and Stoic apatheia. Hobbes is a theorist of power and that 
is clearly visible here. Let us now look at the following key text in some detail
Continual success in obtaining those things which a man from time to 
time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call felic-
ity; I mean the felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual 
tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because life itself is but motion, 
and can never be without desire, nor without fear, no more than without 
sense.15
The main points are: an agent desires things, or a desired object, a desidera-
tum. When he satisfies his desire, this is called success. One single success may 
not yet entail felicity or happiness, which is an intuitive condition. I may say, 
“I am so happy I got the job,” but this alone does not mean that I am happy. 
I may be delighted, but that is all. Hence, happiness results from a series of 
satisfactions. The next relevant point is that Hobbes refers to his mechanistic 
world view – life is a motion and motion implies restlessness, which again im-
plies lack of tranquillity, peace of mind, or ataraxia. It is indeed interesting that 
desire is intrinsically a restless state of mind, and yet, desire we must. Hobbes 
seems to be saying that one can be happy even without ataraxia. In this sense, 
his is a dynamic theory of happiness. We now go to the next quotation.
To which end we are to consider, that the felicity of this life, consisteth 
not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such finis ultimus, 
(utmost aim,) nor summum bonum, (greatest good,) as is spoken of in 
15 Leviathan, Part 1, Ch. 6.
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the books of the old moral philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, 
whose desires are at an end, than he, whose senses and imaginations are 
at a stand. Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object 
to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the lat-
ter. The cause whereof is, that the object of man’s desire, is not to enjoy 
once only, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of 
his future desire.16
Hobbes says there is no greatest good, and here he says he is no hedonist. Plea-
sure as such is only one of the possible goals in life, nor is a promise of eternal 
life the ultimate good in “this life.” What we have is a plurality of goods in a 
seemingly idiosyncratic fashion. A philosopher cannot say much of them; at 
most, one should pursue goals that strengthen one’s vital motion and in this 
way makes one stronger – and happier. Such things are good things and as 
such worthy of pursuing as objects of one’s desires. Another key point is that 
a satisfied desire has its double nature: it is at the same time a conclusion and 
a beginning. I desire in order to get something, or to satisfy my desire. This is a 
logical point concerning the nature of desire. However, at the same time it is a 
starting point for a new desire, or actually all kinds of desires. The problem is, 
as it is easy to see, that the more one desires and the more one gets, the more 
one must desire. If every satisfied desire brings about a number of new desires, 
the final number must be very large. This is what Plato worries as a problem of 
excess, or pleonexia; we will return to this problem. Hobbes continues,
So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a 
perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in 
death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more 
intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be 
content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power 
and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition 
of more.17
We can wonder whether the Hobbesian kind of felicity or happiness is what 
it should be, or happiness as we normally understand it. Happiness, accord-
ing to him, is always mixed with anxiety and fear and this must be taken very 
seriously. Happiness is a precarious thing always haunted by uncertainly, fear, 
anxiety, and distress. It is a kind of maelstrom where we all endlessly whirl 
around. The more we want to be happy the more we desire and the more we 
16 Leviathan, Part 1, Ch. 11.
17 Ibid.
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have to fear, but we cannot avoid wanting to be happy. We have no choice in 
this matter, however violently we are driven around within this mad dialec-
tics of happiness and anxiety. This is how Hobbes describes all of us as social 
human beings, as if democratically, and not as would-be followers of demi-
god-like philosopher sages who empower them to achieve all that is good.18
One is, with a good reason, afraid that the next step of the progress of desire 
will be a failure or even something worse. However successful one is it is never 
enough, and this is a troubling thought. Perhaps we also can read Hobbes as 
follows. My desire can be read both in de dicto and de re modes. The con-
tinuous progress of desire can be understood accordingly. My desire entails a 
mental representation of the desideratum in question. This is what it is, some-
times realistic sometimes not, socially meaningful or idiosyncratic etc. Such a 
de dicto object is my own free creation, which is constrained by the world as 
it is. Many de dicto objects are impossible de re. In many cases the de re char-
acterizations of the de dicto object are untrue. I may want to see a centaur but 
all the de re representations of a centaur are false. There are no centaurs in this 
world. Now, whatever object a Hobbesian agent desires, he cannot get them 
all. One often desires the wrong thing, for instance, when the cause of desire is 
the combination of imagination and human vanity. This does not promise any 
good for the agent.
Basically, if I want something I want it all, all of it, and ceteris paribus noth-
ing less suffices. I maximize. However, as we know, I never get what I want 
because now I already want something else and more of it. Where is my happi-
ness, then? At the same time I am, indeed, successful. Hobbes talks about “con-
tinual success” that makes me satisfied and happy, as if there could be such 
success in any demanding sense of the term. At most, we can say the thought 
of continuous success makes me happy. In this way desire is Janus faced entity: 
it is satisfiable and unsatisfiable at the same time, and it depends on you how 
you view it, either as an optimist or pessimist. However, ultimately pessimism 
seems to win because, even when you are satisfied and happy, you must go on 
towards new desires and struggles. This is to say that your optimism is here-
and-now but pessimism is forever. Perhaps it is a question of time perspective: 
now you see your happiness, then you do not – and forward must you go. In 
this sense life is a motion, process, and struggle that has no designated end.
You take what you can get and you call this happiness, if you succeed often 
enough and perhaps even systematically. To do that requires the proper means, 
which means power. In this sense, Hobbes is an instrumentalist happiness 
18 On how to recruit followers, see B. Frischer, The Sculpted Word: Epicureanism and Philo-
sophical Recruitment in Ancient Greece. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
173Thomas Hobbes on Intentionality, Desire, and Happiness
<UN>
theorist. There is no summum bonum but there certainly is power as the 
supreme means and instrument. A rational person does not aim directly at his 
own personal good but does it always via power and more power. This is to say, 
whatever you aim at you must be sure that what you get provides at the same 
time the means of getting more. And there is never enough power to go around 
because other people also aim at power – this is the cause of struggle and also 
of quarrel.19 The rule is, enjoy what you can, get what you like and love, but 
never forget the requirement of your further desires. All this is of course based 
on the idea that ataraxia is impossible due the nature of life as motion. This 
leads us to another dialectical characterization of the situation, or figuratively 
speaking, to another glance at the Janus faced case. This face is now that of en-
joyment of success and delight of achievement – a smiling face while the other 
face is the grim face of an agent eternally worried about his power, power base, 
and competition. This face is turned towards the struggle where one meets an 
enemy, perhaps a personal one, perhaps a social one, or it is a natural threat. 
Your new house may burn down and you certainly want to protect it by taking 
some suitable precautionary measures. This is another source of anxiety.
 Pleonexia
The logic of desire dictates that one desires everything that is good from one’s 
own personal point of view. Ceteris paribus, desire is an essentially maximiz-
ing attitude. Of course I am so adapted to the real world constraints on my 
desires and their desiderata that I may want to deny this fundamental truth. 
But think of the direction-of-fit argument as it applies to beliefs and desires as 
propositional attitudes.20 When I believe that Mars is a planet, all is fine be-
cause my belief fits the facts. When I think that moon is cheese, this is not the 
case; I must correct my belief. When I desire your love, I want to live in a world 
where you give me what I want, that is, your love. In a successful and happy 
case the world fits my desires, that is, you love me. However, I do not want love 
simpliciter, I want tender, all-encompassing, eternal, unconditional love, and 
in this sense my desire is essentially immodest. I want it all, even if the real 
world is so obviously recalcitrant. It never, or very seldom, delivers all I desire, 
which is an additional cause of anxiety. The following quotation clarifies the 
situation, in connexion of Plato and his Republic.
19 See P. Caws, Ed., Causes of Quarrel. Boston: Beacon Press, 1989.
20 See M. Smith, The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, Ch. 4.7.
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Elementary natural needs such as drinking and eating are not of the same 
order as those that are concerned with possession and are not necessary 
to survival. The ‘vehement gang’ of terrible desires (see Rep. 573e), wild 
and unbridled, belong to registers that are sometimes mutually different, 
including the imaginary. It wakes up when the rest of the soul is asleep, 
in our dreams. Let us say that the epithymetical part is, in this topic of 
the soul, the seat of desires that are as irrational as they are abundant and 
polymorphous. Hence their heterogeneity is a source of constant confu-
sion. We may also wonder how devoid of all cognition these desires actu-
ally are. Does not any desire suggest some activity of the mind: memories 
of pleasures past, anticipation of forthcoming pleasures as well as imagi-
nation of a state of affairs whose realisation feels desirable?21
Hobbes certainly realizes all of this, in his own way, and his solution rests on 
his idea of deliberation. He says we are dealing with “rational desires,” not with 
irrational impulses or drives; hence, we must take a look at Hobbes’s theory of 
deliberation.22
The most famous idea concerning deliberation is, of course, this: The last 
act of deliberation is what we call the will. When you read it the first time, 
you may think it solves the problem of pleonexia or uncontrollable desire and 
greed. Alas, this is not so. The impression is false. The last act of deliberation, 
or the will, can be anything, as it is easy to see. Suppose a particular process of 
deliberation is a long one; when and where does it stop? It is easy to think that 
it has a natural or inherent stopping point, for instance, at the point when the 
best alternative and solution is found. The process of deliberation would be 
inherently optimizing in nature. However, Hobbes does not say anything like 
this. The context is not intensional in the sense that it aims at the best possible 
solution, where it is designed to stop so that the will may initiate the relevant 
action. On the contrary, the context is extensional in the sense that the will 
emerges wherever the process of deliberation happens to stop. Perhaps we can 
call this an early instance of behaviourism, too.
This makes sense, no doubt about it, because Hobbes just wants to give a 
definition of the will and he wants to do it without postulating any mysterious, 
new mental faculty called the will. In this way he also avoids the notorious 
problem of the free will. But he also misses something with respect of the 
21 A. Castel-Bouchouchi, “Plato and the Causes of Excess,” Homo Oeconomicus 31 (2014), 
463–478, p. 467.
22 See S.A. Lloyd, Ed., The Bloomsbury Companion to Hobbes. London: Bloomsbury, 2012, 
pp. 119ff.; and J. Lemetti, Ed., Historical Dictionary of Hobbes’s Philosophy. Lanham: Scare-
crow Press, 2012, pp. 101–102.
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theory of desire, namely an explication of the idea of rational desire. The last 
step of deliberation may well be something outrageous, say, when the process 
happens to stop due to some external influences at a bad point. It may stop 
while one deliberates something crazy and so the will is crazy as well. Nothing 
guarantees the best possible ending in such an extensional context.
We can find a wonderful analogy of this problem of the correct stopping 
point in medieval philosophy. As Edward Grant explains, the problem is this: 
“Can God always reward the meritorious and punish the unmeritorious?”23 
Suppose death approaches at the time point t. Next, suppose that the agent 
is during his last hour alternatively meritorious and not. During the last half 
an hour the same is repeated and so on at each similar division of time. In 
every half-time his merits vary. In this way his life approaches the time point 
t without ever reaching it. Now, the death comes and cuts his life short but it 
is impossible to determine whether the agent was meritorious or not at his 
last moment – simply because there is no such moment: “the instant of death 
does not form part of the infinite series of decreasing proportional parts of 
the man’s final hour.” The idea that the agent is rewarded on the basis of the 
last act of the judgement of his merits does not work, according to this rather 
fanciful but valid argument. In the same way, the last act of deliberation as the 
sole determinant of the will does not make sense. In both case one misses the 
desideratum, that is, the proper verdict of what to do and why.
Actually, Hobbes has several different models of deliberation but I pay at-
tention only to two of them. In The Elements of Law, after saying that “In de-
liberation the last appetite, as also the last fear, is called will, (viz.) the last 
appetite will to do; the last fear will not to do, or will to omit,” he then writes,
Voluntary also are the actions that proceed from sudden anger, or other 
sudden appetite, in such men as can discern of good and evil; for in them 
the time precedent is to be judged deliberation. For then also he delib-
erateth in what cases it is good to strike, deride, or do any other action pro-
ceeding from anger or other such sudden passion.24
First Hobbes utilizes an extensional model of deliberation as a weighting pro-
cess of some motion promoting or hindering physiological impulses. They stop 
wherever it happens to stop, for whatever reasons this may take place. This is 
the will. But then his tone of voice changes and he introduces an intensional 
context where the agent aims at his personal good and considers the best time 
23 E. Grant, The Nature of Natural Philosophy in the Middle Ages. Washington, D.C.: The Cath-
olic University of America Press, 2010, p. 302.
24 The Elements of Law, Part 1, Ch. 12, Sec. 2 and 4. Original italics.
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and opportunity to act. Here deliberation results in the agent’s own idea of 
what is good for him, which is his intentional mental state of, say, object ap-
preciation. This entails the existence of an optimal end point of deliberation.
Once we recognize this crucial ambiguity, our problem of the Hobbesian 
pleonexia is solved, as if automatically. The agent is bound to see that those 
reckless and ever expanding desires, even if there were a natural impulse to 
follow them, are not feasible, if understood in the light of deliberation in its 
value laden intensional context. In that context deliberation can aim at some-
thing and this something is what the agent himself thinks is good. No rational 
agent would ever be inclined to continue on the road to full pleonexia, except 
perhaps in some very special circumstances. One could suggest that a person 
who is going to die soon and knows it would maximize his or her desires for 
the last time and live those last days with a maximal recklessness. Normally 
this does not happen as the person still deliberates in terms of her own good 
in the usual restricted and restricting manner. This may look irrational as the 
extended time perspective, against which all deliberation takes place, is now 
missing. Nevertheless, this seems to be a hard, empirical, psychological fact. In 
normal life, people’s deliberation may occasionally fail, it may be erroneous in 
many ways, but the truth is that it stays there. This logically entails that people 
have some good idea of the means by which they can handle and control their 
desires without lapsing into the abyss of pleonexia.
 Desire and Its Intentionality
Luc Foisneau has beautifully explained the mechanistic psychology of desire 
in Hobbes. I do not have anything to add to his basic account.25 However, there 
is a possibility of a serious misunderstanding, as follows, “Appetites and aver-
sions have what one could call an intentional object. Hobbes expresses this 
intentionality when he says that an endeavour, ‘when it is toward something 
which causes it, is called appetite, or desire.’”26
This is what an endeavour is for Hobbes: “These small beginnings of motion, 
within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and 
other visible actions, are commonly called endeavour.”27 Hence, when I see, 
say, a lovely bottle of wine my attention and appetite are directed to it, as the 
25 L. Foisneau, “Hobbes on Desire and Happiness,” Homo Oeconomicus 31 (2014), 479–489.
26 L. van Apeldoorn, “Reconsidering Hobbes’s Account of Practical Deliberation,” Hobbes 
Studies 25 (2013), 132–142, p. 38.
27 Leviathan, Part 1, Ch. 6.
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cause of the endeavour, and after that my bodily actions tend to follow. It is 
not relevant here how such a fundamental process of endeavour formation 
takes place. It is enough to keep in mind that Hobbes has such a physiological 
theory that he formulates in terms of extensional language. It is formulated in 
terms of physical force and motion in a physiological context in the best, new 
scientific fashion in his De Corpore.28
We have already seen that Hobbes is vague and ambiguous in his discussion 
of the intensional context in the case of deliberation. Concerning desires, he 
appears to have the same kind of problem. His account in De Corpore of appe-
tite and aversion, or desire, is basically mechanistic: a good thing is what makes 
the animal spirits move faster and expands one’s heart, which one experiences 
as rewarding, pleasant and in general positive. This is how desire as appetite, 
a concupiscent feeling, works. The case of irascible feelings works in an analo-
gous manner. The animal spirits slow down, etc. This makes you weak. Let me 
remark about one problem, though. Irascible feelings and negative desires of 
course lead to avoidance and refusal to act, but that is not all. Often when one 
encounters something bad, one tends to attack and thus reacts fast with great 
vigour and determination. How is this possible when the heart shrinks, the 
vital motion is slow, and animal spirits passive? In the case of plain fear such 
passivity makes sense, but not in the case of rage, anger, and, say, revengeful 
emotions. We also know, though, that once a person is in great danger and his 
relevant beliefs concerning survival are negative, he lapses into apathy. He can-
not act. But if one believes that there is a way, the person may well act with a 
greater vigour than in the case of positive expectations.
Be this as it may, we should not think and admit that the mechanistic ac-
count can handle the case of desire as it should be handled. Desires are through 
and through intentional since they have an intentional object – actually they 
have two, namely, a de dicto and a de re object. It is of course true that Hobbes 
himself tries to get rid of this problem, if he sees it at all having been blinded by 
his own fervent anti-scholasticism. Hence, it is a mistake to identify intention-
ality of desire with its object directedness, and it is hard to see how and why 
Apeldoorn sees it appropriate to repeat Hobbes’s own words here as if they pre-
sented a solution to the problem. Even Foisneau struggles with this problem.
Fundamentally, animal motion is oriented motion and orientation nec-
essarily implies an aim. However, because the final cause is systemati-
cally reduced to the efficient cause, the aim is less important here as a 
28 T. Hobbes, De Corpore. Elementorum philosophiae sectio prima. Ed. K. Schuhman. Paris: 
Vrin, 1999, x, 7, p. 103.
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cause than as a function of the evaluation by which a subject represents 
this or that aim as desirable.29
I think the first sentence is the main problem, as I try to explain. Moreover, 
I do not know how to reduce a final cause to an efficient cause; I presume this 
is impossible. All the four Aristotelian causes are supposed to be logically inde-
pendent of each other, or you cannot eliminate the teleological cause by refer-
ring to the efficient cause. And finally, the function of evaluation is presumably 
deliberation in its intentional sense in an intensional context, in which case in-
tentionality is just assumed to be there. In this way, the notion of deliberation 
is divided into two different types, namely, mechanistic and intentional. The 
problem then is that Hobbes’s analysis is no longer consistently mechanistic, 
which is of course understandable because we now discuss intentionality in an 
intensional context.
There may be no solution because no reduction of intentionality to mecha-
nism may work. It is like saying that one wants to reduce the theory of inten-
sionality to that of extensionality, as if intensional language would be an aspect 
of some luxuriating and overblown language usage. When you think of it, it 
is clear that these two sentences differ from each other in the relevant sense:
I threw the ball aiming at the bull’s eye and it hit where it should.
The ball went in the direction of the bull’s eye and hit it straight on.
From the fact that the ball went in a certain direction we cannot infer anything 
about any desire, aim, or value. It just went that way because of some ante-
cedent causally relevant factors and events. To be directed “toward something 
which caused it” suffers from the same malady because it refers to an exten-
sional context. One should reformulate the whole issue to make sense of it. 
Hobbes himself writes,
These words, appetite and aversion, we have from the Latins; and they 
both of them signify the motions, one of approaching, the other of re-
tiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are {orme} and 
{aphorme}. For nature itself does often press upon men those truths, 
which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond nature, they 
stumble at. For the Schools find in mere appetite to go, or move, no actual 
motion at all: but because some motion they must acknowledge, they call 
29 Foisneau, 2014, p. 484.
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it metaphorical motion; which is but an absurd speech: for though words 
may be called metaphorical; bodies and motions cannot.30
Here Hobbes says it clearly: directedness is the key, either towards or away 
when a target exists. Here we know what the target is by looking at the mo-
tion, when in the case of desire we should know the direction by looking at the 
target, or the aim or object of desire. What we have here are causa efficiens and 
causa finalis at work. Also, Hobbes typically attacks the Scholastic theory try-
ing to make it look ridiculous. Yet it is true that desires have their own internal 
dynamism, namely, when you desire an object, the object as a desideratum 
attracts you (a concupiscent case) and as if draws you towards itself. This is, in 
a sense, a motion within the soul, even if it is not real motion.
Desire is an intentional state. As a state of mind it is about something that 
has its desirable object or desideratum understood either de dicto or de re. In 
other words, the agent thinks of an object so that the object forms the con-
tent of his thought. In this sense, the thought and the corresponding desire are 
about the de dicto object. If the agent is in a position to act on her desire she 
must have good reasons to do so, after which a corresponding intention to act 
emerges. Notice that not all desires allow the agent’s actions: I desire your love, 
but there is no single action that would help me there. If I want wine, normally 
I can go and fetch some. Again, the object is something the agent aims at in the 
sense that it should fit the desire in question. If it does, the desire is satisfied, 
and a good string of satisfactions means the agent is happy. Now, my own key 
idea here is that a desire is always about an object or object representation in 
the mind; this is an a priori truth.
For this very reason, you cannot infer from directionality to intentionality. 
When a ball moves towards a target, we mention the target metaphorically. 
Wherever the ball hits, that is its target – notice the analogy with the mecha-
nistic reading of the notion of deliberation above. It is only if the ball is aimed 
at something by an agent that we may call it literally a target. The agent thought 
about it. Hence, to be a target proper logically entails a desire and intention as 
well as an intensional context of our language. In the same way the goodness 
oriented process of deliberation is intentional. Nothing is good or proper in an 
extensional context. Nothing is good without the potential or actual presence 
of a thinking mind. In sum: Where the ball lands depends on its direction of 
motion, but whether the place where it lands is its target or not depends on 
the spot being intentionally set or at least seen and understood as the target 
in question.
30 Leviathan, Part 1, Ch. 6.
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 Egoism
Finally, let me say something about Hobbes’s egoism.31 Is his idea of happiness 
egocentric or is it not? Many readers have seen and still see Hobbes as a strict 
egoist because his account of desire and its good is so person-centred. Every 
person desires and aims at his or her own good. Here is a simple argument that 
casts a shadow over this standard view.
An agent necessarily desires what appears to be good for him. (No egoism)
An agent necessarily desires his own good, or what is good for him. 
(Egocentrism)
An agent necessarily only desires his own good. (Egoism)
An agent does not want something if it is good for others (Negative 
Egoism)
In all these cases a person aims at a target object that is good and, consequent-
ly, forms a corresponding desire (that is about the object), whose satisfaction 
systematically and often enough justifies us calling him happy. In the first 
case above, many things may appear good to me, including social and other- 
regarding good. Our view on these matters may be wide and sympathetic of 
other people. In the second case, we may well want everything that is good 
for us but this certainly leaves room for other-regarding desires as well. Of 
course, if one is keen on one’s own desires and their number and scope are 
large, one is an egocentric or perhaps even an egomaniac person, but this is 
not egoism proper. In the third case, such a person is an egoist in the proper 
sense of the term. In the fourth case the agent is a misanthrope. My own view 
is that Hobbes’s texts are ambiguous here and, hence, the problem may well be 
unresolvable. However, any accusation of egoism is hard to support on these 
grounds. A careful textual analysis is needed to clarify the issue. My conjecture 
is that Hobbes may well be a fake egoist in the sense indicated in the first sen-
tence above. A person can, in that case, be and become happy together with 
other people and not only alone.
∵
31 B. Gert has famously and persistently defended the view that Hobbes is not an egoist, see 
his Hobbes: Prince of  Peace. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010. I tend to agree with him.
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Chapter 10
Sadomasochistic Desire
This paper attempts to promote the recognition of the sexualized social world 
of bdsm in philosophical and tropological perspective. bdsm and especially 
S/M is hard to understand in its own, characteristic motivational perspective 
because such negative experiences as, say, pain and humiliation indicate aver-
sion rather than attraction; hence we ask what kind of desire is this supposed 
to be. To cause pain to others is typically condemned. To cosset pain and suf-
fering is said to be perverse. My main point is, we can better understand bdsm 
via its typical language and rhetoric, especially by paying attention to the key 
role of linguistic metonymy when we discuss the riddles of pain and pleasure. 
I conclude that, within some reasonable limits, bdsm as a type of consensual 
kinky sex is not vulnerable to the standard forms of criticism.1
 Kinky Sex
Psychological, legal, and sociological issues are mainly outside the scope of 
this philosophical and tropological essay.2 Yet, the relevant problems of bdsm 
are begging for explanation. bdsm refers to (often organized) activities such 
as bondage, domination, discipline, submission, and sadomasochism.3 bdsm 
is what one may call a sexual diversion, “serious leisure,” and sometimes even 
a life-style.4 It is often practiced in clubs and other social venues where the 
performers and their audiences can enjoy the show. Of course, bdsm also 
takes place privately. It is important to distinguish between bdsm proper, 
1 This paper contains partially rewritten parts of my paper “The Language of Pain: A Philo-
sophical Study of BDSM,” sage Open 8 (2018), 1–9.
2 Tropology in rhetoric studies the use of tropes or figurative language. The present paper is 
related to my “A Philosophical and Rhetorical Theory of bdsm,” Journal of Mind and Behavior 
31/1 (2017), 53–74.
3 A useful Terms Dictionary can be found at https://www.bdsm-education.com/dictionary 
.html. “Bondage and discipline (B/D), dominance and submission (D/S), and sadism and mas-
ochism (S/M), also known as BDSM/kink, is becoming an increasingly popular topic in both 
mainstream media and people’s sexual lives.” S. Pillai-Friedman, J.L. Pollitt, and A. Castaldo, 
“Becoming kink-aware, a necessity for sexuality professionals,” Sexual and Relationship Ther-
apy 30 (2015), 196–210, p. 196.
4 “Serious leisure” is a useful term first introduced by Robert A. Stebbins, “Serious Leisure: A 
Conceptual Statement,” Pacific Sociological Review 25 (1982), 251–272.
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bdsm-inspired sexual foreplay, everyday sadism and masochism, and com-
mercial pornography: bdsm is a social activity, which is to say the participants 
share a common view of its definition, rules, and values.
I start by asking what bdsm is and what it is not. Let us pay attention to the 
dialectical interplay between what is intrinsically desirable and undesirable, 
like pleasure and pain. I discuss the motivation of and the relevant reasons for 
bdsm activities, given the enigma of how pain, humiliation, and bondage can 
be so desirable. The standard view is that the explanation is related to sexual 
and erotic pleasure, but bdsm enthusiasts may also have deeper personal, cog-
nitive reasons for doing what they are doing. The key philosophical point is this: 
in the bdsm field many of our normal definitions of terms such as violence, sex, 
pain, and enjoyment either lose their conventional meaning or become alien, 
ambiguous, controversial, or essentially contested. This challenges anyone who 
wants to study this field, a trial that we should not underestimate. It is impor-
tant to distinguish between two perspectives: insiders and outsiders tend to 
consider bdsm activities in different light. The outsiders, even when they are 
knowledgeable, sympathetic, and impartial, may fail to understand the desires, 
practices, and values of the insiders, that is, the practitioners and their intended 
audiences. Such a failure is particularly disturbing in the case of power wielders 
like religious, medical and legal authorities. bdsm is indeed a subversive field 
and as such it resists attempts of domination and control, even at the concep-
tual level. It is subversive because, among other strange things, it refuses to re-
spect the accepted standard definitions of pain and pleasure, or jouissance.5 A 
bdsm aficionado’s ideas of a delightful activity can be difficult to follow.6
 Tropological Delineations
Here is an instructive description of bdsm and particularly of sadomasochism 
or S/M that focuses on “[t]he sexual organization of social risk, for one of S/M’s 
characteristics is the erotizing of scenes, symbols, contexts, and contradictions 
which society does not typically recognize as ‘erotic’.” bdsm is about playing 
risky games understood as sex between two seemingly unequal partners. Also, 
bdsm can be seen as “radical sex” that is “our ‘exploration of eros and the 
5 “‘Pleasure’ was associated with extremely intense sensations,” E. Faccio, C. Casini and S. Cipo-
letta, “Forbidden Games: The Construction of Sexuality and Sexual Pleasure by bdsm Play-
ers,” Culture, Health & Sexuality 16 (2014), 752–764, p. 752.
6 N. Largier, In Praise of the Whip: A Cultural History of Arousal. Tr. G. Harman. New York: Zone 
Books, 2007.
Timo Airaksinen - 978-90-04-41030-5
Downloaded from Brill.com02/25/2020 01:38:34PM
via University of Helsinki
185Sadomasochistic Desire
<UN>
liberation of erotic potential from Puritan ethics.”7 This looks like a reference 
to fetishism: one finds or makes non-erotic goals of desire erotic; this is the 
kind of fetishism we may call functional because its objects are actions and 
practices. Often we associate fetishism with things like women’s high heeled 
shoes; this can be called material fetishism, when a fetish is a prima facie non-
sexual thing loaded with sexual meaning. In other words, the erotic and the 
non-erotic switch their places under the umbrella of hazard jointly shared by 
a top and a bottom. The top dominates the bottom and brings about, say, pain 
and humiliation for both of them to enjoy.
Next, I will derive a novel key characterization of bdsm, which is, as it is 
easy to see, closely related to the standard one mentioned above. The main 
point (of S/M) is that the characterizations of erotic/pleasure and non-erotic/
pain change places, in other words, they exemplify reversible pairs. Hence, in 
a bdsm context pain and pleasure are related metonymically.8 Kenneth Burke 
writes:
[We]might extend the [metonymic] pattern to include such reversible 
pairs as disease-cure, hero-villain, active-passive [and] we should “iron-
ically” note the function of the disease in “perfecting” the cure, or the 
function of the cure in “perpetuating the influences of the disease.”9
Pain-pleasure is indeed one of such metonymic pairs: the direct function of 
pain is now to maximize pleasure, which in the S/M context seems to be a 
7 A. McClintock and B. Thomson, quoted by R.F. Plante, “Sexual Spanking, the Self, and the 
Construction of Deviance.” In Sadomasochism: Powerful Pleasures, P. Kleinplatz and C. Moser 
(Eds.). New York: hpp, 2006, pp. 59–79, pp. 61–62. It is questionable whether all the forms 
of bdsm are sexual or erotic, for instance activities that focus on slavery and punishment, 
as Yolanda Estes says (see n. 19). A masochist who longs for humiliation in the hands of a 
paid dominatrix because of his deep guilt feelings may not seek sex but some kind of psy-
chotherapy. To call bdsm a sexual field, without qualifications, is mere gloss. It is of course 
impossible to give a definition of sex or eroticism. They are typically cluster concepts (no 
necessary conditions of being a sexual content can be found unlike sufficient conditions.) 
When one calls, say, an activity “sexual” one is displaying a contextual marker around which 
one can then delineate his discursive intentions.
8 Metonymy is a rhetorical trope that makes two related terms interchangeable, for instance, 
because they refer to a container and contained. In this case I say “I drank one bottle” when 
I could have said “I drank one beer.” You say, “King William won the battle of Hastings” when 
you could have said “The King’s armies won the battle.” In the case of bdsm a product of an 
activity is sometimes substituted for the activity itself. We say that the “pleasurable sensa-
tion” (product) is interchangeable with “the painful flogging” (activity). (See http://examples 
.yourdictionary.com/examples-of-metonymy.html). 
9 K. Burke, A Grammar of Motives. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, p. 512.
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positive bodily sensation and in the case of disciplinary or humiliating activ-
ity a mental pleasure. Now we can freely alternate “pain” and “pleasure,” as in 
“Whip me, give me pain” and “Whip me, give me pleasure.” “Pain” and “plea-
sure” both refer to one self-identical thing, namely, what I want from this social 
exchange. No doubt, the rhetorical context is characterized by its metonymies.
Of course, in most narrative fields the relationship of pain and pleasure is 
far from metonymical, like torture in legal and punitive contexts and hurt in 
many medical procedures. When we discuss serious pain close to that that of 
torture, and not some pain-like playful little titillations, this makes the bdsm 
context a special one: it is a context in which serious pain and rich pleasure are 
indeed related metonymically in cooperative setting. To make the case stron-
ger, also consensual cooperation between the top and the bottom shows its 
metonymic features: when you are hurt by an agent this seems like a paradig-
matic case of conflict; yet, bdsm is all consensual and hence cooperative. Such 
a double metonymy strongly characterizes the unique world of bdsm. In the 
language of bdsm, pain and pleasure as well as conflict and cooperation freely 
switch places.
If it does not happen in other contexts, this type of metonymy indeed identi-
fies bdsm, and more specifically consensual S/M. I think this is so: the relevant 
double metonymy is unique to bdsm, but this of course depends on various fac-
tors I cannot discuss here. Metonymy, when that is used as a characterization 
of bdsm, reveals its paradoxical, revolutionary, and truly subversive nature: 
any social context where conflict and cooperation are related metonymically 
and X and Y also are situated metonymically, when X is something intrinsically 
undesirable and Y is its antonym, is an instance of bdsm. X and Y are intended 
bodily or mental sensations resulting from certain typical social exchange like 
activities. This applies to everyday masochism, too. If I am begging for punish-
ment and maltreatment, say, in domestic life, I desire it, which makes me a 
masochist. If I enjoy punishing my subordinates and derive pleasure from it, 
I am a sadist; I derive pleasure from actions that are not enjoyable as such, or 
desirable from the point of view of one’s audiences.10 The difference to bdsm 
is that an every-day sadistic exchange is never cooperative or consensual. Of 
course, such a usage of the terms “sadism” and “masochism” may sound odd 
and perhaps dated today. We may reject the idea of sadistic and masochistic 
personality types but it is difficult to reject the use of those terms altogether.
Here is an illustration: The top cuts his bottom’s skin with a sharp blade 
making him bleed. This activity combines the horror of free flowing blood, the 
10 See for example Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness. Tr. H.E. Barnes. New York: 
Gramercy Books, 1994, pp. 394ff. About the ultimate failure of sadism, see pp. 405–406.
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perceived hazard of being cut as mental pain and panic, and being wounded as 
physical agony. Next, the bottom reports delight as well as strong pleasurable 
feelings and sensations. In this case, delight and pleasure are substituted for 
horror, mental pain and physical suffering, although the bottom can also re-
port unadulterated pain. Hence, the pain-pleasure pair is freely reversible, just 
as both Plante and Burke (above) say they should be; this is what a metonymic 
relation means in this definitional context. Burke’s additional point about iro-
ny comes in as follows: in an everyday context, when I am hurt and someone 
asks if I am hurt, I can answer –ironically – by saying “What a pleasure this is, 
don’t you see!” To maximize your pleasure by letting someone hurt you, in-
deed contains an analogous ironic aspect, at least if seen from an outsider’s 
perspective. Indeed, in an S/M context irony is clearly visible to outsiders but 
perhaps not always to the participants themselves. The same can be said of ex-
perienced horror and joy: the dedicated audiences of horror films are masoch-
ists since they enjoy horror. They often seem to realize this anomaly, or their 
perception of their own strange sensibilities, which, due to its irony, makes the 
whole experience even more enjoyable to them. Of course, in such a context 
the ironic aspect is so strong that the audience may laugh – and they do. In-
terestingly enough, horror and laughter in such a context come close to being 
interchangeable. Sometimes this tendency is so strong that the show becomes 
ridiculous. Notice how irony and metonymy overlap here: what is ironic, that 
is to laugh at horror, starts looking as an instance of metonymy where laughter 
and horror become interchangeable. Metonymy and irony always are closely 
connected. Alas, however ironic the logic of bdsm plays may be, legal and 
medical authorities have traditionally refused to see it that way; or perhaps 
they live in denial so deep that it turns into aggression. This could to a degree 
explain the relevant elites’, as non-intended audiences, tendency to reject and 
also strongly condemn bdsm.
Do the desires of bdsm have their metaphoric meaning, too? The joy of 
bdsm also is in its metaphors. What is then the metaphoric message of uri-
nating or defecating on a bottom? Such activities beg for metaphoric reading 
since a metaphor changes the considered context into another one that is only 
remotely connected to the original and by doing so creates a set of secondary 
meanings: “Men are nothing but pigs” moves the discourse across the limits 
of fine social etiquette and the hard facts of the human sciences into that of 
animal husbandry and its real life smells and sounds. Staci Newmahr says the 
key metaphor of bdsm is that of life and death.11
11 S. Newmahr, Playing on the Edge: Sadomasochism, Risk and Intimacy. Bloomington: In-
diana University Press, 2011, p. 184. This is an admirable book that gives a good idea of 
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Newmahr may well be right; however, the tropological themes in bdsm can 
be developed further than that. For instance, anal fisting belongs to bdsm, or 
we can situate it as a practice in the repertoire of bdsm.12 The idea sounds 
radical, painful, and dangerous, or impossibly repulsive from the point of view 
of its non-intended audiences. Of course, anal sex constitutes an entire genre 
of pornography, or the hard core of it, but anal fisting goes one step further 
along with vaginal fisting. The more demanding idea and practice of anal fist-
ing rests also on a cooperative metonym, on the symbolism of two persons 
understood as one, connected in a way that cannot be cracked. Why is this dif-
ferent from heterosexual penis-vagina penetration as a kind of bond between 
two persons? It is different because in many ways it is so much more demand-
ing, just like other bdsm activities. Extraordinary deeds create extraordinary 
effects. Vanilla sex may make no impression on a couple, unlike such extreme 
experiences as anal fisting. Just the knowledge that so many people strictly 
disapprove of it may be decisive. Therefore, we see here a special dialectical 
interplay between individuality and unity. Yet there must be more to it. If so, 
what is the relevant metaphor? The mythology of anal unification crosses the 
limits of its original medical anatomical context in which the main allusion 
is to stretching of the dry and tight anus instead of the fluid and flexible va-
gina. Again, irony emerges along with desire and its metonymies: the fluid flex 
(pleasure) under a fist is substituted for the anus as paradigmatically dry tight 
thing (pain). Tightness and flexibility now belong to the same context as ironic 
opposites. Next, our mental representations vacillate between what is real and 
anatomic, tight anus, and the key metaphoric ideal, an unbreakable bond be-
tween two persons. Here we can see an alternative metaphor to Newmahr’s 
life and death, namely that of an unbreakable bond. Of course, we also can 
view anal fisting in terms of life and death: vagina is for giving life and anus for 
extracting dead waste. This is almost too obvious, though.
Here the idea of a bond is indeed a new metaphor built on the top of an 
ironically applied metonymy. There is no bonding in the original descriptive 
context but now it all, with its perfect plausibility, depends on the secondary 
the insider’s perspective on bdsm. About D/S, see K. Cunningham, Conquer Me. Eugene, 
OR: Greenery Press, 2010, 108ff. She makes a crucial distinction between submissiveness 
and masochism, and consequently, I think, between domination and sadism. For instance 
Anne Desclos’ The Story of O (1954) describes O’s submissiveness and not masochism. She 
does now desire suffering. She says she loves her Master and therefore she submits. The 
master, however, wants total submissiveness without love.
12 See M. Weinberg, C. Williams, and C. Moser, “The Social Constituents of Sadomasochism,” 
Social Problems 31/4 (1984), 379–389;  and C.J. Hale, “Leatherdyke Boys and Their Daddies: 
How We Have Sex Without Women or Men,” Social Text 52/53 (1997), 223–236.
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meaning of bonding as something highly commendable and hence ethically 
valuable and as such desirable. Such a bond is a pledge with a deep and com-
plex narrative (secondary) meaning ranging from commitment to love.13 At 
the same time one may feel that such a narrative must be false and definitely 
refuse to recognize how and why one could freely substitute “fluid, pleasant 
flex under a fist” for “dry, painful tightness.” Thus, one misses the awareness – 
and avoids the danger – of the key metaphor of an unbreakable social bond. 
All this must sound subversive, perhaps even repulsive. The metaphor must 
then be denied as it is simply too dangerous to bear. It may look like sheer mad-
ness and perversity that must be seen as (medically) pathological and (legally) 
suspect activity. Again, to distinguish between a view from inside and outside 
is crucial: outsiders may be able to see the rhetorical construction of the key 
metaphor and assent to its basic validity but the participants live it. Without 
such a metaphor, say, anal fisting functions like sheer violence, when it in real-
ity is full of meaning. bdsm activities may not be about raw animal pleasures.
Here is then my amended characterization of bdsm: By bdsm we mean 
(more or less openly) sexualized social activities where a pair of mental 
predicates like pleasure and pain can be freely substituted one for the other 
(metonymy), these predicates being mutually incompatible in their standard 
contexts (irony), and they are charged with shared meaning (narrative) based 
on metaphoric shifts of their fields of discourse. All this takes place in a coop-
erative context that can and normally is called a conflict situation, which is an-
other source of metonymy here. Here we see the two opposites, life/death and 
pleasure/pain, constantly meeting and departing at the symbolic level.14 
Hence, the metonymic aspects of S/M focus on the interplay of two bodily 
feelings and sensations, pain and pleasure, whereas at the metaphoric level we 
look across borders and find, say, a player reporting experience of purification, 
discovery of one’s true self, or her seamless unification with another person, 
her top or bottom – seeing “fresh light and value” in the world beyond this one. 
One may indeed mention the symbolisms of life and death within bdsm, like 
Newmahr says; they are the key metaphors. For its non-intended audiences 
bdsm may well mean the open gates of hell and the abyss of damnation, per-
haps this is so for a true edge player as well; but then their background narra-
tives are radically different.
13 On narrativity and narrative meaning, see G. Genette, Narrative Discourse. Tr. J.E. Lewin. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980, pp. 25–26.
14 On death and sex, see G. Bataille, Erotism: Death and Sensuality. Tr. M. Dalwood. San Fran-
cisco: City Lights Books, 2001; also E. Scarry, The Body in Pain. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985.
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 The Riddles of Motivation
The field of bdsm is large and fantastically varied. Its borders are fuzzy and 
much of it is hidden and secretive, or made to look like pornography. The field 
is enclosed in abjuration, moralism, misinformation, and myth. For philosoph-
ical argument’s sake, let us simplify the field as follows: a bdsm participant 
(bottom) enjoys pain, punishment, humiliation, and bondage; according to 
the definition of bdsm above the participants successfully transmute them 
into pleasure, respect, and even liberty – this looks like some miraculous psy-
chological alchemy. However, if the participants, especially the bottoms, do 
not find their desire for pain, humiliation, and bondage somehow rewarding, 
they would not consent to playing these roles.15 It is not possible to say “I enjoy 
pain” and to mean it literally: pain is not an object that can be enjoyed as such. 
Yet, the logic of the play here presupposes the mental pain/pleasure transmu-
tation in question, no doubt about it. But how is it possible? Pain as such can-
not be pleasure. It is logically inconsistent to maintain pain to be pleasurable. 
(We discuss now the logic of some psychological concepts, not their rhetorical 
usage like we did above.) This problem makes bdsm, and especially S/M, a 
supremely interesting case from the point of view of psychological hedonism 
in philosophy, which is a topic as old as philosophy itself.16
The standard view of pain is that it is a distressing, paradigmatically dis-
agreeable bodily sensation, and a highly motivating mental state. Moreover, it 
is logically inconsistent to say something like this: I feel exactly the same pain 
as yesterday but now it does not feel so bad. In the same way, it is inconsistent 
to maintain that I still have the same pain but, say, that my medication makes 
it easier to tolerate. In other words, I cannot doubt that I am in pain.17 If I toler-
ate pain better the pain is now less severe. Pain is pain, a raw sensation, and 
that is all; yet, an S/M bottom may say he enjoys it when whipped hard with 
a singletail. The pain can be close to intolerable and he may exhibit all its rel-
evant behavioural pain symptoms but he says he somehow enjoys it. Does he 
really enjoy pain? How is this to be understood? Does it mean that he did not 
experience severe pain, for instance, because he was so highly stimulated by 
the activity in question? Sometimes positive excitement, mind control or, say, 
15 T. Schroeder, Three Faces of Desire. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 66.
16 See D. Wolfsdorf, Pleasure in Ancient Greek Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013.
17 P.S.M. Hacker, “On Knowledge and on Knowing that I Am in Pain” (http://info.sjc.ox.ac 
.uk/scr/hacker/docs/Knowledge%20of%20Pain.pdf). It is logically speaking nonsense to 
say something like “I doubt I am in pain” when I show all the relevant pain symptoms.
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sexual arousal works like a pain-killer: “Campanella […] could so abstract his 
attention from any sufferings of his body, that he was able to endure the rack 
itself without much pain [...].”18
Someone may then ask, can excitement also explain why one enjoys pain? 
Perhaps you can talk about the delight the situation brings about instead of 
physical pleasure? How to explain the excitement as a kind of delight then? 
Certainly it is not the case that excitement creates an altered bodily state where 
the pain itself becomes enjoyable – one cannot enjoy pain as such. Hence, the 
bottom feels the pain but also somehow enjoys both the situation where it is 
delivered and his relation to the top. For instance, a love bite hurts but because 
it is a love bite it is also enjoyable: it says she loves me. In this example, pain, or 
pain-and-love, is pleasant because of its relation to love. However, it is impos-
sible that pain would be enjoyable as such; pain is not its own reward.
We know that certain somatic perceptions are a mixture of pain and plea-
sure, as reported for instance by marathon runners. Such mental states are 
mixed pleasures. Hence, in S/M pain plays the bottom may at the same time 
feel pain and report enjoyment or delight as interconnected and mutually 
synchronized feelings. It is possible that the bottom feels two separate sensa-
tions, physical pain and pleasure, but the pleasure is so strong that the pain 
can be (to some extent) neglected. In this case pain is not pleasure but pain 
and pleasure arrive as if side by side both having their own causal genesis. 
Pain and pleasure in S/M are, as I see it, two different and separate sensations 
that emerge and vary together in such a synchronized manner that it is natural 
to conflate them in personal reports. Just like the love bite really hurts and it 
feels good but it is the bite that hurts and feels good; we should not say the 
pain feels good when the bite feels good. In the same way whipping may feel 
good and delightful even if we refrain from saying that the associated pain feels 
good. It is crucial to ask what exactly feels good and what is delightful.
Let me illustrate the explanations given above by means of two rather dis-
turbing semi-pornographic examples of bdsm play performed in front of an 
audience and shown on the Internet. Two naked, good looking young women 
are tied together from their left wrists by a rope two feet long. Both have a 
singletail whip in their right hand. They lash each other tit-for-tat as hard as 
they can. They tremble, grimace, scream, cry, and weep showing all the bodily 
symptoms of real pain, which clearly is extreme. Each lash leaves a bright red 
mark on the skin. They go on for a long time. A second example: This is a com-
petition to determine who lasts longer. Two naked young women (bottoms) 
18 E. Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful. Ed. P. Guyer. Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press, 1757/2015, pp. 53, 106.
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lie down on a platform on the belly; we can see their faces but nothing else. 
We hear the whip and the blow. The women are clearly scared of what will 
happen to them. Behind them stands a whipper (top) with a heavy singletail 
whip. He lashes them one after the other and commands them to count the 
strokes aloud. We see that the pain is absolutely overwhelming, like torture, 
and the women really agonize. In this situation, pleasure of any type is out of 
the question. One surrenders, they both stand up, and the top comes to the 
front and congratulates them – very sternly, devoid of any sympathy at all, and 
then walks away. The audience applauds. Here we have a case of pure and real 
pain and pain behaviour with no hint of enjoyment, pleasure, sex, or eroticism. 
These women are afraid, not visibly eager, and certainly did not show any signs 
of enjoyment at all. At the same time, they do not look like being coerced to 
do what they do.19 Yet, I must admit that coercion looks like the most plausible 
explanation here.
Pain and suffering may indeed have their sacred and cathartic quality. Re-
ligious asceticism tends to recommend them. Religiously meaningful torture 
like self-flagellation has its rich and lasting heritage, extending from the Egyp-
tian cult of Isis to the Dominican order.20 It is clear that in these cases pain 
is accompanied by one’s own, deep sense of reward and feeling of satisfac-
tion, which is motivating. Again, pain is not its own reward although the re-
ward is not possible without the self-inflicted pain; this is what the flagellant 
believes. He certainly is no hedonist. Hence, bdsm is not necessarily about 
sensory enjoyment as such. It is deeply related to higher cognitive and emo-
tional functions. According to this view, when you freely suffer humiliation 
and bondage and risk your health, you will emerge from that situation as a 
renewed person.21 At its best, it is a life-altering, other-worldly experience that 
is as rare as it is personal, a truly remarkable achievement. In this way we can 
argue against the hedonistic model of bdsm and in favour of a cognitive mod-
el.22 Analogously, we may mention disgusting pleasures: a person feels deep 
19 Newmahr (2011) emphasizes intimacy as the true reward, see p. 186: “SM is about creating 
intimacy through social interaction.” Yolanda Estes seems to agree; see her “bdsm: My 
Apology.” In Desire, Love, and Identity, G. Foster (Ed.). New York: Oxford University Press, 
2016, Chapter 8.
20 See J. McCabe, The History Of Flagellation. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger, 2007; and R. Pearsall, 
The Worm in the Bud: The World of Victorian Sexuality. Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 
1971, Ch. 7 “Perversion.” Pearsall pays special attention to English public schools.
21 On professional dominas, see H. Smith and C. Cox, “Dialogue with a Dominatrix.” In S 
and M, Studies in Sadomasochism, T. Weinberg and G.W. Levi Camel (Eds.). Buffalo, NY: 
Prometheus Books, 1983.
22 The cognitive model emphasizes the participants’ beliefs about the activity. These beliefs 
motivate and justify the activity. A participant reports, “I love to play because I want to see 
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pleasure when he has reason to feel bad about the pleasure in question. 
This is a common experience but no one would say that the pleasure itself is 
disgusting – pleasure is pleasure and the reasons for being disgusting are an-
other thing. One simply feels pleasure that is accompanied with disgust; this 
is to say, there are no disgusting pleasures, only reasons for thinking that some 
pleasures are disgusting and then the relevant negative feelings will follow. 
Many people enjoy pornography in such a conflicted way.
These reflections apply primarily to the bottom; perhaps they also apply to 
the top, but in her case the key term must be power.23 We know that wielding 
power is often stimulating and enjoyable, sometimes ecstatically so. When we 
notice that the top in his sadistic role is not able to enjoy any direct sensory 
pleasure, we conclude that he works hard for some rewarding and satisfying 
beliefs and ideas of personal and social supremacy and power. Here we must 
keep in mind that tops and bottoms may switch their roles and hence utilize 
all the opportunities inherent in bdsm. There is another consideration that 
deserves to be mentioned: it is undeniable that people are strangely fond of 
witnessing other persons’ pain, suffering, and death – in these days mainly but 
not solely in fictional terms. Somehow this stimulates and fascinates us no end, 
as our contemporary popular culture so amply proves.24 We want to see it and 
so it must somehow be rewarding. Violence and its victims are in the core of 
popular entertainment, war and mayhem sell well, and the raped and tortured 
body in its various forms is viewed with the superbly enjoyable mixture of 
horror and enthralment. Can this psychological fact explain the top’s sadistic 
motivation? Perhaps it can. Perhaps this interest in violence and pain also is 
connected to power: when I view another person’s pain it empowers me, as if 
the victim were suffering in my hands. Yet, as a spectator, I am not responsible, 
I am innocent, I cannot be blamed for the other person’s suffering; so I am free 
to enjoy it as if I were supremely powerful, so powerful that no moral norms 
may touch me. This is what the top achieves, too.
Let me next address very briefly humiliation. For many bdsm participants, 
humiliation seems to be a form of respect. This again sounds paradoxical but 
can be tentatively explained as follows. In their mutual social situation tops 
and bottoms are engaging in a relationship where they feel for each other 
what is deep within each of us.” (Newmahr, 2011, p. 173). To play is to explore, which has 
little to do with direct sensual stimulation like bodily pleasure or even with sex.
23 “Pleasure […] does not have to be specifically sexual, rather it may stem from power,” 
Faccio, Casini and Cipoletta, 2014, p. 753. Power derived pleasures must be cognitive-emo-
tional, not physical.
24 S. Bok, Mayhem: Violence as Public Entertainment. Reading: Addison Wesley, 1998.
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and share their mutual respect and intimacy; in other words, they freely co-
operate, which entails respect regardless of what they happen to do. The top is 
supposed to care for her bottoms; hence, she would not serve that evil trinity, 
or pain, humiliation, and bondage, raw to her bottoms. They all know what 
humiliation entails in everyday life but in bdsm play the top is supposed to 
respect her bottom and she shows it by humiliating him – this may well be 
the point of the activity. We just need to understand respect in a special way, 
when it depends on humiliation. My argument is as follows: Suppose the top 
respects the bottom. Next, the top humiliates her. The top shows his respect 
by means of humiliating her; it does not do to say, the top shows his respect 
along with humiliating her. Again we meet a metonymical relation between 
humiliation and respect, as my key characterization of bdsm requires: humili-
ation and respect mean the same thing. When we move over from tropological 
consideration to psychological mechanisms we may then suggest that humili-
ation and respect are related instrumentally, that is, humiliation brings about 
or creates the sense of respect. Anyway, “humiliation” and “respect” are freely 
substitutable terms in this context.
 Sade and Sadism
We must draw a firm conceptual distinction between a bdsm top and a bona 
fide sadist, or a habitually cruel and cold person, and his typical sources of 
enjoyment. The usual image of sadism and masochism is dominated by ideas 
that do not correspond to social and consensual bdsm activities but rather 
reflects the ideas of the Marquis de Sade. Therefore, it may be useful to clari-
fy this background.25 In bdsm, the top, although she enjoys and exploits her 
dominant position, at some level also wants to please her bottom and enjoys 
an intimate and respectful relation with him. Yet, her identity can be that of 
a sadist because she enjoys hurting the bottom. However, a sadist in Sade’s 
sense rejects all this and intends to exploit, belittle, humiliate, subjugate, hurt, 
and harm a victim, ultimately aiming at his death. Let us briefly pay atten-
tion to certain aspects of Sade’s novels, such as Justine, Juliette, and The 120 
Days of Sodom, to understand this better.26 He often describes what can be 
called plays or games between sadists and their victims arranged in the form 
of ever changing, diverse illustrative vignettes.27 It all happens as if on theatre 
25 See for instance (https://www.academia.edu/11723094/The_history_of_sadism_and 
_masochism_).
26 See T. Airaksinen, The Philosophy of the Marquis de Sade. London: Routledge, 1995.
27 R. Barthes, Sade, Fourier, Loyola. Tr. R. Miller. London: Jonathan Cape, 1976, pp. 154ff.
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stage – Sade wanted, unsuccessfully, to be a playwright. A sadistic libertine 
brings in a victim or group of them and the action may start. Often it takes the 
following cyclic form: philosophical reflection – sexual arousal – torture – sex – 
killing – discharge of energy in ejaculation – exhaustion; and then back to 
philosophical reflection and dialogue.
This idea of the repetitive circle of libertine life works as follows. The heroes 
are philosophers who discuss and theorize pleasure, sex, beauty, virtue, reli-
gion, power, and death. This offers them new ideas and stimulates them, which 
leads them to attack their victims by torturing them, then having forced sex 
with them, and often killing them. Here murder is the highest and most natural 
form of voluptuousness. Sex in itself is a rather mechanical act in the sense that 
the heroes, men and women, discharge like a loaded gun when one pulls the 
trigger. It also is clear that the heroes are never intimate with their victims; on 
the contrary, they isolate, violate, and harm them as the Other and in as many 
ways they ever can invent. The victims are nothing but victims mostly without 
face, character, personality, or individuality. They are expendable to the de-
gree that they almost do not count as living human beings; yet, their sufferings 
are – rather strangely – supposed to be meaningful and as such stimulating 
and enjoyable. Sade’s 120 Days of Sodom is actually a summa of all vices in the 
realm of sex and sexuality: nothing is left unmentioned and the heroes do try it 
all.28 They are, therefore, paradigmatic non-consensual sadists who play their 
deadly games with their helpless and often faceless victims who certainly are 
not masochists. Sade justifies all this under the banner of total freedom and 
full enjoyment of the supreme pleasures of life. His oeuvre is a catechism of 
freedom in the condition of nature, or alternatively, a display of pure, unmiti-
gated subversives at any cost. However you want to read it, Sade plays with his 
twisted reason and lethal love in the name of the game of sex and pleasure. 
He wants to make the most destructive form of sadism the cornerstone of his 
world-view: the sole source of pleasure that is strong and exciting enough for 
free and resourceful persons. Such is the story of wild and varied, atavistic, 
theatrically staged sexual rage.
It is naïve to think that the roles of tops and bottoms would automatically 
complement each other – without a paradox – because a sadist cannot tor-
ment the victim who obviously enjoys and desires the punishment, which then 
makes the sadist unhappy. A Sadian sadist needs a helpless, reluctant, strug-
gling, suffering, and unhappy victim. The problem is that the masochist does 
not suffer in the required and desired manner. He is not avoiding pain and 
humiliation as he should; on the contrary, he gravitates towards it. For a sadist 
28 See the English translation by R. Seaver and A. Wainhouse, New York: Grove Press, 1966.
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this does not do. Therefore, a masochist cannot find himself a bona fide sadist, 
they will refuse to serve. Hence, he needs situations where some unsuspecting 
person torments him, not quite knowing or caring of what he or she is doing. 
A masochist must find his own Venus in Furs who, while not a sadist proper, is 
sufficiently resilient, cruel, cold, and demanding to satisfy his hidden desires. 
This is what Leopold von Sacher-Masoch communicates to his readers.29 In his 
novels, masochists do not desire physical pain but some rather sophisticated 
forms of humiliation, mental suffering, and anguish. For example, a man longs 
for his loved one who persistently neglects and demeans him. She is there for 
him (as an ideal object of desire in de dicto sense) and at the same time she is 
not (as an individual person, or de re). This is what the man ultimately desires 
even if he begs her to change her behaviour. If she did, his love life would flop. 
Hence, a masochist struggles in a context he both hates and enjoys at the same 
time finding all that disgrace deeply meaningful. It is his desire’s essence and 
he hates it. This may look like Teasing-and-Denial but it is not: the love-object, 
the woman, does not play the game designed by the masochist as a victim; on 
the contrary, she plays no games. If she were, she would be giving something to 
the victim, the next move, which a cold and cruel person would never bother 
to do. She is not enjoying it; she could not care less. Both Sade and Sacher-
Masoch write fiction, though. The point is that the characters they created are 
very different from those of the persons playing in the field of bdsm, who en-
gage in these activities in a genuinely free and consensual manner.
 Problems with Consent
Consent means that some persons as rational agents freely agree to act in some 
way that is supposed to co-ordinate their actions and satisfy their desires ei-
ther jointly or individually. In this sense, consent means social co-operation, 
or a starting point of joint action. It is easy to see why consent is important 
in such a context as bdsm where the activities can be so unusual, dangerous, 
controversial, and subversive. Consent or co-operative agreement between a 
top and his or her bottom is important also for moral reasons. Without con-
sent the bottom can, with justification, blame the top for violating him and 
causing him unnecessary and ultimately unwanted suffering. In other words, 
consent turns the bdsm scene into a co-operative game, which then protects 
the participants against negative legal consequences. We can then ask whether 
29 See G. Deleuze, Coldness and Cruelty, and L. von Sacher-Masoch, Venus in Furs. Tr. J. Mc-
Neil. New York: Zone Books, 1989. Deleuze also writes about Sade.
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such consent should be explicit or is merely implicit consent sufficient. This is 
difficult to determine in any unequivocal manner. However, the problems of 
consent are crucially important when we discuss the moral aspects of bdsm.
The moral problems of consensual bdsm depend on the acceptable limits 
of consenting: it is obvious that a person, in normal circumstances, is not sup-
posed to be able to genuinely consent to everything that may be done to him or 
her. I cannot give you a morally or legally valid permission to kill me. Another 
relevant example is a slave contract. Now, the bottom agrees to stay on leash 
and wear a dog collar, obey and serve the top without asking any questions. 
Disobedience is severely punished and the slave can be auctioned away. In this 
sense, the bottom is supposed to be the top’s private property. Of course, ac-
cording to traditional natural law, slave contracts are forbidden; in the posi-
tive law they are unknown, but a discipline-oriented couple may well agree on 
such a contract. The main question is, of courses, how seriously all this should 
be taken. If it is just play-acting it may be justifiable but it also can be taken 
seriously – it is, however, difficult to say how seriously.
In certain situations, trivially enough, if drugged or coerced, a person’s con-
sent is invalid. If the person is mentally unbalanced her apparent consent is 
again invalid. In such cases, it cannot entail a valid permission to act on him or 
her. The problem is that consent should be free but it is not free if the person is 
mentally unbalanced, drugged, or coerced. In the case of mentally unbalanced 
persons it is difficult to verify that they know both what they are consenting 
to and what the consequences of their consent are. Their apparent consent is 
not properly informed. It follows that that a valid consent entails sufficient in-
formation and correct beliefs. You must not be cheated or mislead to consent. 
Such an information requirement is a complex issue we must neglect here.30
Some situations may be too dangerous to allow for consenting.31 For ex-
ample, someone who finds breath control or choking play personally accept-
able, desirable, rewarding, and exciting might consent to her partner making 
her faint by the lack of air. However, this may lead to death by asphyxiation 
and then it is unclear whether the top is morally and legally responsible. Two 
things can be said to contest such dangerous consent: it might be claimed that 
the consent is invalid because it is possible that certain consequences are risky 
30 See Nir Eyal “Informed Consent,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edi-
tion), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/
informed-consent/>. 
31 For a legal interpretation of this maxim, see C. White, “The Spanner Trials and the Chang-
ing Law on Sadomasochism in the UK.” In Kleinplatz and Moser, 2006, pp. 167–187. See 
M. Stocker, “Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology,” The Journal of Philosophy 
lxxvi (1979), 738–753. He argues that one may (rationally) want to hurt herself.
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but inadequately understood or appreciated by the bottom. At this stage her 
mental stability and competence may be re-evaluated. However, given that the 
bottom is risk-aware, informed, and mentally competent, it may be difficult to 
argue that the consent is invalid even though the activity in question were un-
common, disgusting, hard to comprehend, and seriously risky. After all, many 
commonly accepted social activities are seriously risky as well, for example, 
extreme sports. In professional boxing the fighters agree on a common but mu-
tually exclusive goal of incapacitating the other by violent means. No charges 
have been pressed even after a death in the ring. Why should bdsm be differ-
ent, as it in a legal perspective in fact is? The answer may well be: boxing is 
a fully institutionalized self-regulating activity with its own well-understood 
rules and norms, unlike bdsm that is just an informal field of dangerous activi-
ties. bdsm is thus compared with bar-room brawling rather that professional 
boxing. Whether this is a justified legal and moral idea should be reviewed 
critically. An attempt to protect a consenting, competent adult from herself, or 
from taking too serious risks, is paternalism, which is unjustifiable in a liberal 
moral framework.32
Now, a logical impasse may emerge. Suppose I think an S/M activity is dan-
gerous and repulsive. I infer it is impossible that anyone would like to partici-
pate in it freely and consensually. Justified by this key premise, I argue that 
the participant indeed is unfree, mistaken, and somehow coerced; hence, his 
apparent consent is invalid. Such faulty but such frequently exploited reason-
ing should not be taken seriously. It is, anyway, possible that you freely desire 
something that is incomprehensible to me and my social reference group. It is 
argued, from an outsider’s perspective, that when the risks of a bdsm activity 
are high and the activity in question somehow strange and disgusting the con-
senting person cannot be mentally normal. It cannot be normal to consent to 
that type of activity because any suggested motive to participate in it is incom-
prehensible. In other words, the outsiders, as a non-intended audience, refuse 
to understand the insiders’ life projects and the related reasons for action.
However, this way of thinking is question begging if there is no independent 
evidence for mental problems. What must be scrutinised is whether the per-
son is in fact mentally damaged because, say, he or she was sexually abused as 
a child. However, the same is not done in the case of professional boxers. This 
may, anyhow, explain in a seemingly valid way the strange desires as pathologi-
cal symptoms and thus allow us to dismiss consenting. A person’s pathologi-
cal state undermines his personal responsibility and voids his explicit consent. 
However, to do so we need first to verify the existence of psychological damage 
32 See H. Häyry (Gylling), The Limits of Medical Paternalism. London: Routledge, 1991.
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and then prove that it and not something else is the cause of the unaccept-
able behaviour in question. This is seldom possible. Ideally we should be case-
specific: this requires us to show that given damage X one will indeed later 
on demonstrate unrealistic, sexually relevant risk acceptance; moreover, we 
should also show that all or at least most who suffer from X would do so. There 
should not be X sufferers who do not display bdsm symptoms. The problem is 
that so many children are maltreated, so many have mental problems, and yet 
so few love bdsm. The key term is accurate prediction: does X reliably predict 
bdsm and only that? Accordingly, we should find a special type of X that accu-
rately predicts and explains bdsm. It is not easy to show that exactly this spe-
cific damage causes the allegedly abnormal behaviour exhibited in bdsm ac-
tivities. Without verifiable, detailed information about the history and causes 
of the relevant mental problems, all these so-called explanations are nothing 
but thinly veiled character assassinations. Moreover, from the fact that damage 
X predicts bdsm, it does not follow that bdsm is intrinsically undesirable or 
socially unacceptable – simply because X is involved.
 Safe and Sane?
bdsm play is, or should be, safe and sane – as the standard insiders’ saying 
goes.33 The ideological mantra is something like the following. Its deep ironies 
are easy to appreciate: the players enjoy activities that are supposed to exem-
plify the paradigms of blood, horror, pain, and danger, whose key metaphors 
are said to be life and death; yet, it all should be safe and sane. How can that 
be? Here the ironic aspect is created by the reference to safety when the play 
is supposed to appear as unsafe as possible, at least at the symbolic level. Now 
pain play starts looking like mere teasing, domination threatens to collapse 
into play acting, humiliation is based on pretending, and slavery becomes an 
innocent domestic role. We can say bdsm becomes gentrified. Such ironies 
create a tension within the whole field of bdsm: can it be taken seriously? 
Here is its secondary irony, bdsm must be made palatable to its unintended 
audiences, and especially to those social elite power wielders who may ban 
the whole movement; in other words, the ultimate expressions of subversion 
become the expressions of something like safe and sane practices. Under these 
conditions, why would the insiders bother anymore?
Somehow something must be done to make the play as safe as possible, with-
out compromising its inherent excitement. The basic rule is, no permanent 
33 See Newmahr, 2011, p. 146.
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personal harm or injury may ensue. Therefore, safe words are used; these are 
part of the consent discussed above. They are specific code words whose ut-
terance stops the play. Notice, that the bottom may scream and plead for the 
top to stop, which he is not going to do if the magic safe word is not uttered. 
When pain or humiliation is too much to take, uttering the safe word saves the 
bottom. As I said above, this pre-empts the whole idea of S/M play, if it is to 
be taken seriously. It is easy to see that this kind of soft ideology can and must 
be challenged. Therefore, safe words are not always used, namely, if they are 
against the very idea of the play, in this case edge play. Of course, a play with-
out a safe word can and will be genuinely dangerous, but some players insist on 
it, that is edge players, or those who participate in the most dangerous games, 
such as mock hangings or severe beatings, without subscribing to the normal 
code of “safe, sane, and consensual.”34 Perhaps the last condition, consent, is 
also the last one to disappear. When it is gone, the action is no longer a play, 
as it becomes real and all its inherent irony is gone as well. This is to say that 
without its ironies, bdsm is not what it is supposed to be. Irony is its essential 
feature or otherwise we will meet the shadow of the Marquis de Sade. The 
tropological landscape changes when the essential irony is replaced by the ro-
mance of self-destruction, impossible threats, and mortal danger at the edge 
of the abyss of horror. Tropologically, we move over from the mundane realms 
of metonymy to the ever fascinating depths of metaphor, from what is merely 
dangerous and subversive to what is criminal and sick.
Edge players may try and save their face by arguing that all that is required 
is that both players, the top and the bottom, understand the shared risks of the 
activity, or they are fully risk aware.35 “Sanity” now means risk aware, which 
represents the last vestige of consent in this context. Without risk awareness 
the bottom does not know what she is doing; she has no free will. Without it 
you have a bottom who is a mere victim to be violated at will by all power-
ful tops in the true Sadian manner. The lack of a safe word certainly makes 
the play more exciting and, what is important, more genuine, not only an “as-
if” play of pain and pleasure. I mean, without a safe word the play becomes 
more real and convincing, or less imaginary but also less metaphoric. This last 
point seems to contradict what I said above. Now, tropologically speaking, if a 
safe word tolerates S/M’s metaphors, the lack of it certainly signifies its return 
to metonymy, to raw reality. As Newmahr says, S/M is about life and death, 
first as symbols and now as a real possibility. You no longer play with the idea 
of death, you love and live it. The apparent contradiction between my two 
34 On edgework, see Newmahr, 2011, Ch. 7.
35 This is rack (risk aware consensual kink), see Newmahr, 2011, p. 147.
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accounts of the tropology of edge play can easily be reconciled as follows: its 
deeper metaphoric aspect is available only to the participants and their in-
tended audiences whereas the unintended audiences stay at the level of real-
ity and its harsh and trivial metonyms; in fact, this is where the accusations of 
pathological desire and criminal activity make their entrances. The metaphors 
become exclusive and incommunicado. Accusations of perversity and threats 
of punishment quickly ensue as the non-intended audiences wield their power 
to protect their own threatened sensibilities. What is subversive should not be 
taken lightly, or even mentioned in vain. What is called perverse represents 
dismay and panic when it comes too close.
∵
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Chapter 11
Tricky Sexual Differences: What Is Perversion?
The purpose of this paper is to explicate in detail why we should not use – or 
even mention – the terms perversion and pervert: these are not only essen-
tially contested but inherently discriminatory terms. Thomas Nagel’s famous 
article “Sexual Perversion” is an often reprinted contribution to the philosophy 
of sexuality. I critically review his arguments and compare them with those 
of Sigmund Freud and others. He explains the genesis of perversions based 
on developmental trauma. Freud does not identify and label perverted per-
sons in such a simplicistic manner as he admits that healthy persons may play 
with perverted desires. Yet, he also finds perversions pathological. All this talk 
should change because hetero vanilla sex cannot be the only viable type of sex. 
Of course, evil sexual practices exist, like rape, but this has nothing to do with 
perversity. Also sex and love are two separate things.
 The Tropes of Perversity
Sexuality is a touchy cultural topic loaded with a moralistic package, and there-
fore also strictly regimented by the church (mortal sin), positive law (crime), 
natural law (unnatural behaviour), tradition and its mores (dirty and disgust-
ing practices1). Medical lore follows suit: certain sexual desires are called para-
philias or paraphilic disorders as if they were pathologically symptomatic thus 
deserving a fancy name.2 For instance, bdsm (Bondage, Discipline, Sadism, 
and Masochism, also D/S or contractual domination and submissiveness) has 
been classified together with fetishism, paedophilia, zoophilia, coprophilia or 
scatology etc., so offensive is its popular image. For instance, the scatological 
fetish, or playing with human excrement, may be difficult to accept as normal.3 
1 Disgust is the key term when we discuss perversion, see for instance R. Herz, That’s Disgust-
ing. New York: Norton, 2012, Ch. 6 “Lust and Disgust.” Dirt stains and pollutes a person and 
brands him more or less permanently. Labels like “pervert” stick.
2 For the state of the medical debate on this, see S. Wright, “Depathologizing Consensual Sex-
ual Sadism, Sexual Masochism, Transvestic Fetishism, and Fetishism,” Arch Sex Behav (2010) 
39:1229–1230; and U. Khan, “Sadomasochism in Sickness and in Health: Competing Claims 
from Science, Social Science, and Culture,” Curr Sex Health Rep (2015) 7:49–58.
3 Scatology is an essential if nauseating part of M. de Sade’s idea of “simple pleasure”; see the 
early days and weeks of the 120 Days of Sodom. See also S. Freud, On Sexuality, Three Essays on 
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Is bdsm a perversion? Is it a paraphilia? Is it a paraphilic disorder? The best 
answer may well be in the negative; it is kinky and perhaps weird but these 
two terms are not necessarily condemnatory; their tropology today may be 
ironic, intentionally subversive, and multi-dimensionally suggestive, they may 
be socially unmanageable and even creatively playful. We may also call bdsm 
minority sex because minority is a relational or non-essential term – the situa-
tion may change when social conventions and customs change, like in the case 
of gay sex in many liberal cultures of today. However, calling bdsm perverse 
or paraphilic sex and a paraphilic disorder assigns it a non-relational or es-
sentially negative, unique and ultimately discriminatory characterization. An 
argument against such a negative rhetorical strategy exists: it is ad hoc. If you 
want to censure or condemn a type of wish, desire, need, or action you should 
not use a term that is tailor-made for this special purpose only; it is called nega-
tive labelling, which as such is an ad hoc strategy devoid of explanatory weight. 
The strategy has Biblical roots: to call a desire a sin is to label it as something 
against the religious canon; the next step is to metonymically relate sin to 
immorality; and thus a sectarian condemnation turns into a universalizable 
moral judgement. In this way, sin becomes applicable to everyday social life 
achieving in the process an extra-religious moralistic meaning tone that also 
seems to justify its use. Sin extends its halo into the fields of morality and the 
law. This happens to perversion and, to a lesser degree, to paraphilia as well.
It is customary to describe a kinky sexual activity in common negative terms, 
which make its disapproval appear not prejudiced but objective and coherent. 
However, one must avoid labelling or applying special categorical terms in an 
ad hoc manner, terms that work in a given context only. For instance, by calling 
bdsm sick, unnatural, immoral, or sinful you make it one of the activities con-
demned by the medical community, concerned citizens, and some Christian 
churches.4 Call it ugly, disgusting, criminal, and insane and you attract a differ-
ent audience. You should specify the reasons for your condemnation because 
no bad thing can be bad in its own unique way and in its own special mode, 
like the perverse or paraphilic activities allegedly are. But such specification 
may not be easy if you do not lean heavily on negative emotional terms.
When one uses the term perverse, one uses a term that condemns certain 
desires and actions within the broad and wide open field of sexuality and eroti-
cism. Such a usage is, tropologically speaking, fetishist. The word works as a 
the Theory of Sexuality, Pelican Freud Library Vol. 7. Tr. J. Strachey. London: Penguin Books, 
1977, p. 104, and about “disappearance of their anal eroticism,” in the case of those neurotics 
who are now “orderly, parsimonious, and obstinate” (p. 210).
4 See E. Berkowitz, Sex and Punishment. London: Westbourne Press, 2013.
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linguistic and rhetorical talisman, a magic name that is required to do one spe-
cial job only: to place a negative and discriminatory label on something that is 
already abhorred, or required to be so. This is because perversion has no inde-
pendent meaning base. As a verbal talisman and fetish it does not; instead, we 
create a new use for the word, or a new word, that has no independent mean-
ing base, no previous use or history. This is what a verbal fetish does, it works as 
if in a vacuum where its emerging effect looks like a kind of miracle. In the end, 
the irony of this all is that bdsm appears as a type of sexual fetishism, which 
condemns it as a perversion that in itself is a fetishist trope. Hence, to speak of 
perversions is perverted, which is nothing but criticism’s suicide.
Perversion talk as a linguistic performative convinces and condemns with-
out a reason or ground. Perhaps the general non-sexual meaning of perversion, 
if it has a discursive meaning, is something like happily but incomprehensi-
bly violating one’s own self or essential interests? A meaning like that can be 
coined but a glance at a thesaurus shows that perversion fails to have proper 
synonyms; the best I can find is distortion. bdsm would then be distorted sex, 
but along with such a trope we certainly approach the fuzzy realms of met-
aphor. If perversion means a hopelessly twisted affair it does not say much 
about sex; sex tends to be hopelessly twisted anyway in all its forms. That is 
why we talk about vanilla sex, but who says vanilla sex is a simple thing?5
I suppose the terms paraphilia and paraphilic disorder fare a little better in 
this respect but then they are technical medical terms that should be carefully 
unpacked in order to see what they cover and hide. Why coin such terms? Why 
not use statistical terms such as rare and uncommon? Even strange, non-stan-
dard, and abnormal might do. The question is, even if we prioritize vanilla sex, 
or sex that is or simulates human reproductive activity, what is the reason for 
condemning all the other sources of sexual pleasure? Why provide them with 
a common characterization after all? No good answer exists. It has been sug-
gested, of course, that paraphilic disorders are personally painful and harmful 
in the long run, and thus the sufferer tends to seek for help. They are in this 
sense like diseases. This may well be so but different people react differently to 
different activities. Some individuals flourish, some suffer, so that it is difficult 
to say anything informative about an activity like bdsm. A happy voyeur may 
5 A paradox of perversion: if perversion is sick sex, or deviant sex, one may desire it exactly 
because of this – the more sick and deviant the better. Perversion as the new normal would 
deprive perverts of their desire and pleasure; see J. Dollimore, Sex, Literature and Censorship. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, pp. 89ff. The problem is that this applies to vanilla sex as well. 
For some people all non-procreative sex is exciting and normatively ambiguous, think of de-
vout Catholics. The other side of the paradox is that deviant desires may be a source of great 
pain. Can one want sick sex because of its painfulness?
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exist along with others who suffer because of their desire. If they cause true 
social harm, they commit a misdemeanour and crime, which is an altogether 
different worry. The best rule of thumb is, as it seems to me, if bdsm related 
desire brings about intolerable pain, suffering, and harm (de se) to a person 
that calls for psychotherapy and medical help. However, even in this case one 
might want to resist the temptation of calling bdsm the problem. The relevant, 
in this case harmful, activities need not be condemned in a broader context. 
The sexual disorder is this person’s own personal problem. In fact, it is his own 
problem like any other problems he may have. We may call it a bdsm gener-
ated problem; say, deep anxiety and depression, just like we call a broken leg 
a fall related bone problem. Yet, one cannot say bdsm is the problem because 
happy bdsm aficionados exist, we know that. bdsm is not like a broken leg.
 Freud: Perverted and Pathological Desires
Any account of any type of perversion provided by the members of its non-
intended audience tends to be philosophically and analytically objectionable. 
The same can be said of scholarly definitions. I give two examples, a classic 
psychoanalytical definition by Sigmund Freud, and later on the famous philo-
sophical one by Thomas Nagel. Other definitions exist but these two are, as 
far as I can see, representative and certainly influential. Sigmund Freud first 
notices that obviously healthy people may make certain strange additions to 
their otherwise normal and healthy vanilla sex centred sexual repertoire.6 Un-
like Nagel, he maintains that they are normal, except that their sexual life is or 
tends to be abnormal, and, hence, sexual perversions do not always require a 
psycho-pathological aetiology or signify anything like mental illness. Hence, 
perverted sex is predicated on desires, activities, and practices, and not on per-
sons. Nevertheless, Freud says that many sexual desires and practices are “so 
far removed from the normal in their content that we cannot avoid pronounc-
ing them ‘pathological’.”7 Here a dubious emphasis is placed on non-statistical 
and pseudo-normative reference to something called normal. This is the cen-
tral trope in conservative contexts whose key purpose is to put a lid on the life 
and language of some activities that are too shameful to mention. Again, Freud 
6 He repeats this idea, see Freud, 1977, p, 74, also pp. 61–62, 66, 74, 87. Ultimately, it sounds as if 
perversion is internal to all sexuality, which comes close to saying that no healthy or normal 
sexuality exists.
7 Freud, 1977, p. 74. This is a bad idea, for obvious reasons. A gloriously beautiful person is not 
pathological. A mathematical genius may not be pathological.
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says that some practices, and not people, are sick and so, metonymically, they 
make people sick. Such desires and practices should carry a label “Do Not Try!” 
Fetishism, including some aspects of bdsm, certainly belongs to this category 
almost by definition: a fetishist attaches sexual value to non-sexual things and 
actions, which, consequently, are “so far removed from the normal.” The idea 
is clear: A woman’s shoe – an industrial artefact – is indeed far removed from 
normal sexual objects.
Freud’s definition of perversion, or abnormal and pathological sex, contains 
a preliminary point and two main parts. First, perversion metonymically re-
places vanilla sex taking its role in life and language. Then the first part of the 
definition itself: perversion entails a “sexual instinct […] overriding the resis-
tance or shame, disgust, horror, and pain”; and the second part: “perversion 
has the characteristic of exclusiveness and fixation.” Especially the second part 
should justify the epithet perverse as a pathological symptom.8 But a person 
may show, in vanilla sex, a strong fixation to the partner’s genitals – obviously 
Freud does not mean this. Perversions are supposed to be endlessly repetitive 
and fully rigid and in this sense demeaning, inhuman, or machine like – when 
machine becomes the hidden key metaphor in this context. Only machines 
are fully rigid. This is interesting even if it does not really apply to bdsm, as it 
easy to verify. The members of bdsm community can be and are fully flexible 
with their desires, say, a top and a bottom may change their roles (see Ch. 10).9 
Nevertheless, active bdsm community members are able to deal with “shame, 
disgust, horror, and pain” – this is the name of their game. A submissive person 
is supposed to enjoy disgusting humiliation. Therefore, what Freud is afraid of 
they desire, which is a source of irony here. In fact, Freud emphasizes disgust 
as an essential component in connection with perversions.10
Notice that shame and disgust apply to many or most people who are start-
ing their sex lives; it can be hard to perform a complete fellatio (give head) 
or cunnilingus (eat pussy) and enjoy it. In vanilla sex, genitals may remain a 
source of disgust, which the sexual lust then overrides. But you do not become 
perverted when you get used to it. Freud’s, and we will see, Nagel’s definitions 
are conservative and perhaps logically dubious. Their main purpose is to jus-
tify the desire for vanilla sex by making its alternatives look bad to the non- 
intended audiences of the type of sex play in question.
8 S. Freud, 1977, p. 75; also pp. 66–67 and p. 75.
9 Freud (1977, p. 73) says that a “sadist is always at the same time a masochist,” and that 
entails flexibility.
10 Freud, 1977, pp. 64, 76 etc.
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 Nagel: the Substantiality Thesis
Thomas Nagel’s “Sexual Perversion” (SP in what follows) has been reprinted 
numerous times and widely quoted.11 He has a mission, namely, to reveal the 
secrets of good sex and not only good sex but ethically sustainable sex as well. 
The paper seems to have a special appeal to a wide range of specialists in the 
philosophy of sex and sexuality. Therefore, I ask a simple question, namely, 
is this justified? If it is, we should find a solid and valid analysis of good sex 
and a convincing reason to reject a wide variety of sexual desires and prac-
tices because they are perverted. Concerning sexual perversions in SP, I find 
three layers: first, Nagel defends the idea that the idea of sexual perversion is a 
substantial one; that is, it is not a mere colloquial pejorative term. Second, he 
provides us a narrative account of non-perverted and ideal sexual behaviour. 
Third, he tells us what sexual perversion is and what causes it. I deal with these 
points one by one.
Let us now look into the details of SP. The first argument has two parts, first 
the argument from anti-relativity and then the argument from generalization. 
Nagel writes,
What is regarded as unnatural admittedly varies from culture to culture, 
but the classification is not a pure expression of disapproval of distaste. 
In fact it is often regarded as a ground for disapproval, and that suggests 
that the classification has independent content.12
The key concept here and throughout the paper is unnatural. Anyway, the first 
part of Nagel’s substantiality argument says that however much different cul-
tures and times vary in terms of their sexual ethics they all use a notion of 
unnatural sex, which they disapprove. They have their ideas about good and 
acceptable sex as well as on bad and forbidden sex, or unnatural, sex. We have 
found a cultural universal. Often they reject something because of the viola-
tion of a taboo, for instance. Unnatural as a condemnatory term may not have 
such a universal appeal as Nagel believes.13 Roman Catholic philosophers use 
the term freely but that is another thing. Be this as it may, the main point is that 
11 T. Nagel, “Sexual Perversion” (in his Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979) has been recently reprinted, for instance, in such a major textbook as G. Fos-
ter, Ed., Desire, Love, and Identity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
12 Nagel, 1979, p. 40.
13 Well, this is easy to say, but look for instance M. Douglas, Purity and Danger. London: 
Routledge, 1966/2008, p. 175: “The people [Walbiri of Central Australia] have no beliefs 
concerning sexual pollution.”
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in many cultures the tit-for-tat arousal between man and woman is considered 
weird or even impossible. Ancient Greeks may have thought so. Plato hated 
painted ladies and desired beautiful young men even if he hardly imagined 
that they would desire him. Are these people perverted?
The second part of the argument for substantiality is the generalization 
thesis, which begins like this: “Can we imagine anything that would qualify 
as gastronomical perversion?”14 Nagel answers his own question thus: “Even 
an appetite can have perversions if in addition to its biological function it has 
a significant psychological structure.” I am not sure this is true of appetite for 
food. We do not use the term perversion in any serious sense in connection 
with food. Sex is, indeed, a special case. I am not a pervert if I desire dog meat, 
bull’s balls, or pig’s trotters. If one eats excrement one is probably psychotic. If 
one entertains sexual interests in a dog or pig, one is, colloquially speaking, a 
pervert. Perversion indeed is, when it us used seriously, a special negative term 
dedicated to sexuality. Nagel has not shown the substantial and generalized 
nature of the concept of perversion.
The gastronomical part of SP is important because it hints at what Nagel 
really is after, and that is his ideal sex as love. Culturally I see it as a typical 
Hollywood Americanism. Sex without love is dirty business. Perhaps this has 
something to do with the fact that that porn industry flourishes in the US but 
prostitution is strictly illegal, except in the great state of Nevada. Anyway, Na-
gel writes: “any omelet with the crucial characteristics would do as well,” when 
I desire and find a perfect omelette. Next, Nagel says, “any person with the 
same flesh distribution” would not do equally well when it comes to sex. In sex, 
there is something more than sex, which I call love. This reveals the underlying 
moralism in Nagel’s paper: I do not love omelets, except perhaps metaphori-
cally, but I love my sex partner. This and only this explains the difference.15 
Now, if we discuss sex qua sex one may well desire any potential partner who 
displays that same, lovely “flesh distribution.” Sex is like that and that is why 
some people think of all sex as bad and dirty business. To make sex more pal-
atable Nagel discusses ideal sex, which is nothing but sexually loaded type of 
love, although he shuns the term. He does not like to discuss love although he 
is unable to avoid it. In the modern urban secular world, sex and love are two 
separate things. The quest for mutual respect between the partners is another 
matter. Respect is a moral term and morality is always in demand. But love is 
too much to ask for.
14 Nagel, 1979, p. 42.
15 My wife suggests the following argument: A perfect omelet made by your loving wife is 
certainly preferable to a similar restaurant omelet.
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 Nagel: Ideally Good Sex, or in the Singles Bar
What is the very best sex like then? Nagel argues, “[sex] involves a desire that 
one’s partner be aroused by the recognition of one’s desire that he or she be 
aroused.” This tit-for-tat arousal sometimes happens but it is obviously too am-
bitious as a requirement, as Nagel recognizes, too. I wonder why he bothers to 
introduce the point. You and your partner may have mutually different sources 
and causes of arousal and yet your sex is certainly not perverted only because 
of that. However, if you two share “reciprocal interpersonal sexual awareness” 
you cannot go wrong. But what if I am aroused by the sight of your high heeled 
shoe and you are aroused by my arousal, independently of its source? How 
should one judge this exchange? It may be perverted, I suppose. Nagel may 
answer that the source of arousal must be perceived arousal, yet you must start 
somewhere. The question is, what is the relevant starting point of the cycle 
of arousals? What characteristics of the other person one should find initially 
attractive? What if I find only ugly persons sexy? What about their hair? If so, 
is it fetishism?
Ideal sex is always natural and normal, says Nagel. Is bdsm, as a test case, 
perverted by Nagel’s standards? One thing is certain, however, bdsm can also 
be a mutually agreeable, freely chosen, and fully rewarding, mutually commu-
nicative sexual experience, as reported by the participants themselves. The top 
is aroused by the expressed pain of the bottom and the bottom is aroused by 
the top’s aggression. Of course, Nagel may say that the sources of arousal here 
are not sexual in nature and not the same for both players, as they are in ideal 
vanilla sex: both partners are aroused by the sexual arousal of the partner, sym-
metrically. Is it important that the mutual sources of arousal are fully sym-
metrical? I do not understand why this should be so.
According to SP, a normal man goes to a bar and notices a nice looking nor-
mal woman who notices him.16 They spy on each other and both believe that 
one finds the other sexually attractive and displays the first signs of arousal. 
Anyway, all this leads them to a virtuous circle where he gets excited from 
her being excited and the same happens with her.17 Finally they both are suf-
ficiently aroused to meet and talk, and then they to go to bed and satisfy their 
mutual lust: “For sexual arousal might begin with a person sensing that he is 
sensed being assailed by the perception of the other person’s desire rather 
16 Do singles bars still exist? (See https://punchdrink.com/articles/whatever-happened-to-
the-singles-bar-tgi-fridays-maxwells-plum/). Today, sex traffic is on the net.
17 The paradoxes of this recursive approach are shown by R.D. Laing, Knots. New York: Vin-
tage, 1970.
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than merely by the perception of the person. But there is a further step.” In 
bed, we get pleasure from the pleasure of the other. The more the other enjoys 
the more I enjoy her enjoyment. In this way we both reach the maximal enjoy-
ment. “[H]e becomes conscious of his sexuality through his awareness of its 
effects on her and her awareness that this effect is due to him.”18 Nagel is (too) 
strongly influenced by Jean-Paul Sartre here. Their concepts of flesh and sexu-
ality do not come to an agreement. For Sartre, flesh meets flesh and becomes 
one, but for Nagel this cannot happen because one always must recognize the 
other, which entails a certain distance. Nagel’s ideal couple never really fucks. 
Suppose I go to bed with my partner in order to see him or her react to my own 
sexuality. This may be important to me but it cannot be the point, if I am not 
a single minded narcissist or a pervert. Moreover, I do not understand what 
it means to become conscious of my own sexuality in this context. If one is 
a virgin, it may be fine but for an established husband or wife the situation is 
certainly different. As I see it, a sex act is for sexual satisfaction and orgasm. Yet 
I agree that sex is not only for sexual pleasure; sexual enjoyment is more that 
sexual pleasure as such.
I can of course see what Nagel means, namely, the moral ideal is a sexual 
encounter where the partners fully recognize each other as players of the same 
interactive game. However, many other ways to practice the best sex exist, also 
outside the singles bar, for instance, between well-established married cou-
ples. They need not spy on each other at a distance. Actually, anonymous sex 
between two strangers is seldom that good, or think of the glory hole. I wonder 
why Nagel makes his theory so dependent on mutual arousal and lust when 
he earlier hinted at the role of love. In a singles bar they as if serve omelets 
and other treats where the good distribution of flesh is all that counts. People 
there may avoid all references to love. I agree with Nagel that morally good sex 
requires that the partners at least recognize each other. But then, if that is the 
sole requirement, some perverts might achieve it as well. Nagel should some-
how show that only natural and normal sex allows first for mutual recognition 
and then love.
The problems of the SP model of the best sex are then obvious. I mention 
two special problems. The first one is narcissism and, second, lack of sexual 
content. In the single’s bar narrative the narcissistic aspect is overpowering.19 
Next, the tit-for-tat model of mutual recognition may not be sexual. The only 
way out is to say that both parties are interested in sex and then they expect 
18 Nagel, 1979, p. 46. Jon Nuttall in his Moral Questions: An Introduction to Ethics (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1993, p. 74) supports the same idea.
19 See J. Berman, Narcissism in Novel. New York: New York University Press, 1990, p. 21.
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to derive their forthcoming pleasure from it. Therefore, they interact with the 
other person in order to enjoy maximal mutual arousal. They interact to score, 
get laid, and receive their share of sexual pleasure. If they are moral individuals 
they fully respect the other’s similar interests and they understand that with-
out mutual recognition their own sexual enjoyment must be lacking. The bot-
tom line is indeed sexual pleasure, not their mutual recognition or one’s ability 
to make the other sexually aroused. The key point is that when the time is 
ripe for the sexual pleasure a moral person takes care of the partner; thus both 
may enjoy sex equally. Alas, the problem is that moral people, who alone are 
capable of the best sex, may not derive more sexual pleasure out of the sex act 
than bad people. They may feel better about their sexual exploits because they 
know they also gave pleasure, which is nice. They validly believe that they are 
not perverts, which is even nicer. A bad person may, alas, feel better when he 
thinks of her ability to non-consensually hurt and humiliate the partner – but 
this is not best sex according to Nagel.
 Nagel: the Genesis of Sexual Perversion
Nagel’s definition of sexual perversion in SP is something like this: A sexual in-
clination qualifies as a perversion if and only if it exists because of a particular 
psychological trauma in the person’s earlier life. This presupposes a damaged 
person, or a pervert. Perhaps we can add: later in life the inclination becomes 
urgent and compulsive. For instance, this particular trauma has made the per-
son unable to recognize another person’s sexual arousal or to love him. Alter-
nately, because of the trauma, the person’s sexual focus is turned away from its 
vanilla objects; think of fetishism. Fetishism bypasses the recognition of the 
other as a person because the focus is on an object that is as such non-sexual. 
Let us now ask how Nagel argues for his definition.
Perverted sex is unnatural: “The concept of perversion implies that a nor-
mal sexual development has been turned aside by distorting influences” and 
“if humans will tend to develop some version of reciprocal interpersonal sex-
ual awareness unless prevented, then the cases of blockade can be called un-
natural or perverted.” Here is then Nagel’s famous theory of sexual perversion. 
Perversion means unnatural sex and unnatural means that a person’s normal 
psycho-sexual development became distorted by some external influences or 
trauma so that the person, say, becomes unable to recognize the other. Notice 
that for Nagel people are perverted and abnormal when in the case of Freud 
acts and practices are perverted. For Nagel, a mentally healthy person cannot 
play perverted games; for Freud she can. But how can I know that this normal 
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looking particular sex habit I am truly fond of, and which my partner seems to 
enjoy as well, is not the result of a trauma at some point of my psycho-sexual 
development? It is possible that my preference is a sexual perversion. Hence, 
I am unsure whether I am a pervert and in need of psychotherapy. Even when 
my sexual preferences are apparently normal they may be perverted. A trauma 
is not always remembered. Obviously, Nagel should first say that the trauma is 
the cause of dysfunctional sex, and then specify what is dysfunctional. But he 
only says that tit-for-tat arousal is functional, which is not enough.
Nagel writes, sex between normal persons can “achieve its goal on occasion” 
and thus provides “the conception of perversion with a foothold.” What could 
this mean? As I see it, we sometimes have very good sex, as close to the ideal 
as humanely possible, which is impossible in the field of perversions (cf. the 
final chapter of this paper). Perversions may hedonistically be as good as you 
like, but still they somehow fail. Nagel’s argument goes like this: The ideal and 
best sex is based on mutual recognition and arousal, perverts are unable to do 
so, hence their sex is always less than ideally good: “But if humans will tend 
to develop some version of reciprocal interpersonal sexual awareness unless 
prevented, then cases of blockage can be called unnatural or perverted.”20 This 
is what one can expect when the persons are perverted. Perverts may fare well 
but they can never reach perfection.
Hence, under Nagel’s own criteria for instance consensual bdsm qualifies 
as a sexual perversion, to say nothing of non-consensual sadism, but his cri-
teria seem ad hoc. He infers that bdsm players must be somehow damaged 
individuals. However, we have no idea of the natural, or free and spontaneous, 
development of human sexuality because early sex education is always socially 
controlled and even coercive. We have no idea what kind of sexuality Homo sa-
piens would develop were he and she fully unconstrained. Perhaps it would be 
wild, perhaps tame, and most likely promiscuous and bi-sexual. It may contain 
bestiality. The truth is that indigenous and aboriginal cultures employ wildly 
different sexual mores and practices. The Christian norms are not universal, 
nor is the Victorian heritage unquestionably natural, that much is clear. What 
is nearly universal is the multidimensional anxiety brought about by sex and 
sexuality in its non-intended audiences. It is true that all cultures control sex, 
even if Margaret Mead in Samoa did not realize it.21
20 Nagel, 1979, p. 49.
21 A particularly impressive account is in G.H. Herdt, The Guardians of the Flutes. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1987, pp. 234ff.; and R.M. Berndt and C.H. Berndt, The First 
Australians. Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 1999, Ch. vi. Think of the controversy 
over Margaret Mead’s vision of perfectly free consensual sex in Samoa inspired by D. 
Freeman, Margaret Mead and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropological 
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What Nagel means, as I see it, is that sexual perversions are trauma based 
obsessive-compulsive mental disorders. If the trauma causally determines 
one’s sexual inclination, it will be repeated across all or most sexual contexts 
in one’s life. Nagel’s concept of sexual perversion is, thus, obsessive-compulsive; 
this is what he aims to explain – without mentioning or explicating this point. 
But, what if a pervert shows some flexibility in his abnormal preferences? Na-
gel is then in trouble. For instance, some S/M players freely switch between 
the roles of top and bottom, as Freud knows. Sometimes they like to watch. 
They are flexible even if sadism is a paradigm example of sexual perversions in 
SP. Compulsive rigidity is not a necessary condition of sexual perversity. Is it 
sufficient? Of course it is not. If I must kiss my wife in bed, I am not perverted 
only because of this.
Now, it is clear that sexual perversions are not necessarily rare or even un-
common. So we can forget the statistical meaning of abnormal. What about 
abnormal in the sense of violating a norm? This meaning fits the common idea 
of sexual perversion nicely, if we add like Freud that perversions are disgust-
ing. As Nagel says, sex is always a regulated social affair. Sexual perversions are 
abnormal in the sense that they include sexual behaviour that violates impor-
tant social norms. Perhaps sexual perversion designates sexual behaviour that 
breaks certain social norms of normal sexual behaviour. What if the norms is: 
Do not perform disgusting social acts, if the act is not vanilla sex? Such norms 
can be reasonable or unreasonable; popular or partisan; medical, religious, or 
legal; conventional or radical; traditional or novel; new or old. They may ex-
press a blind taboo, psychological disgust, elite opinion, medical community’s 
scientific theory, or religious dogma – the opportunities are limitless. More-
over, the ideas of sexual perversion are malleable, as the homosexual narra-
tives show. Another example is masturbation.22 When norms change certain 
forms of sex get liberated and when this happens more and more people find 
their variety tempting. People want to explore new possibilities because they 
feel free and unconstrained, which is fun. Incidentally, Nagel stumbles when 
he evaluates the status of homosexuality and sadism. Sadism is first a per-
version “if anything is” and then sadism is a “really difficult case” to evaluate. 
About homosexuality, he recognizes that homosexual sex can be as good as 
Myth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983. Mead was a sensation and Free-
man a scandal because so many people wanted to believe in “good” sex at least in one 
place in the world; also see (https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-imprinted 
-brain/201702/margaret-mead-and-the-great-samoan-nurture-hoax). Nagel’s good sex is 
Mead’s Samoan sex.
22 M. Foucault pays attention to the childhood masturbation panic in early 1900s, see his 
Abnormal. Tr. G. Burgchell. London: Verso, 2003, Ch. 5.
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heterosexual but then he says that it is possible that it is unnatural, depending 
on the genesis of the relevant desire. This is to say that of two similar sexual 
acts one may be perverted and one normal. The ambiguity is startling.
 Some Probable Reasons for the Success of SP
Why did so many editors want to reprint SP? Why is it constantly mentioned in 
literature on sex? Why has SP been so enviably successful and still is? Who are 
the readers of the paper? Do people read it? How do they see it? What does it 
do to university students? These questions require an answer, because SP has 
its problems and shortcomings. It is a suggestive but carelessly argued paper. 
At the same time it obviously is an appealing piece of writing by a famous phi-
losopher who has an excellent reputation all over the world, or at least wher-
ever philosophy is studied and practiced. At the same time not many major 
philosophers have touched such issue as sex and sexuality, to say nothing of 
perversion, a taboo. The topic is more or less disgusting even in liberal coun-
tries, not in the sense that it could not be mentioned but in the sense that go-
ing too deep into case-studies, examples, and terminology is highly suspicious 
and also nauseating to many. SP avoids such pitfalls smoothly. It is written in 
a style that allows for no objection on the basis of obscenity. It is impossible 
to censor.
The main point, however, is that SP provides us with a reasoned conserva-
tive account of sexuality, its fringes, and those peculiar extensions that some of 
us still want to call perversions. SP is conservative, it detects an enemy, it says 
that the enemy is real, studies it, explains its genesis, and at least indirectly 
shows us the way out. This is done by telling what the ideal case of a sexual 
encounter is, or narrating the best sex. As we have seen, this is sex between un-
damaged strangers who fully recognize each other and derive their arousal and 
allegedly also their pleasure from the observation that they are able to excite 
each other sexually. This looks like a seductive scenario in the sense that both 
partners are fully equal, they interact in their mutual ways, and both partners 
have their full-fledged opportunity to sexual pleasure. Also, this scenario does 
not prescribe any special type of sexual activity, which may be anything you 
want and everything that is sexual and created via mutual recognition. This 
certainly allows for homosexuality but not for instance bestiality. However, Na-
gel certainly does not want to accept S/M, however consenting.
SP does not deserve the reputation it has. Perhaps the following facts ex-
plain its prolonged success: SP is written by a leading philosopher, SP deals 
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with a rare topic in the English language philosophy, the topic is superbly in-
teresting and emotionally challenging, the argument is conservative and as 
such minimally disturbing, the style is so abstract that no nasty sexual images 
emerge, the concept of ideal sex is pleasing to both sexes, the ideal sex is for 
middle-class, healthy, young, nice people who visit suitable social venues, fre-
quent the dating sites on the net in search of sex and companionship, and 
most importantly, nothing much is said about sexual perversions. We find no 
descriptive accounts of perverse sex or even their names. SP paints a picture 
in which sexual perversion is just a name and a philosopher’s little tame game 
that can be discussed at the dinner table. You may not want to eat all those 
strange dishes, but those who want to do so you know are traumatized. It is 
a consoling thought. They are damaged persons. The final consolation to the 
reader is that no one chooses their perversions freely. You, an honest, good, 
normal, middle-class person, are safe. Perversity always is the problem of the 
Other. You may want strange things in bed but it does not matter because you 
are not traumatized and you know it.
Finally, this is the main attraction of SP: it recommends sex as a moral affair 
that is intimately connected to recognition and love, which the good people 
enjoy more than the bad. Nagel preaches a moralistic model that also suits 
religious educators and responsible editors who want to look cool, calm, con-
trolled, and enlightened. What has this to do with perversions and sexual per-
verts? Practically nothing, as I have tried to argue. If SP is not read critically its 
effect will be, as far as I can see, negative from the point of view of sexual lib-
erty and mutual understanding between people of diverse sexual preferences 
and inclinations. I do not think we should label anyone psychologically injured 
and his or her sexual inclinations unnatural without thinking what we are do-
ing. As I said, the basic rule is, also in the modern sexual jungle, condemn those 
who maltreat others and help those who suffer because of their own personal 
inclinations.23 That is all that should interest us. Let us not try to rationalize 
and promote personal prejudices about sex.24
23 Think of the poor narcissists, Berman, 1990, p. 18: “Behind narcissists’ self-love lies self-
hate, behind their grandiosity lies insecurity.”
24 Even sexual therapists are not innocent of this fallacy. J. Virtanen in his sexology textbook 
Kliininen sexologia (Clinical Sexology) (Helsinki: wsoy, 2001) notices that some women 
find it easier to reach orgasm when their movements during sex are forcefully re-
stricted. If this is a necessary condition for an orgasm, he says, the person is paraphilic 
(p. 115). This is a dubious claim.
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 Cases of Criticism
Narcissism: A narcissist is psychologically incapable of the SP style best sex, 
this should be obvious, because her focus is always solely on herself. However, 
narcissism is not a sexual perversion; it is an ego or character problem. Now, 
according to SP, the best sex begins when you are aroused by your perception 
that the other is aroused because of you. Such a perception is a narcissist reac-
tion, which is clear when one thinks of a non-veridical perception of the other. 
It is not necessary for you to be a proper narcissistic personality in order to find 
such a perception superbly appealing, although it helps. It may just appeal to 
your narcissist side. The same can be said about the other. Therefore, the first 
steps towards good sex are best taken by two proto-narcissists. Other persons 
are in trouble if they are unable to believe that they are so sexually attractive 
that such an attractive other could be serious in his/her admiration.
Now, think of what happens when you end up in bed with your new admir-
er. According to SP, you now get your enjoyment out of the situation where you 
please the other and bring about the maximal sexual pleasure to her, and she 
feels the same. In this case, you and the other behave like altruists for whom 
the pleasure of the other is the most important thing. What you aim at is the 
veridical perception that the other enjoys you in bed. The other thinks in the 
same way, so you two enjoy great and even ideal sex. Under these conditions 
the sexual encounter works well, as SP emphasizes. However, the psychologi-
cal demands on you and the other obviously make an inconsistent set: a nar-
cissist is now supposed to convert into an altruist. Your focus will change from 
yourself (he/she likes me) to your partner (I want to please him/her) so that 
the beginning calls for a narcissist and the end for an altruist. People can do 
that only if they are not true narcissists, otherwise they cannot. In this way the 
requirements are mutually incompatible. I do not think the quest for the pre-
sentation of such a double personality is a good idea. Think of an advice given 
to a young person: start as a narcissist and then switch over to altruism, and all 
will be fine, your partner will like you.
Sexual Pleasure: If I derive my sexual enjoyment in bed from pleasing the 
other, the situation looks abnormal, if not perverted. I please the other in bed 
when I should take care of my own sexual pleasure. I do not go to bed with the 
other to please her or see her react to my action for the simple reason that this 
is not a sexual motive. I go to bed in order the get my maximal sexual pleasure 
out of the situation, but given that I am a moral person, I do not want to satisfy 
myself regardless of the other’s satisfaction, and certainly not at the expense of 
the other. In the first case I am a sexual predator and in the second an exploiter. 
My motive for having sex is sexual pleasure even if the morally laudable motive 
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for having sex also recognises the other’s similar interests. The bottom line is, 
therefore, that when I go to bed with the other I want sexual pleasure. Nagel 
writes, mysteriously, “if enjoyment is considered very important” in good sex; 
how could it not be?25
Is Nagel’s SP style altruism in bed a perversion? It is not, according to how 
I understand perversions. However, according to the SP model of sexual per-
version the matter is not so simple. Suppose we locate a psychological trauma 
in the life history of the sexual altruist that explains why he is not primarily 
seeking for his own sexual pleasure but that of the other and deriving his en-
joyment from it. Because of his trauma he, as an altruist, is incapable of getting 
pleasure directly from sex. He always prefers the other’s enjoyment to his own 
sexual pleasure. This just might qualify him as a sexual pervert. You must not 
go to bed to please the other. Your sexual behaviour is then unnatural. To exag-
gerate a little, you are the other’s consenting sexual slave.
Explanation of Sexual Perversions: What is wrong with the explanation of 
the origin of sexual perversion in SP? Suppose a trauma T explains sexual per-
version P. This is possible but only if we know what P is, and SP says precious 
little about perversions, actually so little we do not know what they look like. 
However, if you want to use the SP model of their explanation you must first 
correlate T and P. If the correlation is high enough you may proceed towards 
showing that T brings about P. The trouble is that SP never says what P is like 
and thus we cannot establish any correlation between T and P. We only learn 
that sadism is a perverse preference but not what the fully identifying descrip-
tion of sadism is. Therefore, SP can say only this much: given that you can 
identify the forms of sexual perversion you also can identify their causal his-
tory, which is explicable in terms of a mental trauma. Each trauma causally 
produces its corresponding perversion. Such an explanatory method is fine, 
but as I said you must first provide a descriptive account of perversions, which 
SP definitely fails to do. You cannot explain what you do not know.
Think of two persons A and B who share exactly the same sexual inclina-
tions and the relevant behavioural patterns, say, they are sadists. A has suffered 
an identifiable and verifiable psychological trauma at some point of his early 
life, which explains his sexual perversion. B’s history does not contain any simi-
lar traumatic events but yet he is a compulsive sadist, too. According to Nagel, 
we must say that B is not a sexual pervert, unlike A. In B’s case her sadism is, 
say, a socially learned bad habit and thus we cannot call her a sexual pervert. It 
follows that often, or perhaps in most cases, we do not know whether a sadist is 
sexually perverted, because we cannot find a trauma in one’s life history, or we 
25 Nagel, 1979, p. 52.
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cannot prove that his trauma is responsible for a sexual perversion this person 
happens to exhibit. The cause of the phenomenon is not part of the meaning 
of the phenomenon. If you break your leg by falling at home or on the football 
field, it is still just a broken leg. If you want to know what a broken leg is, it is 
not enough to talk about football games and say a broken leg is what you get 
when you play football. I should not call a doctor and say I have what one gets 
on the football field. She wants to know what I have.
Cultural relativism vs. scientific explanation: Nagel says that all cultures draw 
a distinction between good and bad sex, or normal or natural and twisted or 
perverted sex, although the patterns of good sex varies widely between the cul-
tures. In our Christian, post-Victorian cultural environment we call tit-for-tat 
arousal based vanilla sex (V) normal and natural. What a happy co-incidence 
it is that we can show scientifically that non-traumatized and undamaged per-
sons tend to develop in this direction. Psychological trauma and developmen-
tal damage explain perverted character and desires, say, X.
Now, suppose that, in a temporally or ethnically distant culture K, people ap-
preciate sexual behaviour X and condemn V. Scientifically speaking it follows 
that the members of K are somehow damaged individuals because only the 
relevant damage brings about such behaviour. It is true that distant cultures 
have social norms that deviate from our norms. This may show that perversion 
is a substantial concept but it also shows that the members of those cultures 
are psychological damaged perverts. The question is, how can we help them 
and make them understand the value of V. These people are simply wrong 
when they disapprove and condemn V and prefer X. I find this conclusion rath-
er alarming. One should not mix cultural relativism and scientific objectivism.
In sum: I desire X and, therefore, I am a pervert in the scientific sense that I 
am a damaged individual. In culture K, person P desires X and, therefore P is a 
pervert, too. P is a damaged individual. However, P has learned that X is good 
sex, but he is wrong. I have learned that X is not good sex and I am right. Yet, 
I cannot control my desires, which is typical of my illness.
Best sex: In the last two pages Nagel panics and attempts to save face. He as 
if condemned perversions in the main argument of the SP, but now he wants 
to take it all back. He said earlier that perverted sex, or sex by perverts, cannot 
be ideal sex. Now he writes, “It is not clear that unperverted sex is necessarily 
preferable to the perversions.” This is to say, perverts can enjoy sex, or have as 
good sex as normal people, which is a strange idea. If a pervert is always and 
necessarily a damaged person, how can his/her sex be ideally good? If a pervert 
is a person who is damaged by the relevant trauma but their sex life is perfect, 
why speak of trauma at all? Can I really say, I am a damaged person but it does 
not matter? What is a damage that has no consequences? Of course, a pervert 
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may like sadomasochistic games or homosexual encounters, unlike the normal 
person, but what does this matter if both fully enjoy beautiful sex?
In the end, SP self-destructs:
[E]ven someone who believed, for example, that homosexuality was a 
perversion could admit a distinction between better and worse homosex-
ual sex, and might even allow that good homosexual sex could be better 
sex than not very good unperverted sex. If this is correct, it supports the 
position that, if judgements of perversion are viable at all, they represent 
only one aspect of the possible evaluation of sex, even qua sex.26
Even if the idea of perversion were valid, which is not certain, it does matter 
when we discuss sex. Why Nagel did write SP, becomes unclear. And he forgets 
that in SP he really discusses perverts, who are damaged individuals, not per-
versions, like Freud. Nagel does not evaluate sex or sexual behaviour; on the 
contrary, he wants to identify some damaged persons. Finally, the point is not 
what people believe about perverted sex because Nagel has given an objective 
and scientific criterion for identifying perverts among us. Homosexuality is 
perverted sex if homosexuals can be shown to be damaged by a developmental 
trauma. SP may be a popular read but its basic tenet is sinister. SP condemns 
certain persons by naming those perverts, and this without offering even one 
thought to healing. It is not enough to say that a damaged individual can have 
good sex, as long as it is bad sex. And it is bad sex because perversion is at the 
same time a substantial and pejorative term. The last two pages of SP indicate 
that Nagel himself comes close to realizing these problems, but all he does is 
to put up a smokescreen.
 Conclusion: Anxious Desires
To conclude, let me quote two authors, first a self-confessed kinky person, a 
submissive woman, and the second, an author, scholar, and cultural critic. Ka-
cie Cunningham defends her own lifestyle as follows; I have a hard time imag-
ining a good counterargument.
So, are submissives born or made? The answer, as near as I can tell, is 
that submissives are, like all other people, created by the environment 
out of the raw material which is provided by nature. Some people would 
26 Nagel, 1979, p. 52.
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certainly like to claim that we are deviants, warped by childhood trauma, 
but I reject that. I say that we are what we are, regardless of how we got 
to be this way, and all that really matters is that we accept – and celebrate 
– ourselves.27
However, a counterargument can be suggested. What could it be and how to 
evaluate it? Jon Nuttall writes:
[T]here need be nothing wrong with sexual activity which is not normal. 
As I am using the term, to describe a sexual activity as perverted is to 
describe it as being other than what sex should be like and not simply 
other than what it is actually like. Perverted activities may or may not 
be  normal [...]; they are, however, activities which I want to single out as 
being wrong [...]. The term “perverted,” I suggest, is primarily a term to 
describe a person’s moral character.28
This is to say D/S is, or at least may be perverted and therefore morally wrong, 
hence Cunningham’s argument may look suspicious. However, to say that per-
versions are what sex should not be like, and then say that the should here is 
the moral should, looks so strange that we need not take is seriously. What I am 
worried about is that Nuttall’s book is a textbook. I do not think one can define 
perversion as sex that is morally wrong. The resulting list of perverted sexual 
desires will be too strange to be useful or even interesting. What Cunningham 
is saying is, leave me alone and let me live my life; certainly, the worst intrusion 
is to start asking whether she is an immoral character or not. Her own book 
provides ample proof to the effect that she is a good person.
Nuttall and Nagel reason in the same problematic way. What Nuttall should 
do is first to give an independent characterization of perverse sex, and then 
identify its typical features that make it morally wrong. But what he actually 
does is to define perversion as morally wrong and then classify all sexual de-
sires and practices as perverse and not perverse on that basis. I wonder what 
this classification would be like. I must confess I have no idea. We saw above 
that Nagel reasons in this way, too. Think of the wide definition of rape today. 
Would Nuttall really call all those who are condemned of rape in, say, Sweden 
perverts?
Ronald Pearsall writes in his remarkable book on Victorian sex and sexuality:
27 K. Cunningham, Conquer Me. Eugene, OR: Greenery Press, 2012, p. 12.
28 Nuttall, 1993, p. 76.
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Perversion is a word that has no final meaning. What might be a perver-
sion in one century can be normal in the following. It helps to consider 
it as a subjective term, denude it of its ethical overtones, and ask of a 
specific perversion: What physical harm it does? Then ask a subsequent 
question: What psychological harm does it do beyond satisfying the wish-
es of the protagonists?29 
Pearsall is right: it does not make sense to say that a satisfied desire or wish 
alone may constitute that kind of psychological harm against which any ethi-
cally responsible person should fight – in a paternalistic fashion. Certainly one 
should not harm others in the course of sexual play and one may want to be 
careful with pleasures that harm the person herself. But if she ardently desires 
something that she knows harms herself in a way that she does not desire, she 
needs psychiatric help. This is the only such case I can imagine. Think for in-
stance of cosmetic amputations. If one self-consistently wants them, the injury 
does not constitute harm to oneself. However, one may want the amputations 
when one does not accept the related injury, which entails harm to self. This 
leads to cognitive dissonance and in the long run to painful anxiety. Then it is 
mad to want cosmetic amputations, and perhaps, perhaps, perverted, too.
My conclusion is closely related to what Igor Primoratz says, namely, perver-
sion is a “concept best discarded.”30 If this is to say that the concept should be 
neither used nor mentioned, then we agree. Today we must not use or men-
tion racist terms and the same applies to perversion. The idea of perversion is 
subjective, culturally and historically relative, pejorative, essentially contested, 
and inherently discriminatory. Originally it is a hate concept. Moreover one 
should not assume it covers unethical behaviour, criminal action, or mental 
illness.
∵
29 R. Pearsall, The Worm in the Bud: The World of Victorian Sexuality. Harmondsworth: Peli-
can Books, 1971, p. 422; original italics.
30 I. Primoratz, Ethics and Sex. London: Routledge, 1999, p. 63. Incidentally, he says that 
M. de Sade discards the concept of perversion. This is not quite true because he discuss-
es sexual crimes (Les Crimes de l’Amour), and according to him, it is this that makes sex 
worthwhile. Vanilla sex is worthless.
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